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There are three distinct grand narratives of  Pakistan by Pakistanis: the first is an establishment narrative of  victimisation,  
defensiveness and denial. The second is the narrative of  the liberal elite, focusing on the need for socio-economic development of  a  
vast country of  180 million people. The third, radical Islamist narrative, sees Pakistan as an ideological enterprise under threat  
from the non-Islamic civilisations of  the West, Israel and India. These are not mutually exclusive, and it is not uncommon for an  
individual narrator making an argument using one of  these approaches to also draw upon threads of  arguments from the others.1
We have lost our plot. We are like tragic characters trying to find the story line in an absurd existentialist play. We have forgotten  
our narrative. Whether from self-imposed amnesia or a wistful yearning for 'normality', we are no longer able to articulate our  
remarkable story to ourselves or to the world. Those who say we must go 'beyond the conflict' to win the battle for international  
public opinion are half-right – of  course we should tell of  the stunning achievements of  modern Israel. But public diplomacy will  
not succeed until we can unabashedly declare the story of  who we are and why we are here. Google 'why should Israel exist' and  
most of  what pops up is vitriolic hate about why Israel shouldn’t. If  we are going to advocate for Israel, we must proactively and  
dramatically present the essential value that Israel stands for in the world and that frames all our actions and our efforts at self-
defense. That value is freedom.2
1 Cit. Pai, Nitin: Three grand narratives of  Pakistan. In: The Acorn, Takshashila Institution, 20 September 2011.
2 Cit. Helman, Shalom: Reclaiming Israel’s narrative of  freedom. In: Jerusalem Post, 14 August, 2010.
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1 Introduction
The subject of  this dissertation is the ideological contours of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan and the State 
of  Israel. This study argues that central defining elements within the inner organization and logic of  their rais­
on d'être combine the political dimension of  ideology – that is the transformation of  ideological orientations,  
beliefs and values – into the territoriality and historicity of  the state and a framework for a concrete political  
program with a nucleus of  religious, nationalist, statist3, militarist and ethnic orientations. These elements and 
their linkage to the modern nationalist doctrine of  state sovereignty arose from within the colonial context 4, 
but at the same time, had to become integrated into the framework that the historical and mythical 5 repertoire 
of  the past and especially its prolonged process of  Jewish and Muslim identity formation offered. Pakistan and  
Israel are considered ideological states. Here, the state as the ultimate crystallization of  political authority and 
sovereignty preceded the birth of  the nation with its twofold claim of  providing an identity and integration,  
and, thus, reversed the European nationalist experience with a new chronology characteristic for so many  
post-colonial states.6 The transformation of  the narrative of  the claim for freedom and self-expression into 
the concrete framework of  a state, denied for too long but finally recognized by the international community,  
marked the most radical event in both the “established” mainstream and the religious narratives. The rediscov­
ery of  the past and its particular cultural themes, symbols and claims entering the symbolic order of  the na ­
tion-state, intensified the struggle between contradicting elements that had already existed within the politic­
al-religious ideology of  the independence movement. Therefore, the core conflict within the state's framework  
was already there when the state came into being and did not change significantly through the more than six  
decades of  its existence. Such path dependency can be understood as the inability to change fundamental 
political patterns for external reasons and domestically automatized mechanisms. Hence, the thesis highlights 
an ongoing struggle whose present nature is about the relationship between state and society and the state's re­
3 Meaning the centrality of  the state within the nationalist discourse as the single supreme authority exercising political power and  
regulation strategies. See Migdal, Joel S./ Schlichte, Klaus (Ed.): Rethinking the State, p. 16ff. In: Schlichte, Klaus (Ed.): The Dy ­
namics of  States. The Formation and Crisis of  State Domination. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 1-40. Especially its image within 
the discourses of  religious groups shows that, broadly speaking, we can differentiate between a pro-state or statist orientation  
that highlights loyalty, identification and acceptance of  its legal authority, and, on the other side, an orientation that either refuses  
to accept the state's legitimacy totally or refuses only partial elements. Especially the religious connotation and interpretation of  
the state's existence evoked isolation from the mainstream public, delegitimization and forms of  both peaceful and violent resist ­
ance.  
4 In the case of  Israel, the period of  British mandatory power (1917-1948) on behalf  of  the League of  Nations (LoN) requires the 
notion of  its colonial dimension: In 1922, the LoN's charter emphasized the requirement of  facilitating Jewish immigration and 
settlement as well as the preservation of  the Arab population's rights. With the Balfour Declaration in 1917, one can state that  
during the Mandate, the Zionist project of  settlement was favored by the British on the one hand. On the other hand, Britain's  
„dual-obligation“ to mediate between Arab and Jewish interests in Palestine manifested largely in the context of  legal regulations  
for the acquisition of  land and resulted in the imposition of  a contingent colonial legal system based on Western colonial experi ­
ences that succeeded the Ottoman legal system. For a detailed discussion on the legal colonial dimension see Forman, Geremy/  
Kedar, Alexandre: Colonialism, Colonization and Land Law in Mandate Palestine: The Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya Land  
Disputes in Historical Perspective In: Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003, p. 491-539.
5 Political and policy myths with their substantial legitimizing and explanatory function were defined by Yanow as “a narrative cre ­
ated and believed by a group of  people which diverts attention away from a puzzling part of  their reality“, as “matter-of-fact  
statements, but they are 'immune to factual attack'” and as “social constructions rooted in a particular time and place, in a partic ­
ular culture. Myths are produced in response to the needs of  the moment.” Cit. Yanow, Dvora: Silences in Public Policy Dis ­
course: Organizational and Policy Myths, pp. 399/400. In: Journal of  Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 2, No. 4,  
1992, p. 399-423.
6 For the differentiation between both experiences of  political philosophy regarding statehood see Rejai, Mostafa / Enloe, Cynthia  
H.: Nation-States and State-Nations. In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1969, p. 140-158.
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ligious character7 and between liberal-universalist and nationalist-particularist orientations that similarly claim 
ownership over the nation's future development. Proponents of  both camps but especially the nationalist-par ­
ticularist have highlighted the prospective of  changing the status quo as inevitably endangering the political 
sovereignty of  the state, the territorial integrity of  the land and its physical borders, and the unity of  society.  
Here the fear of  a „division of  the nation“ and the notion of  an existentialist Kulturkampf  has been stressed.
Mainly the differences in their political structures were commonly seen as the obstacle for a viable cross-
country comparison. This has been the mainly the case with regard to the two distinct traditions of  democratic  
tradition with Israel upholding its stable parliamentary system despite significant influence on the political pro­
cess and especially its foreign affairs by the military. Pakistan, in contrast, only has a short historical experience  
with democratic institutionalism for which the military's frequent interventions were seen as the main obstacle. 
However, Pakistan and Israel as post-colonial states8 share common concepts in regard of  state and nation just 
as in regard of  civic and religious identity discourses. The creation of  a secular space for a religious com­
munity formulated a civic identity of  its citizens as a religious and nationalist synthesis. In addition, they show 
significant parallels within those historic processes which brought them into existence in 1947 and 1948 and  
thus shall provide an adequate comparative dimension. In spite of  the secular visions of  their founding fath­
ers, a fertile ground based on religion and surrogate religious forms provided the appropriate cultural basis for 
nation- and land-oriented ideologies. Ironically, both founding fathers who had been styled posthumously as 
bridge-builders between traditional religion and modern secular nationalism or even in messianic terms, had 
been confronted by the orthodoxy for their non-observant lifestyle and their atheist orientation.9 In a context 
of  inter-communal violence, both states came into existence with a two-fold legacy: To create a secure home­
land for a ethnic-religious community which was convinced that its political, economic and cultural develop­
ment – or its very existence – was threatened by a majority which neglected its equal rights and sovereignty. 
Furthermore, the justification to gain political and territorial sovereignty was enshrined in a concrete ideologic­
al agenda that intertwined religious teleology and metaphysical sanctions underlining the nationalist imperative 
for freedom and self-expression. It also provided very concrete structural contours for the new state whereas 
the role of  the religious philosophy and its implementation in the state system after independence was not  
clearly defined. What is more, the state, in order to gain specific political outcomes and to accommodate the 
religious sectors, revitalized religion and implemented “theo-politics”10 on the state level as a superimposition 
or institutionalization of  religion. In the course of  research it became obvious that inter-linkages between  
paradigms within state ideology, in both cases, sharpened configurations of  class differences as well as ethnic  
belongingness. As a result they partially overlap with the religious dimension. The issue of  religion remained a 
7 Especially with regard to its intersections with nationalism being “suffused with the religious.” See Friedland, Roger: Religious 
Nationalism and the Problem of  Collective Representation. In: Annual Review of  Sociology, Vol. 27, 2001, p. 125-152.
8 “Post-colonial”, as for Israel, applies to the Mandatory period as a semi-colonial collective experience which includes clear an­
ti-British stances shared by a majority living in the pre-state Yishuv. Furthermore, the conflict between the British army and Jew­
ish militias has been a main element in the state's founding narrative as a war of  liberation and has been interpreted in terms of  
anti-colonial resistance.
9 While Jinnah with regard to his Shī a descend kept a low profile in public and referred to Islam only in generalizing terms, Ben-ʿ
Gurion was suspicious to the Jewish Orthodox circles for his openly displayed cynicism towards the religious issue in Palestine.
10 See Zucker, Norman L.: The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973.
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focal point and main societal cleavage between proponents of  a secular option and those who claimed the  
state to be religious.11 This resulted in today's status quo which in principle did not change significantly during  
the last decades. Although there is enormous uncertainty about future trends in both countries that had ac­
quired new geostrategic importance post 9/11 and subsequent developments, the religious factor is and will  
remain a central determinant domestically and regionally.
This thesis argues that, in the historic genesis of  both states, fragmentation and regional disparities have 
drastically increased as a result of  failed integration of  state ideology on a national basis of  which religion had  
been the main mobilizing force within the project of  independence driven by the elites. While it has been 
claimed that on the institutional level, both states are partially not underdeveloped but in fact overdeveloped,12 
the vacuum created by the state's failure to reach society at grass-roots level and obtain consent has been filled 
by counter narratives provided by identity politics and communalism represented by religious-political groups 
and parties. Here the thesis challenges a popular focus on ideology and suggests that diverse, religiously and 
ethnically defined affinity groups have interests that are represented in particular ways in weak state circum ­
stances.
The other central – if  not the most central – element of  ideology and state culture in Pakistan and Israel  
emphasizes the sociopolitical and cultural complex of  security and insecurity. The perception of  facing an ex­
istential threat enabled the state, from the very beginning of  its existence, to implement policies that concen­
trated on the domains of  foreign affairs, diplomacy, military and security. While the “praetorian model” of  
statehood concentrates primarily on defense economies, „securitization“ of  a state ideology is here presented 
as a concept that allows the inclusion of  nation building processes in order to reconsider the important role  
that society plays within the formation and consolidation of  security states. Discussing the variety of  ingredi­
ents of  state ideology, this study aims to illustrate political outcomes and behavior within the framework that 
Israeli-Jewish Zionism and Pakistani Muslim nationalism provide while claiming and legitimizing their hege­
mony on the basis of  an exceptionalism.
The paradigm of  national security, in which wars and conflict-centered foreign relations dramatically gained  
momentum in Israel and Pakistan, are, from that perspective, no exceptions. Here confrontations served as 
catalysts for the particularist-nationalist interpretation of  the state's character while in times that were determ ­
ined by more peaceful relations with their neighborhood, the universalist-liberal orientation was strengthened 
and paralleled by the state's intensified integrative orientation towards the international community and its  
norms. With regard to its international status, the first orientation considers the state's victimization by its en ­
emies as inevitable and deeply rooted in the nation's historicized exceptionalism. With this orientation high­
lighting a people's struggle for survival and post-independence national history as a logical succession of  mar­
ginalization, persecution and non-acceptance by its hostile neighbor-states, conflict has been framed as a cos­
mic battle separated from restrictions of  time and space. Thus, as a result and in the sense of  Spengler's idea  
11 The Chapters 5 and 6 will show that political-religious orientations contain a variety of  groups and that the secular-religious 
cleavage is overlapping with inner-religious cleavages and discourses.
12 See Kühn, Florian P.: Less is more: International intervention and the limits of  external stabilization, pp. 62/63, 71. In: Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011, p. 62-74. 
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of  “national destiny”, the state tends to fortify its ideological narrative and to frame its (foreign) policies in the  
framework history has set for it even at the cost of  decline of  its international standing.13
Both states are so present in the international public debate since they share a similar security dilemma 14 
and essential security needs and because of  the central role they play within their local, regional and global se ­
curity context which includes the stake they have in the most prominent contemporary conflicts, peace negoti­
ations and also in the context of  new asymmetric forms of  conflict. This development indicates two out ­
comes: With regard to their local and regional environment, largely perceived as neutral or hostile, the continu­
ation of  threat perceptions enabled the states to develop large military resources, high defense budgets, politic­
al and economic power and, on a social basis, acceptance by society. Internally, the external threat generated  
those conditions of  national emergency that allowed the military establishment to develop a dominant posi­
tion in state and society both in terms of  political discursive power, for instance as a co-formulator of  foreign  
policy and as the “school for the nation” but also in terms of  its ability to frame its actions as ideological im­
peratives deeply rooted in the countries' history. 
1.1 The State, integrative Ideologies and Statism
The process of  official identity and cohesion building follows a top-down model with the central state and its 
power elites, being keen to emphasize common shared values, historical traditions and an identity of  citizen­
ship in order to create an authentic unity (immaterial factors).15 As a whole, these nationalist ideal goal represents 
the state's symbolic capital, separated from their material precondition factors such as a welfare system, security, law 
and order.16 Another conception of  the state highlights existing theories on boundaries. Here, society is politic­
ally defined as the community living inside a state's physical territorial borders. As a „national society“ it is rep ­
resented by an organization which is the state. Since practically all nation states in the world are consisting of  
people and groups that define themselves on the basis of  different languages, history, culture or ethnic origin, 
„state leaders have sought to make the image of  representation of  society real by molding the motley people  
of  the territory into a single people, capable of  singular representation.“ 17 Accordingly, the state is interpreted 
as a political and social process rather than a static complex. Representing governmental authority, state leaders  
aimed at creating a social unity by trying to establish a „natural“ society that shares common beliefs, values and 
political orientations towards the state. Migdal and Schlichte emphasize that these attempts usually originate 
13 In “The Decline of  the West” (1918) Spengler saw the rise and decline of  civilizations or of  their associated organic nations as  
an inevitable self-fulfillment of  their destiny. This influential break with the linear weltanschauung on history and especially Spen­
gler's intensive reference to the territorial component of  a nation's spirit had been adapted by nationalist movements and, as is  
well known, by the Nazi elites and the Italian fascists. For the discussion of  the concept in the framework of  radical religious  
Zionist thought and especially its pro-state oriented  mamlachti  stream see Fischer, Shlomo: Self-Expression and Democracy in 
Radical Religious Zionist Ideology. Unpubl. PhD thesis, submitted at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, January 2007, p. 52-67,  
410-414.
14 For instance geostrategic vulnerability through a lack of  strategic depth, the dependency on support by the US and the safety and 
the operational readiness of  the deterrence capabilities of  their nuclear arsenals play a significant role in the military and strategic  
doctrinal setup of  both states.
15 See for instance Heinrich, Wolfgang / Kulessa, Manfred: Deconstruction of  States as an Opportunity for New Statism? The Ex­
ample of  Somalia and Somaliland, p. 58. In: Hippler, Jochen (Ed.): Nation-Building. A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Trans ­
formation? London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 57-69.
16 Ibid.
17 Cit. Migdal / Schlichte, 2005, p. 18.
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from a view on society in which the state feels obligated to „develop“, support, control and – to some extent,  
often followed by resistance from society – to „modernize“ a society.18 National narratives of  de-colonializa­
tion that arose in Asia, Africa and Latin America as a selected variant out of  many 19, and as a “last wave” of  
European nationalism20, include an indigenous element that gained momentum during colonial rule since the  
local colonial elites adapted their rulers' legitimation of  power in terms of  mindsets of  differentiation like eth­
nic superiority, the “utopian idea of  apolitical politics” such as politics of  education, moral guardianship and  
civilizing mission.21 
Duncker, referring to Gadamer's critique of  objectivity, offers a definition of  ideology as "a system of  ideas 
that rises from the explicit or implicit claim to absolute truth, that is to say, that comes from an objectivist-de ­
formed consciousness."22 This definition attempts to go beyond the problem of  definitional fixation and al­
lows adequate operationalization of  the term “ideology”, by not denying the possibility of  objective truth but  
to uncover distortions in the relationship of  consciousness and a society. Ideology, understood as an intellectu ­
al bloc of  power, core symbols (symbolic capital), values and beliefs surrounded by less fixed elements, is subjec­
ted to the interpretation and communication by power elites to others. While the inner core of  an ideology 
might be hard to change, it is much easier to modify its external elements.
However, the academic approach towards ideologies as interwoven side-constructs of  a political doctrine  
proved to be inconsistent within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of  thought as it arose in the 1950s. Ideology as the  
expression of  a totalitarian mentality, resistant to any political debate and the formation of  a pluralistic society, 
became broadly identified with the rise of  the grand ideologies of  the 20 th century. Ernest Gellner sees ideolo­
gies as an element and extension of  nationalism as it arose prominently in Italy and Germany. 23 For others, the 
“end of  history” initially began with he failure of  national socialism and the consolidation of  participative sys­
tems and increasing economic and social growth in Western democracies. Nevertheless and despite its broad 
reception (and its critique) Fukuyama's theory of  an evolutionary degradation of  ideology – quite similar to 
Bell's “end of  ideology”24 – remained an utopia.25 In a more general approach has ideology been described in 
terms of  its embodied values on the individual level:
[…] ideologies are bodies of  concepts, values and symbols which incorporate conceptions of  human nature and 
thus indicate what is possible or impossible for humans to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of  human  
18 Ibid.
19 Illustrative in the case of  the variety of  Zionisms is the short essay by Jehoschua, Abraham B.: Die Zionistische Revolution – 
Hat sie eine Fortsetzung? In: Dachs, Gisela (Ed.): Jüdischer Almanach der Leo Baeck Institute. Identitäten. Frankfurt a. M.:  
Jüdischer Verl. / Suhrkamp, 2009, p. 67-77.
20 Based on Anderson's concept of  nationalism and especially its late localized version in the non-European world. See Anderson, 
Benedict: Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts. Berlin: Ullstein, 1998, p. 100-121.
21 See Osterhammel's important works on the relationship between rulers and ruled and de-colonization. For instance Osterham ­
mel, Jürgen: Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen. München: C. H. Beck, 1995, p. 112-124.
22 Cit. Duncker, Christian: Kritische Reflexionen des Ideologiebegriffes: Zur Bedeutung der Ideologien für den Menschen. London: 
Turnshare, 2006, p. 34. In addition the website and the blog of  the research group Ideologieforschung are highly recommended. See 
Ideologie-Report. See also Walter, Lammi: The Relevance of  Hermeneutics to the Study of  Ideology (paper). AUC, N. d.
23 See Gellner, Ernest: Nationalism. New York: New York Univ. Press, 1997, p. 62. 
24 See Bell, Daniel: The End of  Ideology. On the Exhaustion of  Political Ideas in the Fifties. Glencoe: Free Press, 1960.
25 See Fukuyama, Francis: Das Ende der Geschichte. München: Kindler, 4 th Ed., 1992. See also Bracher, Karl Dietrich: Zeit der 
Ideologien. Eine Geschichte politischen Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart: DVA, 1982, p. 12.
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interaction; the values which humans ought either to reject or apire to, and the correct technical arrangements  
for social, economic and political life which will meet the needs and interests of  human beings.26
On a functional level ideologies utilize varying strategies when constructing value and symbol oriented frames.  
In this process they are not necessarily simplifying propaganda. Moreover, they can allow for complexity, e.g.  
in sciences or philosophy. With regard to the nucleus of  an ideology one has to differentiate between an ar ­
guing-fundamental and a pragmatic-operative sphere. Fundamental values, norms of  belief, morality and typi­
fication of  ideologies and their legitimacy require the demand for concrete individual or collective action ac­
cording to the framework given by the fundamental ideology.27 
According to Vincent, “ideologies are complex structures of  discourse which carry immense amounts of  
inherited, interwoven intellectual baggage, often increasing by the year. Every ideology is therefore a conjunc­
tion of  intellectual hybrids.”28 The competition of  varying drafts represents an inner discourse in which each 
ideology is claimed to stand for absolute truth and, similar to a religious belief, for purity in terms of  a doc ­
trine.29 They formulate imperatives for political ideas30 and serve as frameworks of  reference for political ac­
tion31, together  with an emphasis on how political outcomes and political power as such are justified.32 The 
functional dimension of  legitimation is here relevant due to this thesis' focus on the concrete organization of  
rule and political power in the state and modes of  interaction between its institutions:
Relations of  domination may be established and sustained […] by being represented as legitimate, that is, as just  
and worthy of  support. The representation of  relations of  domination as legitimate may be regarded as a claim to  
legitimacy which is based on certain grounds, expressed in certain symbolic forms and which may, in given cir­
cumstances, be more or less effective.33
This process finds its manifestations on the Indian Subcontinent after partition where the cultivcation of  the 
IndoPak antagonism with its idioms of  Indian “secular nationalism” and Pakistani “religious communalism” 
enabled separation and distinctiveness to become the dominant regional narrative. Such antagonisms require  
the definition and location of  „the other“, before „the self“ can be constructed as something fundamentally 
different: “Secularism had become India's raison d'être, whereas the two nations theory was much of  the same 
for Pakistan. For that reason, any discourse on Pakistan's identity as a nation or state refers – implicitly or ex ­
plicitly – to its Indian counterpart. Pakistan 'lives' vis-à-vis India.”34 Similarly, Israel's political reality is inevit­
ably identified as being linked to its relationship with its Arab neighborhood in the light of  the hegemonic nar ­
rative of  the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like on the Indian subcontinent before partition, images of  the enemy 
26 Cit. Vincent, Andrew: Modern Political Ideologies. Oxford (a.o.): Blackwell, 2 nd Ed., 1995, p. 16. Alternatively, the Oxford dic­
tionary offers the following definition: „Any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of  ideas by which a social group makes  
sense of  the world (..). An ideology needs to provide some explanation of  how things have come to be as they are (..).” Cit.  
McLean, Ian/ McMillan, Alistair (Eds.): The Concise Oxford dictionary of  Politics, 2nd Ed., Oxford, 2003.
27 See Vincent, 1995, p. 16-18.
28 Cit. Ibid., pp. 18/19.
29 See Bracher, 1982, p. 17.
30 See Ibid., p. 13.
31 See Vincent, 1995, p. 19.
32 See Giesen, Klaus-Gerd (Ed.): Ideologien in der Weltpolitik. Wiesbaden: VS-Verl., 2004, p. 10. In Marxist terms, in the sense of  
Antiono Gramsci and Anthony Giddens, an ideology can be interpreted as a part of  hegemony which in the struggle about  
meaning is challenged by counter hegemonies.
33 Cit. Thompson, John B.: Ideology and Modern Culture. Critical Social Theory in the Era of  Mass Communication. Stanford:  
Stanford Press, 1990, p. 61.
34 Cit. Wilke, Boris: Boundaries of  State and Military in Pakistan, p. 189. In: Schlichte, 2005, p. 183-210.
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were formed within the colonial context during the British mandate and in the framework of  the Yishuv's land-
oriented policy that clashed with local Arab interests. 
1.2 Religious Representation and Self-Expression in the Political Culture
In contrast to the state of  Israel, often considered to be “an island of  stability in a turbulent Middle East” with  
strong state institutions and a stable democratic political system, Pakistan seems to be trapped in a failing or 
failed state narrative since its inception. However, few authors stated that Pakistan does not apply as a lost  
state.35 It had been demonstrated that some institutions such as the army and the civil service are in fact over­
developed and strong, even at times of  crisis and fragility.36 Among the sectors that profit most from the weak­
ness of  the political institutions, Wilke sees religious parties as the “parallel” institutions of  society that are  
deeply involved in domains in which the state is underrepresented.37 Their ability to offer public resources and 
competitive systems of  social services like education and welfare centralizes their position within society. Giv­
en the fundamental changes and social differentiation within the religious field – fragmentation, inner group  
dynamics, internationalization and popularization of  religion, e.g. through da wa ʿ (missionary activities) organiz­
ations, merging of  religious and political groups – the religious parties represent a distinctive sphere: 
In these societies, this differentiation was manifested in the development of  (1) the religious field or sphere as  
distinct and autonomous from other institutional spheres in the society; (2) specific religious organizations and 
roles; and (3) several types of  religious orientations emphasizing the autonomy of  religious values and activities 
vis-à-vis other institutional spheres of  the society.38 
As a part of  this institutional autonomy from the state39, the “religious experts”40, many of  whom were edu­
cated dually in religious and secular institutions of  learning, are located at the mergers of  tradition and mod­
ernity as important mediating agents of  change.41 The religious authorities enjoy privileged access to authorit­
ative religious knowledge.42 They interpret, transmit and accommodate changes in their societies and states.43 
35 See Kühn, 2011; Cohen, Stephen: The Nation and the State of  Pakistan. In: Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, 2002, p. 109-122;  
Wilke, 2005, p. 183-210; Lieven, Anatol: Pakistan. A Hard Country. London (a.o.): Allen Lane, 2011.
36 With regard to the army, a former Swedish Ambassador stated: “The nuclear weapons are, by all accounts, well protected by the  
armed forces, with very little say from the civilian setup. The army is not dysfunctional – it is in fact overfunctional. Where  
people are undernourished, the army is well fed; where people are illiterate, the army is well educated; where people are crowded  
in slums, the army has lots of  green grass at its disposal. The army is also known for its discipline. It is not in the Pakistani army  
that extremists start shooting indiscriminately at their colleagues – it is in the US army.” Cit. Wilkens, Ann: Smoke Gets in Your  
Eyes. Pakistan in 2010. Afghanistan Analysts Network Policy Briefing No. 1, 2010, p. 7.
37 See Wilke, Boris: Die religiösen Kräfte in Pakistan. Dynamik von Politik und Religion in der Weltgesellschaft. In: SWP-Studie,  
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Berlin, 2006, p. 8.
38 Cit. Eisenstadt, S. N.: Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities. Leiden (a.o.): Brill, 2003, p.61ff.
39 “[...] a critical variable in accounting for the ability of  its agents to promote their state vision”, according to Friedland. Cit. Fried­
land, 2001, p. 144. 
40 Cit. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim: The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Custodians of  Change. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004,  
p. 189.
41 See Hartung, Jan-Peter: Reinterpretation von Tradition und der Paradigmenwechsel der Moderne. Abū’ l-A‘ lā Maudūdī und die  
Jamā‘at-i Islāmī, p. 108. In: Reetz, 2001, p. 107-126; Reetz, Dietrich/ Liebau, Heike (Eds.): Globale Prozesse und „Akteure des  
Wandels“. Quellen und Methoden ihrer Untersuchung. Ein Werkstattgespräch, Arbeitshefte ZMO, Vol. 14. Berlin:  Verl. Das 
Arab. Buch, 1997.
42 This includes what Zaman calls the new religious intelligentsia without proper traditional religious or philosophical education  
and the authority of  intermediaries which stay in between a “lumpen-intelligentsia” and “pro-western” or western-oriented intel ­
lectuals. See Zaman, 2004, p. 1. 
43 See Geertz, Clifford: Religion as a Cultural System, p. 14ff. In: Banton, Michael (Ed.): Anthropological Approaches to the Study 
of  Religion. London: Tavistock Publ., 1966, p. 1-46. For the role of  the rabbi in society see Knobel, Peter S.: Rabbi. An Inter ­
preter of  Religious Experience, p. 47ff. In: Central Conference of  American Rabbis: Rabbinic Authority, Yearbook. N. p.: 1982,  
p. 47-54; Zaman, 2004, p. 189.
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However, in the course of  change, their authority has been challenged by the modern bureaucratic state that 
attempted to bring all spheres of  public life under its regulation. Religious newcomers and popularized ver ­
sions of  religion contributed to a process of  transformation for their “anti-intellectualism” and the general  
problem of  illiteracy and lack of  readership.44 The complexity of  hierarchies, alliances, loyalties and enmities 
within the religious sector is further increased by the interconnections between religious leaders that are associ­
ated with the establishment and those who are considered “peripheral” for their distance to the establishment 
or critique against existing conditions. In Pakistan and Israel alike, this becomes apparent when high-level  
scholars with postures in ministries or government support the initiatives by low-ranking authorities intellectu­
ally.45
Here, it seems adequate to point out to the crisis of  leadership that is felt throughout all social classes in  
both countries and which is also bemoaned by the political and religious sectors. To begin with the former, at 
present, the ruling government of  Pakistan under Asif  Ali Zardari as well as his preceding regimes have lost  
the hearts and minds not only of  the masses but also the much needed support from the civil-bureaucracy, the  
military and civil-society leaders. Time and again disappointed by the inconsistency of  a sociopolitical system  
of  power relying on kinship, nepotism and corruption, the country's majority is alienated and excluded from  
the political process. Mass poverty, illiteracy and the social divide, guaranteed because of  the persistence of  
feudal structures of  power and the lack of  national integration, contribute to socioeconomic marginalization. 46 
Subsequent national pathways designed and experimented with by Pakistan's regimes – be it Islamic Socialism, 
Islamization or Enlightened Moderation – were unable to meet the basic needs of  the country and its society 
and hence finally failed. The collective experience of  declinism and crisis goes hand in hand with a lack of  reli ­
able leadership, enforcing the well-articulated consensual desire for charismatic, visionary and pragmatic new 
national leading figures. The decline of  leadership is also felt with regard to religious authority. With few ex­
ceptions, those religious groups of  India that were formed during the end of  colonial rule when large seg ­
ments of  Muslim society were politicized in the 1920's, entered elections and politics on the shoulders of  their 
leading personalities. This was massively the case during the rule of  Ayub Khan when they formed the non-
political oppositional camp and from the 1970 elections onwards. Irrespectively of  their electoral power, the 
passing of  their great leaders – Mufti Mahmud of  JUI in 1980, JUP's Shah Ahmad Nurani (2003), the JI with 
44 Roy writes: “The issue is not about writers but about readers. Why are reformists so little read? Do literacy or censorship or  
wealth explain this paradox? […] There is among all religious revivalist movements of  the late twentieth century a widespread  
anti-intellectualism that favours a more emotional religiosity, linked with individualism and with the crisis of  intellectual authority.  
Charismatic Christian movements, as well as the Jewish Lubavitch, explicitly propose an alternative to an intellectualized faith.  
They play on emotion through rituals and collective expressions of  faith, using symbolic and ostensible markers of  belonging to  
a community (such as the candle-lighting for the Lubavitch). […] Born-again believers have an obvious contempt for intellectual­
ism. Feelings are more important than knowledge. An enjoyment of  faith, a pleasure in belief, in being in touch with God are  
clearly manifested. Religious meetings are like festivals in that this religiosity is modern, based on the idea that the self  is at the  
centre of  religion. The self  and hence the individual is at the core of  religiosity. Faith is personal, faith is the truth. Faith is not  
religion.” Cit. Roy, Olivier: Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah. New Delhi: Rupa, 2005, pp. 30/31.
45 See Zaman, 2004, p. 171ff.
46 “Another major consequence of  poor leadership has been that Pakistan has been unable to build and sustain a diversified and vi ­
brant economy; the agricultural system which should have been the backbone of  growth from Independence onwards has been  
unable to live up to its promise. The stutters and starts of  the manufacturing industry are well known and the financial sector al ­
though well managed is fragile due to overall economic issues facing the country. Pakistan is heavily indebted and has little to  
show for it. The people are poor, marginalized and humiliated and the Taliban insurgency has taken a heavy toll on national con ­
fidence.” Cit. Hafiz, Saad: Pakistan. Failure of  Leadership. In: Pak Tea House, 14 March, 2011.
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the death of  Maulana Maududi (1979) and the Shi'a with the assassination of  Arif  Husayn al-Husayni (1988) – 
brought a serious set-back. These leaders combined traditional Islamic education and personal charisma, to­
gether with the dynastic authority, based on their descendant from prominent families of  eminent scholars,  
Sufis or the socioeconomic elites. Some of  them might have been even more than outstanding leaders in the 
eyes of  their followers. Evolving messianic cults styled the personality of  Shah Ahmad Nurani with the image  
of  a prophetic mahdī, “the perfect leader (murshid-e kāmil)”, as a “saviour who will lead the people from dark­
ness to light and who prevents all evil due to his aura”.47 To this day, Jewish communities worldwide perceive 
the Lubavitcher Rebbe who died in 1994, as a mediator between his fellow habadniks, the world and god, and 
as “a prophet in our time” who “has urged us to prepare for the imminent revelation of  the Messiah by ob ­
serving the Seven Noahide Commandments given by God through Moses at Mount Sinai”. 48 Although the 
Habad-Lubavitch movement is still split with regard to its last rabbi who yet during lifetime, was seen as the hid­
den  messiah by one faction.  Followers  of  this  stream, display their  believe that  Rebbe Menachem Mendel  
Schneerson did not  mamash49 (really, truly) physically pass away, with yellow pins on its clothes, a yellow flag 
with a crown and the word moshiah50 (Messiah) and an empty chair at congregations, and represent a dominant 
group within the movement. Both these cases stand apart since Nurani and the Lubavitcher not only served as  
the iconic leading figures for their movements but also because of  their propagation of  a new millennium, that  
will restore contemporary order and will provide the basis for a new just and equal society,51 similar to the 
Judeo-Christian references to the “kingdom of  heaven” (Malkuth HaShamayim).52 
This is also why a historical long-term analysis of  religious parties is necessary in order to identify those  
political organizations that consistently touch on religious or nationalist values and ideas when creating their  
agenda and legitimize the concept of  leadership and their own spiritual leaders by means of  their traditional  
religious education, rather than political competencies and leadership skills.53 However, the shifting of  focus 
and ideological orientations of  religious political parties and partisan groups displays changing perceptions of  
the state: The religious forces analyzed in this study, though by far not all of  them, show a commitment to the 
state's ideology that, in many cases, seems to be even higher than that of  other political forces. This is surpris ­
47 Cit. Malik, Jamal: The Luminous Nurani: Charisma and Political Mobilisation among the Barelwis in Pakistan, p. 46. In: Werbner,  
Pnina (Ed.): Person, Myth and Society in South Asian Islam. Social Analysis. Journal of  Cultural and Social Practice, Special Is ­
sue, 1990, p. 38-50.
48 Cit. Habad: Flyer a). N. d..
49 Integral part of  Habad's messianic theology is the excessive use of  codes and kabbalistic symbols. The term mamash is essential 
for those who believe that Menachem Mendel Schneerson is still alive and hidden but not visible to humanity due to a worldwide 
lack of  spirituality, for it includes his name's initial letters. 
50 The flag symbolized the beginning of  the messianic era and collective redemption, a kingdom of  peace, harmony and unity  
among the Jews with the Third Temple to be (re-)build. 
51 Nurani's vision of  a future society aimed primarily at delegitimize the PPP government, presented as responsible for all evil and  
misfortunes in Pakistan, and was therefore a vague political agenda but with the notion of  nizām-i mustafā, it included a clear reli­
gious outlook of  this future society. See Malik, 1990, p. 42-45.
52 Or "the world to come" (Olam ha-ba) and “God's Kingdom” (Malkuta de-Adonai). See Def. In Jewish Encyclopedia: Kingdom of  
God. Online version of  the 1906 Ed.
53 “Religious nationalist parties initially appear to be products of  a politically expedient and easy synthesis between two competing  
ideologies and venues to depict ideal societies: nationalism and religion. However, the intricate relationship between nationalism 
and religion, which includes both tenets of  rejection and dependency, makes this combination anything but an easy ideological  
coupling.” Cit. Tepe, Sultan: Beyond Sacred and Secular. Politics of  Religion in Israel and Turkey. Stanford: Stanford Press, 2008, 
p. 106. On the religious parties, a paper with preliminary findings has been produced during research for this thesis. See Gaier,  
Malte: Religious Parties in the Political Systems of  Pakistan and Israel. In: Atlantic Community, 28 March, 2011.
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ing when reconsidering the strong religious opposition against government initiatives throughout subsequent 
phases of  national history with state interventions into the domain of  the religious educational sector, taxation  
and funding. In other words, whenever the state tried to change what can be subsumed as the “status quo”, it  
evoked religious resistance. On the other hand, with regard to the state's security mission, the religious sector  
plays an important role as a upholder of  the state's ideology and his nationalist self-image.54
Focusing on the political history of  Pakistan and Israel, religious organizations and activists are involved  
not only in issues restricted to purely religious disputes, but they have testified their ability to mobilize particu­
lar sectors of  society on religious, ethnic and political grounds. Especially the ethnic factor in combination 
with a religious agenda brought by a new dynamic in the political systems of  Pakistan and Israel. Given an ex­
clusive setup of  both political communities and their institutions that was maintained in essence and consolid ­
ated the political dominance by one ethno-national group – Ashkenazi Jews linked to secular Zionism in Israel  
and in Pakistan old Punjubi families more liberal in their Islamic tradition and stemming from the urban salari ­
at class and the military – was challenged by the engagement of  new competitors on the political scene. Exem­
plary is in the Israeli case the rise of  the Sephardi Guardians of  the Torah (Shas) during the 1980's as the reaction 
of  the Sephardi minority to a social, economic and scholarly marginalization in the Israeli State. However, it  
was a generation of  young rabbis, stemming predominantly from a Middle Eastern Sephardi milieu whose split  
from the Ashkenazi mother party Agudat Yisrael was basically induced by scholarly arguments and sectarian dis­
putes. Their claim of  restoring the 'Sephardi crown to its ancient glory' ought primarily to restore the prestige  
of  the Sephardi seminaries and Torah schools (yeshivot), rather than to create a political platform to represent a 
'Sephardi identity' – a term that had in fact never been used in Israel before Shas entered the political com­
munity. In Pakistan, the political organization of  the Deobandi,  Jam‘iyyat-e ‘Ulama’-e Islam, together with the 
Jama'at-i Islami, the self-proclaimed “Vanguard of  the Islamic Revolution” and three other religious parties rep ­
resenting the  Shī aʿ ,  the Barelwis and the  Ahl-e-Hadith formed the political  alliance  Muttahida Majlis-e  Amal  
(MMA). The results of  the 2002 national and provincial elections of  about 18 percent for the MMA that took 
over the government in the NWFP and participated in the Baluchistan government, was based on an intensive 
mobilization of  ethnic identities in the border area, namely the Pakhtuns. From the very beginning, the Pakh­
tun society became victimized by the warfrom the beginning of  Operation Enduring Freedom55 (October 2001) in­
volved in the war against the US Army in Afghanistan, mainly by victimization, therefore, anti-American re­
sentments that were still strong were systematically revitalized by the religious-parties in combination with the 
religious card of  the game claiming Islam being in danger. In this case, as well as in the Israeli case, the disin ­
tegration of  religion is equalized with the collapse of  national sovereignty or as the hampering of  identity and 
nation building.
54 Malik underlines this important factor that contributed to Nurani's popularity not only among his followers and theologians 
from other schools of  thought, but also with regard to government, the political elite and the military: “He can be considered a  
prototype of  the new political-religious leader, displaying features like a claimed descent from the founding Muslims, affiliation  
to Islamic centres, political and religious charisma, initiation into different Sufi orders, missionary activities, migration, formal as 
well as theological education and familiarity with different languages, as well as the acceptance of  the new ideology of  national ­
ism.” Cit. Malik, 1990, p. 40.
55 Originally coded „Operation Infinite Justice”, it was renamed and launched on 7 October, 2001, with massive air-to-ground  
strikes on Taliban hideouts including high civilian casualties. See for instance Lambeth, Benjamin S.: Air Power against Terror.  
America's Conduct of  Operation Enduring Freedom. Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute/ Random Corp., 2005.
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Generally, religious parties fulfill all those legal conditions that apply to secular political parties and are in 
terms of  analysis structurally not distinct from political parties.56 Therefore, they participate in the civic culture 
and have to accommodate their program with the principles of  political legitimacy – especially the religious  
component of  a state's ideology – to which they frequently refer. Due to the paradigm of  the State of  Israel as 
a Jewish state on the basis of  its Jewish cultural and religious heritage no secular political party would distance  
itself  from the religious symbolism which is materialized in various official ceremonies and rituals in the Israeli 
political arena. With the exception of  the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox party Agudat Yisrael (today's alliance United  
Torah Judaism) no party that identifies itself  at least to a certain extent with religion, would not label itself  as 
“super-Zionist”57 and as loyal to state and nation. The case of  Agudat Yisrael is exceptional since the party and 
its Council of  Torah Sages refuses the Zionist State of  Israel but holds seats in the Knesset. Some functionar­
ies lead ministries, but under the title of  a Deputy Minister which expresses the maximum of  commitment to  
the Zionist state, the haredim are willing to show.58 In Pakistan, the same phenomenon can be observed when 
ethnic-nationalist parties that distanced themselves in the past from Islamic phrases, increasingly refer to Is­
lamic values and traditions and share their expressions in public life, e.g. when leaders of  political parties like  
the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)59, a party that promoted to rights of  the Indian Muslim immigrants to 
Pakistan (muhajirun) after Partition in 1947, join the Shī aʿ  processions at the occasion of  Muharram60. The reli­
gious repertoire is activated not only by parties that are traditionally supposed to be religious and originate  
from a religious school of  thought with a specific ideology. Rather, secular parties accumulate religious ele ­
ments within the field of  political competition as a source of  legitimacy in a civic culture that is strongly influ­
enced by religious values.61 It is, as Marty puts it, the “religio-secular” world that is “neither exclusively secular  
not exclusively religious, but rather a complex combination of  both the religious and the secular, with religious  
and secular phenomenon occurring at the same time in individuals, in groups, and in societies” 62. In return, re­
ligious political groups accumulate secular elements while promoting a doctrinaire religious agenda. This is due 
to the secular electoral rules of  political participation and necessary to open the ranks of  a party platform for 
members and supporters of  other religious, political and social milieus and to mobilize them as voters in order  
56 See Rosenblum, Nancy L.: Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of  Liberal Democratic Thought,.  
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23-53. Nevertheless, social sciences and political studies did not  
focus very intensively on religious-political parties despite lively academic debate on religion and religious identities per se and  
their linkage to the debate on multiculturalism. See Schuster, Anke: Religious Political Parties: A Gap in Multicultural Theories.  
Paper, Workshop “Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict”, Durham, 21-23 March, 2007.
57 Interview with Rabbi Nissim Ze'ev, Founder Shas, Jerusalem, 4 January, 2010. 
58 MK Yaakov Litzman, former chairman of  the Finance Committee of  Knesset serves as a Deputy Minister for Health in the cur ­
rent Netanyahu cabinet. The decision, not to take an oath to the state as a minister, reflects the position of  the Rabbis of  the  
Ger dynasty. Litzman follows Rebbe Yaakov Aryeh Alter, the current leader of  the Ger Hassids in Israel.  
59 Formerly Muhajir Quami Movement. According to some analysts, MQM dropped the ethnic muhajir marker to strengthen its claim 
of  national competitiveness and to open its ideological also for the wider religious symbolism. See Budhani, Azmat Ali (a.o.):  
The Open City: Social Networks and Violence in Karachi. In: Crises States Working Papers, No. 2, 2010, p. 4-7.  
60 In this holy month, the Shia commemorates Imam Hussain's martyrdom in the Battle of  Kerbala (680).
61 In 2007, Pakistani media, together with Islamist hardliners were able to bring the issue of  Benazir Bhutto's excessive use of  Is­
lamic symbols into the public discourse. When she returned to Pakistan from exile on 18 October, television showed her covered 
with Islamic talismans (taweez) and with a qur ān ʾ held over her head by fellow PPP activists. The day of  her return was marked by  
two bomb blasts on her procession, however, Bhutto survived. As a result, PPP workers and supporters started to wear talismans  
openly – normally they are worn under the clothes not visible for others. Interview with Arif  Malik, Journalist, Rawalpindi, 22 
July, 2009.
62 Cit. Marty, Martin E.: Our Religio-Secular World, p. 42. In: Daedalus, 132, Vol. 3, 2003, p. 42-48.
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to maximize their chances of  entering governing coalitions.63 As Demerath and Williams emphasized, the sec­
ular ruling elite uses religion to pursue power but tries to distance itself  from religion as soon as the power  
structures have been consolidated.64 This policy of  keeping religion at arm's length is illustrated by various 
cases in Pakistan and Israel the political leadership frequently gains the support of  religious leaders – and vice  
versa, with modernist religious intellectuals being “in alliance with the post-colonial state”. 65 Though one could 
state that these gestures are more symbolic, the traditional religious sector has learned to capitalize this de­
pendence and claims in return pragmatic political concessions. Following a rabbi and asking for his spiritual  
guidance and support is not exceptional in Israeli politics. Private audiences at the residences of  former Israeli  
Chief  Rabbi Ovadia Yusuf, the spiritual master (maran) of  Shas, are an inherent part of  Israeli political culture. 
In the case of  Tzipi Livni this ritual became a challenging issue when Rabbi Ovadia refused to receive the fe ­
male Kadima leader in the middle of  the 2009 polls election campaign, when Livni refused to accept the de­
mands of  Shas to re-extend the financial support for the religious education system and the subsidiaries for 
families  that  was before drastically reduced by than Minister of  Finance Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud).  In 
Pakistan, political heavy weights like Nawaz Sharif  (PML-N) and newcomers like Imran Khan (PTI) alike ad­
here to religious leaders: The Sharif  family, through Nawaz' marriage to Kulsum Sharif, the daughter of  a dis ­
tinguished family from Lahore's Sufi milieu.66 While the clan's patriarch, Mian Muhammad Sharif, became a 
member of  the Ahl-i-Hadith when the family moved to Lahore after partition, the sons Shahbaz and Nawaz, 
showed their generosity towards groups like the Tablighis or Lahore's Barelwis, e. g. with the rebuilding of  the 
shrine of  Data Ganj Baksh, of  whom Nawaz' wife is a follower.67 In turn, the Sharifs were able to ensure reli­
gious support for their rule over Punjab from various religious groups. It is said that Minhaj ul-Qur'an's Tahir 
ul-Qadri who was imam masjid at the Ittefaq Mosque, Model Town, Lahore, which was built by the Sharif's and 
named after their steel company, had been a loyal supporter of  the family until he began to launch campaigns 
against the prime minister in the 1990's. Other high-profile politicians, such as the Bhutto-Zardari68 family, 
despite – or because of  being Shi ites, tended to show religious neutrality or even overemphasized Sunni symʿ ­
bolism in public.69 Imran Khan whose mother and sisters followed a female  sufi from Suhiwal, Lahore, fre­
quently accentuates his adherence for poet Muhammad Iqbal and a local pir, Mian Bashir Ahmad, whom he 
63 In addition, many parties that can be located somewhere in between secular and religious ideological positions, found organiza­
tions that later become semi-autonomous units, e.g. Jama'at-e Islami and its student wing IJT, Gush Emunim and NRP. In addition, 
they “integrate political activity with social and spiritual life. Seen as part of  this web of  associations with overlapping affiliations,  
religious parties appear more like membership groups than other parties”. See Rosenblum, 2003, p. 23-53.
64 See Demerath, N. J./ Williams, Rhys, H.: A Bridging of  Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New England City. Princeton, N.J.: Prin­
ceton University Press, 1992. 
65 Cit. Zaman, 2004, p. 7.
66 “It is not a minority perception in Punjab, that Nawaz, irrespectively of  his family relations with pirs and his politics, is himself  
seen as something like a pir.” Cit. Interview with Abdullah M. Adnan, Associate Director International Institute of  Strategic 
Studies and Research (IISSR), Islamabad, 23 July, 2009. 
67 See Lieven, 2011, p. 276.
68 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was born into a family of  Hindu converts while his wife Nusrat Ispahani who at life times had been glorified 
by  the  PPP as  the  “Mother  of  Democracy”  (Maadr-i-Jumhuriat),  stems  from a  Shiite-Iranian background.  See  also  Bhutto, 
Benazir: Tochter der Macht. München: Knaur, 1991; Bhutto, Fatima: Songs of  Blood and Sword. A Daughter's Memoir. New 
Delhi (a.o.): Penguin, 2010.
69 Similarly, the former Prime Minister Gilani whose family is Barelwi avoided to overemphasize issues linked to the Barelwi-Deo­
bandi schism. Conversation with Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad, International Islamic University, Islamabad, July, 2009.
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claimed to be his spiritual guide until his death in 2005.70 With regard to the military elites, Islamic missionary 
movements such as Tanzeem ul-Ikhwan and Tablighi Jama'at and high position representatives of  the military and 
civic bureaucracy have cultivated frequent circles for prayers (zikr). These gatherings were initiated by General 
Zia but have become strong networks were religious leaders meet local politicians, generals, former Chiefs of  
the Army Staff  and former Directors of  ISI.
Generally speaking, the instrumental use of  religious parties by the state or the political class aims at, 1)  
marginalizing competing mainstream parties in general and left-of-center parties in particular – quite often in  
alliance with the military and security establishment, 2) appeasing the religious sector by power sharing in the  
government or limited legal, political or institutional concessions, 3) gaining social and financial control over 
the institutions of  the traditional religious sector, 4) legitimizing rule by religious means and symbols and, 5)  
integrating religious groups as a proxy force in the regional geo-strategic security agenda.71
Scholars from various disciplines and the increasing number of  studies in the field of  religion and politics 
tend to focus either on the reasons behind the dominant role of  religion in societies in the light of  the secular­
ization paradigm or the impact of  the bearer of  religion, religious parties, on domestic and international polit­
ics. Implicit to this is often a trend to contrast the Western-styled liberal democratic thought with the emer­
gence of  religious-political parties and non-parliamentary partisan movements not least to a religious-based 
threat to democracy. Mistakenly, religious agents are portrayed as a force that blocks democracy and its idea of  
a participative parliamentary system. However, it seems to be more adequate to understand religious forces as 
those societal forces that are – similar to other social spectra – notably affected by social change and, there­
fore, demand more participation in politics.72 However, in the case of  this study, one has to take into account 
that religious groups in Pakistan and Israel from the beginning were actively involved in the negotiations with 
the political leadership on the religious character of  the future state and in fact preceded the independence 
movements. While both states have consciously avoided a theocratic model of  statehood, in both countries the 
predominantly reluctant religious sector has successfully gained disproportionate political and discourse power. 
Considering the concept of  religious nationalism brought up by Juergensmeyer and van der Veer, religious act­
ors have to be seen not only as players in the political arena but also as power shaping powers and important 
agents of  nation building.73
1.3 Threats, Security Cultures and the External Dimension of  State Ideology
National security conceptions and strategic thinking in Pakistan and Israel are subjected to material factors 
such as the special nature  of  civil-military relations, cultivated over time and through accumulated historical 
experiences in changing internal, regional and international frameworks. In this sense, military doctrines as part 
70 See Khan, Imran: Pakistan. A Personal History. London: Bantham, 2011, p. 87ff. Furthermore, Khan has a close relationship to  
Yousaf  Salahuddin who is a grandson of  Iqbal, businessman, patron and benefactor of  arts and an influential figure in Lahore's  
high society.
71 Coined by Byman as “state sponsorship”. See Byman, Daniel: Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
72 See also Jung, Dietrich: Religion und Politik in der islamischen Welt. In: ApuZ, Vol. 42/43, 2002, p. 31-38.
73 See Juergensmeyer, Mark: The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular Order. Berkeley: Univ. of  California  
Press, 2003; van der Veer, Peter: Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: Univ. of  California Press, 1994.
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of  the national security doctrine or interest belong to the material dimension or what Bar-Joseph called the op­
erational milieu.74 For instance, the two basic factors in Pakistani and Israeli strategic thinking being, geostrategic  
vulnerability through a lack of  strategic depth and the dependency on support by a big power play a significant 
role in the doctrinal setup. In this study, security policies and doctrines are not understood as static fields of  
state business, and fixed political and security policy discourses, isolated from day-by-day politics, public opin ­
ion and solely directed by the military and higher political elites. Rather, threat perceptions and their concrete  
implications or the way how imagined, potential and real threats are perceived makes a focus on psycho-polit ­
ical factors obligatory.75 Therefore, in addition to the operational dimension one has to focus on the influence 
of  the  psychological milieu on decision-making in foreign and security policy,  which is constituted by the state 
elite's – civilian and military – keeping in mind the national past and self  imagery.76 The latter is constructed 
predominantly on historical and conflict-centered experiences based on the master narrative of  the birth in 
war followed by a life in inescapable conflict while seeking peace. Since both countries never enjoyed full and 
durable peace with their neighbors the image of  peace they seek for is the image of  an abstract and utopian  
peace.77 
In contrast to limited threats, the dramatic nature of  existential threats or continuous existential threats (CET's) 
is mainly based on their implications that go beyond the matrix that allows to manage a conflict politically.  
Threats in general but especially CET's can rely on self-reproducing mechanisms that "make certain conflicts  
impervious to resolution, or just some other form of  control" through escalatory dynamics. 78 CET's are inter­
woven with the ideas, values, symbols of  a state – its ideology and core of  legitimacy – threaten a state not 
only physically but also ideologically and have the potential to overshadow traditional conflicts and societal  
cleavages. This reciprocity is symptomatic for protracted conflicts and negotiations as well as the reluctance  
and ”political fear” of  states that “negotiations and concessions might jeopardize their national existence.” 79 
Negotiating with the other imposes the risk of  a substantial backlash regarding the subject matter and political  
74 This milieu defines a national security conception as “the product of  the given reality of  external environment and internal re ­
sources”. Cit. Bar-Joseph, Uri: Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel's National Security Conception, p. 99. In: Karsh, Efraim (Ed.):  
Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. II, From War to Peace? London: Frank Cass Publ., 2000, p. 99-114.
75 The term psycho-political refers to “psychological, social-psychological, and cultural factors as they affect political behavior”. This is 
based on the idea that behavior and decisions in international relations, beyond institutional, political and idealistic factors, to a  
considerable extent are based on the attitudes and behavior of  each conflict party induced by images of  the national self, ideolo­
gical beliefs and perceptions of  the other. Kaplowitz used the term 'interaction effect' which supports his argument that the state  
and its institutions can not be seen as a black box, but as reciprocal connected with their non-statist environment. Cit. Kaplowitz,  
Noel: Psychopolitical Dimensions of  International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of  Conflict Strategies, p. 373. In: Interna­
tional Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28. No. 4, 1984, pp. 373-406.
76 See Bar-Joseph, 2000, p. 99.
77 Regarding the utopian component of  peace in the Israeli debate, Gavriely-Nuri writes: “Full peace (shalom ma’le) – this phrase 
refers to the full diplomatic as well as civilian relations (including commercial and cultural ties, tourism, etc.) as normally main ­
tained between friendly countries. It represents a situation contrary to formal peace (usually known as a cold peace, shalom kar), 
with the two closely resembling the pair peace de facto vs peace de jure.” Cit. Gavriely-Nuri, Dalia: The idiosyncratic language of  Is­
raeli ‘peace’: A Cultural Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CCDA), p. 572. In: Discourse & Society, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2010,  
pp. 565-585. 
78 Cit. Wæver, Ole: What exactly makes a Continuous Existential Threat existential – and how is it discontinued?, p. 19. In: Barak,  
Oren/ Sheffer, Gabriel (Eds.): Existential threats and civil-security relations. Lanham: Lexington, 2009, pp. 19-35. For a detailed 
introduction into CET's see also Buzan/ Wæver/ de Wilde, 1998. 
79 Cit. Kelman, Herbert: Social-Psychological Dimensions of  International Conflict, p. 73. In: Zartman, William (Ed.): Peacemak­
ing in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques. Washington: United States Institute of  Peace Press, 2007, p. 73.
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opposition and resistance by non-state hardliners.80 Regardless of  what Jerusalem or Kashmir might be worth 
as objects, the perception of  both is ideologically, psychologically and emotionally connected to much more 
existential values and beliefs whose loss would inevitably impair the ideological framework of  which they were 
made an integral core element. Although many politicians would agree to a limited and conditional Israeli 
withdrawal  from selected West  Bank settlements,  it  remains a  minimal  consensus in  political  mainstream 
between doves and hawks, leftists and rightists, non-observant and observant Jews, to refuse compromises on  
the matter of  the status of  Jerusalem or to change its  post-1967 status which is  Jerusalem complete and 
united, indivisible and eternal capital of  the Jewish People in the Land of  Israel.81 Similarly, although the initial 
Kashmir dispute had been primarily a political dispute between Congress and Muslim League, escalations like  
the wars between Pakistan and India and the competition between a Kashmiri movement – claiming secular 
determined liberation, constitutional emancipation and independence – , a minority of  militants and Muslim 
political organizations, transformed it  into an ideological and religious conflict. Mainly the shifting of  dis ­
course, from secular-territorial to religious-territorial, linked Kashmir with Pakistan's confessional imperative  
to claim Kashmir as an integral part of  the Islamic Republic, justified on the basis of  the Two-Nation-Theory. 
The way how nations see themselves in the course of  history reflects an intransigent attempt to “normal ­
ize” their historical track and memory through which a society “produces ideas of  what a normal past should 
look like and uses those images as ideals to strive for or denied rights to long for.” 82 Using Olick's terminology 
of  national “claims of  genuineness”, images enshrined in the „national story“ refer to a specific past and ex­
press the desire of  adapting it to the nation's present and future. These claims for images of  authenticity are  
exemplary embodied in the claim of  inclusiveness (US, Australia), of  innocence referring to a historical burden  
combined with the desire to undo the past (Germany, South Africa, Cambodia, Rwanda etc.) 83, and of  inevit­
ability and legitimacy challenged by adversaries and new sub-narratives from within society (Israel)84:
Given the seeming pervasiveness of  such narrative foils, we might wonder if  images of  normalcy serve some 
formal as well as substantive purposes, such as giving identitarian myths – and the programs they motivate – dra­
matic shape. Just as there are many reasons why cases cannot be normal, moreover, there are many definitions 
of  normalcy. The question is how images of  normalcy work within and are produced by particular societies;  
normalcy is as much an endogenous feature of  collectivities as it is an external standard.85 
When self-imagery and perceptions of  the other tend to be continuously stable, approaches towards conflict 
can become highly affected by situational outcomes of  wars and the interaction with what is seen as the en­
emy. As Kaplowitz pointed out, national self-images and the prism through which the other is perceived, ex ­
perienced a new stimulus in the case of  events that were “very costly, spectacular, catastrophic, or cumulative”
80 See Saunders, Harold: Prenegotiation and Circum-Negotiation: Arenas of  the Multilevel Peace Process. In: Crocker, Chester/ 
Hampson, Fen Osler/ Aall, Pamela (Eds.): Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of  Managing International Conflict. Washington:  
United States Institute of  Peace Press, 2001, p. 490ff.
81 United due to Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of  Israel passed by the Knesset on 30 July, 1980.
82 Cit. Olick, Jeffrey K.: Introduction. Memory and the Nation – Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations, p. 382. In: Social  
Science History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1990, pp. 377-387.
83 This claim is most prominently expressed in the concept of  German collective guilt which was introduced after World War II ac ­
cepted by many German political leaders and intellectuals. For a detailed discussion of  the policy of  regret and its international  
dimension see Barkan, Elazar: The Guilt of  Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. Baltimore: John Hopkins  
Univ. Press, 2001. 
84 See Olick, 1990, p. 382.
85 Cit. ibid.
86 Cit. Kaplowitz, 1984, p. 399.
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. The perception of  key events in the history of  both states changed over time: Israel's military self-image as  
Shimshon der nebichdicker (poor little Samson) or inferior David miraculously defeating superior Goliath in the 
1948 War of  Independence and the 1967 Six Day War was challenged by the catastrophic outcome during the  
first days of  the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent wars. But the “divine miracle” or the “rebirth” of  Is­
rael, as it was interpreted by the religious Zionist and Kookist narrative and adopted by the government, as a  
direct result of  its total victory and Israel's new hegemonic role in the region, annulled Israel's claim of  inevit­
ability of  conflict and non-acceptance until the anticlimax of  1973. In comparison, Pakistan's defeat and the  
surrender of  its army in East-Pakistan in 1971 is a similar case in point. Pakistan's total defeat after the sur ­
render  of  its  troops,  the  de  facto  territorial  and  political-ideological  state  collapse  after  the  creation  of  
Bangladesh together with the national feeling of  humiliation and revisionism among its leadership, required a 
renegotiation of  the national story. Responding to the near death experience of  1971, the day before Dacca's  
fall on 16 December, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his infamous speech at the UN Security Council promised to  
“come back and fight” and the survival and transformation of  his country into “a new, a better and a greater 
Pakistan” and threatened “a thousand year war” with India.87 
1.4 Methodology
The research framework combines cultural and historic research as it  analyzes how theoretical or abstract  
products come into practice as institutionalized features of  the state and in the social field. Involving historic 
arguments and methodology, the study cannot provide a complete chronological and consistent view on all  
events. Rather, it has been attempted to introduce relevant key events in history and to contextualize them 
within the framework of  analysis which is based on dominant variables like religion, politics, nationalism and  
security. It is also not the aim of  this study to present the full amplitude of  socioeconomic, historic-political  
and cultural factors in their entirety. They specify why certain short-term trends or long-term developments oc­
cur. What is more of  interest – and what can sufficiently be analyzed and explained in this study – is how these 
developments were interpreted and instrumentalized. 
Cross-country comparisons are challenging endeavors in which the researcher is forced to always recalibrate  
his position and view on the subjects of  interest in order to guarantee a well balanced focus between the two  
(or more) cases. Comparative works often have to deal with reservations and it seems to be taken as granted 
that the outcome of  a study can and should primarily focus on similarities between the subjects being ana­
lyzed. This creates a precondition, holding that only similar cases can be compared. In this study this view is  
questioned with an attempt to analyze similar phenomena playing a comparable role in Pakistan and Israel. How­
ever, differing phenomena can also have a comparable function and similar phenomena can have differing outcomes.88
87 See Abbas, 2011. 
88 A comparative analysis of  Pakistan and Israel also has to deal with the much cited problem of  “the big V and the small N” in ­
herent to the debate on cross-country comparisons in political sciences with too many variables (V) but only few cases (N). This  
problem can be solved when increasing the cases or reducing the number of  variables analyzed in the study. Instead of  increas ­
ing N by including other countries in the study, I reduced the variables by organizing them in dominating but open and interre­
lated key or control variables (religion, nation, security, politics) to such an extend that in the end, in the two cases Pakistan and 
Israel (N = 2), I introduced more key variables (V = > N).
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The selection and operationalization of  variables poses another challenge to the comparison: The interrela ­
tion of  variables like religion and politics makes clear that any analytical approach has to reconsider the func ­
tional dimension of  both variables, understood not as an individual and separable phenomenon but as a struc ­
tural concept including both.89 This includes the notion of  religion as an independent variable when for in­
stance politics is influenced by religious factors – or when it is “sacralized” to use this popular term. On the  
other hand, religion can be influenced by a policy as well or by political actors, programs and institutions that 
“politizise” religion. Then, the dialectic impact of  politics on religion (or ethnicity, national identity etc.) can 
signify the use of  religion in the service of  politics (dependent variable) vice versa. 
This study holds that only through systematic comparative and intensive in-depth case-studies it is possible 
to explain complex phenomena and to focus on their context and preconditions. This assumption can and 
should also be expanded to cases which seemingly represent “most different cases” in order to generate new  
results and to go beyond the narrowed focus of  single case studies or “most similar cases” comparisons. The 
former always have to neutralize the main argument, that apples and pears are two distinctive cases which can ­
not be compared without risking to overstretch the framework of  analysis.90 Therefore the view on the sub­
jects – among which religion has a central position – requires an interpretation of  religion which goes beyond 
the narrow determinants of  interpretation set by a distinctive religious doctrine – that is Islam or Judaism in ­
cluding their manifold sub-sects, schools of  thought and traditions. This step automatically involves a range of  
various disciplines and somewhat crisscrosses research fields like history, political sciences – including compar­
ative politics and international relations – anthropology and religious studies. In order to adequately approach  
the field of  security and related psycho-political phenomena like threat perceptions, it is inevitable to discuss  
theoretical approaches stemming from the fields of  military and security studies as well. Nevertheless, compar ­
isons which involve an inter-religious comparative element have somewhat been a neglected terrain in the re­
search tradition on nationalism which had been made prominent by Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and  
others.91 However, the comparative method – often over-hastily labeled as the way out of  ethno- and euro-
centrism92 – can provide an instrument which can maximize the researcher's efforts to escape euro-centrism 
and orientalism. The goal of  a comparison is to investigate similarities and differences, convergence and diver­
gence between the two cases which allows to explain phenomena within their specific context, rather than to  
89 In this context I am following Sharkansky: „Politics and religion are similar as a social phenomenon. Politics and religion depend 
on one another. Both religion and politics employ doctrines and organization in order to advance their causes in competition  
with rivals. The commonalities of  politics and religion are in the various fields of  their behaviors.“ Cit. Sharkansky, Ira: The  
Politics of  Religion and the Religion of  Politics: Looking at Israel. Maryland: Lexington Books, 2000, p. 11-14. 
90 For the varying forms of  comparisons in social sciences see also Lijphart, Arend: Comparative Politics and the Comparative 
Method. In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 1971, p. 682-693.
91 Inter-religious comparisons seem to shift the focus from nationalism to globalization, trans-nationalism, new religious move ­
ments and to the more popular fields of  terrorism and religious violence. See for instance the works on fundamentalism: Marty,  
Martin E./ Appleby, R. Scott (Eds.): Fundamentalisms Observed. The American Academy of  Arts and Sciences: The Funda­
mentalism Project, Vol. 1. Chicago (a.o.): Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1991 and consecutive volumes 2-5 (1993-95); Six, Clemens; 
Riesebrodt,  Martin;  Haas,  Siegfried (Eds.):  Religiöser  Fundamentalismus.  Vom Kolonialismus zur  Globalisierung.  In:  Quer ­
schnitte, Vol. 16. Innsbruck, Wien (a.o.): Studien-Verl., 2004. See also Kippenberg, Hans G.: Gewalt als Gottesdienst. Religion ­
skriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. München: C.H. Beck, 2008; Malik, Iftikhar H.: Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban. Karachi:  
Oxford Univ. Press, 2005, to name some of  them. 
92 For his overview on the state of  the debate, see Kaelble, Hartmut: Die Debatte über Vergleich und Transfer und was jetzt? In: 
Geschichte Transnational, 8 February, 2005. In this case more of  relevance is Haupt and Kocka's distinction between synchron ­
ous and diachronous comparisons. See Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard/ Kocka, Jürgen (Eds.): Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und  
Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1996, p. 9-45.
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just describe them. Furthermore, the comparison aims at analyzing the results of  both cases in the interest of  
a generalizing common position. 
1.4.1 Comparative Dimension: Some Notes on Pakistani-Israeli Relations
Especially since the 1990s, historical comparisons experienced a revival in both the publication of  comparative 
studies and the theoretical and methodological debates that are associated with them. The ideas of  “histoire  
croisée” and “entangled history” are part of  that debate.93 The selection of  the cases Pakistan and Israel neg­
lects  the focus  on direct  or  indirect  transfers  between the  two countries:  Discussed only  in  few articles,  
Pakistan-Israel relations lack a tradition of  normality in terms of  existing political-diplomatic or economic ties.
94 The demand for closer ties is, understandably, rare:
Given the isolation of  Israel vis-à-vis the Islamic world, and given Pakistan’s increasing isolation through the  
perception of  its increasing radicalism, the opportunity to show a nascent dialogue between the second largest  
Muslim nation and the Jewish state would be a public diplomacy boon for two countries with flagging public  
diplomacy images. Dialogue with Israel gives Pakistan more credibility to burnish a moderate image, while dia ­
logue with Pakistan allows Israel to reach beyond seclusion. All of  this being carried out through non-diplomat­
ic, nongovernmental channels helps mitigate the dynamic of  the absence of  formal diplomatic relations.95
Contacts between the two countries, in Pakistan often referred to as „ideological twins“, do officially not exist.  
Rather, bilateral relations are framed by Pakistan's non-acceptance of  Israel on the official level and by intelli­
gence reports, mainstream political statements and psychological mindsets claiming Israel's frequent interven­
tion in Pakistani affairs on the unofficial level.96 Only little attention in public has been given to the existing 
backdoor diplomacy reaching its positive climax in September, 2005, when the foreign ministers met in Istan­
bul, followed by a meeting between president Pervez Musharraf  and prime minister Ariel Sharon.97
Pakistan sees Israel primarily through the military and economic prism. The debate to cope the Israel De­
fense Forces' reserve system, admiration for Israel's becoming the rising Nasdaq star behind the US and China  
and the world's leading start-up nation or the country's visionary plans to utilize the vast Negev desert region 
for agricultural developments have since been focused on. But the dominating ideological discourse concen­
trates on Israel's role as an illegitimate occupying force, enemy to large parts of  the Arab-Muslim world and  
the powerful symbolism inherent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Pakistan, like in most other Muslim 
countries, the Middle East conflict evokes expressions of  solidarity and fraternity towards the Palestinians, 
combined with anti-Israeli and antisemitic mindsets through all strata of  society. In November, 2010, the Jew ­
ish Agency reported on a recent aliyah made by Jews from Pakistan to Israel. According to the press release,  
the airlifting operation was undercover and complicated based on a confidential agreement between the two 
93 For the concept of  histoire croisée see Werner, Michael/ Zimmermann, Bénédicte: Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and 
the Challenge of  Reflexivity. In: History and Theory, Vol. 45, 2006, p. 30-50; for “shared” or “entangled history” see Conrad, Se ­
bastian/ Randeria, Shalini (Eds.): Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwis ­
senschaften. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verl., 2002.
94 See Kumaraswamy, P. R.: The Strangely Parallel Careers of  Israel and Pakistan. In: Middle East Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 31-39;  
ibid.: Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum No. 55, 2000; Yegar, Moshe:  
Pakistan and Israel. In: Jewish Political Studies Review, Vol. 19, No. 3-4, 2007. Siddiqa, Ayesha: Is Pakistan like Israel or North  
Korea? In: The Express Tribune, 6 June, 2010.
95 Cit. Rockower, Paul: Israel-Pakistan Public Diplomacy Campaign, Pub D 504, 12 December, 2008, p. 3.
96 For instance Israeli plans to destroy Pakistan's primary nuclear facilities in Kahuta during the 1980s in a strategic alliance with In ­
dia. 
97 During the 1990s bilateral relations suffered when Israeli authorities refused to provide a visiting visa for prime minister Benazir  
Bhutto's trip to the Palestinian territories. 
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governments. Out of  the 2.500 members of  the Jewish communities in Pakistan that were recorded in 1947, 
probably around a dozen Jews remain in Pakistan, mainly in Karachi, Sindh, where the Bene Yisrael have lived 
over the past centuries. Discriminatory politics and everyday life in the Muslim majority society and a prom­
ising future in Israel made more and more Jews leaving the country, most of  them without compensation for 
their property. Gen. Pervez Musharraf  became the first Pakistani leader to officially recognize the Jews of  
Karachi during an official visit to Jewish communities in New York. Proposals to establish diplomatic ties with  
Israel provoked harsh opposition from all political and religious camps. However, a historical review illustrates 
continuing efforts by subsequent governments to establish loose strategic links between Jerusalem and Is­
lamabad. Similarly, Israel's governments who were clearly oriented towards India based on economic and stra­
tegic interests,  aimed to include Pakistan in their  regional  security paradigm. Beyond the political  level in  
Pakistan,  resentments  against  Israel  remain  embedded  within  a  popularized  narrative  highlighting  the 
“Mossad-CIA-Blackwater-RAW” connection in which Israel, together with the US and India, is seen as an om­
nipresent force harming the strategic interests of  Pakistan with its spy operatives being active on Pakistani soil.  
Hence, a strong political-ideological anti-Israeli element and latent antisemitism in Pakistani society and public  
consciousness, forms a substantial part within the national conspiracy mindset which, according to Siddiqa,  
resulted in an abstract and highly ambiguous relationship:
Pakistan has a love-hate relationship with Israel. While we abhor Tel Aviv, secretly powerful Pakistanis happily  
claim similarities between the two states starting with the fact that both Israel and Pakistan were created on the  
basis of  a religious identity. For those who compare a sense of  similarity probably makes them feel important  
and elevated. After all, Islamabad would like to feel as important as America’s best buddy. Some might argue that 
such comparison itself  is a sign of  neo-colonial mentality of  Pakistani rulers.98
Israel in turn sees Pakistan primarily – if  not exclusively – not as a direct adversary but as a key nuclear and 
terrorist security threat to the Western world.99 While geographically bound to the Middle East, there is a 
strong orientation within Israeli self-perception according to which the State of  Israel, historically and cultur ­
ally, is seen as belonging to the West. Following the 9/11 attacks, Israel's political leadership declared Israel's  
solidarity with the US, the “free world” and the West. In reaction to the attacks, Israel mobilized its troops 
along the Israeli-Syrian  demarcation  line despite  ongoing peace  talks  with  Damascus  via  mediators.  Sub­
sequently, Israel – although not directly involved – has provided support and legitimation for the international  
and US-led missions in Central Asia, Middle East and Africa. Single events such as the kidnapping and murder 
of  Wall Street journalist and American-Israeli citizen Daniel Pearl in 2002 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks in 
which members of  a Jewish Habad community were killed by Lashkar-i-Taiba operatives, believed to have been 
trained and equipped on Pakistani soil, reenforced traditional Israeli and international perception of  Pakistan.  
Facing a new proxy war with Iran, Israel has suspected Pakistan's ISI to have silently provided intelligence for  
Iranian operations against Israeli diplomats in India, Thailand and Georgia in 2011/12 which are believed to  
reciprocate assassinations of  Iranian nuclear scientists by Mossad-trained Iranian dissidents. 100 Taken together, 
the lack of  intensive interrelations allows the comparison to circumvent the problem of  diffusion of  intercon­
98 Cit. Siddiqa, 2010.
99 See Bar'el, Zvi: With all eyes on Iran, who's watching Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? In: Ha'aretz, 25 November, 2009.
100 In turn, similarly to the Arab bloc in the OIC and at the UN, Iran has supported Pakistan's cause with regard to Kashmir. See 
Pakistan Today: Pakistan's enemies will be considered Iran's enemies: Ahmadinejad, 21 May, 2012.
   Seite 27
nected cases  which usually  jeopardizes  the assumption of  independence between analytical  units,  such as  
states, societies, economic systems etc.101
1.4.2 Field Research, Critical Literature and Language 
Preliminary works has been done in my master thesis in which I focused on the genesis of  the Jama'at-i-Islami, 
initially a competitor to the narrative of  statehood as represented by the Muslim League and later a political  
partner of  subsequent regimes. However, central determining aspects of  Pakistani Muslim nationalism and its  
inner paradigm shifts were touched upon only briefly. Between 2009 and 2012, in the course of  research and 
writing, the situation in Pakistan and Israel remained highly volatile due to a sequence of  key events in its for­
eign and domestic affairs. With regard to their implications on the thematic subjects of  this thesis, their influx  
into the national discourse uncovered the central issues discussed in this work and helped to contrast them. 
However, I tried to concentrate on the long-term developments, attitudes and discourses within the context of  
state ideology. Within the voluminous corpus of  existing literature on the subject I tried to contrast older liter­
ature produced during the early years of  statehood with what we can call new critical literature. 102 As in most 
societies, official historical narratives are prominently presented by an old guard of  historians whose authority  
is challenged by a new generation of  scholars that has been born after independence and thus, often claims to  
represent a redefinition of  historic nativeness based on their access to more sophisticated sources such as offi ­
cial archive documents. Among these scholars of  whom most live abroad and of  whom some earned remark­
able international reputation, some were strongly criticized at home and labeled as denigrators and whistle 
blowers. Their conclusions and analysis were often portrayed as contributing to the division of  the nation and 
to international isolation. This scholarly atmosphere in which early works tend to triumphalism while their re­
sponsa often tend to negativism and cynicism, would deserve an in-depth analysis.103 As for this work it re­
flects an academic clash of  competing narratives and illustrates the politicization and emotionalization of  dis­
courses on history and memory and reaffirms their hybrid nature. 
In this study I refer to various specific terms that are not self-consistent and which I try to reconstruct 
within the given country-specific framework. Therefore, when I refer to “the nation”, “the land” or “the con­
flict” or adapt a specific expression (e.g. the “Afghan Jihad”, “war or struggle for independence“, “existential  
threat” etc.), I do this with reference to the specific meaning implied in these terms when they were mentioned  
in the literature or in the interviews. This is based on the assumption that the specific individual meaning of  a  
term and how it is understood and interpreted individually, can only adequately be reflected by reproducing 
101 For Galtung's problem see for instance Naroll, Raoul: Galton's Problem: The Logic of  Cross-Cultural Research. In: Social Re ­
search, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1965, p. 428-451.
102 Special reference is given to this corpus in Chapter III which I used throughout the study. 
103 In its quality, this problem seems to be more visible in the Israeli case, despite similar trends in Pakistani academia and increas ­
ingly in the post-9/11 years. For instance in a booklet by US-Israeli NGOs with special focus on anti-Israeli campus culture, one  
author complains: ”There are numerous reports of  professors questioning the legitimacy of  the State of  Israel, in class, and stu ­
dents feeling too intimidated to challenge them, for fear of  ridicule or reduced grades. Academic freedom goes a long way, par ­
ticularly on traditionally liberal college campuses, where Israel has gone from David to Goliath since the Six-Day War of  1967.  
The Jewish state is commonly perceived as a brutal occupier of  the Palestinian people and stumbling block to Palestinian free­
dom and statehood. Too few students have the knowledge, or courage, to offer a counter view.” Cit. Rosenblatt, Gary: Israel's  
biggest Threat on Campus, p. 44. In: Bard, Mitchell G.: Tenured or Tenuous: Defining the Role of  Faculty in Supporting Israel  
on Campus. Israel on Campus Coalition/ American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 2004, pp. 44/45.
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the term via its associated symbols, beliefs and historic references. When I refer to the occupied territories of  
the West Bank as “Judea and Samaria”, I use a term that is religiously overloaded with biblical connotations  
and politically linked to the rejection of  the Palestinian claim for the territory envisioned as part of  a future 
Palestine by the UN in 1947.104 While initially the term was used mainly in the political rightist camp and by  
most religious groups, it later entered the popularized language of  the political mainstream and is, thus, part of  
a “nationalized” repertoire.
As  supplementary  sources  to  the  literature  collected  during  field  research  in  Pakistan,  Israel  and  the 
Palestinian Territories105, I conducted interviews. Selected interviewees were active and retired representatives 
of  political parties and institutions – here special reference was given to religious-political parties and their  
non-parliamentary wings – civil bureaucracy, governmental and private think tanks, faith-based organizations 
and NGOs, military, media and diplomats, scholars and academicians affiliated with institutes and universities.  
With regard to the mesa complex of  this study this broad selection of  interviewees reflects not only the inten­
tion to include the arguments and opinions of  both, the “ruling elite” and the “intellectual elite”, but also the  
dialectics between supporters, bearers and profiteers of  the state system and those who stand in opposition to 
the state. The interviews were conducted as semi-qualitative and semi-structured interviews in which I tried to 
cover a certain sequence of  themes combined with selected or suggested questions. In opposition to fully  
structured interviews, this method provides the maximum of  openness to change the sequence in order to 
reach viable answers in regard to the main research questions.106 The interviewer is in this way able to impro­
vise follow-up questions and to dig deeper in areas of  interest that emerge to explore further meanings and di­
mensions. The interviewee, selected because of  his expertise and specific inside view or because of  his mem­
bership in a specific group, his position in institutions, or due to his status as an intellectual or well-informed 
citizen allows an additional level of  understanding of  historical events or current trends within his society. 
Given the researcher's status as an „outsider“ – in this case a foreigner, non-Muslim and non-Jew – the ex­
pert's knowledge and personal view is made accessible through the interview.107 Given the already broadened 
focus of  this study, I will discuss theological aspects of  Islam and Judaism with respect to their impact on  
practices of  religious life and their legal, political and cultural-ideological translation in the Pakistan and Israel.  
This of  course leaves open important theological contexts as they might be expected in the case of  in-depth 
comparative religious studies.
104 See United Nations General Assembly Res. 181, 29 November 29, 1947.
105 Data was collected in Pakistan from May to July, 2008; June to September, 2009; March/April, 2011, and in June, 2011. Field re ­
search in Israel and in the West Bank has been done from December, 2009, to January, 2010, and in June and November, 2010.
106 See Kvale, Steinar: Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. London: Sage, 1996. For expert interviews  
see Haller, Michael: Das Interview. Ein Handbuch für Journalisten, 2nd Ed. Konstanz: UVK, 1997, p. 152ff.  
107 In addition, interviews via phone and email as well as informal conversations helped to aggregate data and information. Particip ­
ation at conferences, workshops, meetings and receptions organized by academia, press and security and diplomatic communities  
as well as attendance at sessions and events held by the Knesset, the Arab League, UN bodies, NGOs and others, provided fur ­
ther understanding towards the local and regional matrix. Events organized by political foundations, think tanks and universities 
in Pakistan, Israel, Egypt and Germany gave important impulses as well.  
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1.5 Content
The chapters are aimed to organize overlapping areas of  research. In some parts, phenomena still  persist,  
while at the same time new developments emerge. In the greater interest of  presenting the phenomena, this  
has resulted in a breaking up of  strict linear chronology. 
This first chapter will introduce into the theoretical frameworks which I will adopt the basis for the dis­
cussion of  the empirical data in Chapters 3 to 7. These involve the central role of  the state and its resources. A  
main interest of  this study lies in analysis of  the use of  cultural resources through which an ideological corpus  
is adopted and modified to its local context. Further, orientations towards the state by society in large and its 
particular elites are highlighted. This step involves the focus on how religious forces – political and non-polit ­
ical  movements that promote a religious program – are represented in the political  culture.  This includes  
mainly those who decided to cooperate with the state and to accept it in principle. Again, it seems to be prob ­
lematic to follow a common view in political sciences which sees the religious in terms of  a passive participant  
in politics, in the democratic process and in the state's institutions. However, this thesis sees the religious 
parties as an active element that co-formulate the framework of  Pakistani and Israeli political cultures, their re­
spective political interests which are often based on concrete demands, for instance in the fields of  education,  
in the constitutional debate, and, increasingly, in main domains of  state affairs such as foreign policy. This  
thesis holds that this active and continuous role is mainly legitimized because of  the state's strong ideological  
emphasis on religion. Similar to the strong religious framing of  political culture, the continuous perception of  
threats, some of  them being existential, has contributed to a framing of  political culture, mindsets in society  
and state ideology itself  with a strong orientation towards security aspects. Thus, securitization and cultures of  
insecurity are introduced as a concepts which will be discussed in their specific local contexts in the following  
chapters. 
The second chapter of  this work is dedicated to the complex nexus of  religion and politics on the one  
hand, and nationalism as a concept with its link to the nation-state on the other. Here it is vital to put forward 
the discourse and debate over the nature of  the state not only as the political supreme but also as an ideologic ­
al construction which was established by a secular Western oriented political elite that, despite its efforts to 
share power with traditional religious forces only reluctantly and only for the sake of  their political support, al­
lowed religion to become a central pillar. Since independence, the image of  the state has been fortified with 
numerous symbols, myths and narratives. Accordingly, religion not only entered and changed the political cul­
ture to such an extend that, beyond its stakeholders, the religious-political parties, secular power groups have 
to obey to the framework and its strong references to Islam and Judaism. The analysis of  Israel in the follow ­
ing chapters illustrates that the sacralization of  politics appears to be an irreversible social process with a secu­
lar and non-observant Jewish majority unable to push trough its demands against a minority of  religious or ­
thodoxy while the Pakistani case indicates that liberal-progressive impulses in the ideological state discourse  
were increasingly tabooed. The chapter also highlights the concept of  nationalism and tries to reflect its inner  
dialectics and how these factors provide the ingredients of  a modern state ideology. Especially the first com­
plex, the relation between religion and politics, over the past decades, has become a classic within the fields of  
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political sciences. Its inherent problem is the question of  how to define the boundaries between the antagon­
ism created by Western political philosophy and the paradigmatic dilemma of  the interrelationship between 
tradition and modernity. Similarly, the nation-state is a concept which had to be integrated into communitari ­
an-universalist concepts such as the umma and the Jewish people or the children of  Israel. Studies on national­
ism and ideologies share the inability of  their prolific writers to define the limitations of  both complexes.  
Keeping this problem of  definition in mind, inherent also to the field of  ideologies, this chapter is an attempt 
to focus on selected country-specific characteristics of  nationalist and religious discourses in order to induct ­
ively approach the complex of  ideology.
In the third chapter, I will present selected topoi as they are enshrined in the official national narratives  
and represent core references of  state ideology. Pakistani narratives of  partition, very much like their Israeli 
counterparts with the shoa in its center and against the background of  the fundamental crisis and the emerging 
identity of  a homeless people which so strongly influenced the demand for a sovereign state, style the founda­
tion of  the state as a miracle, unexpected and created despite large opposition. In the Israeli case, the transfer ­
ence of  Zionism from Europe to Palestine, and thus the transfer of  components from European culture to a  
renewed Hebrew culture had a much greater impact on the self-consciousness of  state and society as com­
pared to the Pakistani efforts to strengthen Muslim symbolism with its phases of  Arabization and Islamiza­
tion. Historiography played an essential role in consolidating and disseminating myths, symbols and images of  
post-independence discourses. Suffused with hagiographic elements is the cult of  leadership that, despite sig ­
nificant differences, places Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the central personality until his premature death in 1948 
into the limelight of  national historic discourse. Similarly, the legacy of  David Ben-Gurion, until today the  
longest serving prime minister who was able to make himself  indispensable within the political mechanisms 
and state institutions of  labor Zionist Israel which he helped build and which expressed the paradigmatic  
transformation from Herzlian Zionism to the labor Zionist first republic of  Israel (Ben-Gurionism), is identi­
fied as the father of  the nation.108 Subsequently, the two leaders defined the political culture significantly to 
such extend that even today, reference to their personalities is required for contemporary political forces to  
gain legitimation. However, while the national story, its memory and its founding myths in academia and in the  
public education system had been sacrosanct and remained unchallenged during the initial years, they were in ­
creasingly questioned since the 1980s by new critical scholarship that has gained increasing attention beyond 
its academic target groups and, especially in the Israeli case, generated a heated political discourse.
Instead of  portraying a coherent vision of  how the division line between the sacred and the mundane 
should be determined, leaders used symbols and narratives that strengthened the position of  the state and em ­
powered it to determine parameters of  daily life on the legal level. The fourth chapter discusses key institu­
tional tensions which, as an extension of  state-society cleavages, point out to the wider context of  the reli ­
gious-secular divide as a grand theme and future challenge to Pakistan and Israel, largely unresolved to this day.  
108 Ben-Gurion was in office from 1948 to 1953 and again from 1955 until 1963. After current prime minister Netanyahu ( Likud, 
first term from 1996 to 1999 and second term since 2009) brokered a center-right coalition with Kadima in May, 2012, he will 
hold an absolute majority until the elections in 2013. Electoral success beyond 2013 would make the “King of  Israel” who is the  
first state leader born in Israel, the longest serving prime minister since Ben-Gurion. See Stengel, Richard: Bibi's Choice. In: 
Time, 28 May, 2012.
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This perspective focuses on the status quo and analyzes institutional arrangements like the constitution, per ­
sonal law and tries to define the status of  minorities given the notions of  Pakistan and Israel as religious states  
based on the doctrine of  one particular majority sect, their descriptions as ethnic or military democracies. The  
latter refers to the exceptional role which the army plays beyond its key task of  defense. Here I am arguing 
that the hegemonic role of  the military in society, politics and economy has enriched the state ideology with  
the world-view of  the army as an institution. 
Policies endorsed by the state and especially in the fields of  education, family planning and state subsidies  
were often seen as an existential threat by the religious establishment, who supposed that any renegotiation 
and conditionality of  the status quo could threaten their authority in the religious discourse and their socioeco­
nomic status. This fear has been responded by the custodians of  secular culture who are cautious of  the fact  
that, from their perspective, too much of  influence of  religion would lead to a complete transformation of  
state and society.
In the fifth and sixth chapter, different religious-political orientations and their interpretation of  the state 
will be highlighted. As has been shown in the first chapter, an ideology accumulated by the founding fathers  
and their political elites had been adopted to the state as a direct result of  the political struggle for independ­
ence. Nevertheless, an ideology is here understood functionally as an umbrella body which itself  adapts vari ­
ous elements. Accordingly different groups promoted differing narratives of  state ideology or how the state 
should look like according to their view. Despite a great deal of  discussion of  the significance of  the require­
ments of  religion for the envisioned state and its society, only little attention had been given to the question of  
how to make religious needs adaptable and how to implement them into the structures of  the nation-state, its  
political system, administration and bureaucracy and its legal bodies. This chapter offers insight into the am­
biguous relationship between religious groups and the political guard who acquired the top positions in admin­
istration, politics and military after independence. The religious orthodoxy, of  which some leaders had initially  
been opposed to the idea of  a state but then had been appeased by the founding fathers, positioned itself  at  
times contradictory. Accordingly, one can differentiate between different narratives of  why and under which 
circumstances the state was founded but which relate to one and the same event. Distinct narratives were  
offered by the religious sector where groups explained the state and its creation in specific teleological terms,  
according to a fundamentalist or messianic paradigm etc. 
Religious-political parties have learned the art of  using the electoral political system and coalition tactics to 
its advantage and to impose “politics of  piety” in public or in its domains where the state is not represented.  
Some elements within the religious sector aim at changing the status quo according to their religious-political  
program but remain committed to the state, its legitimacy and its institutions. In both countries there is the  
(contemporary) tendency to adapt symbols and values of  secularist nationalism and especially those with Is ­
lamic or Jewish references, to the categories of  traditional religion. This means that a rethinking and reinter ­
pretation took place in which both, the secular and the religious, connected through reciprocal exchange, in 
fact  overlap. Different from this loyalist-statist  orientation, revolutionary streams emphasize an agenda of  
change in which current policies by the state are seen as having lost their legitimation. They intensively refer to  
   Seite 32
the state's narrative, which they accept in principle with only a minority that consequently denies the state's  
right to exist as an illegal human intervention in history.109 What makes the two cases of  Pakistan and Israel 
outstanding is not so much the fact that state policies faced opposition from religious forces. Rather, the focus  
of  this thesis tries to highlight the nature of  resistance offered to the state since it argues on the basis of  offi ­
cial ideology with its references laid down during the crucial historic phase in which, especially on the constitu ­
tional level, the new state was determined to become an entity with its legitimation primarily being religious. 110 
Therefore, the motif  of  betrayal and unfulfilled promise by the state and its secular elites has significantly 
gained momentum since independence.
The analysis in the seventh chapter catalyzes the core elements of  ideology and highlights the orientations 
it gave birth to with regard to the view towards the constructed „other“. Here, much emphasis is given to the  
security mission of  the state which is the military, political-ideological and economic defense of  its territorial,  
political and economic integrity and sovereignty if  they are considered threatened. 111 The analysis of  external 
threats  to  the  state  is  aimed  at  illustrating  that  despite  the  continuity  of  the  ideological  conflict  within,  
throughout the states' history, these tensions temporarily ease when external and especially existential threats 
emerge. This goes hand in hand with the attempts by state actors and their religious proxies to change the per ­
ception of  the conflict. Genuinely based on territorial and political-ideological claims, the conflicts between 
Pakistan and India and Israel and its Arab neighbors, since their beginning, have been exposed to attempts to 
frame and legitimize them as the logical expression of  an religious antagonism.
Finally, the last chapter, brings together and systematizes the arguments from all chapters. Siddiqa formed 
the term „national-religious security state“ with reference to both countries.112 Other accounts saw both states 
as ideological laboratories which envisioned a national entity accompanied by the universalist claim of  becom­
ing the foundation stone for better, more equal and more peaceful new societies that would serve as role mod­
els for other countries that would follow them on the path of  decolonization and independence. It is not the  
aim of  this study to provide scenarios for the countries' future design. Nevertheless, it will try to focus on 
some main narrative strings which developed immediately after the states' creation but have been modified  
during their history. Among these grand themes, which are all dealing with existential fears indicating a more  
or less negative outlook to the future, the chapter will catch some relevant contemporary variants of  these  
themes. Concluding, the chapter will end with the generalizing findings with regard to commonalities and dif­
ferences between the two countries.  
109 In Pakistan, new religious non-state partisan groups such as organizations under the banner of  the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) argue  
that the ruling elite because of  its inability to respond to the most pressing needs of  their country and their corrupted power  
politics which is contrary to Islam in general and to the Taliban's doctrinal interpretation in particular, has lost its legitimation.  
Their war against the Pakistan Army and their attacks on symbols of  the Pakistani state is, thus, justified as a just war against a  
non-Muslim entity which sold the country to the US.
110 A similar argument – reference to the religious narrative of  statehood – is used by those groups who support the state and co­
operate.
111 Here I provide much more room for the discussion of  perceptions of  external threats and their manifestation in the politics of  
security and foreign affairs.  
112 See Siddiqa, 2010.
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Part I: BIRTH AND CONSOLIDATION OF RELIGIOUS-
NATIONALIST STATE IDEOLOGY
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2 The Theoretical Nexus of Religion, Nationalism and Politics
As long as in the heart, within, 
A Jewish soul still yearns, 
And onward, towards the ends of  the East, 
An eye still gazes toward Zion; 
Our hope is not yet lost, 
The hope of  two thousand years, 
To be a free people in our land, 
The land of  Zion and Jerusalem.113
HaTikvah (The Hope)
Blessed be the sacred land,
Happy be the bounteous realm,
Thou symbol of  high resolve,
O Land of  Pakistan!
Blessed be the centre of  faith.
[...]
The flag of  the crescent and star,
Leads the way to progress and perfection,
Interpreter of  our past, glory of  our present,
Inspiration of  our future,
Shelter of  God, the Glorious and Mighty.114
Pāk Sarzamīn (The Pure Land)
In the context of  nation-building and its symbolic framework, national anthems play a significant role. Their  
narratives canalize central messages and connect the political-territorial identity of  a state with the cultural  
identity of  its people as a collective representation resulting in a specific historical narrative. 115 Anthems reduce 
the high grade of  abstraction and the universal claim embedded in a state ideology and simplify its content to 
make it more plausible for the common man.116 The triumvirate of  religion, nation and politics – beyond the 
contexts of  Pakistan and Israel – seems to be unequal or even contradictorily and leads one to raise the ques­
tion of  how religion as a traditional cultural field on the one hand, and the nation as a phenomenon linked to 
modernity on the other, as an antagonism make up for a couple. Further, one might ask why and how this is  
relevant to the field of  politics. Any political culture with differing grades of  religion and its structure, ideas  
and images in it, provides the framework in which political activism and mobilization take place. This seems  
especially true in the case of  Pakistan and Israel whose ideological bodies seem to clash with the idea of  strict  
secularism due to their history of  thought. Further, keeping those two countries in mind, it seems also that the 
prognosis of  religion being marginalized and privatized has lost its validity. Rather, Pakistan and Israel, like  
other “confessional” states such as Saudi Arabia (1932), Iran (1979) or Sri Lanka (1948)117 developed political 
and social cultures in which religious symbolism, myths and rituals118 constantly frame the national identity.119 
113 Verses based on Naphtali Herz Imber's (1856-1909) poem Tikvateynu (1878). See also Heskes, Irene: Passport to Jewish Music. Its 
History, Traditions, and Culture. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 229-234.
114 Text written by Abu-Al-Asar Hafeez Jalandhuri (1900-1982) who was also a political activist in the Pakistan Movement. His more  
prominent works include Pakistan's national anthem as well as the song text of  Wātān hāmārā Kāshmīr, written during the 1960's 
and considered something like an anthem due to its reference to both AK and J&K. See Pakistan Academy of  Letters: Pakistani  
Literature, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 53.
115 See Friedland, Roger: Religious Nationalism and the Problem of  Collective Representation, p. 129. In: Annual Review of  Soci ­
ology, Vol. 27, 2001, p. 125-152, p. 138.
116 See The Express Tribune: Pakistan creates new anthem record, 14 August, 2011.
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2.1 Religion and Politics
Within the process that finally leads to the declaration of  sovereignty and the foundation of  the modern na ­
tion state, the concept of  the nation as „an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign“120 has attracted significant attention. According to the classical view of  European polit ­
ical theory, the nation manifests itself  in the nation state and thus offers an unit of  organization and values as 
a surrogate that can ensure existential security.121 Following Anderson's approach, the nation can be connected 
to the religious sphere. Thus, strict secular nationalism can be contrasted with religious nationalism, e.g. a civil  
religion.122 Rousseau's (1712-1778) ideal type of  a  religion civile123, as it has been further developed by Bellah 
with reference to the USA, is a specific form of  public religion. Later, Bellah himself  revised his approach and  
introduced  the  term  public  philosophy which  has  to  applied  as  in  contrast  to  institutionalized  religion,  e.g.  
churches.124 According to Bellah, the autonomous dimension of  the civil religion, in the case of  the USA, is  
thus based on the American national identity and Christian and especially protestant symbols and images. It  
forms its own specific variant of  a political culture whose political rituals and discourses are strongly influ­
enced by a religious-nationalist self  perception.125 At the functional level, America's civil religion is preoccu­
pied with religious semantics and central conceptions of  exile, exodus and chosenness as well as biblical-territ ­
orial connotations which see the land in the light of  a “new” or “American” Israel.126 
117 See Alavi, Hamza: Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology. In: Weiss, Anita M.: Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. The  
Application of  Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Lahore: Vanguard, 1987, p. 21-47. Here it remains open for further discussion  
whether states such as the Vatican apply as confessional states, as for instance Zingel suggests. See Zingel, Wolfang-Peter: Stabil ­
itätsanalyse  Pakistan.  In:  Faath,  Sigrid  (Ed.):  Stabilitätsprobleme  zentraler  Staaten:  Ägypten,  Algerien,  Saudi-Arabien,  Iran,  
Pakistan und die regionalen Auswirkungen. In: Mitteilungen, Vol. 67. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2003, p. 281-320.  
Sharif  al-Mujahid, historian and like Justice Javid Iqbal, the son of  Muhammad Iqbal, one of  the chief  architects of  Pakistan's  
official Islamic ideology, provides an international overview of  states with religious constitutional provisions. See al-Mujahid, 
Sharif: Ideology of  Pakistan. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 2001, p. 172-191. 
118 Considering these elements of  the religious narrative, they functionally appear similar to the secular-nationalist repertoire. See  
Friedland, 2001, p. 129.
119 See Smith, Anthony D.: Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of  recent theories of  nations and nationalism. London 
(a.o.): Routledge, 1998, p. 141; Juergensmeyer, Mark: The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular Order.  
Berkeley: Univ. of  California Press, 1994, p. 5ff.; Westerlund, David (Ed.): Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resur­
gence of  Religion in Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
120 This definition is still seen as state of  the art in the field of  nationalism. Cit. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Re­
flections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism, Rev. ed. London/ New York: Verso, 1991, p. 5.
121 See Olick, Jeffrey K.: Introduction. Memory and the Nation – Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations, p. 378. In: Social Sci ­
ence History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1990, p. 377-387.
122 See Moyser, George: Religion and Politics, p. 433. In: Hinnells, John R. (Ed.): The Routledge Companion to the Study of  Reli ­
gion. London (a.o.): Routledge, Repr., 2007, p. 423-438.
123 See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique (1762). Ed. Sálvio M. Soares, MetaLibri, 2008, Vol. 
4, p. 93-101.
124 “There was an implicit but quite clear division of  function between the civil religion and Christianity. Under the doctrine of  reli ­
gious liberty,  an exceptionally  wide sphere  of  personal  piety  and voluntary  social  action was left  to  the churches.  But  the  
churches were neither to control the state nor to be controlled by it. The national magistrate, whatever his private religious views,  
operates under the rubrics of  the civil religion as long as he is in his official capacity […].”  Cit. Bellah, Robert N.: Beyond Belief. 
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World. New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 176.
125 “This accommodation was undoubtedly the product of  a particular historical moment and of  a cultural background dominated 
by Protestantism of  several varieties and by the Enlightenment, but it has survived despite subsequent changes in the cultural  
and religious climate.” Cit. Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. 168-190. For the element of  choseness as a leitmotif  of  nationalist interpretation of  history, see Smith, Anthony D.:  
Ethnic election and national destiny: Some religious origins of  nationalist ideals. In: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, No. 3,  
1999, p. 331-355. 
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Prior to the rise of  nationalism as a focal point of  European academic research in the 1930's, French theor­
ist Ernest Renan (1823-1892) in his lecture  What is a Nation?, assigned a significant but nevertheless limited 
meaning  to  religion  in  the  building  of  a  nation.127 Renan's  „civic  nationalism“  is  based  on  a  „spiritual 
principle“, merging the glorious past of  a community and its common sense of  the present to live together as  
a nation – expressed in various cults of  belongingness and identification that include religion but are not de­
termined by its dogmatic core – rather than by its organizational uniting function and its pure symbolism.128 
Greek polis religion established a system of  cults, particular rituals and sanctuaries, as well as a sacred calender. 
This well-defined religious system was only accessible for a citizen of  the polis. In other words, only worship to 
the  polis' particular canon of  identity made the individual an accepted member of  the citizenry with all the 
privileges and responsibilities that were connected to the status of  a citizen. Renan's claim to free the national­
ist discourse from its dominant emphasis on objective characteristics such as race, class and religion, and to  
concentrate instead on the dynamics between the belief  in belonging together because of  shared past experi ­
ences – such as the sacrifice for the community – and its adaption to the present and the future, has proved 
highly influential to the historians' generation of  Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm. Being not less influential, 
his lecture Le Judaïsme comme Race et comme Religion129 deals explicitly with the ambiguity of  the determination of  
the Jewish people as a unique ethnically and religiously defined exclusive identity. Rejecting both models, Ren­
an claimed that only the expression of  a “collective moral consciousness” 130 based on the political interpreta­
tion and transformation of  world Jewry into a sovereign political entity as a state would substantiate and justify  
a Volk and a nation.131 
Kippenberg and von Stuckrad pointed out to the potential of  a discourse model of  religion with which the  
cultural manifestations could be shifted into the focus of  the general debate on religion in order to go beyond 
Bellah's narrow interpretation of  religion.132 A similar argument can be found in the concept of  a political reli­
gion according to which nationalism reproduces features of  traditional religion and thus serves as a “political  
surrogate” for religion.133 
According to Voegelin has religion an essential function with regard to the political ideologies of  the 20 th 
century which saw themselves as products of  modernity and secularism and as “anti-movements” and plural­
istic “non-ideologies”134 and targeted church and clergy but simultaneously occupied functional element of  re­
127 See Renan, Ernest: Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Lecture held at the Sorbonne University, 11 March, 1882 (Bibliothèque électronique 
de Lisieux).
128 See Ibid.
129 Held at a conference organized by the Cercle Saint-Simon, 27 January, 1883. For the print edition by C. Levy (1883), see Open  
Library. 
130 For this interpretation with regard to the Pakistani nationalist debate see Jalal, Ayesha: Self  and Sovereignty. Individual and Com­
munity in South Asian Islam since 1850. London (a.o.): Routledge, 2000, p. 326. 
131 See Renan, 1882. As a response to his works on Judaism, Renan was accused of  racism and antisemitism although not in a biolo ­
gical sense. In his 1883 lecture Renan distanced himself  from this criticism and also in later works he refused antisemitic determ­
inations, at that time a common phenomenon within the European discourse on nationalism. This was especially the case in 
German ethnic nationalism. Interestingly, since the 1980's, Israeli anti-Zionist  and post-Zionist  writers rediscovered Renan's  
works and referred to it in order to contrast the Zionist dogmatic connotation of  the Jewish people.
132 See Kippenberg, Hans G./ von Stuckrad, Kocku: Einführung in die Religionswissenschaft. Gegenstände und Begriffe. München: 
C. H. Beck, 2003, pp. 102/103. 
133 See Smith, 1998, p. 98.
134 See Maier, Hans: Politische Religionen. Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 2. München: C. H. Beck, 2007, p. 117.
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ligion or even combined elements of  religion.135 This is especially the case at the affective-psychological level 
with regard to the individual dynamics of  political movements and their rituals. Voegelin described political  
communities as social fields which could not be separated and treated solely as profane fields, e.g. of  legal or ­
der or power.136 In this sense, the connectivity between the individual and action and thought of  a political  
ideology come close to a “religious experience” and the active participation in a “mystical process”. As part of  
this process, the individual's relation to the state is similar to that of  a believer to its religious dogma. In other  
words, from the individual's point of  view, the state becomes a divine entity whereas the ideology is framed as  
a “political messianism”.137
And finally, the approach of  a “political theology” is based on very similar assumptions, meaning the intro­
duction of  theological models into the political arena and their secularization and use for the purpose of  rein ­
forcing the legitimacy of  specific policies. Then, political theology has to be seen as a system of  reasoning and 
discourse that uses religious concepts in order to understand, evaluate, and shape a course of  action in the 
political arena. In 1922, Carl Schmitt emphasized the unlimited power of  the non-relative absolute of  the state, 
in which he saw a conceptional secularized variation of  the absolute in religion. 138 This feature is manifested in 
various political cultures worldwide and includes political rhetoric by various religious agents. But beyond that,  
a politicized theology can provide a meta-narrative for the political entity and framing of  the past, the present 
and the future and provides a prism or matrix through which political reality can be interpreted and translated  
into theological meanings vice versa.139 As a result, here again, the plausibility of  actions by the state is under­
stood as following and extending “the institutional logic of  religion into the domain of  the democratic nation-
state [...]”.140
Following Almond and Easton and their approach towards political culture141, the inclusion into a develop­
ment process of  a political system towards modernity and a “cultural secularization” – in this study – makes  
sense only to a certain degree given the fact that Pakistan and Israel as states were established by nationalist  
movements whose leaders and founding fathers, despite their secular or even anti-religious stances, had to ac ­
commodate the religious sectors with a systematic inclusion of  religious elements into the legislative, execu tive 
135 See for instance Hobsbawm, Eric: Das Zeitalter der Extreme. Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. München: DTV, 3 rd Ed., 
1999, p. 19.
136 See Voegelin, Erich: Die Politischen Religionen (1938). 2nd Ed. München: Fink, 1996, p. 63.
137 See Maier, 2007, p. 114; Smith, 1998, p. 98; Hornung, Klaus: Das Totalitäre Zeitalter. Bilanz des 20. Jahrhunderts. Berlin (a.o.):  
Propyläen, 1993, p. 22-57. Similarly, Smith writes: “[…] a surrogate religion which aims to overcome the sense of  futility en ­
gendered by the removal of  any vision of  an existence after death, by linking individuals to persisting communities whose gener ­
ations form indissoluble links in a chain of  memories and identities.” Cit. Smith, Anthony D.: The Ethnic Origin of  Nations.  
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 176.
138 Until today, Schmitt's notion of  the state's use of  emergency rules or the state of  exception, the underlying main instrument of  
power in dictatorships, attracts research on the position of  the state in (post-)conflict societies for its prediction of  enduring au­
thoritarian rule. Carl Schmitt's contemporary political environment – the fragile Weimar Republic with the weakness of  the legis ­
lative parliamentary power and the president's uncontrolled power to enact the state of  emergency – and subsequent events, 
clearly substantiated his paradigm according to which the state of  normalcy becomes an abstract model, borne down by the ex ­
ception becoming the rule and instrument of  power in the hands of  the sovereign. For a commented work on Schmitt's concept,  
see Rissing, Michaela/ Rissing, Thilo: Politische Theologie. Schmitt - Derrida – Metz. Eine Einführung. München: Fink, 2009.  
See also Gray, Phillip W.: Political Theology and the Theology of  Politics: Carl Schmitt and Medieval Christian Political Thought, 
p. 177-181. In: Humanitas, Vol. 20, No. 1 / 2, p. 175-200.
139 This last reflection requires the incorporation into an appropriate conception and critical definition of  what the public political  
sphere is. Said this, and especially in the context of  the well-established conceptions of  the political culture, one becomes aware  
of  the limited validity of  classical system theory in political sciences. 
140 Cit. Friedland, 2001, p. 142.
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and judiciary. Rather, the emphasis laid on a “civic culture” based on secular and participative lines which at 
the same time bears strong non-secular values and beliefs, has to be critically revised. 142 The persistence and 
continuity of  religious institutions and religious symbolism stand in stark contrast to the model of  a secular  
oriented political system and give prove to the only limited use of  the concept of  political culture with regard 
to the analysis of  religious states and the influence of  religion and ideology on state and society. 143 The same is 
of  course true with regard to alternative models such as Kimmerling's “partial theocracy” which has been pop­
ularized by some accounts on the historical genesis of  Israel.144 Similarly, there is no appropriate model being 
used with reference to the secular discourse in Pakistan that lost much ground due to the expansion of  institu ­
tionalized official Islam and its counter-models as provided by traditional authorities and institutions of  learn­
ing.145 Further, any secular discourse on the role Islam could play in Pakistan's society seems to have become  
victim to the politics of  Islamization of  the 1970s and 1980s and growing tabooing of  its more contemporary  
and recent variants.146 Among the sources to which apologists of  a liberal-secular model, or a seemingly plural ­
ist Islamic model of  state refer – a kind of  welfare state (nizām-i-zakat), as proclaimed by the Jama'at-i-Islami 
and other religious parties – is Pakistan's national hero and „poet of  the East“ (Sha'er-i Mashriq) himself. Mo­
hammad Iqbal, whose poetry was re-interpreted and instrumentalized by zealots from both the religious and  
the secular camp, wrote: „Be it the royalism of  monarchs or the jugglery of  democrats; Separate religion from 
politics and one is left with the barbarism of  Genghis Khan.“147 Equally idealized seems the notion of  a “liber­
141 With regard to the factors that guarantee the stability for a political system, Almond and Verba see the “civic culture” as the mer ­
ger of  modernity and tradition as an ideal model. In contrast, they see the “political culture” as the model that allows the trans ­
formation of  a political system from tradition to modernity and as the „the particular patterns of  orientation toward political ob ­
jects among the members of  a nation“ Cit. Almond, Gabriel A./ Verba, Sidney (Eds.): The Civic Culture. Attitudes and Demo­
cracy in Five Nations (1963). Newbury Park: Sage Publ., 1989, p. 13. In this model, the orientation of  citizenry towards values  
and norms is cognitive, affective and evaluative. Only the balanced and positive orientation by citizens towards the state at all  
three levels allows a stable political system which, according to Easton's input-output model, is a interaction-oriented system 
which includes the participation of  all actors for their potential to mobilize political support and legitimacy. See Ibid., p. 14; and  
Easton, David: A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965.
142 Cit. Seitz, Werner: Die politische Kultur und ihre Beziehung zum Abstimmungsverhalten. Eine Begriffsgeschichte und Meth ­
odenkritik. Zürich: Realotopia, 1997, p. 93.
143 See Almond/ Verba, 1989, p. 30ff.
144 See Kimmerling, Baruch: The Invention and Decline of  Israeliness. State, Society, and the Military. Berkely: Univ. of  California 
Press, 2001, p. 207ff.
145 Secular is here being used as indicating the liberals' difficulties to combine European-democratic political thought with religion.  
Obviously, it seems problematic to imagine a secularized or de-sacralized alternative model of  state since this includes a funda­
mental paradigm shift by a state which is supposed to be religious because it has been created for a religious community, the 
Muslims of  the Indian Subcontinent. The same dilemma of  legitimation challenges those who, in the past and present alike,  
claimed Islamization of  state and society to be the one and only way into Pakistan's future, thereby creating a situation in which  
„one can very well ask, what is to be Islamized in a country which, by its raison d'être is supposed to be Islamic [...]“. Cit. Malik,  
Jamal: Colonialization of  Islam. Dissolution of  Traditional Institutions in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, 1996, p. 289. 
146 The term theocracy had been used during the formative period by Khalifa Abdul Hakim, co-founder of  the Institute of  Islamic  
Culture (1954) who was considered a modern progressive Muslim thinker: “Such is the theocracy of  Islam which is not to be  
identified with any theocracy that ever existed. Call it a theocracy or call it a secular state as you please: it synthesizes the virtues  
of  both repudiating the evils with which they often get contaminated.“ Cit. Hakim, Khalifa Abdul: Islamic Ideology: the Funda­
mental Beliefs and Principles of  Islam and their Application to Practical Life. Lahore: Institute of  Islamic Culture, 1961, pp. 
242/243. For the institute see Qasmi, Ali Usman: God's Kingdom on Earth? Politics of  Islam in Pakistan, 1947–1969, p. 1221-
1225. In: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2010, pp. 1197-1253.
147 Cit. Iqbal, Mohammad/ Malik, Fateh Mohammad (Ed.): Muslim Political Thought. A Reconstruction. Islamabad: Alhamra, 2002,  
p. 12. For the welfare state model and its discourse, e.g. within the issue of  Islamic banking, see Shehab, Rafiullah: Nizam-i-Za­
kat: The Fiscal System of  the Islamic State. In: Journal of  Islamic Banking and Finance, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1999, p. 32-39. For a  
brief  discussion of  Abul A lā al-Maudūdī's model of  an Islamic free economy, vague due to its lack of  concrete mechanisms, seeʿ  
Aziz, Farooq/ Mahmud, Muhammad: Islamic Economics system In the Eyes of  Maulana Maududi.  An Analysis.  In:  Indus  
Journal of  Management & Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2009, p. 45-50. 
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al democracy”, that under the banner of  “enlightened moderation” had been used by military ruler Pervez 
Musharraf  as a counter-ideology to the Islamization efforts of  the 1980s and its aftermath during the 1990s. 
However, the question of  how liberalism might constitutionally fit into a concept of  state whose nature is de­
termined by Islam and a lack of  institutional democratic experience, has not yet been placed in a broad public  
discourse but has attracted the country's intellectual circles and especially the military. Open sympathies have 
been expressed towards the Indonesian and Turkish systems for their balance of  power between the civilian  
government148 and the army and at least constitutional limitations to the religious forces.149 
The legitimizing function of  religious topoi and symbols in political systems – understood as “cultural  
power”150 – as interwoven competing identity drafts cannot be overemphasized. Part of  the debate about mod ­
ern political movements and new religious phenomena is the notion of  these new actors and institutions as a  
reaction to modernity itself. This notion requires the historical inclusion of  Western-European hegemonic cul­
ture since the 18th century and, in the case of  Israel, the Zionist's movements obsessive use of  European-na­
tionalist discourses. Especially the emphasis laid on religious and political collectivism in Islam and Judaism 
brings to the forefront a fundamental change of  the meaning and function of  religion.151 This change demysti­
fied and transformed religion from a pure theological-individual framework with focus on the thereafter into  
an ideological-collectivist system of  the present with a political theory and a clear draft for rule and power and 
their  legitimacy.152 This  study aims at  presenting a framework of  analysis  which highlights  the interaction 
between the political and the religious spheres in order to avoid typologies and categorization of  religious  
manifestations in politics. Further, this approach enables us to select a framework with which religious ideolo­
gies, actors and institutions can be adequately analyzed. This study sees religion as providing 1.) a basis on  
which specific political program can be articulated, 2.) as the basis to ensure legitimacy for providing a plat ­
form for mobilization, and, 3.) as a symbolism which allows for political activism and the formulation of  col­
lective identities.153 
148 As of  2012, the two governments' signature of  agreements and joint statements on high-level cooperation can be seen as part of  
this rapprochement. Beyond the relationship between the security establishments becoming closer, Pakistan is keen to win Tur ­
key as an investor. Incentives include special investment zones, similar to those provided to China. See Stratfor: Pakistan, Turkey: 
9 Joint Agreements signed, Situation Report, 22 May, 2012. 
149 Interview with Lt.-Gen. (Rtd.) Talat Masood, Islamabad, 8 April, 2011; Bajpai, Kanti: Pakistan's Future: Muddle Along In: Co ­
hen, Stephen P. (Ed.): The Future of  Pakistan. Washington: Brookings Inst. Press, 2011, p. 70-81: “By liberal democracy, we  
mean here the kind of  disposition exemplified by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of  Pakistan, or, to give a more contempor­
ary example, Turkey, where there is a regularly elected civilian leadership, an army that stays in the barracks but keeps a careful 
eye on things, and fairly widespread public support for moderate Islamic rules and standards in social life.” Cit. Ibid., p. 75. See 
also Farrukh, Saleem: Opinion Army. In: The News, 22 April, 2012.
150 Well known is the field study by Demerath and Rhys in which they highlighted the institutionalization of  religion by political  
leaders in order to gain power. After consolidation of  power, political elites make a drastic turn aimed to keep religion radically at  
arms-length. See Demerath/ Williams, 1992. 
151 For the concepts of  collectivism and the universal claim of  monotheistic religions see Eisenstadt's comparative works. For in­
stance Eisenstadt, S. N.: Jewish Civilization. The Jewish Historical Experience in a Comparative Perspective. New York: State  
Univ. of  NY Press, 1992, p. 23-42.
152 Cit. Malik, 1996, p. 15. An overview on the pioneers of  reform and politicization of  Islam offers Peters, Rudolph: Erneuerungsbewe­
gungen im Islam vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Rolle des Islams in der neueren Geschichte: Antikolonialismus und National ­
ismus, p. 105-126. In: Ende/ Steinbach, 1989, p. 91-131. See also Halm, Heinz: Die Araber. Von der vorislamischen Zeit bis zur Gegen­
wart. München: C. H. Beck, 2004, pp. 100/101; Ayubi, Nazih: Politischer Islam. Religion und Politik in der arabischen Welt. Freiburg 
(a.o.): Herder, 2004, p. 274-281; Malik, 1996, p. 15-17, and Schölch, Alexander: Der arabische Osten im neunzehnten Jahrhundert 1800-
1914. In: Haarmann, Ulrich (Ed.): Geschichte der arabischen Welt. München: C. H. Beck, 2nd Ed., 1991, p. 365-431.
153 See Tepe, 2008, p. 56-59.
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This is also important when reconsidering the general expansion of  civil societies, in which religious actors 
are central forces.154 And finally, one has to differentiate between religion as an individual or collective belief  
connected to an ideological setup identified with the state, and religion as an instrument of  differentiation and 
demarcation. These compressed reflections have also to reconsider the secularization paradigm and its re ­
versal.155 This dominant academic view had been questioned at the end of  the 1970s, with sociopolitical events  
like Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1978/79 and Pakistan's religious drive in which Islam became the motor for  
state policies and the misused legitimate instrument for consolidating military dictatorial power. Moreover,  
these events highlighted the fact that religion has ever been a significant factor in all spheres of  public and 
private life and that growing influx of  religion into politics proved predictions of  the decline of  religion to be  
unsatisfying. Rather, the development of  religion, its revitalization and the return of  the sacred, proved to be  
more complex, taking into consideration specific local, regional and global contexts and frameworks, that in­
dicate specific processes of  fundamental change like the privatization, pluralization156 and individualization of  
religious practices and their imagination157, within the perception and performance of  religion.158 Another con­
tribution by the secularization school is Norris' and Inglehart's “existential security hypothesis”: This approach 
claims that, if  a population is saturated by feeling secure because of  a maximum of  society of  the welfare state 
enjoys the gifts of  highly developed infrastructure, high life standards and physical security, it gradually turns  
away from religion.159 That is, according to the theory, because people, besides their improved socioeconomic 
living conditions and their acceptance of  the political parameters and the state and its ideology in which they  
are fully integrated, experience a lack of  insecurity.160 The notion of  the latter is important with regard to the 
issue of  security and insecurity in Israel and Pakistan, two countries, that since their creation were built on the 
basis of  a conflict- and threat-centered regional perceptions. 
154 See Kippenberg, 2008, p. 35-38.
155 Going back to the claim of  classical post-Enlightenment theories of  August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max  
Weber and Karl Marx who – in different ways – explained the dissemination of  positivist ideas as an irreversible evolutionary  
process, paralleling modernization of  Western societies in the socioeconomic and political spheres. As a selection of  its pro­
ponents see the early works of  Peter L. Berger who later recognized religion's prevalence, and Martin, David: A General Theory  
of  Secularization. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
156 Here theories of  the “religious market” argue that pluralization and competition among religious organizations and agents rely  
on supply and demand models with regard to the consuming believer. See Iannaccone, Laurence R.: The Consequences of  Reli ­
gious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of  Religion. In: Rationality and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1991, p. 156-177. 
157 See Luckmann, Thomas: The Invisible Religion: The Problem of  Religion in Modern Society, 1 st Ed.. New York: MacMillan, 
1967; Casanova, José: Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago (a.o.): Univ. of  Chicago Press, 2004, p. 211-234.
158 This became clear at the end of  the 1970's and is still the case, when observing the development of  Christian communities in 
Europe, the Americas and Africa: Declining memberships and participation in the traditional religious life and rituals of  worship  
like prayers, the believers' attachment to the very idea of  belief  itself, and the failure of  the Catholic church to recalibrate its pos ­
itions towards the most pressing needs and unresolved questions that alienate its most loyal believers, for instance with the issue  
of  Aids in developing countries, underline the decline and crisis of  institutionalized religion. This is also true for the tolerance 
aspect of  religious co-existence, which offers a mixed present global scenario with religious minorities being legally more and  
more integrated into society and state institutions on the one hand, and religious groups who face growing discrimination on the 
other.
159 That is the full provision of  material and immaterial factors by the state to its society. See Heinrich, Wolfgang / Kulessa, Man ­
fred: Deconstruction of  States as an Opportunity for New Statism? The Example of  Somalia and Somaliland, p. 58. In: Hippler,  
Jochen (Ed.): Nation-Building. A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? London: Pluto Press, 2005, p. 57-69.
160 See Norris, Pippa/ Inglehart, Ronald (Eds.): Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2004.
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2.2 Religious Imaginations of  the Nation 
Which identity underlies the logic of  a Muslim or a Jewish nation? How can an Islamic welfare state and a Jew ­
ish democracy be characterized given their parallel national claim for a Pakistan and an Israeli nation? The 
Western understanding of  what constitutes a nation as the highest political and religious unit of  organization  
would require the strong notion of  a public religion.  The concepts of  a Muslim and Jewish nation trans­
formed into the more universal models of  the community of  believers (umma) and the Jewish people imply a 
transnational approach and simultaneously defines the “other” by excluding specific strata of  society which do 
not by definition belong to the religious community, resulting in their de facto exclusion from the nation. 
2.2.1 Islam and the Umma
The umma161 as the transnational imagination of  a Muslim community is essential in the context of  nationalism  
and how it was interpreted among the Islamic scholars and intelligentsia. Ibn Khaldun had highlighted the 
need for inner social cohesion ( asabiyyaʿ ), institutional structures of  power and leadership as preconditions for 
the establishment of  an Islamic state for Muslims. His theory sees religion as the main pillar for statehood. 162 
The legitimacy of  this state is, thus, primarily based on its capacities to consolidate an equal and just society 
within and to defend Islam against external threats.163 With regard to Islam's strong universalist element with 
regard to the definition and nature of  the Islamic community, the umma and its colonial variants like (e.g. al-
jāmi‛a al-islāmīya)164 Eisenstadt remarks:
Islam connected the reconstruction of  a combined political-religious collectivity with a strong ideological nega ­
tion of  any primordial element or component within this sacred political-religious identity. Indeed, of  all the 
Axial Age civilizations, particularly the monotheistic ones, Islam was the most extreme in its denial of  the legit ­
imacy of  such primordial dimensions within the Islamic community – although in practice the story was often  
markedly different […].165 
The refusal to accept nationalism as the ideological vehicle through which legitimacy is ensured, has been justi ­
fied by political Islam on the basis of  a refusal of  the narrowed territorial reference to the homeland (watan). 
As a result, this orientation, at least theoretically, stands for a counter-narrative towards ethno-nationalism with  
constructions like pan-Arabism in between.166 Thinkers of  reform (islāh) Islam like Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani 
(1837-1897) and Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) had argued that the decline of  Muslim civilization had been 
the direct result of  the colonial experience. In this sense a self-inflicted malaise, they argued that only reform  
could introduce a rebirth or renaissance of  Islam (nahda). Western hegemony could only be countered by ad­
apting its social-political and materialistic and especially its military supremacy. Western innovations like the 
very idea of  the nation had been seen as an authentic element of  early Islamic times, exemplified for the  
161 The qur ānic term can be found in various meanings, for instance in 2:128 as ʾ umma muslima. In 2:213 umma wāhida is mentioned.
162 In contrast, language as the most important factor of  a shared “Arab” culture had been highlighted, for instance by the Syrian in­
tellectual Sati al-Husri (1882-1968). See Wieland, Carsten: Nationalstaat wider Willen. Politisierung von Ethnien und Ethnisier ­
ung der Politik: Bosnien, Indien, Pakistan. Frankfurt (a.o.): Campus Verl., 2000, p. 87.
163 See Weiss, Anita M. (Ed.): Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. The Application of  Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Lahore: Van ­
guard, 1987, p. 2-4.
164 Or the idea of  an “Islamic People” (Ahl-i Islām) with the Ottoman Caliphate as its cultural representation which arose in the late 
18th century. See Schulze, Reinhard: Geschichte der Islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert. München: C. H. Beck, 2. rev. Ed. 
(1994), 2003, p. 27-29.
165 Cit. Eisenstadt, 1992, p. 41.
166 See Wieland, 2000, p. 87.
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Muslims through the life of  the Prophet and his companions (sahāba).167 But beyond strict secular conceptions 
of  the umma168, and despite the powerful arguments in favor of  its deep connection with the nationalist West ­
ern discourse and their compatibility, any attempt to unify religion and political rule had to struggle with the 
dogma of  dīn wa daula which saw both aspects as one indivisible entity. This did not, however, include the de­
mand for the introduction of  entirely new life and faith practices in the life of  the Muslims or the establish ­
ment of  a new concept of  political rule and public policy, but rather a return to long-standing notions of  the  
ideal Islamic political system and its re-interpretation.169 The idealized Muslim umma is therefore beyond the 
size and meaning of  the nation and is, on a global level, the “community of  believers” which as a transnational  
social construct, and makes up for the largest political unit of  order.170 Its claim to leadership as articulated by 
the rhetoric of  political Islam in relation to other faith communities, is based on interpretations of  their partic ­
ularistic qur ānic notion, for instance in 3:110 (ʾ al- Imrānʿ ). Interpreted by Islamist narratives as the sanctification 
of  chosenness and divinely legitimized rule, this sūra had also been instrumental to claim of  Islamist parties 
worldwide of  gaining political power as a means to realize the principle of  God's absolute sovereignty in an Is ­
lamic state. However, Muhammad Asad (1900-1992), convert and co-architect of  Pakistan's first constitution, 
accepting the notion of  a community interpreted the sūra al- Imrānʿ  exclusively with regard to individual Muslim 
morality:
This is the moral justification of  the aggressive activism of  Islam, a justification of  the early Islamic conquests  
and of  its so called 'imperialism'. For Islam was 'imperialist' if  you insist on this term; but his kind of  imperial­
ism was not promoted by love of  domination, it had nothing to do with economic or national selfishness, noth­
ing with the greed to increase Muslim comforts at other peoples' cost; nor has it ever meant the coercion of  
non-believers into the fold of  Islam. It has only meant, as it means today, the construction of  a worldly frame 
for the best possible spiritual development of  man. For, according to the teachings of  Islam, moral knowledge  
automatically forces moral responsibility upon man. A mere platonic discernment between Right and Wrong,  
without the urge to promote Right and destroy Wrong, is a gross immorality in itself. In Islam, morality lives and 
dies with the human endeavor to establish its victory upon earth.171 
The discourse on the character of  an Islamic State was institutionalized only months after Pakistan's independ­
ence by Asad. Born in Lemberg as Leopold Weiss, the Jewish convert and scion of  a rabbinical family who 
had been educated in the spirit of  orthodox Judaism, had been strongly influenced by his perception of  the 
Jewish-Arab relationship in Palestine in the 1920s.172 Accordingly, Asad, who became director of  the Depart­
ment of  Islamic Reconstruction before he joined the foreign service where he represented Pakistan at the  
167 See Zubaida, Sami: Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and Contradictions, pp. 408/409. In: Nations and Nationalism, No. 10,  
Vol. 4, 2004, p. 407-420. Together with Prophet Muhammad, the  sahāba  left Medina in 622 A.D. and settled in Mecca. Their 
reputation as muhārijūn (emigrants, pilgrims) had been highlighted by the consolidating Pakistani state during the initial years with 
reference to the millions of  migrants from India who settled in the new Muslim state, mainly in Sindh, thus, providing the  
Pakistan project with another sacred element. For this debate see Chapter 3. 
168 For his contribution to the term, see Schulze, 2003, p. 30. 
169 See Khoury, Adel Theodor: Fundamentalistische und totalitäre Tendenzen im heutigen Islam, p. 86. In: Grabner-Haider, Weinke, 
1989, p. 86-96.
170 See Steinbach, Udo:  Die Stellung des Islams und des islamischen Rechts in ausgewählten Staaten. Einleitung: Vom islamis ­
ch-westlichen Kompromiß zur „Re-Islamisierung“, p. 200. In: Ende, Werner/ Steinbach, Uwe (Ed.): Der Islam in der Gegen­
wart. München: C. H. Beck, 2nd Ed., 1989, p. 198-211.
171 Cit. Asad, Muhammad: Islam at the Crossroads (1934), repr. Lahore: Talha Publ., 2003, p. 16.
172 What he experienced in the holy land made him adopt a highly critical view on Zionism which he refused as an attempt to trans ­
form European ills – and especially antisemitism and the nationalist claim of  chosenness – from the Diaspora to Palestine.
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United Nations, envisioned an Islamic state along the spiritual contours laid down by Pakistan's poet-philo ­
sopher-cum-ideologue Iqbal.173 
2.2.1.1 Indian Muslim Nationalism
The concept of  the nation as proposed by Muhammad Iqbal, the true father of  the Two-Nation Theory, had a 
strong influence in the League circles, as whose temporary chairman Iqbal had served. Its emphasis on millat 
established an overarching program of  religion, law and spirituality. Unlike the notion of  qaum, the Western in­
spired secular model of  nationhood which stressed the possibility of  a society of  believers and unbelievers,  
millat is characterized by an exclusive claim and features of  a religious community which, despite differenti­
ation, would provide equal rights to Muslims and non-Muslims.174 Leading figures of  political Islam such as 
the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, tried to elevate tolerance as a integral element of  the umma, and contrast it with a 
backward and "primitive" nationalism of  the West. According to them racism, national belonging and political  
ideologies were only minor manifestations and temporary phases in human history.175 The umma, in contrast, 
was styled as marking the end of  a development process and the cornerstone of  an ethnically, religiously, mor ­
ally and ideologically defined just society.176 In recent decades, and especially since the 1990s, Muslims world­
wide, either by direct participation in various theaters of  war in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans,  
or through their expressions of  solidarity and fraternity with the Muslim communities involved in fighting, had  
revitalized a spiritual and transnational understanding of  the umma and its territorialized variant, the dar ul-Is­
lām.177 The idea of  Pan-Islamism, after the collapse of  the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate – less in its im­
mediate impact on the process of  nation building in the colony and the political discourse that aimed at the 
emancipation of  the Muslim minority and influence but rather in its long-term effect – had manifested a 
strong symbolic discourse: The latent presence of  a neo-umma after the fall of  the Caliphate gained prominence 
in the Muslim collective memory, but could not offer concrete solutions for its transformation into a state.  
The demand for Muslim sovereignty on the subcontinent had been preceded by efforts to find a solution with ­
in the framework of  an Indian unit in which the Muslims saw their status protected by legal rights. In 1928,  
Jinnah spoke to the All Parties National Conference in Calcutta and called for a common constitution within a 
pan-Indian independent state in order to prevent the breakup of  the Subcontinent and a permanent estrange­
ment between Hindus and Muslims. Jinnah's last attempt to preserve the union may, can be seen as a crucial 
turning point and as an accelerating factor in the development of  a Muslim separatism, which finally expressed 
itself  in the Pakistan idea. The conference's failure to find a common position exposed the deep conflict of  in ­
173 See Asad, Muhammad: The Road to Mecca. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954, p. 8ff.; Windhager, Günther: Leopold Weiss ali ­
as Muhammad Asad. Von Galizien nach Arabien, 3rd Ed. Wien: Böhlau, 2008.
174 See Jalal, 2000, pp. 576/577. Thus, Iqbal proclaimed an inclusive nationalism that would not extinct the cultural distinctiveness  
of  the Indian Muslims as a spiritual entity and therefore, he stood for an alternative model to the Congress' composite national ­
ism with a united anti-colonial struggle as its amalgam. See Ibid., p. 224-239.
175 See Qutb, Sayyid: Zeichen auf  dem Weg (Ma'alim ti-t-Tariq). Istanbul: Islamische Bibliothek, transl. Shukri, Muhammed, 2005, p.  
227ff. 
176 See Lewis, Bernard: The Political Language of  Islam. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004, pp. 32/33.
177 See also Steinbach, 1989, p. 201. A new variant of  this grand theme, as of  2012, can be found in Pakistani mainstream media,  
with regard to discrimination and Buddhist violence in Myanmar against the Rohingya people.
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terests between the Congress and the Muslim League.178 Provincial representatives argued for separated and 
de-centralized electorates what would ensure the status quo with Muslim majorities like in Punjab and Bengal.  
This was against Jinnah's compromise to drop this demand in favor of  a one-third quota for the central gov­
ernment which would enable Muslim minorities in the other provinces to gain substantial participation. 179 In 
the wake of  growing unrest since 1933, especially due to the global economic crisis, Hindu-Muslim relation­
ship further deteriorated more and more when the Hindu-dominated Congress could expand its influence to  
the provincial governments significantly after the elections of  1937.180 The elections and the League's weak 
performance confirmed Muslim fears of  becoming marginalized despite their holding of  a total  share of  
around 25 percent.181 
The collective feeling of  being politically isolated evolved further from the end of  the 1920s, when the 
dream of  Hindu-Muslim shared independence declined substantially, until August, 1942, when Gandhi's Quit  
India  campaign182 deepened the growing distance between the League and the Congress. As a result, those  
voices claiming a Muslim unilateral move for the creation of  Pakistan, attracted more and more support. 
However, only after the Lahore Resolution (Pakistan Resolution) had gained momentum at the League's mysti­
fied meeting in Lahore, the claim for state sovereignty and the annulment of  the Government of  India Act of  
1935 gained more attention among the political power groups for it raised the issue of  territorial and political 
sovereignty on behalf  of  the whole of  “Muslim India”. While it did not claim the Government of  India Act 
to be null  and void, it  called for a revision of  the administrative status of  the “independent states” with  
Muslim majorities and the rights of  Muslim minorities in other areas to be strengthened: 
This session of  the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of  Federation embodied in  
the Government of  India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of  this 
country, and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India […]. Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole  
constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo, and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless  
it is framed with their approval and consent.183
In addition to its refusal of  the Act, the League brought forward its own constitutional demands for its re ­
spective territories:
[...] that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such  
territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as  
in the north-western and eastern zones of  India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent States' in which 
the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign [...]184
178 See Ludden, David: Geschichte Indiens. Essen: Magnus Verl., 2006, p. 221.
179 See Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar (a.o.), 2002, pp. 10/11.
180 The Congress gained majorities in seven of  the eleven provincial parliaments. The Government of  India Act as the constitutional 
reform of  1935 and the determination of  elections in 1937 had been refused by the League since it did not mention Muslim and  
minority rights explicitly. See Ludden, 2006, p. 223.
181 This existential fear had been aggravated by growing Hindu radicalism: The concept of  shuddhi (purification) claimed peaceful 
Hindu-Muslim coexistence in one state as being impossible. It further stressed the need for conversion and subordination of  
non-Hindu minorities to the new Hindu nation (Hindu Rashtra). These concepts referred to the ideological works of  V. D. Sav­
arkar and other Hindu intellectuals. Savarkar's Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? (1923) was a milestone in the history of  Hindu national­
ism; in 1925, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded and soon became the strongest organization for the promulga­
tion of  Hindu radicalism. For its religious-nationalist programs see Six, 2006, p. 93-97.
182 This movement under the lead of  Gandhi called for an immediate British withdrawal but failed when the British refused to do so  
and responded with the imprisonment of  the movement's leadership. 
183 Cit. Philips, Cyril Henry (Ed.): The evolution of  India and Pakistan: 1858 to 1947. Select documents, pp. 354/355. In: Select  
Documents on the History of  India and Pakistan, Vol. 4. London (a.o.): Oxford Univ. Press, 1962.
184 Cit. Ibid.
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Pakistan, despite the newspapers' headlines, was not mentioned as a sovereign Muslim entity.185 According to 
Jalal, Jinnah, in his meetings with the British side, evoked the scenario of  partition of  the Indian Subcontinent  
with the aim of  improving the League's position in the negotiations with the British and the Congress.186 
Simultaneously, the struggle for Muslim autonomy included the concept of  a sacred space for the purpose  
of  maintaining religious rites and practices which were based on the values of  Indian Muslims and whose con ­
tinuity was perceived to be essentially threatened by the processes of  secularization in the everyday life at the  
side of  the British colonial power as well as by what as seen as an aggressive Hindu hegemony. Still circulating  
in Pakistani society, this discourses of  genesis have a strong impact on the state-building process.187 Worldwide, 
the long period of  decolonization has seen new state names and start-ups, while the new creations experienced  
only minor territorial changes. For Rothermund the abstractness of  the idea of  Pakistan and the practical  
implementation of  this concept marks a curiosity in history.188 
Muhammad Iqbal and Jinnah provided the ideological foundation of  what would later be referred to as the 
two-nation theory as the political guiding concept of  the Muslims, which was of  a major help to shape a new 
Muslim national-religious identity. It developed mainly during the 1930s, especially after the founding of  the 
state in the wake of  a rewritten history of  the colonial chapter of  Muslim struggle for independence and  
claimed a new Pakistani identity. Jinnah himself  was confronted with the suspicion of  the clergy accusing him 
of  lacking the proper behavior and lifestyle of  a devout Muslim. As a Shiite he represented in many ways the 
type of  the "westernized" and elitist Aligarh graduate who during his four-year degree in London had been 
absorbed by the traditions of  the European Enlightenment and the practices and customs of  the British  
Empire of  that time. However, until 1940 he tried to dissolve Islam in the context of  a Muslim nationalism of  
its  religious connotations and to reinterprete it  instead politically and culturally as the leading concept of  
Muslim South-Asian statehood: 
The problem of  India is not of  an inter-communal character but manifestly of  an international one, and it must  
be treated as such [...] the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing  
India into 'autonomous national states'. It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to un ­
derstand the real nature of  Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in the strict sense of  the word.189
To some extent as a reactionary counter-concept to concept of  Hindutva and the “pan-Indian nationalism”190 
promoted by Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress elite, the League sought to legitimize the pursuit of  its own 
state by stereotyping its own community with the “image of  Pakistanis as an Arab in the Diaspora” and its ter ­
185 The day after, the Hindu Press published an article titled „Pakistan Resolution passed!“. See Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry: Pathway  
to Pakistan. Lahore: Longmans Pakistan Branch, 1961, p. 237.
186 For this argument see Jalal, Ayesha: The Sole Spokesman. Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999. 
187 The core of  successful nation-building, according to Hippler, includes state-building, socio-political integration and ideological  
legitimation. For his overview on the concept see Hippler, 2005, p. 3-27.
188 Rothermund points out to the similarities in the discourses linked to the creation of  Pakistan and Israel describing especially the  
territorial component as artificial constructs. See Rothermund, Dietmar: Delhi, 15. August, 1947. München: DTV, 1998, p. 38.
189 Cit.  Jinnah, Mohammad Ali:  Speeches and Writings of  Mr Jinnah,  Vol.  1.  Ahmad, Jamil-ud-din (Ed.),  Lahore:  Mohammad 
Ashraf, 1968, pp. 168/169. Quoted in Metcalf, Barbara D.: Islamic Contestations. Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan. New 
Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004, p. 183. 
190 See Khálid, Durán: Pakistan und Bangladesh, p. 276. In: Ende/ Steinbach, 1989, p. 274-307.
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ritorial claim as the demand for a “Land of  the Pure”191. The tension between competing Muslim and Hindu 
narratives indicates the identity crisis with which both camps had to struggle when defending their claims.
The endeavor of  introducing an Islamic government as the government of  sharī aʿ  or an Islamic State, has, 
in principle, not been accomplished.192 The latter, a state based on an Islamic system, had been prominently in ­
troduced into the South Asian nationalist discourse by Maudūdī. In his writings and speeches, he was keen to  
highlight the guaranties provided by his vision of  Islamic statehood with regards to comprehensive human 
rights for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in contrast to Western political and social concepts, which he, in  
principle,  saw  as  doomed  to  fail.193 The  perception  of  Western  civilization  and  its  inner  tensions,  from 
Maudūdī's point of  view, became corroborated in the ideological conflict between the supporters and oppon­
ents to the idea of  Pakistan where it was represented by the League's Westernized and Aligarh-oriented elite. 194 
Maudūdī feared that nationalism as a product of  Western political philosophy would degrade the Indomuslim 
community with religion losing ground as the main marker of  identity of  Muslim society and as the ideological 
backbone for the Islamic state (Islami Hukumat). Accordingly, the concept of  a religiously determined Muslim 
nation (Millat-i Islamiyya), as presented by Iqbal at the congress of  the Muslim League in Allahabad on 29  
December, 1930,195 contravened Maudūdī's political intention to cooperate with the League in the realization 
of  Pakistan in order to lobby for its modification into an Islamic state.196 The manner in which Maudūdī op­
posed the leaders of  the Pakistan Movement, similar to his stance against hegemonic imperialist British rule, il ­
lustrates the JI's ambiguous stance towards Western values and traditions which, until today, remained un­
changed in principle:
There is only one ideology in Pakistan and that's the ideology of  the Britishers who have left it and an elite class  
which was educated according to the British program. They are ruling the country in the same way. Different  
names were given to this class and to their so called ideology but they are the same people. The army is also part  
of  the establishment. There are differences among the Pakistan Army, there are very good friends of  mine in the 
army, retired generals, retired Chiefs of  the Army Staff  and former Chiefs of  the ISI. Unfortunately, these of ­
ficers could not rid the army of  the colonial and British legacy and traditions, it is still a slave of  those. Hamid 
Gul, Mir Aslam Baig, Ehsan ul-Haq and all these generals are retired and they come to Mansurah and we sit  
here, discuss things and pray together.197 
191 See Ibid., p. 278.
192 The case of  Sudan and Hassan al-Turabi's vision of  an Islamic political entity might serve as an example.
193 “[…] the United Nations, which may now be more aptly described as the Divided Nations, made a Declaration of  Universal Hu­
man Rights, and passed a resolution condemning genocide; regulations were framed to prevent it. They are just expressions of  
pious hopes. […] When we speak of  human rights in Islam we mean those rights granted by God. Rights granted by kings or le ­
gislative assemblies can be withdrawn as easily as they are conferred; but no individual and no institution has the authority to  
withdraw the rights conferred by God.” Cit. speech Maudūdī on Radio Pakistan, Lahore, 20 January, 1948. Quoted in: Maududi,  
Sayyid Abul 'Ala: Human Rights in Islam. Islamabad: Da'wah Academy, International Islamic University, 1998, p. 13. 
194 “The Jama'at welcomes the scientific advancement in modern industrial and agricultural development and wants to exploit the  
latest scientific technique and inventions in the development of  Pakistan's industry, agriculture etc. But that does not mean that  
we should play the blind and follow that civilisation in such cultural matters also which are antagonistic to ours and harmful to  
humanity in general. The Jama'at considers that the West has made two sorts of  contributions. The one is scientific development  
– the most useful service to humanity. The second is equally opposite to it, i.e., the worst service to humanity – uprooting the  
moral values altogether. It has administered a rude shock to the foundations of  family life, the bedrock of  every civilisation  
worth the name, by laxing the sexual discipline. It has robbed man of  the man in his and has reduced the individual to a mere  
economic animal.” Cit. Khan, Ali Ahmad: Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, p. 346. In: Verinder, Groves (Ed.): Pakistan. Government 
and Politics. In: Government and Politics of  Asian Countries Series, Vol. 12. New Delhi: Deep&Deep Publ., 2000, p. 333-351.
195 Later, in 1938, shortly before his death, Iqbal brought a modified model in the discourse with an emphasis on a Muslim state,  
thus, a territorially defined nationalism. See also Malik, Jamal: Islam in South Asia. A Short History. Leiden: Brill, 2008, p. 370.
196 See Maududi, Sayyid Abul 'Ala: Weltanschauung und Leben im Islam. Freiburg i. Br. (a.o.): Herder, 1971, pp. 172/173.
197 Cit. Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former amīr Jama'at-i-Islami, Mansurah, 21 August, 2009.
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Facing the reality of  partition of  the subcontinent and the creation of  two new states, the JI was forced to 
ease its aggressive rhetoric against Jinnah. This was due to the political calculus that the party could exploit the 
enormous religious driving force that had transformed Muslim separatism from its humble beginnings in 1906  
into official state ideology, and that it would profit from the popularity of  the Quaid-i-Azam by supporting the 
new establishment to a limited extend. The partition of  British India, like in the case of  other religious groups,  
forced the leadership to decide to either settle in Muslim Pakistan or to stay in what was now India.198  
Realizing the requirement to create a distinctive theoretical basis for an Islamic state and a strategy for its  
practical implementation, Maudūdī formulated a vision of  the state relying on Islam as a de-territorialized, tol­
erant and value-based system with strong reference to the rule of  the rightly guided caliphs (khalifat-i-rashidun) 
and the model of  the first Islamic state of  Medina, the sunna of  the early Islamic period of  the 7th century 
(“golden age narrative”199).200 The Jama'at's Islamic agenda can be labeled as neo-traditionalist, modernist and  
fundamentalist in a way, with qur ānʾ  and sunna, according to their view, being interpreted literally. While the sys­
tem of  modernity allows a re-interpretation of  Islamic traditional values and is therefore accepted in principle,  
its values and contents, were refused by Maudūdī. This change between antagonistic paradigms has been clari ­
fied by Brown through his “prism of  modernity”:
Rather than viewing modernity as a source of  light, dispelling the darkness of  tradition, we should instead ima­
gine tradition as a beam of  light, refracted by the prism of  modernity. A tradition emerges from the prism of  
modernity as a multi-colored spectrum of  responses. Some responses will show the effects of  modernity much 
more dramatically than others, but none will be entirely untouched. At the same time, each color of  the spec­
trum, each different response, is clearly rooted in the tradition. All responses to modernity from a religious tradi ­
tion, and even those that seem to have left the tradition altogether behind, maintain a certain continuity with the  
tradition, just as each band of  the spectrum is present in the light entering a prism.201
This model also allows an insight into Maudūdī's idea of  human knowledge and its limitations: Although he 
acknowledges the human ability to develop a transcendental self-consciousness as a precondition for know­
ledge, he limits it to the irrefutable and eternal truth of  the sunna and the qur ānʾ . Therefore, human self-con­
sciousness and wisdom does not culminate in individual experiences but in the collective experience of  God 
(ma'rifa).202 However, Maudūdī sees human perception as located within a development process, and as not yet  
able to understand and accept the supremacy of  divine law as the best law for mankind. 203 The call for impos­
ing sharī aʿ  is brought forth as part of  an political-revolutionary agenda. As an anti-thesis to tau īdḥ , the concept 
198 Despite JI Pakistan's centrality forms of  cooperation or exchange between Mansurah and the JI organizations in South Asia – in  
Indian-held Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India where Maulana Jalaluddin Umri led the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) to prom­
inence – do formally not exist. See website JIH.
199 See for instance Jackson, Roy: Mawlana Maududi and Political Islam. Authority and the Islamic State. London (a.o.): Routledge,  
2011, p. 84-86.
200 “According to Maududi, during the caliphate of  Hazrat Uthman the spirit of  ignorance reasserted itself  and found its way into  
the Islamic social system and at last the caliphate after the pattern of  prophethood came to an end to be replaced by a tyrant  
kingdom. This was a 'counterrevolution' which brought forward 'ignorance' under the guise of  Islam.” Cit.  Zaidi, Syed Mo­
hammad Zulqurnain: Pakistan Resolution and Jama'at-i-Islami, p. 386. In: Yusuf, Kaniz F./ Akhtar, M. Saleem/ Wasti, S. Razi  
(Eds.): Pakistan Resolution revisited. Islamabad: NIHCR, 1990, p. 367-398. The legitimacy to serve as political leaders exercising 
state power was part of  the caliphs' competence to decide on matters which laid beyond the scope of  the religious sources of  in­
terpretation as part of  their competence to bring policies in conformity with Islam (Siyāsa sharī aʿ ). See Rohe, Mathias: Das Is­
lamische Recht. Geschichte und Gegenwart. München: C. H. Beck, 2009, pp. 36/37.
201 Cit. Brown, Daniel W.: Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. In: Cambridge Middle East Studies, Vol. 5. Cambridge  
(a.o.): Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996, p. 3.
202 See Hartung, 2001, p. 114.
203 Cit. Maududi, 1971, pp. 150/151.
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of  ijtihād emphasizes the need of  independent interpretation and judgment to make Islamic tradition adopt ­
able to modern times and the idealistic form of  a Muhammadian society as envisioned by Maudūdī.204 Accord­
ingly, ijtihād as a tool of  legitimate re-interpretation and reform (islāh) to authenticate and harmonize elements 
within Islam with modernity, must be based on rational efforts towards finding the absolute truth with the 
qur ānʾ  and the sunna as absolute sources.205 In their efforts to bring about this re-interpretation, modernist Is ­
lamic thinkers came under pressure to which they sought to respond by re-opening the gates of  ijtihād. This 
was a major challenge to the Sunni ruling under 'Abbasid rule (750-1258) whereas independent reasoning by  
an authorized jurist or person of  knowledge (mujtahid) had been abandoned, and the ruling whereas a jurist 
was bound to taqlīd, the legal ideas as outlined by a recognized school of  law, was established.206 Ijtihād was, 
thus, the essential precondition for the establishment of  an Islamic state which, in turn, had to be realized be ­
fore in order to legitimate ijtihād. Again, this constitutes the central contradiction in Maudūdī's theoretical work 
which he aimed to bypass with the legalization of  a limited ijtihād as a proper means of  adapting Islam to the 
requirements of  modernity. His preoccupation with ijtihād had also been shared by Iqbal who in turn influ­
enced Maudūdī's works, for instance when emphasizing the importance of  the Prophet's life as a role model 
for the Muslim self  (khudi).207 Iqbal, who saw Islam as a practical means of  making the eternal principle of  
tau īdḥ  “a living factor for the intellectual and emotional life of  mankind”, saw the restrictions on ijtihād as the 
main reason for the “immobility of  Islam during the last 500 years”. 208 Although highly critical towards the 
separation of  religion and state and the Turkish model of  laïcité as constitutionally enshrined in 1937, he – like  
Iqbal – could not hide his admiration and referred to it as an example of  successful and legitimate ijtihād:
The truth is that among the Muslim nations today, Turkey alone has shaken off  its dogmatic slumber, and at ­
tained to self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of  intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from 
the ideal to the real transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle.209
To remain independent of  the interpretation of  the ulamā  ʿ ʾ 210, Maudūdī elaborated a theory about the method­
ology of  the change from the contemporary colonial social reality to the Islamic State in which his Jama'at-i-Is­
lami as a small elite would play a central intermediary role.211 
2.2.2 Judaism and the Jewish People
In the Israeli case, the relationship between the nation and the Jewish community is complex as well: Yet on 
the semantic level, the construction of  the “People of  Israel” (Am Yisrael) as the Jewish people whose place of  
descend and destination embodies a dialectics in which the biblical past is connected to the present and the fu­
204 See Rohe, 2009, p. 36ff.
205 See Peters, 1989, pp. 110/111, Hartung, 2001, p. 114.
206 See McDonough, 1984, pp. 10/11; Brown, 1996; Rohe, 20009, p. 46; and Hartung, 2001, p. 114.
207 See Jackson, 2011, p. 89-94.
208 See Iqbal, Mohammad: The Reconstruction of  Religious Thought in Islam. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2004, p. 130ff.
209 Cit. Ibid., p. 131, 142.
210 See Ahmed, 1994, p. 671.
211 See Hartung, 2001, pp. 114/115. With regard to the name of  his organization, Lewis writes: “Gathering is good – hence the  
jamā aʿ , “the community,” ruled by ijmāʿ, “consensus.” Separation is bad, and gives rise to firqa, “sect”, and other forms of  dis­
unity. The two notions are combined and contrasted in the prophetic injunction to the Muslim not to separate himself  from the  
community, the jamā aʿ .” Cit. Lewis, 2004, p. 13.
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ture through the land, had been subjected to different interpretations not before the 19 th century in the light of  
the European modern nation state.212 
Terms such as „Israel“, „House Israel“ (Bet Yisrael)213 and „Children of  Israel“ (B'nei Yisrael) refer to pas­
sages of  the Hebrew bible214 where they are synonymously used while describing the nation of  the Israelites 
and their father Jacob (Israel).215 It is its notion in the Hebrew bible as a holy community of  people chosen by 
God and connected to him as the descendants of  Abraham and Sara through the covenant which provides the 
term its sacral connotation.216 Following the era of  slavery and exodus to Egypt, God led the Israelites to the 
promised land where they dispersed the Canaanites to enforce God's laws. Zionist interpretation aimed to dis ­
solve the tension evoked by biblical and orthodox interpretation and to harmonize the term with the vision of  
a modern nationalist narrative.217
In the mutual encounter of  religion and state, similar to the qur ānʾ  who “spells out a political religion”, the 
sanctified connection between the umma and God, the Torah, as the “covenant between a people and a God, a 
people whose capacity to occupy eretz yisrael, the Land of  Israel, is dependent on following its laws.” 218 Thus, 
scriptural understanding and reference to the religions of  Judaism and Islam “provide images and precepts for 
a society, indeed the foundations for a state”219
2.2.2.1 Zionism
Broadly speaking, Zionism as a modern ideological movement of  Jewish nationalism defines the religious, ter ­
ritorial and political framework of  the relationship between Judaism and the claim to intervention in history 
and political sovereignty. Thus, the declaration of  the State of  Israel on 14 May, 1948, manifested the political  
ideology of  Zionism and, in the sense of  Herzl, created a sovereign and international recognized Jewish state.  
The idea of  a “national home” had been evolved when the majority of  East European Jewry were persecuted  
and  threatened.  Herzlian  Zionism stands  among the  various  Zionist  schools  of  thought  as  a  consensus 
between political and cultural Zionism with regard to their central demands as they had been earlier articulated  
at the First Zionist Congress (29-31 August, 1897) in Basel.220 
In his Judenstaat Herzl referred to Freiland, ein soziales Zukunftsbild (1890), written by his friend, the economist 
Theodor Hertzka (1845-1924) in which he portrayed the vision of  a free and just society of  settlers in Kenya.
212 See Brenner, Michael: Propheten des Vergangenen. Jüdische Geschichtsschreibung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. München: C. H.  
Beck, 2006, p. 19-21.
213 See Jeremiah 31:33.
214 The Tenakh, mentioned often only in its acronym TNK, includes the Torah (commandment), den Nebiim (prophets) und Ketubim 
(scriptures).
215 See Genesis 32:29; 35:10.
216 The covenant between Abraham and God as being valid and obligatory for Jews. In the biblical Jewish tradition also berit mila, 
the “covenant of  circumcision”. See Stemberger, Günter: Jüdische Religion. München: C. H. Beck, 5 th Ed., 2006, p. 11-15; Deu­
teronomium 7:6.
217 Herzl's works document this attempt quite clearly. See Herzl, Theodor: Der Judenstaat. Versuch einer modernen Lösung der 
Judenfrage. Leipzig (a.o.): Breitenstein, 1896, p. 11.
218 Cit. Friedland, Roger: Religious Nationalism and the Problem of  Collective Representation, p. 128. In: Annual Review of  Soci ­
ology, Vol. 27, 2001, p. 125-152.
219 Cit. Ibid., p. 127.
220 See for instance Hecht, Georg: Der neue Jude. Leipzig: Engel, 1911, pp. 9/10.
221 See Herzl, 1896, p. 4.
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 The entity, which Herzl demanded to be established in Argentine or Palestine222, would be guided by the Soci­
ety  of  Jews,  a conglomerate responsible for the political,  diplomatic and scientific representation of  Jewish  
Palestine to foreign states and financiers.223 To make the “royal dream” of  “Ueber's Jahr in Jerusalem” reality,  
Herzl proposed the establishment of  Jewish financial institutions which would provide independence. 224 Eco­
nomic progress and wealth225 would be based on the work of  the Jewish Company, a chartered stock company 
responsible for real estate, land appropriation and building.226 
The idea of  returning to Mount Zion is integral part of  Jewish thought since the destruction of  the Second  
Temple and territorial Zionism is deeply connected its legacy:227 Like in the case of  Pakistan, the act of  state 
independence of  1948 is still seen as highly problematic with regard to the relationship between Zionism and  
Judaism and the State of  Israel and his acceptance among religious Jews. Despite all their sacralized concep­
tion of  the pre-exile Land of  Israel, the Zionist founding fathers perceived the idea of  Israel primarily through 
the secular prism and, thus, created an “anti-thesis to traditional messianism”228. According to the tradition­
al-orthodox messianic interpretation collective salvation will be brought by the Messiah at the end of  patient  
suffering and hoping.229 The idea of  both individual and universal eschatology is closely linked to it: Only the 
return of  the Jewish People as the “community of  Israel” to the united Land of  Israel would guarantee re ­
demption (yesha) by a Messiah as a logic result of  Jewish religious life in the land according to the command­
ments of  the Torah. Accordingly, rule in its political dimension in the State of  Israel is legitimized only when  
subjected to messianic leadership. Even those Zionists who were eager to refer to the religious-biblical symbol­
ism of  Judaism were confronted by the resistance of  the Ultra-Orthodoxy (Haredim) who felt that any Jewish 
intervention in time and space would endanger the survival of  religious tradition and its divine command­
ments (Halacha).230 
The position of  the Zionist founding movement in pre-state Palestine was dominant due to its institutional  
empowerment of  semi-official organizations such as the World Zionist Organization, the Labor Zionists of  Dav­
id Ben-Gurion, the Jewish Agency and the trade union Histadrut. In the light of  this strong institutional fortifica­
tion, the resistance of  local non-Zionist Jewish groups was comparably weak and, thus, favored the consolida ­
222 Palestine was given priority since it would enable the Jewish settlers to uphold custodianship over the ex-territorialized Christian  
holy places. Thus, the Jewish government – its leadership heading an aristocratic republic with reference to the European mon­
archic model, to which Herzl adhered – would earn legitimacy from its “Ehrenwacht” in the eyes of  the world. See Herzl, 1896,  
p. 28, 73/74. 
223 According to Herzl, the Society which he considered “the new Moses of  the Jewish People” would represent Jewish values and  
morality. Cit. Herzl, 1896, p. 70.
224 See Herzl, 1896, p. 15.
225 See Herzl, 1896, p. 42.
226 See Ibid., p. 33-37.
227 See Avineri, Shlomo: The Making of  Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of  the Jewish State. New York: Basic Books,  
1981. The territorial demand was highlighted by Herzl according to whom the Jewish people as a people of  the middle-class re ­
mained highly independent but relied on the European powers' support in the struggle for land. See Herzl, 1896, p. 27.  
228 See Bunzl, John (Ed.): Islam, Judaism, and the Political Role of  Religions in the Middle East. Gainesville: Univ. Press of  Florida,  
2004, introduction.
229 See especially Ravitzky, Aviezer: Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago, London: The University of  
Chicago Press, 1996.
230 See Ingber, Michael: Fundamentalismus im Judentum und in der jüdisch-israelischen Gesellschaft im Staat Israel, p. 101. In: Six,  
Clemens; Riesebrodt, Martin; Haas, Siegfried (Ed.): Religiöser Fundamentalismus. Vom Kolonialismus zur Globalisierung. In:  
Querschnitte, Vol. 16. Innsbruck, Wien (a.o.): Studien-Verl., 2004, p. 91-115; Friedman, Menachem: The Haredi (Ultra-Ortho­
dox) Society- Sources, Trends and Processes. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1991.
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tion of  the state as a Jewish ethnic-centric republic.231 Peleg underlines that the political drive of  the Ben-Guri­
on leadership until 1948 lacked serious efforts to introduce an alternative model of  liberal democracy „based  
on full civil equality in law and in practice, and enshrined in a written constitution and a comprehensive bill of  
rights“. Indeed, the reasons why the Zionist elite voted against passing a written constitution in 1949 were 
complex. In addition to an “illiberal” spirit within the founding party Mapai and harsh opposition by the reli­
gious parties, Ben-Gurion's personal style of  governance was that of  a hegemonic patriarchate in which the 
doctrine of  statism, that is the supreme legacy of  state and nation above class and confession, ruled the mind­
sets of  the political elite.232 
Those Zionist groups that were committed to the idea of  a territorial and political Jewish state were not 
only predominantly secular, rather they emphasized the demand to radically break with traditional Judaism and  
the period of  exile, associated with the stereotype of  the “Ghetto Jew”. Only the establishment of  a state for 
the  Jewish  people  could  guarantee  for  the  protection  against  repressions  and  antisemitism.  “Leaving  the  
Ghetto” of  Europe and settling land was the amalgam that had held the various Zionist groups together since 
not only the question where the Jewish State was to be founded divided the different camps: “'Zions' where  
located in areas as far flung as Argentina, Alaska, Angola, Ecuador, French Guyana, the New Hebrides and  
Tasmania. A recent book carried the title States for the Jews: Uganda, Birobidzhan and 34 Other Plans.”233
This division was deepened when Herzl died in 1904, with his followers trying to push forward their indi­
vidual territorial demands.234 The advocates of  the Jewish state had ever been confronted by the orthodoxy, 
that refused the idea of  a Jewish nation-state in Palestine, built by human hands before the intervention of  the 
Messiah – “Our nation is a nation only through its Torah”235. In this respect, the cultural Zionism of  Achad 
Ha'am (1856-1927) aimed at forming a new Hebrew cultural framework for the immigrants to Palestine. 236 
Arts, language, academia and literature were the grounds on which a new type of  Hebrew self-understanding –  
drawn by Max Nordau's Hebrew “Muscle Jew” – emerged.237 This clear distinction between secular and reli­
gious perished when a minority of  rabbis joined the Zionist project and religious Zionism was invented. From 
the orthodox point of  view, this form combined the requirements of  tradition and of  the political ideology of  
231 With reference to historical comparisons of  new states, Migdal highlights an actor-oriented approach in which he differentiates 
between „old rulemakers“, „potential rulemakers“ and „potential statebreakers“ which are the basic interest groups with the  
strongest influence on the state-building process. See Migdal, Joel S.: The Crystallization of  the State and the Struggles over  
Rulemaking : Israel in Comparative Perspective. In: Kimmerling, Baruch (Ed.): The Israeli State and Society. Boundaries and 
Frontiers. Albany: State Univ. of  New York Press, 1989, p. 3-23.
232 See Peleg, Ilan: Democratizing the Hegemonic State. Political Transformation in the Age of  Identity. New York: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2007, p. 174-176. Mamlachtiut, in religious Zionism stands for the acceptance of  the state leadership and the Chief  
Rabbinate and their decisions in the sense of  civilian obedience with can be expanded to the traditional orthodox rabbinical au­
thorities. In the light of  the historical experience of  the fratricidal war between the biblical kingdoms of  Israel and Judea, dis ­
obedience or violence against fellow Jews is seen as endangering the unity of  the Jewish People and is, thus, a taboo. See Adel ­
man, 2008, p. 36; see also interviews in ICG Middle East Report: Israel's Religious Right and the Question of  Settlements, No.  
89. Jerusalem/ Brussels, 2009, p. 6-11.
233 Cit. Shindler, Colin: What Do Zionists Believe? London: Granta Books, 2007, p. 7. 
234 Israel Zangwill became the leader of  those who demanded Uganda to be the new Jewish home. See Hecht, 1911, pp. 12/13.
235 Cit. Saadia Gaon, in: Dieckhoff, Alain: The Invention of  a Nation. Zionist Thought and the Making of  Modern Israel. New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2003, p. 138.
236 According to Kohn, Ha'am sought to create a miniature of  Jewish life in Palestine as a bridge between present and past which 
would harmonize the relations with the Diaspora.  See Kohn, Hans:  Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient.  
Frankfurt: Societäts-Verl., 1931, p. 179.
237 See Hecht, 1911, p. 10.
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creating a state for Jews in Palestine without contradiction.238 In regard to the messianic element of  traditional 
orthodox thought, a new dynamic became acute when during the 1920's, the chief  rabbi of  the Yishuv Abra­
ham Yitzhak HaCohen Cook (1865-1937) declared the Zionist endeavor and the desired Jewish state a pre-
stage on the way to redemption and the advent of  the Messiah. This messianic conception and other teachings  
of  Rabbi Cook strongly influenced the emergence of  religious-nationalist groups and the settler movement  
after the Six-Days-War (1967).
In the discourse on the political legitimation of  the state, the role of  Judaism and its expression became a 
practical matter since many Zionist leaders, involved in the negotiations, led by Ben-Gurion, agreed on the 
point that Judaism needed to be formalized but advocated a strict division between state and religion. Others  
voted for the implementation of  Halacha as  the guiding and legitimizing principle  of  the state.  The reli­
gious-political groups, basically represented by the anti-Zionist ultra-orthodox  Agudat Yisrael, demanded the 
perpetuation of  the status quo of  the Yishuv – religious jurisdiction, including matters of  personal status (mar­
riage, divorce) would continue to be directed by the Chief  Rabbinate under Jewish halachic law. 239 In return for 
political support, Ben-Gurion accepted further demands regarding Sabbath, Kashrut laws, autonomy of  the reli­
gious education and representation in the High Court.
As many Zionist leaders had emphasized before, the endeavor of  Zionism was comparable to the pro­
grams of  secular-nationalist movements worldwide, seeking the establishment of  a sovereign territorial and 
political entity for a people. The model of  statehood promoted by Ben-Gurion's pioneering socialist Zionism 
went further by characterizing the state in the making as a national state and bearer of  a universalistic enlight ­
enment, an ethos expressed by means of  democracy and equality. The Israeli telos of  being a light unto the na­
tions (or lagoyim) ought to harmonize two principles of  legitimation: The dialectics between nation and state  
offered the framework of  the nation as a product of  a primordial national community whose members share 
cultural traditions, origin and historic continuity at such a rate that the demand for the state is legitimized in  
terms of  a “natural and historic right”240. Created by and for the nation, the state's raison d'être is to uphold 
the nation's continuity and is in the specific Israeli case closely linked with the safeguarding function of  state  
power to guarantee independence and, in the light of  the shoa, the physical existence of  the Jewish People in 
the State of  Israel: “The Zionist project did not bring survivors of  the Holocaust to Israel to suffer another 
Holocaust.”241 In other words, as Herzl had proclaimed in his theory, the Jewish people represented an entity  
because of  external threats.242 
Regarding the boundaries of  this national particularistic entity, as the one and only effective political com­
munity with substantial participation in state and society, even citizens, that are not member of  the national 
group but do apply to all legal requirements for citizenship, cannot participate in the political community as  
238 See Brenner, Michael: Geschichte des Zionismus. München: C.H. Beck, 2. Ed., 2005, pp. 89-92.
239 The Judges Act of  Knesset was adopted in 1953. 
240 See Provisional Government of  Israel: The Declaration of  the Establishment of  the State of  Israel. Official Gazette, No. 1, Tel  
Aviv, 14 May, 1948.
241 Cit. opening remarks, MK Tzipi Livni, Opposition Leader (Kadima) at the 3rd Annual Conference on Security Challenges of  the 
21st Century, INSS Tel Aviv, 15 December, 2009.
242 See Herzl, 1896, p. 14.
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full-privileged members: Non-Jews, Israeli Arabs and immigrants who do not apply to the requirements for ­
mulated by the Law of  Return  (aliyah)243 are therefore not fully recognized by this exclusive conception as 
“Jewish nationals”. Contrary to this, according to the universalistic principle, the notion of  the state as a fabric  
of  policy-making in order to achieve collective goals does, ideally, respond to the will of  its citizenship in  
which all individuals that are by law citizens of  the state are included and therefore represent the effective  
political community. 
The combination of  both principles and their implementation into the state by the elite of  socialist Zion­
ism could not happen without ideological and pragmatic tensions. This became obvious when more and more 
immigrants had to be “absorbed” in the early Israeli society. In the context of  early pioneering Zionism, this  
procedure was, beyond its legal implications, linked to the idea of  a Zionist re-education of  the new nationals.  
Disillusioned by the failure of  early pioneering socialist Zionism – manifested in the Kibbutzim 244 – it was ob­
vious that the new state, settled by an international and intercultural melting-pot society needed a less narrow  
framework for the identification of  citizenship with the state and to arrange a more comprehensive ideological  
basis for the inclusion of  most segments of  society. Statism (mamlakhtiut) became the dominant vehicle for le­
gitimacy from the 1950's to the early 1960's. Proposed by the Labor elite that had to respond to the exorbitant  
influx of  immigrants that were not affiliated – or rather, not “duly reeducated in the light of  revolutionary 
Zionist values”245 – , statism represented an elite discourse that is deeply linked with Ben-Gurion's personal 
perception of  state supremacy.246 It emphasized the unifying character of  the Jewish cultural and historical her­
itage in the Land of  Israel. As a “civil religion of  one subgroup without hampering the basic unity of  the Jew ­
ish population” a process of  revitalization and nationalization of  Jewish biblical symbols and motifs resulted  
in the adoption of  religious holidays, excavation projects in Israel etc.247 Regarding the role of  the state and its 
interaction with the citizenship, statism was based on a state-centred civil obedience.
The strong impact of  the specific socialist Zionist drive – personified by the founding father and the “Ben-
Gurion Boys” Moshe Dayan, Simon Peres and Moshe Sharett248 – on state-society structures can also be ob­
served in terms of  a continuance of  Ashkenazi dominance in all Zionist institutions ( Jewish Agency, Histadrut, 
Jewish National Fund (JNF), Zionist Council etc.) and the strategy of  political cleansing – off  “lefties” and “social ­
ist red flags” – and radical replacement of  positions, that followed “the day after” Likud's electoral victory in 
243 Enacted in 1950, I shall refer to the Law of  Return (Amendment No. 2) 5730-1970, passed by the Knesset on 10 March, 1970.  
Art. 4B of  this amendment of  the Chok HaSch'vut defines a Jew as "a person who was born of  a Jewish mother or has become 
converted to Judaism and who is not a member of  another religion" and, thus, goes beyond the halachic definition.
244 The extend to which socialist elements were inherent during the realization of  the Kibbutz ideal, is in fact controversial. Israeli  
scholars who position themselves as “post-” or “anti-Zionists”, argue that the first settlements in pre-state Israel were the begin­
ning of  a systematic settlement policy that reflected the structures of  an colonial “ethnocratic settler society”. See for instance  
Piterberg, Gabriel: The Return of  Zionism: Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel. London: Verso, 2008.  
245 Cit. Cohen, Erik: The Changing Legitimations of  the State of  Israel, p. 150. In: Medding, Peter Y. (Ed.): Israel. State and Society,  
1948-1988. Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew Univ. Jerusalem, Vol. 5, pp. 148-165.
246 See Liebman, Charles S. / Don-Yehiya, Eliezer (Eds.): Civil Religion in Israel. Berkeley (a.o.): Univ. of  California Press, 1983, pp.  
81-122; Peleg, 2007, S. 174-176.
247 See Liebman / Don-Yehiya, 1983.
248 The same applies to the opposition with what has been called revisionist-rightist Zionism. Until today, the elite of  this political  
milieu is prominently represented by the Ashkenazi Arens, Begin, Weizmann, Livni and Netanyahu families and Begin's  Herut 
party, today's Likud, that took over in 1977 and initiated an ideological turn in Israeli politics and society.
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1977.249 The exclusive setup of  Israel's political community and its institutions was maintained in essence al ­
though over the last few years, yet a mild transformation can be observed. Beyond these inclusive “cosmetic” 
changes, the dominance by one ethnic group – Ashkenazi Jews, politically affiliated with both major blocs, so­
cialist and liberal-revisionist Zionism – continues.250 The latter, that lacked the broad networks and organiza­
tional strength of  socialist Zionism, during the 1960's began to open its platform and lower positions for other 
ethno-national groups. Exemplary, is the rise of  the Sephardi Guardians of  the Torah (Shas) during the 1980's as 
the reaction of  the Sephardi minority to a social, economic and scholarly marginalization in the Israeli State.  
However, it was a generation of  young rabbis, stemming predominantly from a Sephardi milieu whose split  
from the Askenazi  Agudat Yisrael was basically induced by scholarly arguments and sectarian disputes. Their 
claim of  restoring the “Sephardi crown to its ancient glory” ought primarily to restore the prestige of  the 
Sephardi seminaries and Torah schools (yeshivot), rather than to create a political platform to represent a Seph­
ardi identity – a term that had in fact never been used in Israel before Shas entered the political community.251 
2.3 Nationalism and National Identities 
To characterize nationalism as a political field more precise, it is necessary to respond to the different theoret­
ical approaches within this controversial field of  research to allow for a concrete operationalization of  the 
central terms "nation" and "nationalism". The concept of  the nation proves to be problematic in terms of  its  
limited applicability on almost exclusively Western European contexts. Nevertheless, the struggle for suprem­
acy in Palestine between Jews and Arabs was identified early as a special case. 252 Jewish historians such as Hans 
Kohn (1891-1971) who stood close to the Zionist idea, legitimized the demand for Jewish sovereignty with 
reference to the indivisible unity of  the land, the religion and the political requirement of  Zionism. 253 Regard­
ing the question of  the development of  nations, having been formulated by Renan already a century ago in a  
similar manner, within the research on nationalism a controversy between primordialists and “modernists” 254 
has been created. Unlike the primordialists that emphasize the origins of  the nation in its continuity with so ­
cial, economic and political organization of  the pre-modern period, the latter based their argument on the 
concept of  the nation and its evolution in the light of  the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and industri ­
alization.
249 Interview with Morris  Zilka,  former Special  Envoy of  Jewish Agency to Iran, Canada; JNF Head Africa Dept.,  Judea and 
Samaria etc., Tel Aviv, 11 January, 2010.
250 See Peleg, 2007, p. 168ff.
251 This was the beginning of  a movement of  renewal within the Haredi sector, expressed by the mobilization of  the torahni concept 
- following the Torah, referring to reformed religious and historical traditions to the modern Israeli context – and t'shuva, mean­
ing the revival of  a more observant lifestyle and a doctrinal separation from other t'shuva interpretations, e.g. by the more messi­
anic  Chabad Hassidism. See Lehman, David/ Siebzehner, Batia: Remaking Israeli Judaism: The Challenge of  Shas. New York:  
Oxford Univ. Press, 2006, pp.42-119; Rosmer, Tilde: Shas. The Sephardi Torah Guardians and their Construction of  the New 
Jewish Israeli Identity. Unpubl. M.A. Thesis, History of  Religions, University of  Oslo, 2002.
252 See Kohn, 1931, pp. 80/81.
253 See Ibid., p. 175-182ff.
254 Representative for the “constructivists” of  nationalism see also Deutsch, Karl W.: Der Nationalismus und seine Alternativen.  
München: Piper, 1972; Kedourie, Elie: Nationalism. Oxford (a.o.): Blackwell, 4th Ed., Repr., 1994; Hobsbawm, Eric J.: Nations 
and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge (a.o.): Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd Ed., Repr., 1994; Anderson, 
1998.
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As a sound political  concept neither universalist  nor incidental,  Gellner assessed nationalism as a con­
sequence of  the European Enlightenment, and drew attention to its deep socioeconomic roots which derive 
from a radical historical break and transition from the agrarian to the industrial society and modernity itself. 255 
This is not to say that the modernist approach per se denies the historical emergence lines of  nationalism,  
which date back to “pre-modern” times. Rather did modernity with its socio-economic factors dominate over  
other factors and traditions, such as the category of  ethnicity, which had been strongly emphasized by Smith.  
Gellner attaches high importance to the development of  the concepts of  nationalism and the nation state:  
Both phenomena are not natural, inherent characteristics of  human development, but rather represent the pre ­
requisite and centric point of  reference of  nationalism.256 But Gellner points out to asymmetries in the interre­
lationship between the state and the nation. According to him, there have always been countries “that have 
certainly emerged without the blessing of  the nations.”257 And also Kedourie sees the emergence of  modern 
nationalism as based on an ideological movement and the symbolic language of  nationalism, thus, a self-gener­
ated process.258
Symbolism and rites are the format that ensures a sense of  identity, as a prominent, ceremonially shaped  
communication.259 The use and ritualization of  particulate elements of  history by ceremonial communication  
never occurs in a “power-neutral” space. Instead, the symbolic codes of  an identity are always determined by 
certain social groups260 that are either motivated by short-term political and electoral calculations or by a long-
term ideological-political motivation. The processing of  colonial experience and the initiation of  a new nation­
al narrative context as a mediator between collectively-national and historical memory as the balancing act 
between patriotism and subversion is, contrary to the Halbwachs' postulate, closely interwoven with the re ­
spective narrative of  the national memory.261 Historiography shapes to a not inconsiderable part the national 
memory and can provide legitimacy. The rise of  nationalist political movements worldwide has established the 
255 See Gellner, 1997.
256 “Nationalism is a state-centered form of  collective subject formation, a form of  state representation, one grounding identity and  
legitimacy of  the state in a population of  individuals who inhabit a territory bounded by that state.” Cit. Friedland, 2001, pp.  
137/138.
257 Cit. Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983, p. 6. Gellner sees a nation as „two men are of  
the same nation if  and only if  they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of  ideas and signs and associ ­
ations and ways of  behaving and communicating.“ Further he writes: „Two men are of  the same nation if  and only if  they re­
cognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations make the man; nations are the artifacts of  men's  
convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of  persons (say, occupants of  a given territory, or speakers of  a given  
language, for example) becomes a nation if  and when the members of  the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and 
duties to each other in virtue of  their shared membership of  it. It is their recognition of  each other as fellows of  this kind which  
turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-  
members.“ Cit. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
258 See Kedourie, Elie: Nationalism in Africa and Asia. New York (u.a.): The World Publ. Company, 1970. Here the notion of  iden ­
tity comes into play with reference to Halbwachs and Assmann. For their concepts of  collective identity and memory as well as  
history as a “super-organic” product of  scholarship and sciences, see Halbwachs, Maurice: The Collective Memory. New York:  
Harper & Row, 1980, p. 50-87; Zerubavel, Yael: Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of  Israeli National Tradi ­
tion. Chicago (a.o.): Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 4/5; Assmann, Jan: Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und 
politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen, 6th Ed. München: C. H. Beck, 2007, p. 134-143; Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah/ Giesen, 
Bernhard: The Construction of  Collective Identity, p. 74. In: Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Vol. 36, 1995, p. 72-102.
259 See Assmann, 2007, p. 143.
260 See Eisenstadt/ Giesen, 1995, p. 78ff.
261 Rather than using nationalism as the result of  a long historical process that ensured national unity, in African and Asian societies,  
a nationalist repertoire had been used as a medium to gain this unity. Therefore the historian's self-understanding and reputation 
in these societies is a different one as compared to, e.g. the European context. The historian's authority, in these societies, is both  
academic and political. See Wieland, 2000, p. 125. 
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view that attempts by the state to legitimize rule often have to refer far back in history to selectively ensure a  
sense of  tradition. The creation and raising of  national identities like on the levels of  political representation,  
in diplomacy and cultural exchange, is done by inclusion of  diverse rites and symbols of  the memory, e.g. holi ­
days and ceremonies, the visual symbolism of  architecture and in art and literature. In the two latter fields,  
with the cult of  the hagiography, heroes were created – or, as the example of  Israel's Massada myth might well  
illustrate, existing historical exemplary figures were distorted. While intellectuals and scientists ensure the es­
tablishment of  formal historical discourses and the reproduction of  the past and its inclusion into the present,  
the multiple rituals of  the performance of  the past provide primary access to this knowledge, too. In this con­
text, the education sector usually plays a significant role in the socialization of  young citizens and provide their  
access to national traditions. The act of  remembrance reconstructs selectively specific segments of  the past to 
a narrative: of  its own:
Yet these commemorations together contribute to the formation of  a master commemorative narrative that structures 
collective memory. With this concept I refer to a broader view of  history, a basic "story line" that is culturally  
constructed and provides the group members with a general notion of  their shared past.262 
By highlighting of  its own identity, its place of  origin and its historical development, this narrative enters the  
linear process of  nation-building as a national and formal narrative. However, its historicity and its linearity  
may be interrupted by selected historical events, which highlight the ideological principles and fundamental  
values,  which serve as the core of  the national narrative. In particular,  the historical turning point, which 
marks the rise of  the founding movement – in that sense as a  revolutionary movement – provides the beginning 
of  the national story.263 Historic events are being transformed into political myths.264 Despite their reference to 
the past or to “imagined traditions”265 they allow insight into the sociopolitical present because they reflect 
current claims of  a specific group. This observation is striking when looking at the ritualized performance of  
the past in terms of  a state's inner and foreign policies in which it often follows the lessons it has learned in  
the past and through which it sees developments of  the present. Further, the interaction between past and  
present and the ability of  a state to duplicate and implement them forms imperatives and worldviews that, e.g.  
claim a specific international role or divide the world into „hostile“ and „friendly“ states.
2.3.1 Religious Nationalism 
Dealing with the cases of  Pakistan and Israel, it seems adequate to focus on the inter-linkages between nation ­
alism and its religious components. Van der Veer has highlighted the failure of  Euro-centric tendencies in 
political theory to see nationalism as an exclusively secular concept. In order to understand the influence of  
the factor religion within the nation and nationalism, the discourse on the interrelation between modernity,  
secularism and nationalism has to be reconstructed.266 Van der Veer's studies proved that religion in South Asia 
262 Cit. Zerubavel, p. 6.
263 “The emphasis on a 'great divide' between this group and others is used to dispel any denial of  the group's legitimacy. The com­
memoration of  beginnings justifies the group's claim as a distinct unit, often by demonstrating that its roots go back to a distant  
past.” Cit. Ibid., p. 7.
264 Ibid., p. 9ff.
265 See Anderson, 1998.
266 See van der Veer, Peter: Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley: Univ. of  California Press, 1994, p. 11-13.
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not only plays a surrogate role, e.g. in ethnic conflicts. Rather it has been the most important provider of  iden­
tity and legitimized the foundation of  new entities in the region as well as the European colonial endeavor.267
The same seems to be true with regard to existing theories of  nation-building: Referring to Pakistan and Is ­
rael, Hippler emphasizes their special ways towards nationhood by embedding the nationalist call for inde­
pendence into a religious framework:
It is not absolutely essential, though, for such an integrating ideology forming the basis for nation-building to al­
ways and automatically be 'nationally' oriented. It can also be replaced by other value and identity models, at least  
for a time: constitutional patriotism – 'liberty, equality, fraternity' – secular ideologies (for example socialism) or  
religion can assume the same function or auxiliary functions. The cases of  the founding of  the states of  Pakistan 
and Israel are illustrative in this respect: when states were founded for the 'Muslims of  India' and 'the Jews',  
these originally religious classifications were increasingly reinterpreted in a 'national' way.268
The politicization of  religion, described as characteristic also by Robinson for the increasing influence of  the  
political movements of  British India and their medium of  political articulation to the British colonial adminis ­
tration269, is contrasted by Van der Veer's account which highlights the autonomous development of  religious  
institutions an their potential for transformation.270 Like Gellner, he acknowledges the interdependence of  the 
two dimensions of  state and nation. However, he underlines the strong potential of  religious-nationalist ideo­
logies in the Islamic context to take over secular ideological state features:
Obviously, it is impossible to ignore the role of  the state in the formation of  nationalism. It is clear, that state  
and nationalism are directly connected. Nationalism seeks control over the political unit, the state. Thus far,  
Muslim nationalism is the only religious nationalism that has been able to capture the state.271
The agents propagating the inclusion of  religious elements into the nationalist discourse quite often came 
from the secular intelligentsia who were confronted with the resistance of  some strata of  the traditionalist reli ­
gious sector.272
Juergensmeyer, although he focuses in his works primarily on religious violence, has presented a useful  
framework in which the religious-political mixture of  nationalist ideology can be adequately located. Like Kip ­
penberg, he highlights the individual act of  religious violence – “religious terror” – as a ritualized form of  
symbolic warfare in which the believer participates in a globalized and transcended cosmic drama between 
good and evil in the light of  a millenarian world-view,273 but sees religion – in its collective dimension – as a 
counter-ideology of  protest, competition and protection against the secular nation-state and its failure with 
267 See Ibid., p. 30. On the influence of  pietism and 17 th century European imaginations of  superiority, constructed as a contrast to 
“oriental despotism” see Mann, Michael: 'Torchbearers Upon the Path of  Progress': Britain's Ideology of  a 'Moral and Material  
Progress' in India. An Introductory Essay. In: Fischer-Tiné, Harald/ Mann, Michael (Eds.): Colonialism as Civilizing Mission.  
Cultural Ideology in British India. London: Anthem Press, 2004, p. 1-26.
268 Cit. Hippler, 2005, p. 8.
269 See Robinson, Francis: Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia. In: Contributions to Indian Sociology, No. 17, 1983, p. 185-203.
270 “Religious identities are produced in religious configurations, which are related to other more comprehensive configurations,  
such as the state. I would argue that the formation of  religious communities is certainly affected by state formation but cannot  
be reduced to it.” Cit. van der Veer, 1994, p. 30. 
271 Cit. Ibid., p. 31.
272 “The common enemy of  the Jewish traditionalists (but also of  the Christian and Muslim ones) had a face: the face of  the mem ­
ber of  the intelligentsia who wanted to establish a totally new, national identity with an evolutionary culture, to replace the peren­
nial, transcendental identity with its unchanging rituals and beliefs. The traditionalists rightly saw in the intelligentsia a social cat ­
egory that was not only fashioning a different collective identity but also striving blatantly to deprive them of  their leading posi­
tion.” Cit. Dieckhoff, 2003, p. 144.
273 See Kippenberg, 2008, p. 11-27, 199-207.
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special regard to its non-religious nationalist elements.274 Moreover, the religious narrative which, according to 
Juergensmeyer and Friedland, is able to mobilize believers does not replace the nationalist message in its en ­
tirety but offers a more attractive framework of  a sacralized modern nation-state in which nationalism is suf ­
fused with the religious275 as a secular concept perceived as a religious political culture. 276 Further, Friedland 
hints at his observation that such a distinct culture favors policies that are by far more socialist in their orienta­
tion.277
2.3.2 Authenticity and Indigenousness
Linked to the question of  how a national identity is characterized, is the imagination of  a “genetic” identity. 
Here, the conception of  the citizen who is born and socialized in the land and in the state merges a territorial  
as well as political determined indigenousness:
‘Indigenous’ is a term applied to people – and by the people to themselves – who are engaged in an often des­
perate struggle for political rights, for land, for a place and space within a modern nation’s economy and society.  
Identity and self-representation are vital elements of  the political platform of  such peoples. Politics [...] is all  
about identity,  among various ethnic groups,  with claims […] to rights,  land and competing claims to ‘first  
people’ status and standing.278
Conceptions of  a new ethnicity embody hybrid ideological constructions mixing essentialist, primordial and 
therefore historically consistent notions of  citizenship. The debate on national belonging embarks on a politic­
al dimension within the nation building discourse as the following statement by a former Pakistani cabinet  
member underlines:
Ethnicity will remain a potent factor in formation, deformation and reformation of  states. […] However, in the 
next 90 years we are likely to witness very volatile times […] We are even more unique than Israel. Judaism has a  
very strong connection with ethnicity. It'll take another two hundred to three hundred years for a Pakistani eth­
nic identity to develop. We have not even begun to create a genetic Pakistani identity. Perhaps this will change  
after more inter-marriages.279
That such claims are merely based on an ideal type induced by the idea of  purity becomes clear with regard to 
the problematic legal rules and procedures of  inter-religious and inter-ethnic marriages or conversions in both 
countries, when exclusive conceptions of  belonging to a religious or ethnic group rely on descent. 280 This 
shows that liberal egalitarian principles, rooted in the constitution, surrender to the reality of  a diverse mul­
ti-ethnic state framed by religiously determined laws of  civil status. As a substitute for a not yet existing na­
tional identity, in both countries, the accentuation of  Islamic and Jewish identities, gives expression to the  
state's unifying aim of  integration and control despite the reality of  ethnic-religious complexity and diversity:
274 See Juergensmeyer, Mark: Terror in the Mind of  God. The Global Rise of  Religious Violence. Berkeley: Univ. of  California 
Press, 1999, p. 254ff.
275 See Friedland, 2001, p. 126-130.
276 Ibid., p. 129.
277 This is true in the cases of  Pakistan and Iran but would apply to other countries as well. See Friedland, 2001, p. 135. Recent  
changes in Middle Eastern regimes, in which religious forces in charge of  government are confronted with the difficult task to  
respond to pressing socioeconomic needs is a case in point.
278 Cit. Guenther, Thomas: The Concept of  Indigeneity, p. 17. In: Social Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 17-32.
279 Cit. Address by former Minister for Information Javed Jabbar on the occasion of  the lecture „Ethnicity and other factors: State  
formation, De-formation and Reformation“ organized by the Area Study Centre for Europe (ASCE), University of  Karachi, on  
28 April, 2009.
280 With regard to marriage which is in Pakistan's mainstream society, more than in Israel, strictly determined on the basis of  ethnic,  
tribal and family status and sectarian affiliation, minorities often maintain their own rules. For instance Ahmadis are not allowed  
to marry exogamously. In Israel, marriage within haredi sects follows similar lines, often possible only with the leading rabbi's ap­
proval.          
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In many multiethnic (proto)societies,  the impetus for pushing through social  integration and creating a na ­
tion-state came and comes from the state apparatus itself, using methods like material incentives (financial, eco­
nomic, public service employment etc.), cultural means (language policy, education system, policy on religion) or 
compulsion.281
In this way certain groups emerge as the winners of  identity politics, though not exclusively and unchallenged 
any more due to increasing political and economic participation of  other social groups.282  
2.3.3 Citizenship, Ethnicity and Demography
While Muslims in colonial India experienced both, minority and majority status – with their majoritarian areas 
in the North-Western and Eastern regions of  the colony – on the whole, they accounted for about 25 percent  
of  the total population.283 In Pakistan Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority of  more than 90 percent 
of  the total population while religious minorities are believed to account for between three to ten percent in ­
cluding Hindus (1.6 %), Christians (1.59 %), Ahmadis (0.22 %)284, Sikhs and Buddhists (0.07 %285), Bahais, 
Parsis, Kalashis, Bahai, Zikris and Jews.286
A similar controversy, a Jewish-Israeli  Kulturkampf, is being discussed in the Israeli context with regard to 
the country's ethnic-religious cleavage and the question of  political participation. Smooha has introduced his  
model of  an “ethnic democracy” as the main focal point of  discourse within this cleavage. While the term is  
highly contested and controversial, it questions nothing less than the ideology of  a “Jewish democracy” and,  
thus, Israel's fundamental narrative and the basic claim of  post-independence Zionism. Beyond this ideological  
dimension, the ethnic-religious question of  participation in the state requires numerical clarification. Despite  
about 42 percent of  Jewish world population holds Israeli citizenship with 5.704.000 Israeli Jews as of  2009, a  
significant majority of  about 58 percent (7.296.000) lives in the Diaspora.287 However, the Israeli state, for dec­
ades, and because of  its ideological claim of  being a Zionist-Jewish state open for “the exiled”, those Jews 
who wish to settle in Israel, has been challenged in maintaining its immigration numbers. With the country's 
economy and labor market relying heavily on the influx of  qualified immigrants, decrease of  immigration 
numbers, increasing numbers of  dual citizens who leave Israel288 and high birth rates among those parts of  
population who do not fully integrate into the labor market, might shape the country's future. With a frus­
trated middle class which bears the burden of  Israel's settlements in the West Bank and the drop out of  ul­
281 Cit. Hippler, 2005, p. 10.
282 Religion in the formation of  identities on the Subcontinent has been identified as the key identity marker by Brass whose works  
on groups such as the Sikhs are highly relevant to this study. See Brass, Paul: Language, Religion and Politics in North India.  
London (a.o.): Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974. Despite the violent history of  the relationship between the Sikh communities and 
the Indian state, and their total share of  around two percent of  the population, Sikhs are well represented in its institutions like  
in the army where they compose a large share of  the officer ranks, thus over-representing Sikh identity. See also Jalal on the im­
perative of  citizenship in the cases of  India and Pakistan and identity formations in the post partition scenario which made 
Hindus and Muslims on both sides „declared enemies of  co-religionists beyond the nearest international checkpoint“. Cit. Jalal,  
2000, p. 568.
283 See Malik, 2006, p. 204.
284 Ahmadis themselves claimed about 600.000 individuals in 2010. See US State Department: International Religious Freedom Re­
port, July-December 2010, September, 2011, p. 3.
285 All numbers according to the last official census for 1998. See GoP: Population Census Organization: Census, 1998. 
286 Ibid., p. 199-204. Similar to the numbers for the Shī a and Ahmadi proportions, members of  minority groups might tend to exʿ ­
aggerate their numbers while Sunni Muslims might doubt it. Pakistan's Jewish communities faced a rapid decline and like other 
minority groups, kept a low profile in public. After some dozen Jews were airlifted to Israel at the end of  2010 and beginning of  
2011, it is believed that the last community in Karachi is defunct with only a hand full of  its members still living in Pakistan.
287 See Annex, Tabelle 7.
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tra-orthodox communities as a productive work force while being the main receiver of  state subsidiaries, this  
problem is likely to deepen in the future.289 Israel's economy and immigration, until recently, proved to be af­
fected by wars only insignificantly.290 With Israel entering a new security environment with Iran as a potential  
nuclear adversary and the fear of  upcoming conflict in the region steadily growing, the country's future chal ­
lenge would be a massive brain drain accompanied by financial retracements and international disinvestment. 
Fear of  a brain drain became a persistent argument used by the Israeli leadership according to which “the first-
stage Iranian goal is to terrify Israel's most talented citizens into leaving”291 The security argument applies to 
contemporary Pakistan too, where domestic violence and the fear of  terrorist attacks and tensions with India  
on the regional level, dissuade local and foreign investment and push unemployment292 while the country's 
weak economy deteriorates by the day.293
With regard to the legal requirements for citizenship, Pakistan together with Cambodia is the only country 
in Asia that grants citizenship on the basis of  jus soli, the US-Canadian legal tradition by which nationality or 
citizenship is recognized to individuals born in the territory of  the related state.294 Like in Israel, the issue of  
dual citizenship remained in the center of  a controversy which culminated in 2012, when the Supreme Court  
abandoned Farah Naz Isfahani's (PPP) and Interior Minister Rehman Malik's parliamentary status295 because 
of  their dual citizenships.296 While the court's maneuver was politically motivated and aimed at discrediting the 
PPP-government, the judges argued that the oath for citizenship for the US would disqualify Isfahani from be­
ing able to serve as a Pakistani member of  parliament, thereby arguing on the grounds of  antagonistic security 
interests between Pakistan and the US.297 Involving the issue of  loyalty, this precedence case questions the very 
nature of  Pakistan's citizenship law and is expected to be expanded to other prominent politicians.298 Israel up­
holds a legal argumentation that in principle applies to jus sanguinis. Being granted to all individuals irrespective 
of  their religious or ethnic descend, citizenship is granted by virtue of  birth in Israel or naturalization which 
288 Immigration trends with regard to the US have slightly changed in recent years. Due to decline of  the US job market since 2008,  
the end of  domestic instability after the Second Intifada in 2005 and the Lebanon War in 2006, the trend of  Israel-born immig ­
rants obtaining legal permanent residence in the US seems to have been reversed for the moment with 5.943 Israeli immigrants  
in 2006 down to 3.826 in 2011. For the data from 2002 to 2011 see Guttman, Nathan: Fewer Israelis immigrate to U.S. In: The 
Jewish Daily Forward, 19 April, 2012.
289 See Ha'aretz, 2 August, 2011: Netanyahu's Panic is a Threat to Israel's economic Stability.
290 While the 1967 and 1973 wars in fact were motors for Israel's defense industry and especially its R&D branches, “In 2006 and at 
the turn of  2008 to 2009, Israel fought wars against two groups trained and funded by Iran. While these wars hat little effect on  
the Israeli economy, and Israeli companies have become adept at upholding their commitments to customers and investors re ­
gardless of  security threats large and small, the next iteration of  the Iranian threat could be different from anything Israel has  
ever experienced. “ Cit. Senor, Dan / Singer, Saul: Start-up Nation. The Story of  Israel's Economic Miracle. New York: Council  
on Foreign Affairs/ Twelve, 2011, p. 265.
291 Cit. Prime minister Netanyahu in an interview, December 2008. Quoted in: Senor / Singer, 2011, p. 265.
292 Unemployment and security reasons have cultivated the brain drain of  Pakistan's educated middle and upper classes of  which  
many leave the country for education in the UK or the USA. Seen as a sine qua non for the survival of  Pakistani economy, iron ­
ically, the “Dubai chalo syndrome” guarantees the influx of  rich remittances by Pakistani guest workers from the Gulf  region. For  
Pakistani images and myth regarding the UAE. See Ahmed, Akbar S.: Discovering Islam. Making Sense of  Muslim History and 
Society. London (a.o.): Routledge, 2nd Ed., 2002, p. 172-184.
293 See Ahmed, 2010, p. 30. 
294 See GoP: Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, 13 April 1951.
295 See The Frontier Post: SC suspends Malik's Senate membership, 4 June, 2012.
296 Being the wife of  former ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani who was ousted from office due to his alleged role in the  
Memogate affair in 2011, it is widely believed that the Court was trying to indirectly target Haqqani.
297 See Khosa, Sameer: The Law on Citizenship. In: Dawn, 28 May, 2012.
298 See The Frontier Post: Dual nationality: 14 more parliamentarians listed, 4 June, 2012.
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requires five years of  residency and the acquisition of  basic knowledge of  Ivrith and national history. How­
ever, the right of  blood, similar to all the other states that grant nationality on the basis of  jus sanguinis, is ex­
clusively dedicated to aspirants who are Jewish by birth or because they converted to Judaism under the guise 
of  a rabbi whose school of  thought is recognized by the Ministry of  Interior. Thus, the Israeli case exemplifies  
a legal tradition in which citizenship is determined by both, the territorial principle and the principle of  lineage  
of  nationality on the one hand, and the ethno-religious exclusive right of  being a member of  world Jewry on  
the other. 
Israel's ethnic-religious demography is further fragmented because of  its large proportion of  non-Jewish  
citizens. Out of  a total population of  7.848.800 (March, 2012), 75.3 percent are considered as Jews due to their  
registration at the Ministry of  Interior with about four percent including relatives of  immigrants and registered  
inhabitants without religious affiliation.299 As for the state territory, around 19.9 to 20.5 percent of  its popula­
tion being Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship and in addition those who refused to acquire citizen status  
but live in East Jerusalem as permanent residents or, like in the case of  the Druze, as Syrian citizens in the oc ­
cupied Golan Heights.300 1.286.500 Muslim citizens, most of  them Arab, compose the largest group among the 
non-Jewish population followed by 151.700 Christians and about 125.300 Druze:301
Many Jewish Israelis question the willingness of  their Arab fellow citizens to come to terms with the existence  
of  the state. Arab Israelis often are perceived as a security threat and a political/ demographic time bomb. With 
allegations of  cooperation between Arab Israelis and Palestinian militant organizations since the intifada, such  
perceptions have further solidified.302
While the demographic demon – that  is  the explicit  fear  of  minorities  becoming a substantial  new force 
primarily on the basis of  legal emancipation and, thus, a threat to the majority or a “fifth column” and “enemy 
within” – remains subjected to heated debates in both Israel and Pakistan, numbers show that there is indeed a  
growth in numbers. However, with regard to their proportion of  the total population, minorities' total share  
remained more or less the same since the foundation of  the modern state with 15 to 21 percent in Israel and  
three to ten percent in Pakistan.303
Demographically hegemonic states with a religious majoritarian or ethnically defined bias have to deal with 
their minorities. Cases like Estonia, Latvia, Sri Lanka, Israel, Belgium, Canada and Switzerland show that, once  
a minority group reaches about 15 to 20 percent share of  the population, combined with factors such as the  
concentration in a particular region of  the state's territory304, cultural identity markers (e.g. language), interna­
tional pressure on human and minority rights issues etc., the dominant ethnic-religious group has to agree to a  
transformation of  its hegemonic order by gradually granting limited or full rights to peripheral strata of  soci ­
ety. Politically, this can result in increased participation in the framework of  a power-sharing model of  gov­
ernance or, in the worst case, in separatism and re-negotiations of  the territorial and political status quo. The 
299 For the numbers see Central Bureau of  Statistics: Population by Population Group. Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics, No. 4/2012.
300 References to these groups and terms used in official documents tends to be highly politicized; for instance when the group  
refers to itself  as “Palestinian citizens of  Israel” in contrast to the National Security Council's formula of  “Arab Citizens of  Is ­
rael”. See International Crisis Group: Identity Crisis: Israel and Its Arab Citizens. Middle East Report, No. 25, 2004, Executive  
Summary and Recommendations.
301 For the data see Central Bureau for Statistics: Statistical Abstract of  Israel 2010, No. 61, Subject 2.
302 Cit. ICG, 2004, Executive Summary.
303 See ICG, 2004, p. 1; Malik, 2005, p. 203.
304 Also Demographic Concentration Factor.
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latter point materialized during the history of  Pakistan and Israel in the Great Partition of  the Indian Subcon­
tinent in 1947, the state collapse and the creation of  Bangladesh in 1971 vis-à-vis the de facto parallel exist­
ence of  three governmental entities of  Gaza (until 2005), Palestinian Territories and the territory of  the State 
of  Israel and the model of  a Two-States-Solution as a final status solution within the Middle East Peace Pro­
cess.
It is hardly surprising that the demographic argument is subjected to biased miscalculations and provides a 
powerful weapon in the hands of  those who aim at winning public support and votes. Accordingly, the ethnic-
religious demography challenge, instead of  being harmonized within an umbrella ideology, a plausible national  
identity and politics of  integration instead of  differentiation, remains a strong pool of  reference for Hindu na­
tionalist groups in India, Pakistani ethnic rival factions and religious militant groups and nationalist lobbies in  
Israel that feel the state's self-legitimacy as a Jewish majoritarian democracy being threatened.305
2.3.4 The Role of  Languages 
Language as an “extension of  nationalism” played a major role in the construction of  a Muslim-Pakistan and 
Hebrew Jewish-Israeli collective identity.306 Seeing the ‘ulamâ’ as defenders of  religious culture, Maulana Ashraf  
Ali Thanvi had declared that “in the present circumstances, […] the protection of  the Urdu language is protec­
tion of  our religion”. In Israel, religious groups like the Agudat Yisrael were keen to separate themselves from 
their Sephardi competitors and their non-orthodox environment by using traditional Yiddish instead of  Ivrith. 
Seeing new Hebrew as a vehicle of  indoctrination linked to the ideology of  the state and, similar to the case of  
Pakistan, the introduction and modification of  an official language as an “internal colonialism” 307 based on the 
“anglicized” or “vernacular proto-elite” of  the founding generation which itself  had problems to articulate its  
program in the new language.308 Similar to this, Hebrew emerged from the Zionist narrative under the formula 
Yehuda, daber ivrith! (Jew, speak Hebrew!) – and was to be the language of  the full assimilated, absorbed and  
educated elite of  new modern Hebrew culture.
The introduction and development of  an exclusive language, only used by an intellectual, religious or ethnic  
elite, to the point where it is accepted as the hegemonic language is closely linked to the ideological discourse  
in which language can be identified as a tool with which power is exercised, hence, language is regarded an  
ideological element within a state. Naturally, language automatically involves knowledge and its proliferation 
305 Khushwant Singh, author of  Train to Pakistan (1956), gives insight into these Indian narratives, present in contemporary Hindu-
Nationalist circles and their concepts of  Hinduness (hindutva), in recent essays and journalistic works and especially in The End of  
India (2003). See also Malik, Iftikhar H.: Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban. South Asia at the Crossroads. Karachi: Oxford Univ.  
Press, 2006, p. 84-129.
306 See Rahman, Tariq: Language and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996, p. 161.
307 See Rahman, Tariq: Language, Power and Ideology. In: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 44/45, 2002, p. 4556-4560. 
In this context, Jalal sees Urdu as being instrumental to “neo-imperialist rule” and speaks of  a Pakistani Punjabi dominated im­
perialism with reference to the language war between West and East Pakistan where the introduction of  Urdu as the official lan ­
guage had been refused by the students and intellectuals of  Dhaka who, for instance on 21 February, 1952, when the protests be ­
came violent and styled by the rioters as the defense of  Bengali. See Jalal, 2000, pp. 570/571.
308 With reference to the first wave of  Jewish immigrants to Palestine Fellman writes: “Indeed, many could already speak Hebrew  
upon arrival in the country, while others were willing to improve their knowledge or begin learning the language. They passed on  
Hebrew to their children in the home, and in the kindergartens and schools they set up throughout the country. Thus, within a 
biblical generation, in the forty years between 1881-1921, a core of  young, fervent Hebrew-language speakers was formed, with  
Hebrew as the unique symbol of  their linguistic nationalism.” Cit. Fellman, Jack: Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and the Revival of  Hebrew  
(1858-1922), online article Jewish Virtual Library, n. d. 
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within society. Therefore, education has to be seen as a main arena where state ideology is disseminated, e.g.  
through textbooks. Beyond its meaning and use as an instrument of  communication and interaction, language 
– and its preference of  one selected ethnic milieu or class group – has to be seen as a element within the eth ­
nic national discourse. Ethnicity, only thematized and brought to the consciousness of  the nation-to-be-cre ­
ated and to the forefront of  its cleavages and divides, as a byproduct of  modernity and the rise of  nationalism.
309 Anderson assigns „intellectual theft“310 of  antique languages to this process, in which, like in the case of  re­
ligion, language's functionality within the formation of  identities became overemphasized. The production of  
native status symbols and styles is therefore not only an attempt to create authenticity but also part of  a polit ­
ical program that is aimed to either suppress or appease dynamics that would challenge the superimposed 
identity setup. With regard to the role of  language the cases of  Pakistan and Israel represent a dichotomy in  
which the introduction of  Urdu, from the very beginning, did not contribute to the formation of  a collective  
identity. Rather, Urdu and its identification with the economic, political and cultural elites, deepened existing  
cleavages within Pakistani society while the attempt to impose Urdu on the Eastern part of  the country only 
strengthened separatism which ultimately led to the 1971 war and the independence of  Bangladesh. 311 Against 
this background, the Israeli project of  integrating a society of  immigrants and to form, at least, a cultural ho ­
mogeneity on the basis of  a shared language, has been successful and, thus, helped to strengthen the identific ­
ation of  citizenship with Zionist ideology. 
2.3.4.1 Urdu 
When the 11th and 12th centuries witnessed Muslim conquests of  Punjab and Northern India, Persian was the 
language at the court of  the Delhi Sultanate used in literature and poetry. Before Urdu began to rise in the  
northern intellectual centers of  Delhi, Aurangabad and Lucknow, it had been used in a local variation, the 
southern or Deccan Urdu since the end of  the 15th century.312 The establishment of  Urdu threatened a mono­
poly of  power, until then held by the Muslim ašrāf  elites. Politically, the Mughal Empire saw its rise during the 
reign of  Akbar I (1542-1605), who, as a descendant of  the Timurid ruler Babar, succeeded in establishing a  
South Asian dynastic rule. The dominant status of  Persian as the court language was abandoned due to Ak ­
bar's policy of  sulh-i kul (unity), proclaimed in 1581.313 The decline of  the Moghul empire which began with 
the death of  Aurangzeb (1658-1707), witnessed also the decline of  Persian. In 1837, following a British order,  
309 This argument was presented in the early 1960's with reference to the ethnic transformation of  New York, considered the role  
model for the world's immigration societies as well as the romanticized concept of  a “melting pot”. Needless to say that Israel  
immigration and absorption policies aimed at defending that concept regardless of  its negative social implications. These in ­
cluded also frustration and discrimination of  immigrant groups. For instance the Mizrahi youth channeled their anger with the  
establishment of  the Israeli Black Panther protest movement (HaPanterim HaShorim) in 1971, which referred to the American 
Black Panther Party, that became a forceful political actor and pressure group for the interests of  the Black Americans during the 
1960's and 1970's. See Glazer, Nathan / Moynihan, Daniel P.: Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Itali ­
ans, and Irish of  New York City. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2nd, 1970.
310 See Anderson, 1998, p. 63ff.
311 See also Rahman, 2002.
312 See Schimmel, Annemarie: Im Reich der Grossmoguln: Geschichte, Kunst, Kultur. München: C. H. Beck, 2000, p. 315. Given  
the dual claim regarding the origin of  Urdu, according to which it arose to prominence during the rule of  Wali in Aurangabad,  
but was recognized mainly by the rising North Indian Muslim classes that integrated Urdu into the broader cultural framework  
of  an Indian Muslim identity, Malik too, points out to its Deccani roots and the role of  Wali who brought Urdu poetry to the 
Mughal court in Delhi. See Malik, 2008, p. 283.  
313 See Malik, 2008, p. 171ff.
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Urdu, labeled as Hindustani, became the substitute for Persian as working language at the legal courts. 314 The 
development of  contemporary Urdu as the official language of  Pakistan315 was paralleled by the creation and 
propagation  of  modern  Hindi  in  India.  As  an  exclusive  cultural  identity  marker,  aimed  at  antagonizing  
Pakistanis and Indians after partition and independence of  both new states316, the introduction of  “new” lan­
guages is closely linked to the re-invention of  confessional traditions with regard “to help integrate the mul­
ti-ethnic and multi-lingual state [...]”.317 Just as Punjabi and its various subgroups were linked to a specific eth­
nic group with a strong literary tradition, Urdu became known as a language of  elites and medium of  Muslim  
intellectual thought.318 Although not entirely the language of  Muslim writers and still acknowledged by Hindu 
intellectuals in India, Urdu's origins and literary tradition were closely identified with a genuine Muslim literary  
culture thus making up “an important pillar in Muslim cultural memory.“319 Another author points out to the 
mix of  pride and admiration towards Urdu as a key feature of  the Pakistani state “cramped to the status of  a 
symbol of  the East just as the rising sun. Although with no formal association with this magnificent language  
to the extent that when around 90% of  Pakistan chooses it as elective for their graduation.” 320 However, ac­
cording to the last official population census of  1998 in which the number given in the census of  1961 ap­
peared to be the same321, the total number (Pakistan) of  Urdu speakers was 7.57 percent as compared to Punj ­
abi (44.15), Pashtu (15.42), Sindhi (14.1), Seraiki (10.53), Baluchi (3.57) and other languages (4.66). The region­
al concentration of  Urdu speaking population was Sindh (21.05), followed by Islamabad (10.11) and Punjab 
(4.51) whereas it was below one percent in the NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan.322 Thus, the demand for estab­
lishing Urdu not only as the second official language, together with English, but also as a feature of  Pakistani  
Muslim national identity and as an extended functional element of  Islamic state ideology, has in fact never 
been successful. Rather, the narrow frame of  identity, identified with an minority elite, the muhajirin from the 
intellectual centers of  Northern India, and their cultural claim as a power elite,  has been institutionalized  
through state policies. Regarding the role of  Urdu on education, Rahman writes:
In Pakistan all ruling elites have tried to counter the ethnic threat as well as the threat of  class-oriented move­
ments by appealing to Islam and Pakistani nationalism. Hence, language and literature textbooks are used in  
Pakistan to disseminate ideological messages to students. Such messages are mostly given through the textbooks 
of  history, social studies and Pakistan studies. However, language textbooks also reinforce the ideological mes ­
314 Beyond its radius within the business of  courts, the issue of  language touched political and religious interests as well. Malik  
points out to this relevance with regard to a decision made in 1900 according to which Urdu script should by the Nagari script.  
This decision provoked the resistance of  the Urdu Defense Association and religious authorities, primarily for fear of  suffering so­
cioeconomically marginalized. See Malik, Jamal: Islamische Gelehrtenkultur in Nordindien. Entwicklungsgeschichte und Tenden­
zen am Beispiel von Lucknow. Leiden: Brill, 1997, pp. 434/435.
315 Established as the national language by the Basic Principles Committee under Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950. See Jinnah Institute: A  
Question of  Faith. A Report on the Status of  Religious Minorities in Pakistan. Karachi, 2011, p. 24.
316 “The government of  Pakistan lays down certain objectives for the teaching of  various subjects. These are often ideological. They 
use Islam as a marker of  identity to define the boundaries of  the self. The 'other' is, by definition, non-Muslim. However, this  
notion of  Islam is so tempered with nationalism as to exclude Indian Hindus rather than non-Muslims who are friendly with  
Pakistan.” Cit. Rahman, Tariq: Denizens of  Alien Worlds. A Study of  Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan. Kara ­
chi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004, p. 27.
317 Cit. Malik, 2008, p. 288.
318 See Schimmel, 2000.
319 Cit. Malik, 2008, p. 283.
320 Cit. Raja, Ali: Mansoor, we and Qibla. In: LUBP, 14 February, 2012.
321 See data from GoP: 1961 Census: Mother Tongue. In: Pakistan Year Book 1969. Karachi: National Publ. House, 1969, p. 44.
322 See data in GoP: Population Census Organization: Population by Mother Tongue, 1998.
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sages in the other books. These ideological messages are of  three kinds. First, messages on Islam; second, those  
on nationalism; and third, those on militarism.323
At least Peleg's classification of  hegemonic statehood can be transferred to what Jalal observed in the case of  
Pakistan where, instead of  accommodating non-Urdu population, language was instrumentalized as a tool of  
preserving hegemonic power interests.324
2.3.4.2 Ivrith
The way how Hebrew was re-brought to world-Jewry and then introduced as the official language to be used 
by citizens of  the State of  Israel,  indicates similarities to the case of  Urdu. But beyond the mechanisms 
through which the cultural meaning is channeled through the political-ideological framework and the need to 
provide new identity markers of  belongingness and unity, Hebrew, before its use in Zionist terms, became the 
focus of  Jewish debate for very different reasons. Gotzmann shows the transformation of  the issue of  an  
autonomous language from an issue which arose from the Western Ashkenazi German discourse of  integra­
tion and assimilation into a central demand of  the nationalist discourse, how it was promoted by Zionist territ ­
orialists and autonomists much later.325 The inner-Jewish discourse aimed at projecting its various positions to 
the (protestant) German nationalist and bourgeois reference which saw language as irreversibly linked to the  
concept of  a united nation.326 19th century inner Jewish debate on language was, firstly, the attempt to respond 
to the  precarious  situation  and social  status  of  the  Jews  as  a  culturally  self-isolated  minority  in  Western 
Europe, excluded by the majority within the framework of  integration. Secondly, the debate about the acquisi­
tion of  a Jewish language, in which languages and styles like Hochdeutsch, considered to be among the purest of  
languages, on the one hand, and languages like Aramaic and Yiddish, considered impure were envisioned or 
totally neglected, expressed also the desire for cultural autonomy.327 
Yiddish, the vernacular language in 18th century Western European Jewish communities, more and more 
had to compete with Hebrew. The latter, being a ritual language, only accessible for few, had superseded Yid­
dish within the Jewish ideological language discourse and even more clearly within the Christian-European per­
ception in that it provided features that, from a euro-centric view, were commonly understood as part of  civil­
ized „culture languages“.328 Furthermore, Hebrew had been the connecting medium between Jewish com­
munities in the world. Contrary to other achievements of  political Zionism which demanded the break with 
traditional Judaism and the exile, it aimed at compromising between the past and the present:
The revival of  Hebrew, however, created a very different dynamic, one that does not contradict the traditional 
definition of  the Jews as a people and as a nation. On the contrary, the Hebrew revival wished to create an or ­
ganic connection between the Zionist revolution and the ahistoric and nonterritorial loci of  Jewish identity. The  
language of  the Bible, the Mishnah, and Jewish liturgy, Hebrew was also for two millennia the medium of  com ­
munication between Jewish communities. When the sages of  Babylon wrote to those of  Italy or the Rhineland, 
323 Cit. Rahman, Tariq: Language-Teaching and Power in Pakistan. N. d.
324 See Jalal, 2000, p. 570ff.
325 See Gotzmann, Andreas:  Eigenheit und Einheit. Modernisierungsdiskurse des Deutschen Judentums der Emanzipationszeit.  
Leiden: Brill, 2002, p. 243-289.
326 See Ibid., p. 255.
327 See Ibid., p. 245.
328 Marking  the  end  of  the haskalah period,  the  heterogene  reform impulses  that  became more  and  more  present  since  the 
1830's/1840's, contributed to a defragmentation to the Hebrew's main domain – its use in Jewish liturgy. For the introduction of  
German prayers, see Ibid., p. 252ff. 
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they did so in Hebrew. The language became a place, a locus, for a dispersed people, the earthly manifestation of  
Jewish faith. The revival of  Hebrew constitutes, then, a connection both to the remains of  ancient Jewish civiliz­
ation and to the discourse of  Diaspora Judaism.329
The revival of  Hebrew had been lauded as the “manifestation of  the spirit of  the nation” by the poet Haim 
Nahman Bialik (1873-1934), the leading figure of  modern Hebrew culture.330 Its modernization – for instance 
with the publication of  the first Hebrew dictionary by Eliezer Ben-Yehudah331 – and ideological adaption to 
both the social and political realities in Europe and the envisioned territorial project in Palestine at the end of  
the 19th and at the beginning of  the 20th century, became what Hirschfeld sees as the “most radical event of  
the Zionist revolution”.332 However, Hebrew was not an undisputed achievement and faced harsh opposition 
even among Zionists: Among its most prominent opponents were Theodor Herzl who had supported the in­
troduction of  German as the official new language and Ahad Ha'am with his notion of  Hebrew as a religious  
high language, learned and understood only by few, mainly the religious scholars, which he refused for being 
used as a mundane everyday language by the masses.333 
329 Cit. Hirschfeld, Ariel: Locus and Language. Hebrew Culture in Israel, 1890-1990, p. 1025. In: Biale, David (Ed.): Cultures of  the 
Jews. A New History. New York: Schocken, 2002, p. 1010-1060.
330 Bialik headed the Hebrew Writers Union and became a leading force behind the establishment of  the Hebrew University in Jerus ­
alem inaugurated in 1925.
331 See Hirschfeld, p. 1032. Ben-Yehuda (1858-1922) became known as a prolific Hebrew writer and journalist. But his reputation as  
the “language teacher for the nation” stemmed from his presidency of  the Committee of  the Hebrew Language (Va'ad HaLashon), 
today's Academy of  the Hebrew Language at the Hebrew University. 
332 Cit. Ibid., p. 1025.
333 See Ibid. pp. 1031/1032.
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3 National History and Self-perception: Legitimizing Themes
As to where Pakistan was located, the inmates knew nothing. That was why both the mad and the partially mad were unable to decide whether they  
were now in India or in Pakistan. If  they were in India, where on earth was Pakistan? And if  they were in Pakistan, then how come that until the  
other day it was India? 
Sa'adat Hasan Manto, Toba Tek Singh, 1955.
The history of  Zionism is, in part, a story of  the search for support from the nations of  the world, of  knocking on the doors of  states to the point of  
appearing neurotic in its desire for sympathy and recognition.334
The decolonialized new nation state had to place the radical event of  its creation into an appropriate frame­
work in order to legitimize its sovereignty by building historical continuity. Through reference to the predom­
inant or constructed religious tradition this often became a process in which historical teleology came into 
play, as an evolutionary concept and melting pot in which religious, political and military antagonisms were  
harmonized through the removal of  its limitations of  time, space and historical evidence. 335 This enforcement 
of  a selectively constructed historical linearity – an „amnesia consciously deciding and unconsciously over­
looking events“336 – put forward an alternative interpretation of  history giving birth to a historiographic genre 
of  its own and political myths that also came to serve as justification for political outcomes.
3.1 The Role of  Historiography
The ultimate goal of  historiography in the service of  nationalism is not only to rewrite the past in a particular  
way. Rather it is used to redefine the role of  the state and to provide a state-centric view – together with the  
historical context of  its creation, its philosophical or teleological meaning – in order to emphasize its stabiliz ­
ing, civilizing and guardianship role in preserving the cultural heritage, and, thus, the social fabric in order to  
provide legitimation for the power of  the ruling (post-)colonial elites. Similar to the centralization of  the state,  
religion, in these grand narratives of  Muslim or Jewish history, is presented as independent and unchallenged  
by its inherent sectarian history. This stream of  historiography, written by what we can call the „traditionalist  
school“ among historians, is followed by the next generation which tends to be more on the stream of  a „revi­
sionist“ school in that it questions existing traditionalist historiography by critically re-examining the orthodox 
historical framing of  an event. Revisionist arguments often clash with the historical reality, presented by the 
traditionalists and adopted and disseminated through the education system by the state. In that sense, histori ­
ography itself  has become the focus of  critical discourse which at times proofs to be the playground for „his ­
tory piracy“337 and a battleground for ideological arguments.338 It is intriguing that this critical view on national 
events and dominant interpretations taken for granted, in most cases comes from outside: Many scholars that  
334 Cit. Biletzky, Eliyahu: Libel: Zionism = Racism. Tel Aviv: Amal, 1979, p. 7.
335 See Wieland, 2000, pp. 119/120.
336 Cit. Malik, 2008, p. 59.
337 See Wieland, 2000, p. 117ff.
338 Another claim is raised by „subaltern studies“ and „oral history“. As „history from below“, telling the individual account on his ­
torical events by common people and contemporary witnesses, it challenges the grand narrative told by the historical account  
„from above“. 
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produced the most cited works about Pakistan and Israel and claimed to represent a „new history“ 339 are for­
eigners or national citizens that were educated abroad and entered their academic careers in the West with a 
stronghold at universities in the US and England.
3.1.1 Pakistan 
History writing on the sub-continent and numerous works of  Western scholars that have evolved around the  
events of  partition and independence have cultivated a biased and ideologized academic discourse, character­
ized by critiques and counter-critiques:340
Historiography on Pakistan, inclusive of  themes such as the debate on Muslim identity, the struggle for inde ­
pendence, the relationship between the centre and the provinces, the uneven interface between state and civil so­
ciety or the country's external relationships, especially with India, has tended to be Islamic-centric. Pakistani and  
other observers, in their own separate ways, have tried to disentangle the problematic of  Islam both in the  
achievement and the subsequent nation-building project.341
The partition of  the Indian subcontinent and its antagonist historical grand narratives evolving from the na ­
tional Indian or Pakistani view on the past, as a mega event of  20 th century after World War II and „massive 
exercise in human misery“342, plays the most central role as the most defining event in the history of  both 
states. As far as historiography is concerned, it was an event not easy to explain which finally resulted in trends  
to either support the argument that Hindus and Muslims ever since were not able to live together or to high­
light Muslim self-consciousness to such an extend that the Muslim demand for sovereignty became the leading  
argument for the creation of  both countries.343 
A particular controversy has been born with regard to the foundation of  Pakistan and the question whether  
religious groups  granted support  to  the  League  beyond the  Pakistan  Resolution of  1940.344 The decisive 
factors which finally led to the two-state solution are disputed to this day and stand in the center of  heated de ­
bates  between differing religious and political-ideological  historic  traditions.  Popularized versions of  1947 
identified various contemporary mindsets at that time, such as nationalist „common will“ to partition shared 
among the Indian Muslims or the high-level support that the British colonial administration provided to Jin ­
nah on a personal level, as the driving forces behind partition.345 Other theories identified a deep mistrust and 
conflictual interests between Hindus and Muslims within the Indian colonial civil service or in Muslim society  
as a whole as the momentum which attracted the support by the ‘ulamâ’.346 
339 See Ian Talbot's introduction in Salim, Ahmad (Ed.): Reconstructing History. Memories, Migrants and Minorities. Islamabad:  
SDPI/ Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2009, p. Vii.
340 By nature, these academic and politicized struggles are highly emotional too. See Jalal, Ayesha: Secularists, Subalterns and the 
Stigma of  'Communalism': Partition Historiography Revisited. In: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1996, p. 681-737.
341 Cit. Malik, 1999, p. 98.
342 Cit. US-correspondent Margaret Bourke-White. Quoted in: Khan, 2011, p. 21.
343 Authors whi pronounced the last theory are for instance Smith, W. C.: Modern Islam in India. A Social Analysis. London: Gol ­
lancz, 1946; Ahmad, Aziz: An intellectual History of  Islam in India. In: Islamic Surveys, Vol. 7. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ.  
Press, 1969; ibid. (Ed.): Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan 1857 – 1968. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1970; Robinson,  
Francis: Separatism among Indian Muslims. The Politics of  the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923. Delhi (a.o.): Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1997. A focus more on the Muslim political and intellectual elites is given by Jalal, 1999. 
344 See Ahmed, Akbar S.: Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity. The Search for Saladin. London, New York: Routledge, 1997; Pirz ­
ada, Sayyid A. S.: The Politics of  the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000.
345 See Wilcox, Wayne A.: Wellsprings of  Pakistan, p. 33-36. In: Ziring, Lawrence/ Braibanti, R./ Wriggings, W. Howard (Eds.):  
Pakistan: The Long View. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1977, p. 25-39.
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Rosser pointed out to a trend beginning in the 1980s when Pakistan's education system was subjected to su­
perimposed Islamization by the regime, in which publications from the fields of  history and social sciences, as  
well as textbooks, 1.) highlighted immensely the Ideology of  Pakistan (Nazariya-e-Pakistan) as the political and 
religious program of  the Pakistan Movement and its future referential function for the self-understanding of  
the Pakistani state; 2.) styled Jinnah as a leader with a clear religious vision for Pakistan along the lines of  or ­
thodoxy, and, 3.) presented the ‘ulamâ’ as the „genuine“ social agents which had supported the Pakistan Move­
ment and the League without reservation.347 
Scholars like K.  K. Aziz have highlighted the argument that  sophisticated historical  scholarly work on 
Pakistan until the 1980s seemed to be somewhat out of  time and unable to compete with the Indian produc ­
tion of  scholarly work on the event of  partition and subsequent national history in both quality and quantity.  
Recalling a lecture on the 1971 events, held during is scholarship at the South Asia Institute in Heidelberg 
(1982-1987), Aziz writes:
The talks went well, because I was in possession of  a great deal of  little-known but authentic information and  
because I spoke like a scholar and not like a Bengali-baiting, ignorant and bigoted West Pakistani of  1970-71.  
The trouble came during the question-answer time when several persons among the audience referred to or 
quoted from Indian publications and, hearing my disavowals, asked about the books putting forth the Pakistani  
point of  view. There was absolutely nothing that I could suggest; and I did not want to incur more odium by  
naming the White Paper issued by the Yahya Khan regime or a few Urdu books and digests which were models  
of  fanciful history and warped fact-finding. The assembly did not believe that the country's contemporary his ­
torians could have ignored a tragedy of  this magnitude unless there were specific and clear reasons for the si ­
lence. I could not give them any reasons. Then somebody mentioned Kashmir, and that started the whole debate 
over again. There were about one hundred Indian books on the Kashmir problem, at least a quarter of  them 
scholarly and documented. Could I name five Pakistani publications to match them? I could not.348
While Pakistani historiography has produced some remarkable works since around the late 1980s, Aziz' dia­
gnosis of  the „phenomenon of  a totally inactive profession“349 coincides with the fact that especially the 1980s 
witnessed the „saffranization of  history“ under  Zia  ul-Haq with an explosion of  works  that  emphasized 
Pakistan's ideological pillars as drafted in its historicist version by the generation of  Sharif  al-Mujahid, Javed 
Iqbal, F. K. Khan Durrani and others which was paralleled by the emergence of  new critical scholarship in the 
late 1980s and 1990s.350 In 1993, Aziz' work The Murder of  History in Pakistan, despite presenting only the well-
known fact that textbooks used at schools and colleges as well as Pakistan Studies as an obligatory subject,  
served the purpose of  national mythologization and as a vehicle of  political-ideological indoctrination, had 
much more impact on the international perception of  Pakistan and its education system351 than any other rel­
evant study on the subject.352
3.1.1.1 Selectivity towards Muslim History on the Subcontinent
Pakistani historiographic accounts and mainly their narration in the education sector reflect a phenomenon 
which follows the lines of  a selective chronology of  events. Pakistan's father of  the nation is quoted in saying: 
346 See Alavi, Hamza: Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology. In: Weiss, Anita M.: Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan. The  
Application of  Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Lahore: Vanguard, 1987, p. 21-47; Taylor, David: The Politics of  Islam and Is ­
lamisation in Pakistan, p. 185-189. In: Piscatori, James P.: Islam in the Political Process. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983, 
p. 181-189.
347 See Rosser, Yvette C.: Islamisation of  Pakistani Social Studies Textbooks. New Delhi: Rupa, 2003, pp. 8/9; Alavi, 1987, p. 22. 
348 Cit. Aziz, 2009, pp. xi/xii.
349 Cit. Ibid.
350 With representatives like Ayesha Jalal, Tariq Rahman, Ayesha Siddiqa and others.
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„Pakistan was created the day the first Indian national entered the field of  Islam.“ Reconsidering Jinnah's fam­
ous dictum on the origin of  Pakistanihood in the light of  national narrative building, it is understandable that 
the historical key event of  712 A.D., when Muhammad Bin Qasim sent his Arab army to the Sindh, has since  
occupied a special place in the national historical chronology of  Pakistan. 353 Notwithstanding several fruitless 
Arab attempts to conquer the Sindh prior to 712, Bin Qasim is widely presented as the first agent of  Arabiza­
tion and Islamization on the Subcontinent. According to this version, he was able to ally with the „infidels“ of  
the Sindh against their king, Raja Dahir, and motivated them into conversion to Islam. 354 Rosser has shown 
that his role in the Pakistani narrative and his pioneering endeavor as it has been glorified in Pakistan Studies  
textbooks, differs fundamentally from the Indian interpretation. Here Bin Qasim's advent and Arabization – 
seen nowadays more critically or even as an “Arab cultural imperialism in the name of  religion” 355 – is presen­
ted as a „localized affair“ with little impact on the regional history.356 But it would be misleading to treat the 
Pakistani narrative as an unchallenged version of  history: Pakistan's struggles within, between central state and 
provinces on a cultural, ethnic and political basis, spurred local variants of  712, such as the Sindhi sub-national  
counter-narrative in which ruler Raja Dahir is described as the heroic Sindhi defender against the Arab in­
vaders who massacred and enslaved the local population after they had refused conversion. 357 A similar im­
portance is attributed to the Ghaznavi dynasty's efforts to conquer areas in the Pakhtun belt, today's border  
area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The most prominent figure here is Mahmud Ghaznavi who between  
1001 and 1025 A.D. invaded the Peshawar area with the largest cities of  the Gandhara empire (1000 B.C.-1100 
351 Education as a key factor required to build a strong society, strengthen national economy and competitiveness and countering  
trends of  radicalization in Pakistan, has in fact never been seriously subjected to the long demanded reforms on both the nation­
al and provincial level. With one of  the world's youngest populations, no government, with the support of  international donors,  
has shown serious commitment to adjust this imbalance through considerable reforms as they had been outlined, for instance in  
2010 by the  Pakistan Education Task Force.  In contrast to its exorbitant military budget with almost five percent of  its GDP, 
Pakistan has devoted less than 1.5 percent to education with only 13 percent allocated for Higher Education. See The Express  
Tribune: Higher education budget: Of  132 countries, Pakistan stands at 125, 28 April,  2012. Former ambassador to the US 
Haqqani wrote: “Pakistan spends almost 5 percent of  its GDP on defense and is still unable to match the conventional forces of  
India, which outspends Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 2.5 percent of  its GDP to military spending.” Cit. Haqqani, Hu ­
sain: The Role of  Islam in Pakistan's Future, p. 86. In: The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2004, p. 85-96. In comparison,  
India spends 4.1 percent, Bangladesh 2.4 and Sri Lanka 3 percent on education. See Khalatbari, Babak: Atommacht mit Analpha ­
beten. In: NZZ, 11 July, 2012. Despite individual initiatives by private organizations and civil society groups or the establishment  
of  an Innovation Fund in 2011, Pakistan – because of  its inability and lack of  political will to successfully implement new 
policies and structural reforms in the education sector – is unlikely to achieve the goal of  universal primary education as set forth 
in the  UN Millennium Development Goals. Given the failure of  Pakistan's education reform policies (around ten reforms) since  
1956, skepticism must be further countered with the visible improvement of  the quality of  education, management and adminis­
tration through coordinated capacity and facility building. The socioeconomic divide as a result of  failed attempts to bridge  
between the state education system and the traditional education system of  the madaris has in fact never been properly addressed 
too. The transformation of  both systems into a uniformed and standardized system to avert the existing division of  Urdu and  
English medium, the disparity of  religious and non-religious disciplines, degrees and the graduates' access to university education  
and the job market, have been targeted through initial steps such as the expansion of  the madrasa curricula to include social and 
scientific disciplines, provision of  stipends etc. A consensual approach in which special emphasis should be given to the involve ­
ment of  religious scholars aimed at meeting the specific concerns of  the madaris and, thus, dialogue between governmental ex­
perts, religious representatives, madaris umbrella organizations and international experts is strongly needed. 
352 See Aziz, 1993.
353 The same is true for the ideological re-discovery of  the Indus Valley civilization, also known as Happaran or Mohenjodaro civil ­
ization named after large settlements in Pakistan dating back to 2600 B. C., similar to the attempts by Hindu nationalists to style  
the Central Asian Indo-German tribe of  the Aryans of  1500 as the genuine founders of  Hindu religion and culture. See Wie ­
land, 2000, p. 133-138. Other narratives trace the descent of  the Pakhtuns back in history to the lost tribes of  Israel, the Bene Yis­
rael and especially the tribe of  Joseph (Yusufzai) or even to the soldiers of  Alexander the Great.
354 See Rosser, 2003, pp. 11.
355 Cit. Badruddin, Asad: A Muslim majority Indus Valley Civilization? In: Dawn, 22 June, 2012.
356 See Rosser, 2003, pp. 10/11.
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A.D.).358 The mainstream narrative presents him as a crusader in the service of  Islam while in other works he  
is primarily known for plunder: While the national narrative sees his conquests in the higher service of  religion
359,  the counter-narrative de-constructed this  claim by arguing on the basis  of  economic and material  in­
terests.360 Similar to the period between Bin Qasim and Ghaznavi, subcontinental Muslim history has high­
lighted the Delhi Sultanates (1206-1526) until its fall and absorption by the Mughals due to their symbolic cap ­
ital of  a Muslim empire, in the collective memory regarded as a Sunni-determined entity.361 The Battle of  Pan­
ipat of  21 April, 1526, in which Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi with his army being half  the seize of  Lodi's in ­
fantry and elephants, and took ownership of  Agra and Delhi, has been highlighted as a miraculous Muslim 
victory. However, the Second Battle of  Panipat of  November, 1556, fought between the Hindu ruler Samrat  
Hem Chandra Vikramaditya from North India and Akbar, the third Mughal ruler, in contrast, has been under ­
represented in the textbooks. According to Rosser, bypassing Akbar, in modern India seen as an „Indian lead­
er“ and role model of  cultural and religious assimilation and syncretism, has been systematic. International ac­
counts see his rule as stable due to his accommodating relations with neighboring rulers and his universal  
policy of  peace (sulh-i kul). Pakistani historians, instead of  highlighting the Mughal period as a golden past ten­
ded to eliminate Akbar from the textbooks although he ruled much longer than any other of  the Muslim 
Mughal emperors:
[…] in discussions of  this seminal regime that firmly established the Mughal Empire on Indian soil, Pakistani  
textbooks, though necessarily brief  in their presentation due to space limitations […], are almost unanimously si ­
lent about Akbar. This omission is an amazing hick-up of  historiography in which fifty-five very essential years  
are simply eliminated.362
As a counter narrative to Akbar, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), the descendant of  a notable ašrāf  family 
and member of  the Naqshbandi order, is presented as a challenger to Akbar's religious policy and therefore  
seen as a defender of  Islam. Aurangzeb's (1618-1707) rule in the late 17 th century finds special attention due to 
his expansionist policies thanks to which the Moghul empire (1526–1857) reached its largest extension. Fur ­
ther, the sixth Mughal emperor became known for his reversal of  his predecessors' accommodating religious 
policy towards their non-Muslim subjects and foreign adversaries. Marking events were the codification of  
Hanafi law under his rule and his attempts to eradicate Hindu holy sites and temples, to restrict music, arts and 
to introduce more puritanical and conservative court culture. 
357 See Rosser, 2003, p. 12. Here again, the ethnic dominance of  Punjabi and Muhajir identities is reflected in the Pakistani histori­
ography while Bengali identity and East Pakistan have been presented, for political reasons but based on cultural arguments, as  
not belonging to the Subcontinent's Islamic cultural tradition due to the predominance of  Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism un ­
til the arrival of  the first Muslim conquerors in the early 13 th century which marked the beginning of  the Sultanate period fol­
lowed by Mughal rule. See Van Schindel, Willem: A History of  Bangladesh. New Delhi: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009, p. 26-32ff.  
Key events such as the Battle of  Polashi (1757) are dealt with in Pakistani textbooks only marginal: In the battle that took place  
close to modern Bangladesh's borders and in which the East India Company was able to establish its rule in South Asia, accord ­
ing to the Bengali narrative, was only the beginning of  a new foreign occupation of  the Delta after the Mughals had taken con ­
trol of  the region in 1612: “Bangladesh historians emphasise that colonial rule did not come to an end when the British retreated  
in 1947: those who ruled the delta as part of  the post-1947 state of  Pakistan should also be considered as foreign colonialists.”  
Cit. Ibid., pp. 49/50. 
358 Buddhist Gandhara culture in Pakistan is mainly identified with the excavations of  Taxila, Peshawar and Bamyan in Afghanistan. 
359 His name has been given to Pakistan's nuclear military capabilities which include the Ghaznavi short-range missiles. Similarly,  
Pakistan's Babur cruise missiles were named after the Moghal ruler Zahiruddin Babur. See also Wieland, 2000, p. 141.
360 See Rosser, 2003, p. 13-18.
361 See Malik, 2008, p. 14. 
362 Cit. Rosser, 2003, p. 21.
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But it is the Mutiny of  1857 which again connects what had widely been dramatized by the Pakistan Move­
ment and later Pakistani historians as the pre-stage for the struggle for independence of  the 1930s and 1940s –  
while at the same time, the real struggle and political violence culminated in 1947 alongside communal lines of  
conflict and then finally with the catastrophe of  forced mass migration during and after partition (Hindustān  
ka Batwārā).363 Taken together, Indian and Pakistani history writing, especially when seen through the Pakistani 
communal prism, highlighted a specific series of  historical key events whose themes can be rendered with re­
gard to the complexes of  the Two-Nation-Theory, the Ideology of  Pakistan, the Jinnah cult of  leadership and  
personality and the Muslim League's political struggle with a pre-emphasis on Punjab from the 1930s to inde ­
pendence.
3.1.1.2 Foundation of  State and Concepts of  Collectivity 
Among different theories focusing more on the political process that resulted in the creation of  Pakistan, 
Hamza Alavi's salariat theory should be taken into account, claiming that the Pakistan Movement was not a  
purely religious movement, but represented a consensus of  diverse Muslim ethnic groups, more in pursuit of  
explicit material goals, which Jinnah had to compromise. To include these “diverse Muslim ethnic groups from 
different regions of  India, representing different social strata and interests”364 was a political demand to gain a 
stable basis of  support. This backbone of  Muslim nationalism was mainly constituted by those strata of  Indi­
an colonial society, that as urban professionals were supposed to be integrated in the colonial state apparatus.  
Before they joined Jinnah, they had experienced Indian nationalist ideas and claimed more representative self-
government. Based on regional ethnic identities, especially the Punjab, Bengal and Uttar Pradesh salariat sup ­
ported the Movement under the banner of  a Muslim identity which lost much of  its momentum when the  
state was founded. Most dominantly involved was the salariat of  Punjab which, until today, is overrepresented 
in military and civil-bureaucracy in contrast to that of  Bengal which had been underrepresented when the state  
was established, and later until East Pakistan became independent.365 
As far as the representatives of  religious groups and their stance to the movement are concerned, one has  
to differentiate between the groups and their inner disputes whether to join or to refuse Jinnah's party: “Prac­
tically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was specifically religious – Islamic  
– was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the Pakistan movement” 366, is an argu­
able statement but is still of  relevance when taking into consideration that when the state of  Pakistan became 
reality – like almost all political parties – religious parties had to accept its civic culture. In order to uphold the 
legitimacy which was needed to participate in the political process, the commitment to the “ideas and ideals of  
Quaid-e-Azam”, who died in 1948, was obligatory.367 This created a serious dilemma for those factions who 
had opposed Jinnah during the pre-state era: Basically  Jama'at-i Islami as a sort of  “counter-League”, whose 
363 On the civil war in Punjab after the resignation of  Punjab's minister Khizr Tiwana in the spring of  1947, see Khan, Yasmin: The 
Great Partition: The Making of  India and Pakistan. New Haven (a.o.): Yale Univ. Press, 2007, p. 81ff.
364 Cit. Alavi, 1987, p. 22.
365 See Ibid., p. 24-27.
366 Cit. Ibid, p. 21.
367 Cit. Constitution of  Pakistan Muslim League. Islamabad: Central Secretariat, 1996, Preamble; See also Pakistan Peoples Party  
Manifesto: Towards Peace and Prosperity in Pakistan, 2008.
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founder Maulana Maudūdī had not hidden his hostile attitude towards the idea of  a territorial nationalism in  
contrast to the transnational concept of  the  umma, made several attempts to revise its past.368 Since the re­
sponse of  the Muslim masses to the program of  the movement was, initially, very poor – in the elections of  
1936/37, the All India Muslim League was defeated disastrously – its leadership tried to win the support of  the 
religious groups of  the different schools of  thought and involved the ulamāʿ ʾ, masha’ikh and pirs for their po­
tential of  mobilizing members of  the traditional religious institutions. The result of  the 1937 Punjab elections  
reflected the loyalities of  the muridi, many of  them being influential biridari who had unanimously voted for 
the Unionist Party (UP), whereas Congress and Muslim League at that time still relied on the support of  the 
urban ulamā  ʿ ʾ . 
Until 1940, the political body of  the land-holding Punjabi elite, the UP under Sir Sikander Hayat Khan 369, 
had been the most influential party in the center and was able to predominate until the provincial elections in  
1946. As the main representative body for the rural areas of  Punjab which was divided on the basis of  the  
British cultivation of  agricultural communities bridging communal divides, the electoral basis in these parts of  
Punjab differed significantly from the urban environment where politics was still determined by communal-re­
ligious markers. Within the colonial system of  power, this elite played a central role:  
Their loyalty towards the British rulers was unflinching and they extended all possible cooperation to them in 
the war efforts on the occasions of  two world wars. The British reciprocated by decorating them with medals  
and honours, and granting them lucrative tracts of  land in canal colony districts which helped them to not only  
sustain rather enhance their power and prestige over the local populace. It was, hence, a mutually symbiotic rela­
tionship.370
Despite his attempts to relativize religion, facing electoral defeat in 1937, Jinnah stronger than before referred 
to religious stereotypes and evoked the scenario of  Islam being threatened by the British colonial invaders and 
the “Hindu-Congress”. This step, for the short-term, had been successful for it guaranteed the support by the 
UP which had been founded in 1922 by Fazl-i-Husain and Chotu Ram. The UP was able to expand its political  
power in Punjab, ironically, under a Muslim-Hindu leadership, and succeeded also in occupying key posts in 
the Muslim League after the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of  1937.371 Jinnah's Muslim League profited from its pro-
British stances during the Second World War, in which it displayed by far more solidarity with the colonial 
power than with the Congress leaders. In turn, the British provided Jinnah with more political space for his  
mobilization efforts in Muslim majority areas of  the colony where he was now able to promote the Muslim 
League's plea for political Muslim emancipation.372 Prominent slogans of  that time, like “Muslim hai tu Muslim  
League mein  aa” (if  you are a Muslim then join Muslim League) or “Pakistan ka matlab kia? La illah ha ill lal­
lah”373, give an idea of  how a political campaign with mundane secular strategic goals was islamized. 374 Mass re­
368 See Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza: The Vanguard of  the Islamic Revolution. The Jama'at-i Islami of  Pakistan. Berkeley: Univ. of  Cali ­
fornia Press, 1994.
369 For the Unionist Party and its sociopolitical background see Kamran, Tahir: The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947:  
Key Turning Points and British Responses, pp. 187/188. In: Journal of  Punjab Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007, p. 187-210.
370 Cit. Qasmi, Ali Usman: Who will Punjab vote for? A study in the context of  Punjab’s electoral history, 14 November, 2011.
371 The pact of  Lucknow allowed Muslim Unionists to function as members in the League, led by Muhammad Iqbal at that time. 
See Ahmad, Syed Nur: From Marital to Martial Law. Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p. 145-
148.
372 See Hasan, Mushirul: Partition Narratives, p. 26. In: Social Scientist, Vol. 30, No. 7/8, 2002, p. 24-53.
373 This slogan is said to have been brought prominently into Punjab politics by the Urdu poet Prof. Asghar Sodai.
374 See Kamran, 2007, p. 189.
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ligious enthusiasm, transformed into a political movement, had been described in terms of  a “chiliastic move ­
ment” that, spearheaded by Jinnah's League capitalized its symbolism on Islam, thereby serving as an umbrella 
body for a diversity of  distinct sectarian and ethnic regional groups. 375 In a stark contrast to the electoral dis­
aster of  1937 in which the League won only two seats, in the 1946 Punjab elections the Muslim League re ­
ceived a total of  75 percent of  the votes and was able to secure 75 out of  86 Muslim seats.376
Another fundamental question for Pakistanis and Indians alike, whether the father of  the nation, himself  a  
Western-educated Shiite from the smaller Khoja or Ismaili stream under leadership of  the the Aga Khan, in ­
tended to design Pakistan as a secular state or as a state with a dominant role of  religion, can not satisfactorily 
be answered since Jinnah's intellectual legacy, mainly his speeches, leaves much room for interpretation. In 
contrast to most of  the other religious-political figures of  his time and especially non-Muslim Leaguers like Sir  
Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash or Mufti Mahmud, Mian Iftikharuddin and Khan 
Abdul Qayyum a.o., Jinnah and personalities like Maulana Maudūdī and the leader of  the Khaksar Inayatullah 
Khan Mashriqi recorded their political life more extensively and, thus, became much more present in the his­
torical discourse.377 The political and private life of  Mohammad Ali Jinnah has become a matter of  consider ­
able debate initiated by the publication of  Bolitho's  Jinnah, Creator of  Pakistan in 1950. The New Zealand 
journalist wrote this first biography on Jinnah on request of  the Government of  Pakistan. In 1984, Stanley  
Wolpert's Jinnah of  Pakistan was published. Unlike Bolitho, Wolpert was authorized to review Jinnah's corres­
pondence which until then had been hold by the Quaid's sister, Fatima Jinnah. Nevertheless, the Zia regime 
censored the new biography because parts of  the work mentioned Jinnah's „un-Islamic“ life style, and, thus,  
ridiculed the father of  the nation.378 The controversies as how to place the Quaid in the historical narrative cul­
minated again when in 2009 the expulsion of  the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politician Jaswant Singh 
from the party followed the publication of  his Jinnah: India-Partition. Independence in which he lauded Jinnah as a 
“good Indian” in contrast to the pro-partition stance of  Nehru. In August, 2009, Singh's book temporarily fell  
victim to censorship due to a request by the authorities of  Gujarat. The author who served as a minister in 
subsequent cabinets, was expelled from the BJP. In his narrative, Jinnah was in the forefront of  those who 
supported the idea of  a federal Indian unity while Jawaharlal Nehru insisted on a partitioned centralized state.
379 In 2011, a book was banned in Gujarat after reviews hinted at a portray of  Gandhi as having had a homo­
sexual relationship.380 Like in the Pakistani case, the Indian narrative is subjected to ideological biases too.  
Rosser states with regard to Indian textbooks dealing with the partition: „Jinnah is seen as almost Hitleresque,  
a ghostly messianic figure whipping up a false nationalism and leading a paper organisation that had no clearly  
defined concept for the actual form of  Pakistan.“381
375 See Hardy, Peter: The Muslims of  British India. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972, p. 239.
376 See Kamran, 2007, p. 189.
377 For his very detailed list of  political figures see Aziz, 2009, p. 97-125.
378 Under Benazir Bhutto's first government the ban was lifted. See Aziz, 2009, pp. 10/11.
379 See The Times of  India: BJP expels Jaswant Singh over Jinnah remarks, 19 September, 2009.
380 See The Guardian: Indian state bans Gandhi book, 30 March, 2011. For the impact of  this discourse on textbooks and curricula  
in Pakistan and India see Aziz, 1993; Rosser, 2003.
381 Cit. Ibid., p. 10. See also Noorani, A. G.: Authors' Secrets. In: Frontline (The Hindu), Vol. 24, No. 9, 2007.
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Inherent to the founding fathers' claim for moral authority that became part of  national hagiography, is the 
credit for the establishment of  the state to just one political movement: Similar to Israel's socialist Mapai has 
the Muslim League of  Jinnah been presented as the sole political force and Muslim representative body in  
most Pakistani narratives.382 The dogmatic legitimacy attached also to today's Pakistan Muslim League and its di­
verse subgroups for its reference to the Quaid-i-Azam has been analyzed in terms of  a „national belief“ which 
stretches into all segments of  Pakistani society.383 The historic reference to the father of  the nation is part of  
Pakistan's political culture. Even political forces that might be the dominating power on the provincial level or 
with regard to their specific ethnic or religious electoral basis have to obey to this ritualized political dynamics  
in order to claim authentic national leadership. 
Ritualized current political culture in Pakistan, with its recent revival of  mass jalsa events in public, forces 
political parties to substantiate and underline their claim for national leadership with their displayed commit ­
ment and subordination to the Quaid's legacy. Accordingly, symbolic capital with strong connection to the 
state and its founding elite and the cult that “Jinnahism” offers, as expressed in shows of  strength and man 
power384 at historical sites like Iqbal Park in Lahore with the  Minar-i-Pakistan built on the site where on 23 
March, 1940, Pakistan's creation was demanded by the League with the passing of  the Pakistan or Lahore Res­
olution (Qarardad-e-Pakistan)385, and at the Jinnah Mausoleum (Mazar-e-Quaid)386, Karachi, seem to have more 
impact on domestic political campaigning than a well-grounded political agenda.387 
In some cases Jinnah has been interpreted with a strong reference to Iqbal and his notion of  a semi-reli ­
gious spiritual nationalism as a third way model. This accounts styles both leaders as advocates for a spiritual 
democracy and spiritual secularism based on the mystic tradition of  the East as an Indian syncretism388 and 
counter-hegemony to the Western European material hegemony as it had been thematized also by Mahatma 
Gandhi.389 In this debate, the Quaid's legacy, as enshrined in the Jinnah Papers, gives its authorship the discurs­
ive power. Much later than the official papers for the documentation of  Indian nationalism, the material of  the  
Pakistan Movement was not explored before 1966. At the end of  the 1980s, the government ordered the pub ­
382 Alavi has highlighted the heterogeneity within the Pakistan Movement and the role of  the salariat as main agents of  independ ­
ence. However, he acknowledges that this class consisted “of  diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions of  India, rep­
resenting different social strata and interests”. Cit. Alavi, 1987, p. 22.
383 See Aziz, 2009, p. 71.
384 It is intriguing that religious parties and their secular rightist counterparts in Pakistan utilized means of  mass mobilization from 
the grassroots that had been introduced into the country's political culture by the left and later by the PPP. 
385 The day is celebrated in Pakistan as Yaum-e-Pakistan (Pakistan Day) commemorating both the passing of  the resolution and the 
adoption of  Pakistan's first constitution on 23 March, 1956, and, thus, the country's transition from a dominion to a sovereign 
republic.
386 Lieven and others have interpreted the fact that the tombs of  Muslim Leaguers like Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan show inscrip­
tions in both Urdu and Hindi as the “curious last echo of  Muslim League hopes for a united confederal India […].” Cit. Lieven,  
2011, p. 57, footnote 9.
387 The jalsa trend in politics has arisen in 2011 when Imran Khan's PTI organized a political rally at Mazar-e-Quaid on 25 Decem ­
ber, 2011, which is said to have been one of  the biggest gatherings in Pakistan's history with approximately 300.000 people.  
Earlier, on 30 October, PTI 's Lahore jalsa at the Minar-e-Pakistan had been attended by similar numbers of  participants. This 
success brought the Sharif  brothers and the PML-N under pressure which the party tried to counter with its own rally. Similarly,  
the DPC with its who-is-who of  jihadism and the religious-political right on board was able to organize rallies which created  
similar echo in society. 
388 The connection and mixing of  either specific traditions of  two distinct religions or elements within one religion. For the concept  
see Schumann, Olaf: Der Islam und lokale Traditionen – synkretistische Ideen und Praktiken, pp. 560/561. In: Ende/ Steinbach,  
1989, p. 560-581.
389 See Rahman, S. M., 2005, p. 35.
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lication of  the Quaid's literary estate in the Jinnah Papers published by the National Archives under the guise of  
Prof. Z. H. Zaidi from SOAS. In the midst of  the debate is Jinnah's speech made in Karachi on 11 August,  
1947, at the Constituent Assembly only three days before the British raj on the Subcontinent ended:
[…] you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of  worship in 
this State of  Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the busi ­
ness of  the state […]. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens  
of  one state […]. Now, I think we should keep that in front of  us as our ideal and you will find that in course of  
time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, be ­
cause that is the personal faith of  each individual, but in the political sense of  the state.390
This speech which is Jinnah's strongest statement for giving religion only a marginal role in the state became  
the mantra and focal point of  liberal-progressive interpreters of  Jinnah's vision for a tolerant and pluralistic  
state and supporters of  minority rights. The fact that Jinnah, in his profession as a lawyer, had been involved 
in one of  the first blasphemy trials of  colonial India seems to be ignored by his biographers and in the current  
debate on the blasphemy laws and the discrimination of  minorities: In 1926, Ilam Din, a Muslim young man 
from Lahore killed a Hindu shop keeper in Urdu Bazar whom he thought to be the author of  a pamphlet in  
which the Prophet's polygamy had been explicitly criticized.391 Din followed the call of  a scholar at the Wazir 
Khan Masjid who had condemned the authors,  probably  associated with the Hindu Arya Samaj,  as  blas­
phemers. After refusal by the court to bring the case to trial, Din acted on his own and, like many religious  
scholars after the murder, sanctified the killing with reference to his duty to defend the Prophet and Islam. Ac ­
cordingly, he was found guilty by the Lahore High Court. Jinnah, at that time still based in Bombay, took over  
the position of  the lawyer in appeal but lost the case and Din was executed in the Mianwali prison in 1929. 
Din's martyrdom had been prominently promoted and glorified by Mohammad Iqbal, who negotiated with the  
British authorities in order to bury Din's body in Lahore on sacred ground, which had been initially been re ­
fused by the British to avoid further unrest between Muslims and Hindus.392
In 2012 it became known that Pakistan Broadcasting Cooperation had destroyed existing recordings of  the 11 
August speech, when the government formally asked the Indian government for approval of  a copy of  the re ­
cordings still kept in the All-India Radio archives.393 Only a year after the speech, Jinnah died on 11 September, 
1948, from tuberculosis and blood loss, too early to frame the state and to implement his vision. In October,  
1951, Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's confident and successor and first Prime Minister394 was assassinated in Muni­
cipal Park (today's Liaquat Bagh), Rawalpindi, in the same park in which former Prime Minister and opposition 
leader Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated on 27 December, 2007, under similarly mysterious circumstances.  
390 Cit. Jinnah's Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of  Pakistan, Karachi, 11 August, 1947. Quoted in Ziadi, Z. H. (Ed.):  
Pakistan at last 26 July - 14 August 1947. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, Vol. 4, Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project,  
National Archives of  Pakistan, 1999, pp. 537/538.
391 Prior to that, Muslim pamphlets had been distributed which depicted the Hindu goddess Sita as a prostitute. See Altaf, Waseem:  
Ghazi to Qadri. In: Viewpoint, Online Issue, No. 107, October, 2011.
392 Ibid.
393 See Nelson, Dean: Pakistan seeks recording of  Jinnah calling for secular state. In: The Telegraph, 5 June, 2012. 
394 Also referred to as Quaid-e-Millat, Leader of  the Nation, and after his assassination as shahīd (martyr). In contrast to India where 
the Congress and the continuance of  the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty established a stable political system, Pakistan's political culture  
and  ideology  were  considerably  destabilized  after  the  deaths  of  its  founding  leaders  and  subsequent  disruptive  events  like 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's dis-empowerment and execution in 1979, Zia ul-Haq's mysterious plane crash in 1988 and Benazir Bhutto's  
murder in 2007.
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The premature deaths of  its most important leaders created a serious dilemma for the Muslim League and es­
pecially its reform oriented elements within experienced a backlash.395 
There has much been written on both the Two-Nations-Theory and the Ideology of  Pakistan reflecting an 
official historical narrative that is dominated by an academic old guard of  Pakistani historians. Quite often,  
their works are still referred to as state of  the art regarding the research on the formation of  Pakistan. The dy ­
namic of  colonial Muslim nationalism as an integrating force that eventually ensured the political survival of  a  
small elitist group as against other groups, after Pakistan became independent, lost much of  its mobilizing  
power  and  an  Islamic  ideology  was  promoted  as  the  amalgam between a  Weltanschauung  of  a  primordial 
Muslim nation and its religious traditions and its historical destiny:
The state […] should create such conditions as are most conducive to translating the idea-system – that is, their  
cherished ideals – into social action. It should help in building a 'good society', like the Greeks – except that this  
society has to be based upon the Islamic value-system, the system which Pakistanis fervidly believe in. The state 
should thus help its people in leading the Islamic way of  life.396 
This concept of  Islamic or Pakistan Ideology (Nazariya-e-Pakistan) is part of  a legal and political debate that 
frequently arises on the basis of  the Constitution of  1973397, where the notion of  Pakistan Ideology in refer­
ence to Art. 2 (Islam to be state religion)398 and Art. 227 (Provisions relating to the Quran and Sunnah)399 tends 
to be interpreted as an affirmation of  the state's pure Islamic character by some religious-political parties 
whereas, more on a individual basis, other parliamentarians claim to define the concrete character of  this ideo ­
logy.400 However, as far as the historical narrative is concerned, Pakistan's ideology, according to Javid Iqbal, 
prominent judge, politician and son of  Muhammad Iqbal, has developed from the Pakistani-Indian antagon­
ism after partition to a much greater framework: “The ideology is based on the two-nation theory on which  
raised the edifice of  our nationhood. Therefore it is the source and expression of  our political, economic, cul­
tural and religious and moral values.”401 
Some authors have emphasized the integral dimension of  the Two-Nations-Theory: According to this view,  
the right of  self-determination as a fundamental right of  all human beings was the idea behind the paradigm  
of  two nations,  each searching for its own path of  self-determination. Partition as a consequence of  the 
concept of  Two-Nations has then been interpreted as a political step necessary to exercise this right and „to  
help the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, to live in peace and harmony.“402 Although „the Hindu ma­
jority refused to show any magnanimity or generosity by heart towards the Muslim minority“ 403 the leadership 
of  Tehrik-i-Pakistan (Pakistan Movement) continued with their attempts to create a collaborative platform with 
the Congress leadership in order to ensure the implementation of  constitutional guarantees for the Muslim 
395 See also Lieven, 2011, pp. 61/62.
396 Cit. al-Mujahid, 2001, pp. 15/16.
397 See Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, (modif. 20 April, 2010), National Assembly of  Pakistan, Art. 63G – 62H. 
398 Further, the article defines “the Objectives Resolution to form part of  substantive provisions”. Cit. Ibid., Art. 2-2A. For the full 
text see Annex, Document 1.
399 For the full text see Annex, Document 2. 
400 See for instance Daily Times: Bill seeking debate on ideology of  Pakistan rejected, 13 September, 2006.
401 Cit. Iqbal, Javid: Ideology of  Pakistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2005, p. 8.
402 Cit. Sadiq, Khwaja Ghulam: Speech. In: The Philosophical Basis of  the Ideology of  Pakistan (A Symposium). Lahore, 1969, p.  
10.
403 See Ibid., p. 4-10.
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minority. According to this narrative, the decision for partition and the creation of  Pakistan was an act of  self-
defense against the various attempts to create a Hindu hegemony in India.404
Pakistan's survival, as has been stated prominently by Zia ul-Haq, Javid Iqbal 405 and others, depends on the 
maintenance of  its ideological integrity: “Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from 
Israel and it will fall like a house of  cards. Take Islam out of  Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would col­
lapse.”406 The ideology of  Pakistan claims to be based on a principle of  “peaceful co-existence” which is con­
sidered to be the pillar of  Pakistani foreign policy gaining „peace – not regional or territorial peace, but inter­
national or universal peace […] a social order which tries to realise the ideals of  unity, equality, and freedom 
[...]“.407 In contrast  to this,  both the Western colonial  powers and international  organizations such as  the 
United Nations, it has been claimed, had kept Africa and Asia under “subjugtion”, and failed to ensure peace  
and „proved ineffective in vacating aggression from Kashmir, Arab countries in the Middle East and Vietnam 
[…] due to the fact that the right of  existence to the developing countries is not conceded to in spirit. It is the  
block interest that is dominant“408. Both Marxism and “atheistic Existentialism” neglect religion and the en­
forcement of  a empirical spirit of  colonialism, neglected individualist spiritual experiences with religion. These  
philosophies emphasized the dialectic of  materialism and strengthened the distinction between “caste, creed 
and colour”, thereby failed to provide an universal and inclusive order that could guarantee individualist and  
collectivist material well-being and spiritual needs.409 According to Lieven, the Muslim orientation towards the 
idea of  Pakistan during the colonial 1940s had been accompanied by the vision, if  not belief, that the new en­
tity could materialize as “a sort of  ideal Muslim socialist state, drawing on Islamic traditions of  justice and 
egalitarianism as well as on Western socialist thought.”410
The ideological  imperative which „not meant that  India and Pakistan should always remain  at  daggers 
drawn“ but that they „would live as well-knit neighbours like Canada and the US“411, re-emphasized commun­
alism as  it  had been used as a means for the implementation of  colonial  rule.  The systematic  policy  of  
sharpening borders between the communities under colonial rule and the „ideological construction of  the 
politics of  secular nationalism“412 has been the focus of  a number of  studies.413 Jalal has pinpointed that the 
404 In numerous works the origins of  the Pakistani nation and the genesis of  the Two-Nations-Theory are traced back to the advent  
of  Islam in the sub-continent. Representatives of  the “Pakistan School” do thereby refer to differing and diffuse “historical  
turns” in South Asia that marked the beginning of  Muslim rule. See Ali, Chaudhry Rahmat: Pakistan: The Fatherland of  the  
Pakistan Nation. Lahore: Book Traders, 1978; al-Mujahid, Sharif: Ideology of  Pakistan. Islamabad: IRI, 2001; Aziz, K. K.: The 
Making of  Pakistan. London: Chatto and Windus, National Book Foundation, 1967. Aziz, former Head of  the National Com­
mission of  Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, with his subsequent works became a critic of  the historiographic dis ­
course in Pakistan. 
405 See Iqbal, 2005, p. 8.
406 Cit. Interview Zia ul-Haq in: The Economist, 12 December, 1981, p. 48.
407 Cit. Sadiq, 1969, p. 13. 
408 Cit. Ibid.,, p. 11.
409 See Ibid., p. 9.
410 Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 61.
411 Cit. Rahman, S. M., 2005, p. 34.
412 Cit. Jalal, 1996, p. 683.
413 For instance Pandey, Gynanendra: The Construction of  Communalism in Colonial North India. Oxford: Oxfort Univ. Press,  
1992; see also Malik, 2008, p. 346-355. For the contemporary Indian context see Brass, Paul: The Production of  Hindu-Muslim 
Violence in Contemporary India. Seattle: Univ. of  Wasington Press, 2003 and Six, Clemens: Hindi – Hindu – Hindustan. Politik  
und Religion im modernen Indien. Wien: Mandelbaum, 2006.
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communalist drive primarily focused on the question of  nationhood and only secondarily on the issues linked  
to the creation of  a modern state:  
The historiographical debate has focused more on the Muslim claim to 'nationhood' than on the ambiguities of  
the demand for 'statehood'. A product of  the telos which presumes the orchestration of  separate nationhood as  
an inevitable overture to exclusive statehood, it ignores the uncertainties which attended the Muslim League's 
movement for a 'Pakistan'. While the insistence on national status for Indian Muslims was absolute, the demand  
for a separate and sovereign state with no relationship to a Hindustan containing almost as many Muslims re ­
mained open to negotiation until the late summer of  1946. An analytical distinction between 'nation' and 'state' 
on the one hand, and between a partition of  the provinces and India on the other, is necessary to grasp the con­
tradictory dynamics underlying the demand for a 'Pakistan'.414
Other historical orientations such as Marxist accounts from India, often labeled as the Nehruvian Socialist  
School, or the works of  Soviet writers were keen to highlight the Muslim League in terms of  a bourgeois  
movement, and its leaders as having pursued the plan of  partition unilaterally and based on ideological goals.  
As a response, new critical leftist scholarship has concentrated instead on the introduction and ideologization  
of  religion as a means of  political tactics and the socioeconomic dimension of  partition.
3.1.1.3 Sacralization of  the State
Liberation and secular independence movements worldwide have propagated their cause to change the politic­
al reality in their societies in territorial-sacral terms with the connotation of  their fatherland as a sanctified  
“promised land”.415 Early Pakistani narratives tend to emphasize a religious-millenarian interpretation of  polit ­
ical history including the creation of  Pakistan. They underline the myth of  a “divine plan and intervention” or  
“mission” which led to the existence of  both states. "Can any intelligent mind miss seeing the Hand of  God, 
in the wondrous way the Islamic State of  Pakistan was brought into being at a most sacred and auspicious time 
– chosen by God most munificent?" asks a recent publication by the Nazariya-e-Pakistan Foundation (Lahore).416 
Similar  to  the  religious  Zionist  account  on the  creation  of  Israel  as  an  unforeseeable  miraculous  event,  
Pakistan's ideologues discovered the religious past and aimed at bringing the Islamic Republic into a line of  
descent that stretches back to the statehood of  Medina. In both, the religious Zionist and the “sacralized“  
Pakistani historical discourse, much emphasis is laid on the fact that the project of  creating a sovereign state  
was refused by the British rulers and exposed to the harsh political opposition of  its adversaries. Although Jin ­
nah was heavily opposed by the majority of  the ‘ulamâ’ until the early 1930s, it is true that the majority of  
Barelwi scholars and factions within the  Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) supported the Muslim League. Jinnah 
was declared Quaid-e-Azam417 by Maulana Ahmed Saeed from the JUH in a speech held at the Jamia Masjid,  
Muradabad, on 7 December, 1936.418 Accordingly, his and Iqbal's image as messianic leaders has been fortified 
in the national narrative:
God brought into being Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah and equipped them fully to activate, unite  
and spearhead all the diverse forces meant for meeting the two requirements. Indeed, God gave them a deeper  
vision that motivated them to inspire the entire Muslim Ummah and to herald the reemergence of  Islamic polit ­
414 Cit. Jalal, 2000, p. 400.
415 See Hechter, Michael: Containing Nationalism. Oxford/ New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000, p. 15-17.
416 Cit. Majeed, Tariq: An Untold Story. The Divine Imprint on the Birth of  Pakistan. Lahore: Nazaria-i-Pakistan Foundation, 2006, 
p. 39.
417 Similarly, he was declared Amir-ul-Momineen by Maulana Uthmani. See Jinnah Institute, 2011, p. 22.
418 See Majeed, 2006, p. 10.
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ical, economic, social and spiritual power on the world stage. These two specially gifted and divinely inspired lu­
minaries were another clear manifestation of  the divine factor in Pakistan's creation.419
Despite the territorial component of  Pakistani state ideology being much less central than in the Jewish-Israeli  
and the Zionist narrative, especially the early historical works published in the consolidating years of  statehood  
have elaborated on the aspect of  territory and land more explicitly with the connotations of  Pakistan as a  
“fortress of  Islam”, a “sacred land” and the “Land of  the Pure”. The community of  Medina, the Prophet's  
city (Madinat un-nabi), is an important element within these discourses and embodies the symbolism of  purity,  
intensified through motifs like hijra420:
Madinah was the first state in the world founded in the name of  Islam. The Prophet of  Islam had himself  estab­
lished it. Thereafter, the world saw great Muslim empires and scores of  Muslim kingdoms and states, governed  
on broad Islamic principles. However, they were all established in territories which already existed as geographic­
al  and  political  entities  and  which,  in  fact,  retained  their  old  names  on  becoming  part  of  Muslim kingli­
aquat-nehrudoms. No new state was carved out of  any territory in the name of  Islam. Thirteen hundred and 
sixty-five years after the appearance of  the Islamic State of  Madinah on the map of  the world, by which time all  
the existing Muslim States had lost either their Islamic spirit or altogether their independence, the divine plan for 
humanity brought forth Pakistan – the second state created in the name of  Islam. [...] Pakistan was chosen to be  
a successor to the State of  Madinah […].421
However, self-identification on the part of  the millions of  Muslim refugees with the Islamic obligation to pil ­
grimage422 and the Prophetic example was not able to legitimize the massive losses of  property and lives in the  
face of  migration and massacres during partition despite the efforts by Pakistan's first generation of  historians  
trying to introduce this sacralized narrative in the formative years.423 In this short-lived tradition, the historical 
recourse to the ideal type of  community and statehood, a societas mohammadi, offers an understanding similar to 
the Israeli perspective on the yishuv, the first Jewish community in pre-state Palestine. The projection of  these 
idealized societies, to which a reformist and pioneering spirit has been attributed, featured inner strength and 
cohesion linked to a strong symbolic of  piety and purity, against their external environment. Both archetypical  
societies, according to the sacralized narrative, were not only enabled to face external threats because of  their  
inner strength based on a firm belief, but also because of  their integrative legal and social orders which al ­
lowed for the integration of  non-believers and minorities and, thus, served as role models for contemporary 
societies.   
Maulana Uthmani belonged to those ‘ulamâ’ who supported the League's Pakistan plan by proclaiming the 
new state's succession to the prophetic cities: “Everyone knows that the Holy Prophet did not carry with him 
the shrines of  Mecca when he migrated to Medina; he migrated because he wanted to transform Medina into a  
Pakistan.”424 This account supports the view on the partition as both a sacred duty and heroic „self-sacrifice“  
on the part of  those Muslims in the minority states and those who remained in what became India:
419 Cit. Ibid., p. 20.
420 The Prophet's journey from Mecca to Medina in 622.
421 Cit. Majeed, 2006, p. 18.
422 Hajj as the major pilgrimage constitutes the fifth pillar of  Islam. Pilgrimage to Mecca is obligatory for those Muslims who can 
afford and are physically able to travel to the Al-Haram mosque and its inner district with the ka baʿ  as its holy center. As a minor 
pilgrimage umraʿ  is not obligatory and can be undertaken throughout the year.
423 Talbot writes: “[...] many of  the refugees regarded their journey to Pakistan as a true hijrat, an opportunity for a renewal of  their 
faith.” Cit. Talbot, Ian: Pakistan: A Modern History. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, p. 120.
424 Cit. Maulana Shabir Ahmad Uthmani (1946), founder of  JUI. Quoted in: Arif, M.: The Resurgence of  the Muslim Ummah and 
Pakistan Movement. Lahore: Wajidalis, 1988, p. 15.
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The creation of  Pakistan also illustrated a unique example of  self-sacrifice in the name of  religion in the modern 
era. This sacrifice was offered consciously and willingly by the Muslims living in the Hindu-majority areas which  
were bound to be excluded from the new Muslim state.425
This account found its political strategic equivalent among the Muslim League's leadership in the “hostage the ­
ory”, according to which communal minority groups would not be discriminated by the majority since the 
other's population on one's own territory would be treated equally on the basis of  reciprocity.426 
Beside this pathetic construction of  historical continuity there are various other tools within the divinized 
and romanticized conception of  Pakistan. The date on which Pakistan gained dominion status, the night of  
August 15, 1947, as scheduled by Viceroy Mountbatten as the date of  independence for India and Pakistan 
marked Friday, 27th of  Ramadan. The religious mapping in time and space provided a deep religious meaning  
to the new state. Rahman highlights, very similar to the Jewish-Israeli telos of  being a light unto the nations,  
the duty given to the country and its people: 
You are a privileged people [...] in the sense that God has given you the privilege of  entrusting you with a Mis ­
sion that He wants you to accomplish. The Mission is two-fold: to establish a truly Islamic State to be a model  
for the nations in the contemporary world; and to lead the effort against the anti-God, anti-Humanity forces of  
Evil, which are forcing on the people the most abominable forms of  immorality and perversion, besides making 
them more and more irreligious, impoverished and miserable.427
In textbooks, history books and contemporary internet fora, the idea of  the state's holiness still attracts the 
imagination of  many. In this imagery Pakistan's independence is seen as part of  a linearity together with other  
important religious events that took place during the holy month such as the revelation of  the qur ānʾ  or the 
Battles of  Badr (624 A.D.) and 'Ayn Jalut (1260 A.D.).428 In this context, al-Mujahid states that even secu­
lar-oriented states proved to be bound to the ideological requirement of  using religious symbolism: 
Even „secular“ Egypt under Anwar al Sadat found it expedient to invoke Islam and utilize Islamic symbols and  
slogans extensively during the „Ramadan“ War of  October 1973. Code-named „Badr“, it was launched on 10 
Ramadan (6 October, 1973), and its battlecry was  Allahu Akbar.  The success of  the Egyptian arms, though 
„thwarted only by the United States'  last minute intervention, was termed an „Islamic victory“. The Indian  
Muslims during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could not do otherwise.429 
Al-Mujahid who is a central figure among Pakistani historians430 with his Ideology of  Pakistan as one of  the most 
popular and most circulated historical works in Pakistan, sees Islam and its introduction into the League's cam ­
paigns after 1937 as the critical identity and mobilization tool for mass religious enthusiasm turning into a 
political force that paved the way towards hegemony in Muslim politics at the eve of  partition.431
And finally, the creation of  myths in the context of  Pakistan's independence can be illustrated with regard  
to its unique name. According to the well-established historical narrative, student Chaudhry Rehmat Ali (1897-
1951) had formed the anagram PAKISTAN, in Urdu the „Land of  the Pure“, at Cambridge University in 
425 Cit. Ibid., p. 15. 
426 A similar view can be found in Durrani, F. K. Khan: The Meaning of  Pakistan, 2nd Ed. Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1988, es ­
pecially p. 137-147.
427 Cit. Rahman, S. M., 2005, p. 62.
428 See Majeed, 2006, p. 39. For some exemplary online debates on this issue, see for instance Paklinks, website.
429 Cit. al-Mujahid, 2001, pp. 14/15. 
430 He worked in various leading positions at the University of  Karachi, the International Islamic University (Pakistan and Malaysia)  
and the Quaid-i-Azam Academy. For his works on Jinnah since the 1950s he was awarded the Aizaz-e-Kamal and Sitara-e-Imtiaz  
by the government of  Pakistan. For his biographic data see website Sindh Archives.
431 See also Lieven, 2011, p. 53-58.
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1932/33.432 He referred to the envisioned Muslim provinces presented by Muhammad Iqbal in his 1930 Alla ­
habad speech including Punjab (P), Afghan/ North-Western Frontier Province (A), Kashmir (K), Islam or In­
dus (I), Sindh (S) and Balochistan (TAN).433 Another version of  how the state's name came into being had 
been presented to the Pakistani public in 2005, based on a witness account given by Muhammad Jahangir 
Khan (1910-1988), a member of  the All-India Cricket Team from 1932 to 1936 and uncle of  Pakistan's cricket  
legend and PTI politician Imran Khan Niazi.434 On 9 February, 2005, The Nation published the facsimile of  an 
affidavit made on oath in October, 1983, by Jahangir Khan in which he claimed Khwaja Abdur Rahim, an In ­
dian Civil Service probationer and Cambridge colleague of  Ali, to be the true author of  the anagram and not 
Ali who had always claimed his authorship.435
Bestrangened relations between West and East Pakistan and their perceptions of  each other having ever 
been artificial, Aziz has pointed out to their inclusion into the historical discourse: While the  ulamā  ʿ ʾ were por­
trayed as „genuine“ supporters of  Jinnah's movement with a geographical overbalance of  Northern India and 
Punjab as the intellectual hubs and origins of  political thought of  separatism and Muslim Pakistani national­
ism, the efforts by British India's Eastern Muslim elites and their support for Jinnah are, in most historical ac ­
counts produced by West Pakistanis on the political  struggle  for independence, neglected with only West  
Pakistan's Muslim League being credited for the creation of  the state.436 1971, the fall of  Dacca, the surrender 
of  the Pakistan Army and the loss of  Pakistan's Eastern part has been subjected to attempts by historians to 
explain the shameful defeat and the collapse of  the state – territorially and politically – in differing accounts. 
In the context of  the sacralized view as outlined in this chapter, the question why the state which had been 
created as the result of  a divine will had been defeated with its territory broken apart, created an ideological di ­
lemma. Popularized explanations for the separation – “inevitable sooner or later”437 – saw sabotage and sub­
version by East Pakistani Hindus and India or an Indian-Russian conspiracy438 behind the crisis.439 Similarly, 
East Pakistan's leading political figure at that time, Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, is described as an Indian agent 
on the payroll of  the RAW.440 Beyond, Pakistani historiography offers a minority account which sees the dis­
aster as a punishment for the Pakistani state elites having betrayed the founding fathers' vision for Pakistan 
432 For a detailed account which basically underlines Jama'at-i-Islami's narrative of  Chaudhry Rahmat Ali's demands see Sehmi, An­
warul-Haq: Nationalism, Islam and Pakistan. Lahore: Islamic Publ., 1983, p. 151-154.
433 See Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 12 and Aziz, Kursheed Kamal: Rahmat Ali. A Biography. In: Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Südasien-In ­
stitut, Univ. Heidelberg, Vol. 118. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987. 
434 For biographical data see The Cricketer, online data bank.
435 See Majeed, 2006, p. 40ff. Ali, who became the founder of  the Cambridge-based Pakistan National Movement that promoted a 
more radicalized interpretation of  the Muslim League's nationalism, claimed his authorship of  the Pakistan idea in his pamphlet  
Now or Never. Are We to Live or Perish Forever? (1933).
436 See Aziz, 2009, p. 40-45.
437 Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 60.
438 As expressed in Zulifkar Ali Bhutto's infamous speech at the UN SC on 15 December, 1971, in which he rhetorically attacked 
the Russian delegates as collaborators of  Indian aggressors and the Council as a whole. See Abbas, Sara Syeda: Deliberative  
Oratory in the Darkest Hour: Style Analysis of  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Statement at the Security Council. In: Pakistaniaat: A Journ ­
al of  Pakistan Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011. 
439 "The proportionately very large and influential Hindu population in East Pakistan was a readymade effective tool in the hands of  
the Indian government. Combining this huge resource easily with the other Fifth Columnists, India constantly undermined  
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program; it could have also caused disastrous and irreparable damage to Pakistan as a whole." Cit.  
Rahman, S. M., 2005, p. 42.
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through their incompetent and corrupted rule441: “When the rulers continuously blunder and the leading sec­
tions of  society remain inter, the nation as a whole has to suffer the consequences. God imposed a heavy pen ­
alty on the nation of  Pakistan. The State was cut into two."442 
3.1.2 Israel 
In Israel scientific interest in the ideology of  the state and especially its formative period has increased drastic ­
ally since the 1980s. Numerous publications by “new” sociologists and historians in the light of  the debate that  
Post-Zionism provoked, illustrate this renewed interest.443 However, in its interpretation of  history, Post-Zion­
ism, that is the self-description of  an orientation which sees Zionism in the light of  an evolutionary process  
which reached its climax when the State of  Israel was founded, does not per se neglect the continuity of  the  
concept of  the Jewish people.444 According to this view, Zionism is equalized with the practical and ideological 
mission to end the Jewish misery with the help of  a sovereign political Jewish entity whose very existence 
would mark the beginning of  a new era for the Jewish People that would also allow to abandon particular ele ­
ments of  Zionist ideology. A paper published by the Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR)445 sees post-Zionism 
as a new form of  anti-Zionism putting into question the legitimacy of  the Jewish state: 
Post-Zionist writers label each and every one of  the central conceptions of  Zionism as 'myth' in its negative  
connotation. Post-Zionist writers even accuse Zionism of  purposely and systematically 'commissioning' great  
poets, scholars, educators, writers, etc. to disseminate Zionist ideology to justify its egregiously immoral act of  
occupying Arab territory in Palestine/Israel. The Zionist Organization, it is asserted, made every effort to estab­
lish a 'mythical' continuity between bygone eras of  Jewry and contemporary Israel. By so doing, Zionism sought 
to brainwash Israel-born generations of  Jewish youth, that they were the true descendants of  earlier generations  
of  Jews who cherished a love of  Zion since Biblical antiquity. […] [They] were merely a random collection of  
immigrants, and their sabra offspring were no more than second-generation immigrants. The notion that they  
belong to an ancient Jewish people that has returned to claim sovereignty over its historic homeland, is, in their  
eyes, merely one of  the myths disseminated by Zionism.446 
Post-Zionism – by its  opponents and critics described also as the destructive expression of  “classical an ­
ti-Semitism”, “anti-Jewish nihilism” or “Jewish self-hatred, a phenomenon which is regrettably rampant in Is ­
rael's universities and colleges”447 – was an intellectual movement and ideological stream that was mainly iden­
tified with Israel-born Jewish scholars who live in or outside Israel. Similarly, the political left and Zionist lead ­
ers such as Yitzhak Rabin whose compromising position during the Oslo negotiations had been associated 
with post-Zionist thinking by their adversaries. Their claim of  solving Zionism's central conflict, that is the  
440 For instance in contemporary textbook for Pakistan Studies exams one finds the question: „Explain why the war broke out  
between East and West Pakistan in 1971?“. The sample solution sees a “spirit of  revolt” spread among young and formerly pro-
Pakistan oriented Bengalis by East Pakistan's Hindu population as the model answer. This was, according to the standardized an­
swer sample, the beginning of  the “rebellion” that followed Mujib-ur-Rehman's false promises. See Siddiqui, Erum Habib (Ed.):  
GCE-O-Level Pakistan Studies, 4 June, 1991, qustion 5c). In: GCE-O-Level Solved Papers, Pakistan Studies, O-Level, Paper I  
(1989-2002). Karachi: Qamar Kitab Ghar, 2003, p. 42-44. 
441 See Rahman, S. M., 2005, pp. 40/41.
442 Cit. Ibid.,,p. 41.
443 Such as Benny Morris (1988) with his works on the Palestinian refugee complex, Avi Shlaim (1988 a.o.) on the Arab-Israeli wars,  
Itamar Rabinovich (1991) on early Israeli-Arab peace negotiations, and Baruch Kimmerling (1983) on Zionism and cleavages  
within Israeli society, to name some of  these scholars. 
444 See Brenner, 2006, p. 256ff.
445 The think tank ACPR, founded in 1997, is based in the settlement of  Sha'arei Tikva and considered an NGO-based organ of  
right-wing political groups and especially Likud. 
446 Cit. Sharan, Shlomo: Zionism, the Post-Zionists and Myth. A Critique. Sha'arei Tikva: ACPR Policy Paper, No. 134, 2001, p. 7.
447 Cit. Ibid., p. 8.
   Seite 84
clash between a religious and a secular identity, which Peleg as a “dilemma of  the essence”448, and to pave the 
way for a new concept of  the Jewish state in favor of  a heterogeneous, pluralistic and secular-democratic-ori­
ented Israeli nation. “Israeliness” as the master draft of  Israeli identity has been contrasted with the post-
Zionist self-portrait of  an Israeli society of  settlers and immigrants, which in the following years found more  
acceptance in the academic and media discourses. Nevertheless, critics of  post-Zionism rightly pointed out 
that intellectual innovation and a realignment of  the official Israeli historiography and thus a development to ­
wards a new objectivity never succeeded and that in contrary Israeli historiography became more and more 
politicized.449 A new trend to introspective and distance to the older Jewish historiography and their grand fig ­
ures such as Heinrich Graetz (1817-1891), Simon Dubnow (1860-1941) and Salo W. Baron (1895-1989) was 
visible only in the 1980s, and thus comparatively late. This trend had been initiated for example by Yosef  Hay­
im Yerushalmi's Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (1982).450 
In  contrast  to  Pakistani  Muslim  historiography,  Jewish  historians  and  later  their  Zionist  successors  
struggled more vehemently with the challenge of  redefining and reinterpreting history. Dealing with varying 
and contradictory chronological, geographic and thematic frameworks, their main dilemma was the pressing 
need to define and clarify whether the Jews represented a people (Volk) with its ethnic connotations, a religion 
and communal group or a community whose members were linked with each other on the basis of  shared cul­
tural values, rituals and history. Based on this intrinsic question, the question arose, how to frame the Jews his ­
torically. Nationalist historicism contributed to this challenge in that it added the imperative to “nationalize” 
the historic narrative – a dynamic which became more and more the main focal point of  Jewish historians with 
the rise of  Zionism and its territorial ideology: “[...] after the cultural turn, still almost unrecognized within  
Jewish studies, all the attempts to discover new methods of  writing Jewish history necessarily have to face the 
dominant heritage of  one fundamental historical concept, namely national history.”451 The wide framework for 
interpretation resulted from its comparable long period and proliferation of  thought throughout world Jewry 
receiving new impulses from different Jewish communities. Therefore, it is important to take a deeper look on 
the traditions of  history writing in the Jewish context since the intellectual interactions between historians and  
their contemporary societies give insight into the significant changes within the discourses of  how national 
history should be written and which referential systems for history writing and interpretation is being used,  
making the historical discourse the most dominant cultural one in modern Judaism.452 Only through this step 
which concentrates on what Brenner categorized as antagonist liberal-emancipatory and diaspora-nationalistic  
master-narratives, it  is possible to understand how Zionist historians, and later Israeli historiography, tried 
448 See Peleg, Ilan: The Peace Process and Israel's Political Kulturkampf. In: Ibid. (Ed.): The Middle East Peace Process: Interdiscip­
linary Perspectives. Albany: State Univ. of  New York Press, 1998, p. 237-264.
449 See Penslar, Derek J.: Narratives of  Nation Building: Major Themes in Zionist Historiography, p. 117-123. In: Myers, David N./  
Ruderman David B. (Eds.): The Jewish Past Revisited: Reflections on Modern Jewish Historians. New Haven (a.o.): Yale Univ.  
Press, 1998, p. 104-127.
450 See Myers, 1998, p. 3. As compared to contemporary Jewish authors, Graetz' History of  the Jews received disproportional attention 
and gained popularity. See Gotzmann, Andreas: Historiography as Cultural Identity: Toward a Jewish History beyond National  
History, p. 498. In: Ibid./ Wiese, Christiane (Eds.): Modern Judaism and Historical Consciousness. Identities, Encounters, Per­
spectives. Leiden: Brill, 2007, p. 494-528.
451 Cit. Gotzmann, 2007, p. 494.
452 See Ibid., p. 494ff.
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both, to recur to a traditional historiographic reservoir and in many cases also to radically break with that in ­
terpretation of  history.453 
3.1.2.1 Refusal and Selectivity towards the Jewish Past 
Haskalah, the self-proclaimed Jewish enlightenment, not only brought a new understanding of  Jewish contem­
porary life in the Diaspora but also a fundamental, if  not revolutionary, critical reinterpretation of  history. 454 
Against  the background of  a new demand for truth finding through objectivity  – to the extend of  „hy­
per-scientism“455 – the Jewish historical discourse was opened in the same manner in which it was deleted from 
the narrow theological parameters and the traditional-rabbinical view of  the past. In that context, Jewish his ­
toriography found a new beginning in the late 18th century: At this beginning the central figure was Moses  
Mendelsohn (1729-1786) and its center where a new critical spirit towards the religious-oriented interpreta ­
tions of  the past originated, was Jewish Germany. It should be emphasized, as Gotzmann points out, that the 
Jewish historiographic turn, for which the haskalah paved the way, beyond its challenging the religious narrative 
of  Jewish history, was also directed against the dominance of  Jewish discourse by the Christian-missionary in­
terpretation.456 By challenging this religious monopoly, the proponents of  haskalah not only changed the way 
how they narrated the Jewish story. More or less, they successfully changed the parameters within which Jew­
ish history had been seen as a religious-oriented narrative: 
[...] history was, therefore, used as a medium to explain the special status and the problems of  Jewish society,  
blaming the Christian side for its allegedly negative situation. Re-evaluating, but also defending one's own culture 
in such a way was considered to be an integrative act that was supposed to include Jewish culture among the 
ranks of  the civilized nations because now it was history, and not religion, that would define the hierarchy of  
cultures.457
History as “the new mode of  cultural legitimization” was incrementally seen as a force that had the potential  
to promote unity.458 But the main problem for Jewish national history was to be established without a Jewish  
land or territory.  Gotzmann makes a case in point when he refers to the dependency of  Jewish historical  
thought during the mid-19th century to the notion of  a national territory: In that sense, developing a stringent 
narrative from the German-Jewish context was a more complex endeavor then in the French case given the  
lack of  a German central state and the German Jews' less advanced legal status in society.459
Apologetic, political misuse and neglect of  inner-Jewish social factors and phenomena, stood in the main  
focus of  a new intellectual generation within Zionism. It demanded a renegotiation and “Hebrewization” of  
the Wissenschaft des Judenthums and its Eastern variant Hohmat Yisrael.460 Martin Buber (1878-1965) and Joseph 
Klausner (1874-1958) were advocates of  these Hebrewized sciences (mada ivrith), for which they designated a 
political role in the Zionist struggle for a state. Their intention was to develop the cultural ground for the 
political nation-building. 
453 For Brenner's overview see ibid., 2006, p. 24/25ff.
454 See Gotzmann, 2007, p. 495.
455 See Myers/ Ruderman, 1998, Introduction, p. 2-4.
456 See Brenner, 2006, p. 25.
457 Cit. Gotzmann, 2007, p. 497.
458 See Ibid., p. 503.
459 See Ibid., p. 509.
460 For this term see Brenner, 2006, p. 210.
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Initially, the generation of  historians to which Graetz, Leopold Zunz (1794-1886), Peter Beer (1758-1838)  
and Isaac Marcus Jost (1793-1860)461 belonged, had been strongly influenced by the European haskalah. Like 
them, Simon Dubnow's early works reflect a strong connection to these ideas, mixed with Yiddish cultural in­
fluences. With his Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes von den Uranfängen bis zur Gegenwart he sought to present a new 
historical interpretation of  the Jewish past. Seen by Graetz and contemporary writers as a people without a  
state – a „passive“ object, rather than an active subject manifested in history – especially the period of  the dia ­
spora had been subjected to a dominant trend in contemporary works in which intellectual history and the 
Jewish experience of  suffering (tsuris)462 had been highlighted through the prism of  theology and spirituality. 
Dubnow's work, published in ten volumes in the 1920s was therefore an attempt not only to introduce a new 
perspective on the „most historical people in the world“ but also in terms of  reforming history writing and re ­
moving the distorting theological view. Linked to the notion of  historical exceptionalism of  the Jewish Volk, 
was the demand of  limiting the gift and competence of  scientific interpretation only to Jewish authors. 463 Im­
manent in the spirit which is displayed in Dubnow's and the works by others, is the acceptance of  destruction,  
exile and diaspora. But beyond that, there is the belief  that an ancient nation, its state and sovereignty brought  
to fall by the Roman occupiers and its people spread over the world, could be resurrected as the case of  
Greece and its struggle for autonomy against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s had proved. 464 According to 
Dubnow, this was possible only due to the Jews' special role in history in which they stand as the incarnation 
of  a spiritual nation. This includes the idea that Jews represent a people that – because of  its covenant with  
God or because of  external influences – is trapped in the “tyranny of  space” in which had been forced by the 
nationalist ideology of  territory and land.465
   The search for mystical roots and folklore elements that could provide the myth, necessary for the modern ­
ist renewal of  Judaism and its implementation into Zionist ideology, was a task in which many of  the most  
prominent Jewish historians were involved. Gershom Scholem (1897-1982) and Martin Buber (1878-1965) 
both broke with the traditional common view on Judaism as a de-mythified religion and put forward a new ac­
count which placed kabbalistic and hassidic influences on the same level as the orthodox rabbinical thought.466
461 His main contribution was the voluminous Geschichte der Israeliten seit der Zeit der Makkabäer bis auf  unsere Tage, written between 
1820 and 1829.
462 Yiddish term for heartache and Leid.
463 This demand came from, among others, Petez Smolenskin, editor of  the Hebrew journal  HaShahar  (The Dawn), see Brenner, 
2006, pp. 210/211. 
464 The Hellenistic element in Jewish historiography and later the adaption of  partial aspects in Zionist narratives, is well elaborated  
by Leoussi and Aberbach. See Leoussi, Athena S./ Aberbach, David: Hellenism and Jewish nationalism: Ambivalence and its an­
cient roots. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2002 p. 755–777. Another prominent proponent of  Jewish-Hellenistic  
parity was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) who emphasized the cultural significance of  the Old Testament as an intellectual and  
moral equivalent to the values of  ancient Hellenism. See Pfahl-Traughber, Armin: Friedrich Nietzsche – ein anti-antisemitischer 
Freund der Juden oder ein geistiger Wegbereiter des Holocaust? Die Einstellung des Philosophen zum Antisemitismus, zur jüdis­
chen Religion und zu den Juden, n. d. Similarly, Islamic thought and literature were not free of  the ancient philosophy and espe ­
cially its political thought: "Muslim philosophers were concerned to realter the philosophic doctrines which they had inherited  
from antiquity with the religious teachings of  Islam. In confronting these dilemmas, they produced a new and original philo ­
sophical literature, often containing fresh insights into some of  the major problems of  politics. In doing so, they forged a new  
political vocabulary, devising Arabic equivalents for Greek political terms and blending it with the other and more original lan ­
guage which had grown up to express the religio-political traditions of  Islam." Cit. Lewis, 2004, p. 26. However, Lewis points out  
to its only limited impact. See ibid., pp. 6/7, 26. See also Schubert, Kurt: Jüdische Geschichte. München: C. H. Beck, 3 rd Ed., 
1999, p. 21-29.
465 See Dieckhoff, 2003, p. 143 and especially footnote 32.
466 See Ohana, David: Zarathustra in Jerusalem: Nietzsche and the "New Hebrews". In: Israel Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995. 
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Following Klausner, their re-invention of  Jewish mysticism included a harsh critique directed against the  
German-Jewish historians who, like Gaertz, had neglected Jewish Eastern Europe when they followed Moses  
Mendelsohn's idealized era of  light. Klausner had been a member of  a group called the Jüdisch-Historisch-Ethno­
graphische Gesellschaft based in St. Petersburg (1908) that followed Simon Dubnow's call for an emancipation of  
Jewish historiography and cultural life. The group's members, including Israel's future president Chaim Weiz­
mann, criticized what they perceived as “Entjudung”. Accordingly, they promoted the cultural emancipation of  
Jews but demanded also a historians' revolt against Jewish scholarship of  the 19th century.467 While their ra­
tionalized interpretation of  Jewish life mentioned the East only as the region in the shadow, a periphery of  en­
lightenment, Zionist historians encountered the mystical heritage of  Eastern Europe and thereby reversed the  
hegemonic emphasis on the West.468 This  stance is  illustrated in  the writings of  Buber with reference to 
Hassidism.469 
A general contemporary derogatory view on Eastern Judaism by the German congregations has found its 
continuity after World War II in Germany where Jewish life had been dominated by about 30.000 Jews when 
in 1950 the Central Council of  Jews (Zentralrat der Juden) was founded. In 1990, this hegemony ended and was re­
placed with a Russian-Jewish culture when more than 150.000 Jews from the former Soviet Union migrated to 
Germany.470 Buber and Sholem broke with the tradition by understanding and promoting myth as an innovat ­
ive and vital factor that belongs to traditional Judaism. This was against the assumption that saw Judaism as an  
anti-mystical religion that even tried to eliminate its inner myths. Both assigned a central role in the process of  
a re-evaluation of  myth to Nietzsche whose works subsequently entered the Zionist  Hebrew cultural dis ­
course.471 Another strong link between their reform-oriented work was their active membership in Brit Shalom 
(Peace Alliance)472, a circle of  Jewish intellectuals and established in 1925 in the yishuv as an initiative to bring 
the idea of  early Jewish-Arab cooperation into public.473 
 The negation of  partial components of  history points out to a central problem within Zionist ideology  
and its orientation towards time. The aim of  any ideology in the world, as the profound research on national ­
ism shows, is to create historical continuity for a people and the nation for motives of  legitimation or sanctific ­
ation of  policies of  the present. While most of  the various Zionist streams instrumentalized the Jewish past 
until the expulsion from the holy land and the beginning of  the exile in a glorifying manner, not all ideological  
accounts uni-vocally accepted the era of  exile:474
[…] those who totally negated the Diaspora adopted a selective vision of  Jewish history that pointed toward 
their ideal future. Thus, they viewed the emergence of  the ancient kingdom if  Israel and its restoration in the  
467 See Brenner, 2006, pp. 216/217.
468 See Brenner, 2006, p. 216-219. This critique originated also in the marginalization of  the Eastern European haskalah as it had 
been prominently promoted by Isaac Ba'er Levinsohn (1788-1860) who soon gained the reputation of  a "Russian Mendelssohn”.
469 See Buber, Martin: Die Legende des Baalschem. Frankfurt a. M.: Rütten & Loening, 1908, p. 5.
470 See Jewish Voice from Germany: New German Jewry – Made by Russians, No. 2, April 2012.
471 Sholem, Mircea Eliade and Carl Gustav Jung, participated in the  Eranos Circle which stressed the centrality of  myth in under­
standing religious and cultural phenomena. See Ohana, 1995, p. 38-60.
472 Tahāluf  as-Salām in Arabic.
473 The organization was working together with the Ihud (Union), a small political party which was mainly represented by Buber and 
Ernst Simon until independence. Ahad Ha'am who had been associated with a de-ideologized spiritual Zionism, was a member 
of  Brit Shalom too. See website Brit Shalom. 
474 See Horowitz, Dan / Lissak, Moshe (Eds.): Trouble in Utopia. The Overburdened Polity of  Israel. Albany: Suny Press, 1989.
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period of  the Second Temple as their sources of  inspiration. These currents tended to link these periods with 
the modern return and restoration […]475
Minority positions and groups such as the Canaanite intellectuals totally neglected the idea of  a Jewish exile.476 
Accordingly,  some authors  referred  to  the  Canaanites  as  a  „lost  generation“  of  native  Hebrew pre-state 
Palestinians whose demand for a universalization of  Judaism as a pan-Semitism finally failed.477 The search for 
authenticity as the fundamental legitimate basis for the creation of  a new Hebrewism and the selectivity to­
wards events or even bypassing of  history, included the demand for the establishment of  a Hebrew nation  
with the yishuv as the most developed entity of  Jewish presence in the Middle East, and, thus, as its cultural and 
political epicenter. Canaanite ideology saw the region of  the fertile crescent, the „Land of  Kedem“ as the  
cradle of  a historical Hebrew civilization, culturally coherent because of  its inhabitants' use of  the old Hebrew. 
It did not influence the political discourse within yishuv society in large but had a strong impact on develop­
ments in contemporary poetry, music and literature. Like other marginal streams of  Zionism and groups that  
stood in strict opposition to the Zionist endeavor, the Canaanites with leading figures like the poet Yonatan 
Ratosh (1908-1981), Binyamin Tammuz and Yitzhak Danziger, both sculptors, participated in the War of  In­
dependence but were ousted by the dominant ideological stream of  Ben-Gurion's secular socialist Zionism. As 
an off-shot of  Jabotinsky's revisionist Zionism, from which it adopted key features such the emphasis on mil­
itary power and politics478, Canaanism developed a cultural-political program that in many ways became much 
more radical and extremist in its demands than Jabotinsky's revisionist Zionism because of  its central claim –  
similar to early secular Zionist streams – to split from traditional Judaism. The Canaanites redefined the form­
ing nation as a new Hebrew rather than a Jewish nation which had its roots in the glorious days of  the Biblical  
era. They claimed that in ancient times, Hebrew culture (tarbut ivrit), in large parts of  the Middle East, which 
they named Kedem ("East/ antiquity")479, constituted a Hebrew-speaking, pagan civilization or Kulturnation.480 
Hence, the project of  a Hebrew renaissance as articulated in the Canaanist interpretation, should aspire to re­
build a nation based on the same geographical area. Further, it should embrace the whole local population by 
liberating them from their religion through a soft cultural repression of  pan-Islamic and pan-Arab tendencies, 
that were seen as medieval forces, hostile to Jewish enlightened modernism. Having its early roots in European 
extreme right-wing movements, notably Italian fascism, it exhibited an ambiguous emphasis on militarism and 
power politics towards the Arabs as an organized community on the one hand, and acceptance of  them as in ­
dividuals to be redeemed from pre-modern slavery on the other. This inclusive approach which automatically 
involved the issue of  citizenship ought to diminish the traditional boundary between Jews – the “nation of  
475 Cit. Ibid., p. 100.
476 See Ibid., pp. 100/101.
477 See for instance Shavit, Jacob: The New Hebrew Nation: A Study in Israeli Heresy and Fantasy. London: Frank Cass, 1987, p.  
150-156. The group's name referred to the biblical name of  the land inhabited by Hebrews and Philistines.
478 For the central ideological components of  (neo-)revisionism or “Jabotinskysm” see Peleg, 1987, and Kaplan, Eran: The Jewish  
Radical Right. Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy. Madison (a. o.): Univ. of  Wisconsin Press, 2005.
479 Hirschfeld points out to an interesting link between the notion of  kedem as the land in the East, kedem in its alternative Hebrew 
meaning “to proceed forward” and the term's primordial notion (Urzeit) which implies a movement backwards in time to the 
primordial era, which gives the concept a threefold meaning epitomized also in the text of  HaTikva, Israel's national anthem. See 
Hirschfeld, 2002, p. 1011.
480 See Shavit, 1987, p. 107.
   Seite 89
priests” – and gentiles.481 As for the arts, the school's most dominant sphere of  influence since the late 1940s,  
found its orientation in the mystical and archaic East, “though not the actual East – be it Jewish or Arab – but 
the one that preceded the monotheistic religions […] in the soil itself  – in its sand and stones, in the bowels of  
the earth, the deepest archaeological strata of  Israeli space.”482 As a symbol of  Canaanite thought and source 
of  reference to its self-declared ancestry, served the statue of  Nimrod, king, hero and passionate hunter, “[...] 
the first man of  might on the earth”483, presented in 1939 by sculptor Yitzhal Danziger. Most of  the Canaan­
ites served in the Jewish underground armies, such as the  Irgun before and during the war of  1948. Other 
groups like the underground military organization Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the freedom of  Israel)484 
– Lehi or “Stern gang” – shared Caanite ideological elements too.485 However, in contrast to the Canaanites, 
they embraced religion and made Jewish messianism part of  their political agenda of  nationalist liberation.486  
3.1.2.2 Foundation of  State and Concepts of  Collectivity
Israel's sociologists, in their attempts to identify the core elements of  Israeli national culture and its canon,  
generated the term „Israeliness“.487 As an umbrella category it includes varying cultural streams that all togeth­
er must be seen as the constitutes of  modern Israeli culture: To mention a few of  them, there is, firstly, a  
strong notion of  Hebrew culture or „Hebrewism“ (ivriuth). Sponsored by the state and its institutions from the 
1950s to the 1970s,  ivriuth and, as a central component of  it, the generation born in pre-state Palestine, the 
sabra Israeli represented the most dominant identity linked to Israeli national culture. Secondly, the influx of  
oriental Jews born in Islamic countries, especially from the Maghreb, the Fertile Crescent and Iran, brought a  
new cultural and ethnic impact (mizrakhiuth).488 Thirdly, religious-nationalist Zionism aimed at compromise 
between the secular ideology and the neglected religious tradition of  Judaism as will be discussed in the next  
481 See Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, pp. 115/116.
482 Cit. Hirschfeld, 2002, p. 1041.
483 Cit. First Book of  Mose, Genesis 10:8. With reference to Nimrod's interpretation in the context of  the  sabra identity model, 
Hirschfeld writes: “[...] made of  Nubian sandstone, which imparts a weighty symbolism: this is the desert stone representing the  
pure expanse, natural and untamed; it was taken from the red rock of  Petra, a mysterious oracle of  the ancient past. The statue is  
a curious, uncanny combination of  a raised, pseudo-archaic head and a thin, sensual, and very realistic boyish body. […] The 
statue has been the subject of  many interpretations and is one of  the most famous subjects in the discourse of  Israeli identity.  
Some see in it a rare, primordial beauty, others ravaging power, and others, in the 1990s, exilic weakness and sensual femininity.  
“Nimrod” remains an enigmatic emblem, tied to the feel of  the local space, to the sandstone, to a primordial reality, and to the  
East; it is a work whose differing interpretations reveal the internal contradictions beneath the idealized facade of  the Sabra.” Cit.  
Hirschfeld, 2002, p. 1041.
484 Efforts by this group to win the public support by prominent personalities often failed because of  their militarized agenda. For  
instance Albert Einstein's disrespect has been expressed quite clearly in a written response to the group: “When a real and final  
catastrophe should befall us in Palestine the first responsible for it would be the British and the second responsible for it the ter ­
rorist organizations build up from our own ranks. I am not willing to see anybody associated with these misled and criminal  
people.” Cit. Einstein, Albert: Letter to Shepard Rifkin, Director American Friends of  the Fighters for the Freedom of  Israel, 10 
April, 1948.   
485 Founded in 1940 under Avraham “Yair” Stern. Yair refers to Elazar Ben-Yair, the commander of  Masada's last Sicarii defenders.  
See Ben-Yehuda, 1995.
486 See Shavit, 1987, p. 53-55.
487 Israeliness, as Regev claims, has to be seen as a highly contested field, as “a space of  struggle” over the definition of  different  
cultural variants in Israeli society and their attempt to be recognized as part of  national culture. See Regev, Motti: To have a cul­
ture of  our own: On Israeliness and its variants, pp. 242/243. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2000, p. 223-247.   
488 Certainly, all national cultural models are increasingly influenced by the worldwide globalization of  culture that gives birth to new  
alternative models,  sub-cultures and the adaption of  distinct influences.  Especially in the Israeli  case,  notwithstanding state  
policies of  immigration and absorption, the new Israelis' lives are to a high degree influenced by the culture of  their native re ­
gions.  
   Seite 90
chapters. And, fourthly, Palestinian-Arab Israeliness describes the cultural variant of  those Arab-Israeli citizens 
who are politically distinctive from the Israeli state and the Palestinian National Authority. Culturally “their 
constant and continuous contact with Israeliness as a Jewish national culture […] and their relative disconnec­
tedness from the rest of  the Palestinian people” resulted in the formation of  a specific variant. 489 Although it 
lacks the sensitive political component which arises from the question of  citizenship, within the cultural frame­
work of  identity formation, it is important to reconsider also the legions of  guest workers from the Philip ­
pines, Romania, Thailand, Colombia, Ghana and other African countries, not to forget refugees from Eritrea 
or Sudan who end up in Israel where they have become a significant labor force and motor of  an underground  
black market economy.490 
As Regev states, the emergence of  new cultural grouping as a byproduct of  cultural diversification does not  
necessarily, like in conflict societies, undermine or challenge “the belief  in and commitment to the idea of  ‘one 
nation – one culture’” per se. What is more, additional variants expand the formative dominant national cul­
ture.491 The proclamation of  the new ancient Israelite as a member of  the “generation in the land” (dor ba-
aretz) has to be seen within the wider historical dimension of  how the revolutionary movement of  Zionism 
located itself  in Jewish history.492 The Zionist conception of  history stressed three major distinct periods with­
in Jewish history. The first lasted from ancient times to the concrete event of  the breakdown of  the last rebel ­
lion against the Roman occupation in 135 A.D.. This long period is largely linked to the element of  activism 
and Jewish self-determination.493 The defeat of  Shimon Bar Kochba's troops not only brought an end to the 
Second Revolt (132-135 A.D.), but also abandoned Jewish hope for liberation and freedom of  Israel. 494 What 
followed was a second period, „1745 years largely erased from the collective memory“ 495, that was determined 
by a the passivity of  the exile (galut) and the victimization of  the Jews. It did not end before the 1880s, when 
Zionist settlement in Palestine by the first Zionist organizations – the Hovevei Zion or Hibbat Zion (The Lovers 
of  Zion) – began.496 Mass immigration became the most important expression of  Zionist political activism. 
Hence, aliyah, immigration of  Jews to pre-state Palestine and later to the State of  Israel, in this context, can be  
489 Cit. Regev, 2000, p. 240. 
490 Tel Avivian southern areas, especially the Neve Sha'anan neighborhood with the Central Bus Station and the Levinsky Park as  
the hubs of  migrants' life, show that the number of  African legal and illegal immigrants has risen in recent years. According to 
the official numbers, provided by the Interior Ministry and the Tel Aviv municipality, there were about 72.540 legal, 117.848 illeg ­
al migrant workers and ca. 40.000 asylum seekers living in Tel Aviv in total in 2010. When dealing with the massive influx of  mi ­
grants and refugees, the Israeli state's policy has always been ambivalent. In 1996, prime minister Netanyahu, during his first term 
increased the number of  foreign worker permits as a substitute for the drop out of  Palestinian working force in the low-paying  
sectors after the First Intifada. During his second term as premier, Netanyahu and Likud ministers have shown to be more com­
mitted to counter this “concrete threat to the Jewish and democratic character of  the country.” Quote Netanyahu in: Pack, Eth ­
an: In the Tel Aviv Bus Station, Underground Economy Flourishes, Legal and Not. In: The Jewish Daily Forward, 28 July, 2010.  
Numbers quoted in: Morag, Gilad: African infiltrators taking over south Tel-Aviv. In: Live Leak, 12 April, 2011.
491 See Regev, 2000, p. 224.
492 See Ibid., p. 228. 
493 See Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin: The secular Israeli (Jewish) identity: An impossible dream?, p. 163. In: Kosmin, Barry A./ Keysar,  
Ariela (eds.): Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives. Hartford: ISSCC, 2007, p. 157-165.
494 For the Bar Kochba revolt and its role in the construction of  Israeli myths see Zerubavel, 1995; and Brenner, 2005. The person ­
ality of  Bar Kochba and his role within Jewish history embodies two distinct interpretation which reflect the clashes between the  
Zionist secular glorifying narrative and the religious approach by rabbinical authorities in the Diaspora: “Rabbinical Judaism re­
garded Bar-Kochba as a false messiah who caused a holocaust. His memory was never resurrected in the Diaspora and children  
were never named after him. Secular Zionism was ready to embrace him without hesitation, and in Israeli kindergardens every  
child sings about his valour, facing Roman soldiers and lions.” Cit. Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, p. 117.
495 Cit. Interview with Dr. Yaacov Yadgar, Bar Ilan-University, Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv, 9 December, 2009.
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seen as an attempt or the direct response to the problem of  the galut.497 This trend of  periodization of  national 
history continued and had a strong impact on Israeli history with the notion of  the yishuv times, the first Israeli 
Republic and “the Second Israel” (Yisrael Hashnia) since Menachem Begin's ballot box revolution in 1977. 
The Sabras498, also known as the “first Israelis”499 or as “the generation of  1948”500, composed the first gen­
eration of  citizens that was born in the 1930s and 1940s and grew up in the Zionist settlement in Palestine.  
Socialized and educated in the ethos of  the Zionist labor movement, the youth movements, and the communal 
ideals of  the kibbutzim and moshavim, they were the generation who translated the vision of  their pioneer par­
ental generation into the concrete political,  social and economic reality of  the State of  Israel. While these 
“bearers of  Israeli ideology”501 made up only a small minority of  the new state's population, their cultural in ­
fluence on the state-driven project of  building a uniting national and citizen identity should not be underestim­
ated. While initially after independence and the subsequent war, on the institutional level, state and govern­
ment were still struggling to define their relationship with the world and the regional Arab belt surrounding 
the new state, this process of  identity formation was paralleled in the society. Due to the ethos of  a melting  
pot society which was aimed at integrating all ethnic and religious strata of  society, the sabra became the arche­
type and the hegemonic model of  identity with its denomination of  a secular European-Ashkenazi setup. The 
new cultural influx with the sabra as „a new Hebrew ancient superman. The Zionist answer to the ghetto men­
tality, a new healthy Jew“502 merged with the Israeli memory mainly based on personal romanticized experi ­
ences from the Zionist youth movements in the yishuv, hence, the idealized notion of  eternal youth became a 
subliminal feature of  the new Israeli.503   
3.1.2.3 Sacralization of  the State
Historiography, like in so many other cultural and historical diverse societies,  served as a central factor in  
connecting  the  legacy  of  an  ancient  Israel  to  the  modern  state.  In  rejecting  rabbinical  Judaism,  Zionist  
interpretation and self-location in history could not succeed without the “biblicalization” of  Jewish history and 
identity. Biblical Hebrew and Biblical mythology became the pillars of  the new Jewish-Israeli self-conception. 
Contrary to his reputation as a secular-minded personality – if  not even hostile to religion – , it was David  
Ben-Gurion himself  who pointed out to the reciprocal relationship and interdependence between the Jewish 
496 See Beit-Hallahmi, 2007, p. 163. For the Hovevei Zion see Sachar, Howard M.: A History of  Israel. From the Rise of  Zionism to 
Our Time. 3rd rev. and upd. Ed., New York: Random House, 2007, pp. 16/17. Although Sachar makes no secret of  his own left ­
ist and pro-labor orientation, he presents one of  the tightest Zionist accounts.
497 See Peleg, Ilan: Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-1983. Israel's Move to the Right. New York (a.o.): Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 55.
498 The term evolved from the name of  the cactus Tzabar symbolizing robustness, the ability to survive in a meager environment,  
the ability to defend itself  and roughness and masculinity. See Oz, Almog: The Creation of  the New Jew: The Sabra. Berkeley  
(a.o.): Univ. of  California Pres, 2000, pp. 4/5.
499 Segev labeled this term in his work. See Segev, Tom: Die ersten Israelis. Die Anfänge des jüdischen Staates. München: Siedler,  
2008. 
500 See Hirschfeld, 2002, p. 1040.
501 Cit. Ibid., p. 1042.
502 Cit. Nahshon, Gad: The Myth of  the Israeli Sabra. In: Jewish Post, n.d.
503 See Hirschfeld, 2002, p. 1042. Hirschfeld notes that especially against the backdrop of  the Shoa, the way the sabra was highlighted 
in its exceptional appearance, evoked “to a small degree the psychological markings of  the 'hostage syndrome', in which the cap­
tive begins to identify with his captors. Here, the Jew adopts the form of  his tormentor.“ Cit. Ibid. This is with reference to the  
presentation and visualization of  the sabra in arts and literature where his Nordic physiognomy, coinciding with the Aryan stereo­
type of  man, the “blonde beast”, has been highlighted.
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people, the land and the book. The Bible and especially the Torah, whose language was superimposed by the 
founding ideologues to the new state's education system as the official language, documents the primordial  
Jewish nationhood and, as Buber wrote, the fact that “just as the Jewish people need the land to live a full life,  
the  land  needs  the  Jewish  people  to  be  complete”  elevated  the  Bible  to  the  main  intellectual  focus  and 
historical  source  of  reference  of  the  state  during  the  initial  years  of  its  existence. 504 Despite  the  Jewish 
haskalah's claim of  establishing a secular determined Jewish self  in the diaspora and to bring about a cultural  
and political  emancipation for the Jewish communities,  the rediscovery of  the Hebrew past,  its  language, 
history and culture, could not bypass the religious tradition:
The leap over the history of  2000 years of  rabbinical tradition and Diaspora experience, aimed at landing in a  
past of  glorious national  sovereignty,  to be overshadowed only by future grandeur.  Reinterpretation of  the 
Hebrew Bible initially began with nineteenth century Hebrew literature and the haskalah movement, which dis­
covered new heroes and new ideas in the ancient text. Those who wanted to revive Hebrew found the Bible to  
be a source of  classical Hebrew style, and a repository of  great literature. Today's interpretation of  the Bible, as  
it is studied in all Israeli schools, is a direct continuation of  the 19th-century approach.505
The Zionist historical narrative and especially its transformation into public school and text books, for decades  
neglected the important developments that came from within the communities in exile, such as the haskalah, 
which initially gained momentum in Western Europe in the 18th century and Hassidism from Eastern Europe, 
Bundism as a competing form of  early Zionism promoting a revolutionary socialist change in Europe, and  
later in Israel, with new cultural and later political impulses from Sephardi immigrants. This trend, which al ­
ternatively can be categorized into four periods – the biblical exodus, exile, holocaust and State of  Israel – un­
til today, did not bring about a change to the existing curricula.506 A guideline for the teaching of  “Jewish Civil­
ization” at university level might serve as an example: National history of  Zionism and Israel, as “a significant 
component of  the materials taught by the traditional disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences” 507, 
the guide recommends a periodization in which the era of  the ge'onim – the post-Talmudic time from the 7th to 
the 11th century A.D. in which Jewish thought was significantly influenced by the impulses that came from the 
decrees of  the heads of  the academies in Babylonic Sura and Pumbedita (ge'onim) and their responsa – should 
be taught in a unit,  directly followed by the early 19th century history and the “modern age”.508 In 2010, 
Ha'aretz found that history curricula on high school level, based on the recommendation by the directorate of  
history at the education ministry, displayed the trend to „map out reality“ by excluding important events in Is­
rael's history like the Oslo Accords or the first Lebanon War, „arguing that it takes 20 to 30 years to arrive at a 
historical perspective suitable for teaching young people.“509 Nevertheless, it would be inadequate to interpret 
the ministry's policy as a generally refusal of  teaching sensitive events from recent history, since events like the  
peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan are included in textbooks. Another visible feature of  today's history  
504 Quotation Buber from Shapira, Anita: The Bible and Israeli Identity, p. 11. In: Association for Jewish Studies Review, Vol. 28,  
No. 1, 2004, p. 11-42.
505 Cit. Beit-Hallahmi, 2007, p. 164.
506 The demand for reforms in the history curricula exists for a long time and under both labor and right-wing-led education minis ­
tries. However, the trend of  narrowed periodization of  Jewish history persists. Conversation with Dr. Yaacov Yadgar, Dept. of  
Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, 9 December, 2009.
507 Cit. Zionist Academic Council: Guide for the University Teaching of  Zionism and Israel. New York, 1982, Introduction.
508 See Ibid., p. 2-6. Thereby, the guide does not give any recommendation towards the 700 years between the Gaonic period and  
the rise of  the Zionist movement in the 19th century. 
509 Cit. Kashti, Or: First Lebanon war, Oslo Accords missing from Israeli textbooks. In: Ha'artez, 25 June, 2010. 
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teaching to which the “generation of  the state” (Dor HaMedina) is subjected at public schools, is a dominant 
historicized biblical account on national history, which, for instance, in elementary schools sees passages from 
the Old Testament such as the Genesis or the Exodus „as the starting point of  national history“.510 These phe­
nomena follow conceptualizations and attempts to revitalize the Jewish heritage stemming from the 19 th cen­
tury as the logical implication of  the imperative to both create an authentic image and to justify the territorial  
demand as put on secular Zionism.511
A Jewish time-line and especially the theology of  the galut seems to clash with the historicized narrative of  
the expulsion of  the Jewish people from their land. The dichotomy between the insufficient historical sources 
and the powerful narrative of  the exile, as a fundamental part of  the national historical identity, has been ques­
tioned.  One of  the most  recent  and prominent positions in  this  debate  comes from the Israeli  historian  
Shlomo Sand, whose Invention of  the Jewish People512 created much furore in Israel and abroad.513 Zionist-Israeli 
„mytho-history“ traditionally promotes the view that  the whole of  the Jewish people,  a term which Sand 
claims to be itself  a political invention by Zionist nationalism or the predecessor concept of  the Israe li nation, 
were exiled by the Romans and forced into Exile. According to Sand, this version tends to neglect the fact that  
about two million Jews continued to live in Palestine during Roman reign. Beyond the negation of  historical 
facts, Judaism of  the present, Sand argues further, could not be seen anymore as a unity nor understood as a  
nation in the modern sense. Sand's appeal for a liberal democratic model for the State of  Israel with which he  
agrees with Oren Yiftachel's ethnocracy model514, includes the demand for a normalization and thereby rene­
gotiation of  Israel's claim of  its right to exist by reference to its historical right. Furthermore, Sand highlights 
the theological-idealist elevation of  Israel's exile by the Christian interpretation. Accordingly, after Christianity 
became state religion, Jewish scholars included Christian teachings into their account from which the theology 
of  the galut – an exile narrated more radical than the Babylonic one – arose to prominence.
In the historiography of  Israel published since 1948, there are countless myths and exemplary examples of  
selective Zionist historical narrative-building. On the basis of  a history of  salvation of  the Jews the new state  
was constructed in history books with which the first generation of  Israelis had been taught, on the basis of  a 
rich historical heritage, and in spite of  their secular claim, linked to a religiously-messianic legitimized excep­
tionalism. One recurring topic of  Zionist historiography is that of  heroic Jewish resistance against a superior  
enemy. The myth of  Masada, the Jewish fortress located at the mountainous West Bank of  the Dead Sea that 
become the arena of  the last standing between the Roman troops and Jews fighting under the command of  
510 Cit. Beit-Hallahmi, 2007, p. 164.
511 “[…] secular Israelis often claim that they represent a new, and still authentic, kind of  Judaism, by trying to defend their historic ­
ally recent conception. Orthodox Jews have no such problem. They don't have to apologize because no one will ever doubt their  
Jewishness and their Judaism, which are historically authentic. If  you claim to be Jewish you cannot gainsay these representatives 
of  Jewish history and historical Judaism. Thus, in any debate about Jewish identity […], the secular side trends to be apologetic  
and apologizing while the Orthodox side is confident and secure.” Cit. Ibid.
512 I am referring to the German edition, see Sand, Shlomo: Die Erfindung des jüdischen Volkes. Israels Gründungsmythos auf  
dem Prüfstand. Berlin: Propyläen, 2010. See also Sand, Shlomo (Ed.)/ Renan, Ernest: On the Nation and the 'Jewish People'.  
London (a.o.): Verso, 2010.
513 See Strenger, Carlo: Shlomo Sand's 'The Invention of  the Jewish People' is a success for Israel. In: Ha'aretz, 27 November, 2009  
and Widmann, Arno: Es gibt kein jüdisches Volk. In: Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 April, 2010.
514 See for instance Yiftachel, Oren: Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine. Philadelphia: Pennpress, 2006. The  
Israeli scholars who coined the term in combination with the theories of  Israel as a settler state and the policy of  settlements as  
a colonial project, a group known as „critical geographers“, included also Alexandre Kedar, 
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Eleazar Ben Yair in the Jewish-Roman War (66-73 A.D.)515, has attracted legions of  scholars, politicians, clergy 
and archeologists alike. Today the cult and myth of  Masada has been institutionalized in Israeli society and ad ­
opted as a national symbol by political parties, youth organizations and entered the textbooks of  schools and 
universities.516 The importance of  this last refuge of  Jewish freedom struggle, that ended with the collective 
suicide of  the Zealot defenders and their families, and the work of  Josephus Flavius, has been revitalized in  
the 20th century. 
Even before the Battle of  Al-Alamein and the military supremacy in North Africa had been decided in  
1942 in favor of  the Allies, the British Government, in the face of  the threat of  the Germans invasion into the  
Holy Land, began to prepare evacuation plans for British nationals living in the Mandatory of  Palestine. Disil ­
lusioned and acknowledging that they had to defend Palestine on their own in case of  a German invasion, the  
Jewish underground armies propagated a last Jewish standing and “new Masada” in which Jewish defense rings  
would encounter the invaders nowhere else than in the Old City of  Jerusalem and the Carmel Mountains. Sim­
ilar collective imaginations of  uphill yet heroic struggle were produced during the War of  Independence in  
1948/49 in which Israel faced attacks from all Arab fronts. A confidential CIA report of  November, 1947,  
predicted that Israel would collapse until 1950 latest due to the military superiority of  its enemies and because 
of  social disintegration and its weak “third-world-economy” which was based solely on the export of  Jaffa Or ­
anges.517 Masada also entered the Yom Kippur War when initial offensives by the Arab armies went deep into  
Israeli territory together with heavy Israeli losses provoked panic and hysteria among the population. 518 Since 
the late 1950s, the army cultivated swear-in ceremonies for new recruits at the old fortress of  Masada. 519 How­
ever,  much earlier,  in  1927,  Israel's  symbol  of  fortification,  patriotism and sacrifice  had  been introduced 
among the Zionist Jews of  Palestine by Ukrainian columnist Yitzhak Lamdan in his poem Masada in which the 
prominent slogan „Never again shall Masada fall!“ was raised.520 However Masada, according to the settlers' 
understanding, stood metaphorically for the painful return of  the Jewish people to Zion and thus expressed 
their collective desire for ending the Exile which separated God and his chosen people. In the  Yishuv and 
among European Zionists Lamdan's poem was euphorically celebrated and in 1955, he was awarded posthum­
ously the Israel Price. Time and again, Israeli historians have linked Masada with the uprising in the Warsaw  
ghetto in April/ Mai, 1943, and highlighted the speech given by poet Abba Kovner in the Ghetto of  Vilnius 
earlier in 1942, in which he called for armed resistance against the Nazis with the words “Let us not go like 
lambs to the slaughter!”.521 The analogy between both events which was largely made by the immigrants of  the 
515 See Ben-Yehuda, Nachman: The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythology in Israel. Madison: Univ. of  Wisconsin Press, 
1995, p. 8-16, 27-49.
516 See Ibid., p. 163ff. Ben-Yehuda highlights in his study the ideologization of  archeology for political goals. Since 1967, the Temple 
Mount of  Jerusalem has been in the center of  a struggle between the Israeli authorities and the Palestinian Waqf  administration. 
Violent clashes between Jewish ultra-orthodox and Arab protesters have been the most visible outcome of  „politics of  archae ­
ology“ brought forward by both sides. See also Silberman, Neil A.: If  I forget thee, O Jerusalem: Archaeology, religious Com ­
memoration and Nationalism in a disputed City, 1801-2001. In: Nations and Nationalism, No. 7, Vol. 4, 2001, p. 487-504.
517 See Adelman, 2008, p. 5.
518 For her personal account on the 1973 war see Meir, Golda: My Life. London: Futura Publ., 1976, p. 353-381.
519 See Ben-Yehuda, 1995, p. 147-162.
520 For Lamdan's Masada see Zerubavel, Yael: Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of  Israeli National Tradition.  
Chicago (a.o.): Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1995, p. 116-119.
521 See Ibid., p. 74.
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Yishuv and their perception of  the riots. After independence Masada was included also to a large extend into 
secular Hebrew culture as a counter-metapher to the Holocaust.522   
The Masada sacrifice implied both the total annihilation after heroic self-sacrifice and the promise of  re­
turn and redemption. Such alternative narratives concentrated on the way how the war in which the Jews were 
deemed to fall, was fought, rather than on the outcome. With a strong impact on revisionist Zionism, these 
elements became characteristic for the anti-bourgeois Hebrew revolt represented by writers like Ya'akov Ca­
han's (1881-1960) who in his poem HaBiryonim (1903) wrote: 
We arose, returned, we the biryonim!
We came to redeem our oppressed land – 
With a strong hand, we demand our right!
In blood and fire did Judea fall. 
In blood and fire shall Judea rise. 
[…] Proud and courageous, generation of  masters,
Generation of  fire and desire, fanatic and vengeful,
Generation of  freedom and victory.523
Vladimir Jabotinsky and his followers who aimed to present themselves as the young generation of  radical re ­
formers, represented this new and militarized definition of  Hebrew man in similar terms:
From a cave of  rot and dirt
In blood and sweat
A new race shall rise
Proud, generous, and cruel.524
The strong notion or oath on the restoration of  Judea became linked with the martyrs of  Tel-Hai: On 1 
March, 1920, Arab troops cleared the settlement of  Tel-Hai in the Northern Galilee searching for French  
soldiers. For unknown reasons, fighting between Arabs and Jewish military under the command of  Joseph 
Trumpeldor resulted in the death of  Jewish and Arab fighters.525 The element of  collective death, martyrdom 
and sacrifice, contributed by the Tel-Hai massacre to the cultural canon of  Hebrewism, gave shape to the 
contours of  the new Hebrew Jew, and added to the cultural notion of  the Nietzschean Übermensch the features 
of  militarism, masculinity and power, gratefully adopted by revisionist Zionist ideology. Referring to the “War 
of  Liberation” against the British, David Raziel (1910-1941), commander of  the Irgun, had declared that “there 
can be no struggle for national liberation without sacrifices and repression, death in battle and the execution 
of  martyrs. And nothing on earth can withstand the power of  self-sacrifice.”526 
522 See Ibid., p. 118.
523 Cit. Ya'akov Cahan: HaBiryonim (The Hooligans). Quoted in: Shapira, Anita: Land and Power. The Zionist Resort to Force, 
1881-1948. New York (a.o.): Oxford Univ. Press, 1992, p. 32/33. 
524 Cit. Jabotinsky, Vladimir, n.d. Quoted in: Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, p. 98.  
525 For her analysis of  the massacre see Zerubavel, Yael: The Politics of  Interpretation: Tel Hai in Israel's Collective Memory. In:  
Association for Jewish Studies Review, Vol. 16, Issue 1-2, 1991, p. 133-160. Trumpeldor, the one-armed Jewish-Russian officer,  
for his patriotic willingness to sacrifice his and his men's lives, became a hero of  Hebrewism and Zionism in general.  
526 Quotation from memorial, Jabotinsky Institute, Tel Aviv. Like Raziel, his comrade Ya'akov Meridor who had been sent together  
with him to Iraq by the British Army in 1941, became a heroic personality in revisionist Zionist memory. 
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The influence of  Friedrisch Nietzsche's work on nationalist movements, political ideologies and even reli ­
gious thought that embraced nationalism, is well known.527 Leading Zionists such as rabbi and philosopher 
David Neumark (1866-1924) introduced Nietzsche's  Übermensch into the concept of  the Hebrew  adam elyon 
(higher man), and thereby linked the Hebrew secular new superman to Nietzsche's notion of  death of  religion 
and the radical-revolutionary break with the past or even its total annihilation. Another feature highlighted by  
Neumark was the indigenous, physical and intellectual giantism considered to be characteristic of  the new race.
528 The young Hebrew nationalism and its  interpretation which some claimed to be part  of  Nietzschean  
thought, although Nietzsche himself  in his various writings had condemned nationalism and militarism529 in­
terpretation, referred also to the works of  Micah Joseph Berditchewski (1865-1921). This essayist had high­
lighted the personalities of  King Herodes and Joshua as exemplary ancient “Übermenschen” who could have re­
generated Israel if  he had not been thwarted by the dwarfed religious scruples of  the rabbis of  his time. 530 
Joshua, presented by Berditchewski as the tribal leader of  the Israelites has the primordial instincts of  a warri ­
or thanks to which he is able to conquest the Land of  Canaan. Contrary to the rabbinical interpretation in  
which Joshua is described as a man of  peace and wisdom, Joshua the warrior is favored by God because of  his  
exceptional skills as a warlord. The miracle manifests with his election as the successor of  Moses and his vic ­
tory at the end of  an expansionist but sacred war against King Amalek. In the hassidic tradition and increas ­
ingly in revisionist rightist and religious Zionism, the tribe of  the Amalekites who “dwelt in the land of  the 
south”531 has been styled as an archetypical eternal enemy to the Jewish People and antisemitism per se return­
ing throughout history and, hence, had been associated with the Nazis532, the Palestinians533 and also with the 
inner struggle of  a Jewish moral person to decide between good and evil.534
The notion of  martyrdom as part of  the cult to which the New Hebrew is linked, on the part of  the Nietz ­
schean Zionists, ignored Nietzsche's total refusal of  self-sacrifice in the name of  God as an instrument of  
power or as disciplinary measure and indoctrination in the service of  religion, with main reference to the  
527 His concept of  the new man, because of  the vagueness of  its symbolism and aphorisms that provide at most impulses rather  
than a complete and comprehensive body, served a broad spectrum of  ideological schools. Accordingly, Nietzsche's ambiguity  
towards the issues of  antisemitism, nationalism and traditional Judaism provoked misuse.
528 See Ohana, 1995.
529 In fact, Nietzsche called for “breaking the sword” and for an exposure of  the military's power and legacy (“Armeen der Nothwehr”, 
armies of  self-defense) which he saw as an self-sustaining instrument of  an expansionist orientation and basis for wars of  ag ­
gression. See Colli, G./ Montinari, M. (Eds.): Nietzsche-Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Berlin (a.o.): de Gruyter, 1967ff., Vol.  
IV, No. 3, p. 316ff, 460. 
530 See Sachar, 2007, p. 74.
531 Cit. Numbers 13:29.
532 In the context of  the Eichmann trial of  1961.
533 The Baroch Goldstein massacre of  1994, Hebron, had been sanctified on the basis of  the three commandments referring to the  
just annihilation of  the Amalekites. Goldstein killed 29 Palestinians on 25 February, the day of  Purim. Purim rituals include the  
symbolic blotting out of  the names of  the Jews' archenemies Amalek and Haman, the adviser of  Persian King Xerxes, as deman ­
ded in Deuteronomy 25:19.
534 See for instance Rabbi Arthur Waskow: Amalek Today: To Remember, To Blot Out, Shalom Center, 9 August, 2001.
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Christian church.535 The traditional Jewish notion of  martyrdom (kiddush hashem)536 and rabbinical restrictions 
on which the concept was grounded, had been commonly associated with passivity. But as Feldman underlines, 
the sacrifice as a religious demand, can also be applied to the sacrifice demanded by a national ideology that it­
self, within the framework of  a civil religion, can be linked to religious meaning. 537 Instead of  creating a secu­
larized nationalist ethos and justification for the self-sacrifice, the Biblical metaphor of  Isaac's binding was in­
tegrated into a secular framework. In other words, the religious reference, albeit disclaimed by the secular com­
mands of  Jewish nationalist claims and Zionist ideology, was converted into secular meaning and therefore  
politicized. The universal validity of  the secular metaphor has become particularly apparent with regard to its  
adoption into Israel's war discourses. Their thematizing of  military sacrifice, together with the exceptional atti ­
tude the State of  Israel has shown towards issues such as death or captivity of  its military servicemen since its  
inception, became undisputed components of  the Israeli ethos.538 
The leitmotif  of  sacrifice (akedah) connected to the sabra generation did not only refer to cases of  exem­
plary heroism in the pre-state period: Israel's War of  Independence of  1948 and the generation of  soldiers  
who fought and fell in this war, posthumously “were depicted as sacrificial lambs on the altar of  the nation  
and of  the homeland”. The symbolism of  their fight includes the metaphoric linkage to the Biblical story of  
Abraham and Isaac,  each representing a distinctive generation of  Jews: While Abraham, according to the 
mythologized ethos is identified as the halutz, a settler stemming from the first generation of  immigrants to 
Palestine, not born in the Land, and expression of  early pioneering Zionism539, Isaac represents the sabra, born 
in the land for which he is willing to sacrifice his life in battle. This interpretation of  the binding of  Isaac and  
its embodied justification of  sacrifice had largely been glorified by Zionist Israeli writers until the Sinai Cam­
paign in 1956.540 The perception of  sacrificing soldiers and civilians alike in order to guarantee the survival of  
535 According to Nietzsche, “blood is the worst witness of  truth”. Regarding the true motivation of  a martyr to die as a result of  
fighting with the enemy, Nietzsche testified the martyr in fact cowardice and fear. See Colli/ Montinari, 1967, Vol. 6, No. 3, p.  
233; Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 408. Similarly, the hysteria and collectivism of  nationalism and especially its German Wilheminian variant,  
as a mass movement, and its exaltation (Deutschtümelei) paving the way into stultification and slavishness of  the masses had been 
defamed and condemned by Nietzsche. See Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 730.
536 Here it is differentiated between a holy person and martyr (zekher kadosh livrakha or ZK''L) of  rabbinical descent, and an ordinary 
Jew (Hashem yikom damo,  HY''D)  who,  similar  to  the  fate  of  a  ZK''L was  killed  by  his  persecutors  (e.g.  during  pogroms,  
holocaust), 
537 See Feldman, Yael S.: Glory and Agony: Isaac's Sacrifice and National Narrative. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010, p. 232.
538 The association of  captured or missing soldiers with the concept of  the “living dead” (osher akedah) became more and more ap­
parent with increasing cases of  abductions of  Israeli soldiers by Hamas and Hiszbollah. For Israel's policy of  prisoner deals and 
especially the latest Gilad Shalit case of  2011see Gaier, Malte: Israel's Missing Soldiers: A Sacred Principle and Implications for  
the Conflict. In: Eurasia Review, News & Analysis, 18 October, 2011. 
539 Hibbat Zion and the bilu'im (Pioneers in Palestine) belong to this group who came to Palestine with the first aliyah (1882-1884 and 
1890/1891). They built the first settlements such as Rishon LeZion and served as an orientation for the  kibbutzniks. The bilu'im, 
who had their roots in Kharkov, Ukraine, saw themselves forced to leave Tzarist Russia due to the violent pogroms after the as ­
sassination of  Tzar Alexander II in 1881 for which the empire's Jews were blamed. After initial cooperation with Hibbat they  
splitted, and, like other Zionist groups found in Baron Edmond James de Rothshild (1845-1934) “the well-known benefactor” 
(HaNadiv HaYadua) as a patron and sponsor for their activities. See Sachar, 2007, p. 30-32. Penslar's account on the bilu'im is in­
teresting for its notion of  their socialist orientation which made them the only pionieering-socialist politicized group within the  
first aliyah which “consisted of  bourgeois, observant Jews with little passion for political organization.” According to Penslar,  
this is the main reason why the first  aliyah was somewhat neglected by Israeli first generation historians until the end of  the  
1970s, when the labor era ended, succeeded by the rightist political camp. Among those historians, there is the trend to focus in­
stead “on the Second and Third Aliyah, or more accurately, on the members of  these aliyot who affected a proletarian and secular 
Zionist identity, indulged in ideological system-building, and devoted themselves to political organization, thereby founding the  
Israeli labor movement.” Cit. Penslar, 1998, p. 108.
540 For a more recent analysis see Feldman, 2010, p. 131-182.
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the nation, gradually changed from the dominant motif  of  “willing sacrifice” to that of  “unwilling” but neces­
sary sacrifice for the sake of  the state's survival. Similarly, the shifting from the glory, or the “gift” of  akedah, to 
the notion of  victimization, was also a byproduct of  the 1960s, a decade that Israelis entered with the illusion 
of  peace after the 1956 Suez Crisis but which was interrupted by the return of  the Holocaust into the public  
memory after its horrors had been exposed during the Eichmann trial in 1961.541  
Contemporary cultural  contributions like  Samuel  Moaz'  movie Lebanon (2009)  re-brought the historical 
trauma and is also exemplary for the conflict between the generations of  the fathers and the sons. In the 
movie, a tank crew of  young Israelis in their twenties is ordered to a Lebanese village. Their officer, a veteran 
of  several wars, harshly introduces them into the conduct of  war, which in the Lebanon case quickly became a  
total war. The commander shocks the inexperienced crew with his reference to their tank's phosphorus am­
munition – its use restricted according to the Third Protocol of  the Geneva Convention on Conventional Weapons  as in­
cendiary  weapons542 –  and  his  nonchalantly  downplays  of  their  reservations  with  the  euphemism “Israel  
doesn't use phosphorus grenades. We call it yellow smoke.”543 Experiencing the nightmare of  war from the in­
side of  their tank, the crew is composed of  kibbutzniks, religious orthodox and secular Tel Avivians who stand 
for the cultural heterogeneity of  the Israeli sabra generation. Their Merkava tank (“God's chariot”) as the ulti­
mate symbol of  Israeli military might and superiority bears the iconic motto “Man is steel, the tank is only  
iron”.544 Following the 1960s and the social transformation and diversification of  Israeli society and the shift­
ing from collectivity to individual self-expression, the revolt of  the new writers 545 is not a complete turning 
away from the Hebrewized concept of  Israeliness. Rather, the 
[...] ideology of  native-ness interprets the adoption of  cultural materials previously perceived as 'foreign' and 'not  
fitting' local culture, as an accomplishment of  the 'normalization' theme of  Zionist ideology. That is, making Is­
raeli-Jewish culture stand in one line with the 'enlightened' national cultures of  the world.546
However, Hebrew mythology was not accepted by all intellectuals without criticism. Resistance against and a  
more differentiating view on Zionist myths came, as Brenner observes, long before the generation of  “new  
critical” Israeli historians during the 1980s gained momentum. Yosef  Haim Brenner, Russian-born writer and 
541 Another radical interruption was of  course the 1967 war. This trend continued after 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of  1973 des ­
pite Israel's victories. Feldman, in this context, speaks of  the 1967 generation of  Israelis as the modern “Isaacs”: “Soon enough 
the epithet Dor Yitzhak (the Isaac Generation, applied to the 'first children' of  the State), stood for the post-1967 generation's  
difference from their parents, the founding Abrahams (the 1948 Native Generation, Dor ba'aretz). Ostensibly passive and de ­
pendent followers, the members of  the Isaac Generation were allegedly marked by a sense of  victimhood, aimlessness, and loss  
of  purpose." Cit. Ibid., pp. 217/218. Also in subsequent wars, the Isaac Generation has identified victimization with its war ex­
periences from the 1973 near-death-experience to the disastrous Lebanon war in 1982 in which the IDF invaded Lebanon fol ­
lowing an assassination attempt against Israel's ambassador to Britain by a militant Palestinian group. The war which was politic ­
ally aimed at fighting the PLO presence in Lebanon and in which the army occupied Southern Lebanon and massively bombed  
Beirut, became the mass grave for estimated 675 Israelis and 17.825 Lebanese, mainly civilians. After lengthy U.N.-brokered ne ­
gotiations, the Israeli army retreated later that year.
542 Israel and the United States are not signatories to the Third Protocol.  
543 Still refused by large parts of  the Israeli public and the country's military community, reports by international NGOs published  
in the aftermath of  the 2008/2009 Gaza invasion accused the IDF of  having used white phosphorus grenades against military  
and civilian targets. 
544 Recent contributions in film and literature by Claude Lanzmann (Tsahal, 1994), Avi Mograbi (Z32, 2008), Ari Folman (Waltz with  
Bashir, 2008) provide a genre of  its own in which the specific Israeli war context, culminating in the traumas of  the Sabra and  
Shatila massacres, military life and operations in the West Bank and at Israel's Northern border with Lebanon, is highlighted in a  
throughout pessimistic manner. The same applies to the writers Ron Leshem and David Grossmann, and their novels  Beaufort 
(2005) and To the End of  the Land (2008) in which the Isaac motif  recurs.
545 This revolt of  the sabra against the halutz generation is exemplary illustrated by Amos Oz' critique against Nathan Alterman.
546 Cit. Regev, 2000, p. 231.
   Seite 99
teacher at the prestigious Herzliya Gymnasium Tel Aviv – the country's first institution where Hebrew as 
major language was introduced in 1909/10 – , and his friend A'aron David Gordon, co-founder of  a socialist 
Zionist wing called Hapoel Hatzair (The Young Worker), belonged to those who denounced particular elements 
within the grand narrative.547 Mainly the relationship to the Arabs, connoted as an abnormal relationship based 
on mistrust and conflict, was interpreted in a much different way by Brenner and Gordon. The view on Arabs  
involved  the  view  on  the  Jews  and their  relationship  to  their  land.  For  instance,  Gordon's  emphasis  of  
agricultural work and life in nature – a semi-religious pillar of  the kibbutzim movement – claimed that the Jews' 
renewed encounter with the historic land would trigger a change of  mindset that would accelerate the return 
to their roots.  Life  with the land and its  inhabitants,  and the limitation of  the use of  force,  according to 
Gordon who considered the sword a primitive feature of  a modern nation and the institution of  the army as  
“un-Jewish”, would pave the way for acceptance and a peaceful coexistence with the Arabs too.548 By creating 
“a Hebrew rural culture deriving nourishment from close contact with the soil, by converting its settlements  
into  strongholds  on the  front  lines  of  the Yishuv's  defences”549,  kibbutzim and  moshavim,  were  important 
agencies for the practical  implementation of  the ideological  demands,  forcefully  aggregated in  pioneering 
Zionism. Jews who settled the land and lived in the kibbutz communities, the kibbutzniks, aimed, together with 
their involvement in agricultural work, to create an egalitarian society, better than those which the Jews had left  
in Europe.
Others, like Ahad Ha'am saw education as the key challenge for the settlement of  Palestine. Ha'am, who 
split from the Zionist establishment – he had been member of  Leon Pinsker's (1821-1891) Hovevei Zion – tried 
to introduce what became later known as “culture Zionism” into the Zionist mainstream.550 Pinsker,  who 
emerged as a leader in Kattowitz in 1884, had summoned a national conference for the various circles, clubs 
and groups that  belonged to the  Hovevei  Zion  stream.551 Initially  a  proponent  of  a  peaceful  reconciliation 
between the Jews and their adversaries, he changed his position after the pogroms in Tsarist Russia as ex­
pressed in his pamphlet Autoemancipation of  January, 1882. The need for emancipation, as Ahad Ha'am noted 
in his foreword to Pinsker's pamphlet, allows an insight into the “inner problem” of  Jewry which is mainly 
based on humiliation by others but which generated a Jewish attitude which concentrated on assimilation as 
the one and only way to counter antisemitism.552 The will to assimilate at any cost, according to Pinsker, had 
provoked the disrespect of  the European environment against the Jewish communities. In other words, Jewish 
“pride” and the desire to restore “national honor” were features of  Jewish mentality which Jews had forgotten  
under the influence of  assimilation and enlightenment. Therefore, Pinsker's call for emancipation has to be in­
547 For the political-ideological mapping of  pre-state Zionism, see Brenner, 2005, p. 76-80.
548 See Brenner, 2005, p. 73-75.
549 Cit. Fishman, Aryei (Ed.): The Religious Kibbutz Movement. The Revival of  the Jewish Religious Community. Jerusalem: Jewish  
Agency/ Jerusalem Post Pr., 1957, p. 9.
550 For instance with his circle of  followers who called themselves the “Sons of  Mose” (Bnei Moshe).
551 See Sachar, 2007, p. 16. Sachar writes further: “Indeed, before his death in 1891, he [Pinsker] managed to provide the Chovevei  
Zion with a coherent ideology and an organizational framework, to strengthen the foundations of  Palestine colonization, and to 
achieve a quasi-legalization for the movement in Russia.” Cit. Ibid., pp. 16/17. After Pinsker's death, the organization became an  
international advocate for the Palestine project, with branches in Eastern and Western Europe, the USA.
552 See Ha'am, Achad: Ein Stolzer Jude (A proud Jew). In: Pinsker, Leon: "Autoemancipation!": Mahnruf  an seine Stammesgen­
ossen von einem russischen Juden (1882). Mit einer Vorbemerkung von Achad Haam. Berlin: Jüdischer Verl., 1917, pp. 6/7.
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terpreted as the call for the creation of  a Jewish nationality based on a sovereign state. Only the creation of  a  
Jewish state or home would allow the Jews to normalize their perception in the world.553 Anti-Semitism, in this 
argument, was only a reaction to the abnormality of  the Jews.554
The idea of  physical  fitness forcefully manifested in 1898 at  the Second Zionist  Congress  when Max 
Nordau (1849-1923), Theodor Herzl's medical doctor and co-founder of  the Zionist World Organization, spoke 
about the need to develop a new “Muscle Jew”. This stereotype had also been introduced by leading planners 
of  the settlement project in Palestine. Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943), who since his first visit to the yishuv had be­
come a leading figure in the WZO responsible for the settlement project in Palestine555, elaborated on this 
matter in a speech in which he advocated the “physical selection of  immigrants”: 
Another question may be touched on here which is not without importance: that is, whether it is possible to  
work for the keeping pure of  the Jewish racial stock. Since it is our desire to develop in Palestine our Jewish side,  
it would naturally be desirable to have only 'race' Jews come to Palestine. But a direct influence on the process, 
via the selection of  such immigrants as most closely approach the racial type, is not practically possible. On the 
whole, however it is likely that the general type in Palestine will be more strongly Jewish than the general type in 
Europe, for it is to be expected that the more strongly Jewish types will be the ones which are most generally  
discriminated against in Europe, and it is they who will feel themselves most strongly drawn toward a Jewish  
community in Palestine.556
The  leitmotif  of  Jewish  physical  “regeneration”  from  a  state  of  stasis  or  even  backward  biological  
“degeneration” and its introduction in the European context in which assimilated Jews, as an integral part of  
the  bourgeois  strata,  were  confronted  with  the  antisemitic  narrative,  found  its  expression  also  in  the  
establishment  of  various  sport  clubs.  These  institutions  of  Jewish  physical  activism,  sports  and  fitness 
abounded at the beginning of  the 20th century despite various obstacles stemming from the Halachic religious 
corpus of  rules. Similar to the nationalist idea of  displaying physical might with the membership in gymnastics  
associations and student associations (Burschenschaft)557, activities in Jewish associations like the Bar Kochba Berlin 
(1898) and most famously the Sport Club HaKoah Wien (1909)558, were repugnant to anti-Semites in Austria and 
Germany. A day after Austria was annexed into the Third Reich on 12 March, 1938,  HaKoah as a Jewish 
association  and  the  sport  club  with  most  subscribed  members  worldwide,  was  shut  off,  its  scores  were 
553 Pinsker's demand for a territory as the most important prerequisite of  a state, coincided with the Zionist orientation at that time:  
“Therefore, the selection of  a permanent, national land, meeting all requirements, must be made with every precaution and con­
fided to one single body, through a committee of  experts selected from our directorate. Only such a supreme tribunal will be  
able, after thorough and comprehensive investigation, to give an opinion and decide upon which of  the two continents and upon 
which territory in them our final choice should fall. Only then, and not before, should the directorate, together with an associ ­
ated body of  capitalists, as founders of  a stock company later to be organized, acquire a tract of  land sufficient for the settle ­
ment, in the course of  time, of  several million Jews. This tract might form a small territory in North America, or a sovereign  
Pashalik in Asiatic Turkey recognized by the Porte and the other Powers as neutral. It would certainly be an important duty of  
the directorate to secure the assent of  the Porte, and probably of  the other European cabinets to this plan.” Cit. Pinsker, 1917,  
pp. 32/33.
554 “The world saw in this people the uncanny form of  one of  the dead walking among the living. The ghostlike apparition of  a liv­
ing corpse, of  a people without unity or organization, without land or other bonds of  unity, no longer alive, and yet walking  
among the living – this spectral form without precedence in history, unlike anything that preceded or followed it, could but  
strangely affect the imagination of  the nations. And if  the fear of  ghosts is something inborn, and has a certain justification in  
the psychic life of  mankind, why be surprised at the effect produced by this dead but still living nation? A fear of  the Jewish  
ghost has passed down the generations and the centuries. First a breeder of  prejudice, later in conjunction with other forces we  
are about to discuss, it culminated in Judeophobia.” Cit. Ibid., p. 12.
555 Ruppin later in 1933 became the director of  the Jewish Agency and is largely identified with pioneering Zionism of  the settle ­
ments. Like Buber a member of  the Brit Shalom, he abandoned the claim for a bi-national Jewish-Arab entity in Palestine after the 
massacre of  Hebron on 24 August, 1929, in which 67 Jews were killed by Arabs and which, in the eyes of  many in the  yishuv, was 
the culmination of  years of  Arab-Jewish rioting which the British troops were not able to counter.  
556 Cit. Ruppin, Arthur: The Selection of  the Fittest. In: Der Jude, 1919. Quoted in: Ruppin, Arthur: Three Decades of  Palestine.  
Speeches and Papers on the Upbuilding of  the Jewish National Home. Jerusalem: Ha'aretz Pr., 1936, pp. 78/79.
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annulled and most of  its team members arrested and killed in the camps. Those players who were able to flee  
Europe and to immigrate to Palestine founded HaKoah Tel Aviv  in Ramat Gan,  equipped and supported by 
their former adversary, the club Austria Wien.559 
557 Based on the teachings of  Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) who made the Turnverein an integral element of  German ethnic na­
tionalism. Jahn introduced the idea of  Volksthum in 1813. In his cultural approach he emphasized the nucleus of  Volk, nation 
and fatherland which is created through the amalgam of  a national collective memory which at the same time ensures the “pur­
ity” of  the national community by providing the connection to a shared past. See also Kaschuba, Wolfgang: Nationalismus und  
Ethnozentrismus. Zur kulturellen Ausgrenzung ethnischer Gruppen in (deutscher) Geschichte und Gegenwart, p. 239-241. In:  
Jeismann, Michael/ Ritter, Henning (Eds.): Grenzfälle. Über neuen und alten Nationalismus. Leipzig: Reclam, 1993, p. 239-273.
558 Known for its victories in the Austrian football prime league, its Austrian mastership in 1925 and the fact that it was one of  the  
first teams from continental Europe to defeat an English club in England (1923). For the  HaKoah see Bunzl, John: Hoppauf  
Hakoah: Jüdischer Sport in Österreich von den Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart. Wien: Junius, 1987. In addition, see Schwaiger,  
Simon: Sportklub Hakoah Wien – Ikone jüdischen Selbstbewußtseins. Unpubl. Master-Thesis, History Dept., University of  Vi­
enna, 2008.
559 HaKoah's legacy is present in Austrian football culture until today. In fact, the  HaKoah, much more known and successful in the 
broad public than any other Zionist organization at that time, became the figurehead of  the Zionist movement in Europe. 
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Part II: FRAGMENTATION, CLEAVAGES AND THE IDEOLOGICAL 
DILEMMA
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4 Constitutional and Legal Framework: The Issues of  Religion and Citizenship
Hifiz Kifayat Husain, the Shia divine, held out as his ideal the form of  government during the Holy Prophet’s time, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi also  
included in his precedent the days of  the Islamic Republic of  Umar bin Abdul Aziz, Salahuddin Ayubi of  Damascus, Sultan Mahmud of  
Ghazni, Muhammad Tughlaq and Aurangzeb and the present regime in Saudi Arabia. Most of  them, however, relied on the form of  government  
during the Islamic Republic from 632 to 661 AD, a period of  less than 30 years, though some of  them also added the very short period of  Umar  
bin Abdul Aziz. Maulana Abdul Haamid Badayuni stated that the details of  the ideal state would be worked out by the ulema.
Final Report of  the Munir-Kayani Court of  Inquiry after recording the views of  all schools of  thought, 1954.560
Imagine someone in the process of  naturalization, on being told to swear allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, asking the Interior  
Ministry official handling his case what a "Jewish state" means. What would the reply be? After all, Israeli law does not define this term in any way  
- and that is a good thing.
Shlomo Avineri, Hebrew University, on the amendment of  the Law of  Citizenship, 8 October, 2010.561
It would be insufficient to define the political culture of  a nation by omitting the diverse subcultures that con­
tribute to both consensus and conflict in diverse societies of  partitioned states. As argued in the previous  
chapter, the constitutional debate in Pakistan and Israel remains a strained and confrontational issue in societal  
discourses irrespectively of  political changes. This normative conflict within both societies is inherited from al­
ternative or parallel normative orders, particularly religious normative orders, that exist alongside common law. 
As they oblige obedience from the believer they may get into conflict with the common law. Through the ex ­
istence of  a secular constitutional law next to religious law, there are two parallel normative systems that have 
to be harmonized and bridged in order to prevent further conflicts within society.562 In this context, courts are 
important agencies of  rule and power and have an interactive relationship with a society's political culture.  
They are crucial in shaping the political culture in the process of  turning social issues into legal categories in  
states and societies.563 In general, regimes often constitute legal orders that facilitate the perpetuation of  power 
structures and reduce the necessity of  direct intervention to maintain the system, in order to freeze initial  
agreements on power and resource-sharing. Elites of  dominant ethnic, economic or political  groups strive to 
institutionalize a hegemony that justifies their power. Thus, the rule of  law and its enforcement occupy a spe­
cial place in this process of  institutionalization and legitimization of  initial structures.564  
When analyzing the manifestations of  religion in state law, I will limit the scope to those legal fields that  
constitute  tensions due to an overlapping of  religious  and civil  law in the light  of  the limited reference 
provided by constitutional fragments. These sources are therefore of  conditional nature and manifest the very  
560 Quoted in Idris, Kunwar: The constitutional dilemma. In: Dawn, 15 March, 2009.
561 Cit. Avineri, Shlomo: It's enough to recognize Israel's legitimacy. In: Haaretz, 8 October, 2010.
562 The analysis of  judiciary and legal frameworks in this chapter might seem to be asymmetric when focusing on Pakistan's penal  
code and religious determinants in Israel's law on matters of  personal status within the same institutional framework of  analysis:  
The former is designed at applying to an individual's actions against legal regulations as formulated by the state, while the latter  
refers to law regulating everyday life. However, it is the aim of  this comparative argument that Pakistan's religious laws relate  
more to citizens' status than to their conduct and therefore, similar to the Israeli case of  personal and family status, contribute to  
fragmentation and discrimination within a society. 
563 See Kedar, Alexandre: On the Legal Geography of  Ethnographic Settler States: Notes Towards a Research Agenda, p. 412-420. 
In: Holder, Jane/ Harrison, Carolyn (Eds.): Law and Geography. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, p. 401-439.
564 See Ibid., p. 412-414ff.
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idea and the self-conception of  the respective state and the initial status quo or consensus agreed on by the 
secular Founding Fathers and the religious authorities that accompanied the transitional process of  the pre-
state arrangement into the modern state. As constitutional obligations, the  Objectives Resolution (adopted on 
March 12, 1949 by the Constituent Assembly), made a substantial part of  Pakistan's constitution under article 
2-A. The Declaration of  the Establishment of  the State of  Israel, approved by the Jewish People's Council on May 
14, 1948, offers a framework of  reference for proponents of  a religious interpretation and therefore the ap­
plication of  religious law on a particular issue which can also be subjected to civil law.565 In a legal sense the 
commitment to the principles of  equality and freedom of  religion regarding race, gender, religion and class  
that one can find as integral parts in both documents cannot control or influence the substantive provision 
that finally is ruled by the courts on this issue. 
4.1 Legal Traditions and Basic Institutional Determinants
When discussing the  jurisdiction  of  Pakistan and Israel,  one  has  to take  into  consideration  the  different 
streams of  legal traditions and schools of  law that developed into two parallel legal systems with a loosely co­
ordinated set of  court systems that lack an integrated unitary entity. In Pakistan these multiple judicial systems 
are represented through governmental civil, military and anti-Terrorism courts and tribunals, religious courts  
and a cooperation between non-governmental local courts (jirgas) and political agents, representing the nation­
al government. In Israel law is administered by civil courts (basic jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters), reli­
gious courts of  the fourteen recognized religious communities566 with exclusive jurisdiction over members of  
their communities on personal matters (marriage, divorce) and military courts. 
The process of  transition from the colonial vis-à-vis mandatory era to independence was accompanied by  
the decision of  introducing and implementing codifications of  a yet existing continental European or Anglo-
Saxon legal framework on the one hand or a traditional religious system of  law on the other hand. Voting for 
the alternative of  legal continuity,  Pakistan and Israel maintained a synopsis of  local  and common law. 567 
Therefore, essential law and legal culture is stemming from the legislation of  the colonial/ Mandate period. 
The case of  Israel's Absentee Property Act of  1950 might well-illustrate this dimension568: Like Pakistan and India 
after partition of  the subcontinent, Israel, after the 1948 war, had to find a legal solution for the administration  
of  land and property left behind by Palestinian residents in what was now within the political-territorial bor ­
565 For the full text see Annex, Document 3.
566 The recognized religious communities are Muslims, Bahai and Druzes. According to the Palestine Order in Council (1922-1947) the 
following Christian communities are recognized too: Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Gregorian Armenian, Maronite, Ar ­
menian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldaean, Greek Catholic and Syrian Orthodox communities, as well as adherents of  the  
Evangelical Episcopal Church. Judaism as the majoritarian religion is only recognized in the form of  Orthodox Judaism whereas  
Conservative, Reform and Liberal Judaism is refused by the Israeli State and the Orthodox establishment though outside Israel  
the two former groups are powerful and growing. See Wasum, Susanne: Israelisches Recht. In: Zeitschrift für vergleichende  
Rechtswissenschaft, Vol. 83, 1984, p. 308. 
567 The Anglo-Saxon tradition of  law that was applied to both states as the main legal body differs from the continental European 
tradition since the former emphasizes case law and is therefore law developed by judges through precedent decisions of  courts  
rather than through legislative statutes or executive branch action. See Harris, Ron (a.o.): Israelische Rechtsgeschichte: Vergan­
genheit und Gegenwart. In: Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte, No. 172, 2003, p. 70-94.
568 I am grateful to Dr. Alexandre Kedar who brought up this case on which he worked in a more detailed manner. Unfortunately, at  
the time of  writing, no legal literature is available on the topic.
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ders of  Israel.569 In 1950,  the Knesset  passed the  Absentees'  Property  Law which, together with its  amend­
ments570, provides one of  the most complex legal documents in Israel's legal corpus.571 
The fact that both countries lack a permanent and finalized territorial border, from both a geopolitical and  
social perspective, cannot be ignored given its transformation into a national specific legal setup. This manifes ­
ted in an exceptional arrangement of  law that, according to Kimmerling, institutionally and culturally charac­
terizes the “frontier society” that must consolidate itself  within a given territory while its external frontiers are 
simultaneously contested and threatened by external forces.572 Pakistan and Israel came into existence under 
pressing circumstances and, immediately after independence, they were not only politically and economically  
confronted with the outcomes of  war and forced migration but were also pushed into a legal state of  emer­
gency. This generated an imperative of  subordinating legal issues under the primacy of  national security with  
all its legal consequences and outcomes. The demand for a specific arrangement of  borders provoked a con­
stant policy of  non-acceptance by their neighbor states and hindered in the long run the ability to normalize  
bilateral diplomatic relations within the framework of  regional and international conventions. 573 In addition, 
the administrative, economic and constitutional composition of  heterogeneous areas within the organizational  
entity of  a nation state created a fragile patch work situation: In Pakistan this fragmentation of  state law exists 
due to the semi-autonomous status of  some areas including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)  
and Islamabad Capital Territory, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) that together with the 
four provinces form the territorial entity of  the Pakistani state but are subject to a different legislation . Territ­
ories that are administrated and controlled under differing legislation by Israel include the State of  Israel territ ­
ory,  Jerusalem and the occupied, annexed or disputed areas of  East Jerusalem, Golan Heights,  Judea and  
Samaria (West Bank), Gaza Strip (until 2005), Sinai Peninsula (until 1982) and Southern Lebanon (until 2000).
And finally, the Supreme Courts within the legal and political system became themselves important players. 
It is symptomatic for the Pakistani constitutional judiciary that the courts never exceeded their competences  
and hardly made sufficient use of  their powers. Challenged by repressive interventions of  the military and 
political  forces,  Pakistan's  courts  have reluctantly intervened in  cases  when it  would have been necessary. 
Pakistan's Supreme Court, through the doctrine of  state necessity, sanctioned and legalized the dismissal of  ci ­
vilian governments and the take-over by the army for the sake of  political stability.  For the first  time, in  
569 According to the official UN investigations about 711.000 Palestinians, that is about 90 percent of  the Palestinian population,  
left the territory after the war or were forced into leaving by the IDF. See UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine: General  
Progress Report and Supplementary Report. Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950, and Official Re ­
cords of  the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/1367/Rev. 1). New York, 1951.   
570 Amended in 1956, 1958, 1965 and 1967.
571 See Absentees' Property Law, passed by the Knesset on 14 March, 1950. Israeli and Pakistani local versions of  British legislation are  
no single cases. Jordan (Custodian of  Enemy Property) established property acts that were in principle very similar, in order to real ­
locate land and property of  Jewish residents of  the West Bank that had lived there prior to the 1948 war in which parts of  the  
area became military ruled divisions. India established a similar Custodian after to IndoPak War of  1965 for the administration  
of  Pakistani property. Bangladesh followed with the Enemy Property Act after independence in 1971.
572 For the concepts of  boundary and frontier see Kimmerling, Baruch: Zionism and territory: The socio-territorial dimensions of  
Zionist politics. Berkeley: Univ. of  California, Institute of  International Studies, 1983; Kimmerling, Baruch: Jurisdiction in an Im­
migrant-Settler Society: The "Jewish and Democratic State". In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 10, 2002, p. 1122ff.
573 Disputed territories and border areas of  Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China include the Durrand Line, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit-
Baltistan (due to the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of  28 August, 2009), Jammu and Kashmir,  
Trans-Karakoram Tract and Aksai Chin. Areas claimed by Israel, Lebanon, PA and Syria: West Bank/ Judea and Samaria, Gaza  
Sea Zone, the Golan Heights, the Shaaba Farms and the village of  Ghajar.
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1953/54, the Federal Court justified the extra-constitutional dismissal of  the first Constituent Assembly.574 On 
the basis of  this precedent decision, the Supreme Court validated General Mohammed Ayub Khan's declara­
tion of  martial law in 1958 and all subsequent take-overs. However, during the last two decades the public de­
bate on the rule of  law shifted. This crystallized in a nationwide movement spearheaded by the Lawyers Move­
ment that had emerged after Chief  Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry refused to resign from his post as 
demanded by the then president in post General Musharraf  in March, 2007. The protest of  civil society calling 
for an independent judiciary and the restoration of  a democratic political culture was also carried by the media  
as well as several political parties.575
In Israel, the Supreme Court is widely known for its liberal decisions, but until recently, maintained a more  
rigid  approach regarding all  matters  involving security.576 Israel's  court  system and especially  the Supreme 
Court has attempted to liberalize society and to make it more inclusive with special regard to the problematic  
majority-minority relations. This reflects a change during the 1990s that was substantially initiated by former 
President of  the Supreme Court Aharon Barak (1995-2006). Barak under whose legislature the court's re­
sponsibilities had been noticeably expanded (“Constitutional Revolution”) was succeeded by Dorit Beinisch  
who perpetuated Barak's “philosophy of  unlimited justiciability”577. The extended informal influence of  the 
Supreme Court on other spheres became obvious when members of  the court co-designed tactical orders to­
gether with the army staff  in the forefront of  the Gaza War in 2008/09. 578 This was basically grounded on a 
pre-emptive measure by the government and the IDF command that aimed at minimizing beforehand the risk 
of  another “breakdown of  the civilian home front”. The scenario of  mass protests, disobedience and insubor­
dination, political (international) pressure and accusations against high-level politicians and generals had been 
traumatically experienced during the First Lebanon War following the massacres in the refugee camps of  Sabra 
and Shatila (Beirut, 16-18 September, 1982) by Phalangist militias against Palestinian civilians under the direct  
and indirect responsibility of  the IDF.579 This reflects a development in which the traditional political elite, at  
least morally, has been weakened by an increasingly negative image of  its class whose top-representatives –  
among them presidents and prime ministers – find themselves frequently involved in cases of  misuse of  
power, corruption, sexual harassment etc.580 Further, splits and fragmentation within the party landscape con­
tribute to this feeling of  alienation and to a deepening of  existing state-society chasms. Therefore and because  
of  their, at least formal non-political position, judges offer an alternative to the public.581 
574 The  Supreme Court,  chaired by Justice  Munir,  upheld the dismissal  of  the  assembly  by Governor General  Malik  Ghulam 
Muhammad, that in a first decision had been declared unconstitutional by the Sindh High Court. See Newberg, Paula: Judging 
the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995. 
575 However, in 2011/12, Pakistan's Supreme Court has, it seems, enormously re-politicized its agenda with several controversial rul ­
ings that were directed against the PPP-led government and are said to be influenced by the Chief  Justice's loyalties towards the  
army.
576 This manifested in the expulsion of  hundreds of  Hamas activists without prior hearing by the military tribunals, the approval of  
house demolitions in Palestinian neighborhoods and the appliance of  highly criticized practices of  “moderate physical force” in  
interrogations of  suspected individuals within the framework of  counter-terrorism.
577 Cit. Zenith: An den Grenzen der Legitimität, Interview with Ehud Brosh, 2010.
578 See Ibid.
579 Interview with Moshe Arens (Likud), Minister of  Defense (1983/84, 1990-92, 1999); Minister of  Foreign Affairs (1988-90), Tel  
Aviv, 17 January, 2010. For a detailed analysis of  the Sabra and Shatila events see Sachar, 2007, p. 913-916.
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4.1.1 Pakistan 
4.1.1.1 Constitutional Genesis
In Pakistan, the process of  constitution making lasted until 1973. Until independence, the majority of  the 
‘ulamāʾ  had supported Jinnah's League. The stumbling block in the discourse on how Pakistan came into exist ­
ence is the two-fold legacy that was based, firstly, on the belief  that the preservation and development of  
Muslim culture and economy would not be achieved in a Hindu-dominated post-colonial India, expressed in  
the Two-Nations-Theory, and, secondly, on a semi-religious philosophy that, pioneered by Muhammad Iqbal 
and Jinnah, offered the ground for what Aziz calls “a national belief ”582. Though religiously inspired or at least 
mobilizing Islamic symbols,  ideas  and slogans  excessively  while  searching for  historical  continuity  of  the 
Muslims on the sub-continent, neither the advocates of  the Pakistan Movement nor their opponents offered 
an inclusive concept of  Islam in the state, hence, the question of  “who is to determine a nation's Islamic path 
– the head of  state, bureaucrats, the 'ulema, intellectuals?” remained open.583 
On their first political platform, the All India Sunni Conference (1925), Barelwi ulamā  ʿ ʾ voted for the support 
of  Jinnah's platform, campaigned for the League and issued  fatāwā in favor of  the League candidates.584 In 
contrast, the majority of  the political body of  the Deobandis, Jam‘iyyat al ‘Ulama’-e Hind (JUH), joined the Con­
gress in 1940 and supported the idea of  a “Composite Nationalism” (Muttahida Qawmiyyat), that promoted a 
collective position of  Hindus, Muslims and minorities towards the British, gaining a united India. 585 This was a 
reaction to the League's Lahore Resolution (1940) that demanded a constitutional rearrangement, arguing Indi­
an Muslims constituted a nation rather than a minority. “Muslim nationalism” was, initially, supported only by 
a small faction of  ulamā   ʿ ʾ that had split off  from JUH.586 
The strained relationship between the representatives of  the JUH of  Delhi under 'Allamah 'Inayat-u'llah 
Mashriqi of  whom some cooperated with the Congress and other pro-Jinnah Deobandi scholars proved that 
the question of  either supporting the League or opposing its struggle for power was closely linked to the de­
580 Mayor of  Jerusalem Teddy Kollek wrote about the Israeli mentality towards the authorities: “Da allzu viele von unseren Führern  
auch in der Folgezeit nicht imstande waren, zwischen dem Überlisten einer Kolonialmacht und dem Betrug der eigenen Regier ­
ung zu unterscheiden, leidet Israel heute unter einer lokalen Abart levantinischer Korruption. Es geht nicht um gelegentliche Be ­
stechungen, sondern vielmehr um einen allgemeinen Verfall von öffentlicher oder bürgerlicher Moral. Man nehme zum Beispiel  
die Lohnverträge. Um Lohnsteigerungen ohne entsprechende Steuererhöhungen zu ermöglichen, gewährte man von der Steuer 
absetzbare Kilometergelder für Autos, die gar nicht existierten. […] Aber diese 'krummen' Praktiken reflektierten die Mentalität 
Osteuropas, wo man die Regierung als Feind betrachtete.“ Cit. Kollek, Teddy/ Kollek, Amos: Ein Leben für Jerusalem, 3rd Ed.. 
Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1992, pp. 247/248. 
581 For the relationship between judiciary and political culture see Kundi, Mansoor Akbar: Politics in Pakistan. Bending the Rules.  
Karachi: Maktaba-e-Faridi, 2005, p. 21-51; see also ICG Asia Report, No. 86: Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan. Is ­
lamabad/ Brussels, 2004; ICG Asia Report, No. 160: Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan. Islamabad/ Brussels, 2008; Arian, 
Asher: The Second Republic. Politics in Israel. Chatham: Chatham House, 1998, p. 237-278.
582 See Aziz, 2009, p. 71.
583 Cit. Esposito, John L.: Foreword. In: Weiss, 1987.
584 For the political involvement of  the Barelwis see Ahmad, Mujeeb: Jam'iyyat 'Ulama-i-Pakistan 1948-1979. In: Historical Studies  
(Pakistan) Series, Vol. 12. Islamabad: NIHCR, 1993, Introduction; see also Sanyal, Usha: Devotional Islam and Politics in British 
India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi and His Movement, 1870-1920. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996.
585 According to Faruqi, in 1919, JUH had been founded as a political-ideological alliance of  all  ulamā  ʿ ʾ irrespective of  their school 
of  thought and political alignment, including the modernists and supporters of  the Aligarh stream. This account in which the 
JUH is presented as a platform on which significant differences among the scholars were integrated and harmonized, however,  
ignores the grave tensions and hostilities among the ulamā  ʿ ʾ and parallel efforts to unite among the Barelwis. See Faruqi, Ziya-ul-
Hasan: The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. Mumbai: Asia Publ. House, 1963, p. 67.
586 See Pirzada, 2000, p. 2ff.
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cision for or against a division of  the subcontinent. Hence, the groups discussed the risks of  a division and es ­
tablishment of  two sovereign states for each Hindus and Muslims in their political circles and among the uʿ ­
lamāʾ: Apparently each step towards partition would have meant not only the challenge of  transferring millions 
of  people from one state into the other, but the idea of  territorial separation included also the risk of  loosing 
important symbols of  Islamic cultural and religious heritage on the Subcontinent with centers such as Luc­
know and Delhi being included into the future Hindu state.587 The issue of  transferring a people to another 
country would have meant to be forced to leave behind a considerable number of  Muslims including their  
property in what would be India. Hence, this problem resulted in such thought plays such as the “hostage the ­
ory”.588
After the passing of  the Nehru Plan in 1928 which determined the status of  a dominion India post inde ­
pendence, apostates of  full sovereignty like the scholar of  JUH, declared the end of  their cooperation with the  
Congress. Only after 1930, when the Nehru Committee failed to formulate an action plan and Congress began  
to campaign for the independence of  the colony, the cooperation was revived.589 Maulana Madni's public com­
mitment to the idea of  “composite nationalism” had strong repercussions to the unity of  the JUH and pro­
voked splits by leading ‘ulama’. The reaction followed immediately when the eminent mystic and former prin­
cipal  of  Deoband,  Maulana Ashraf  Ali  Thanwi (1964-1943),  issued a  fatwa declaring the support  for the 
Muslim League mandatory according to the sharī aʿ .590 With the upcoming elections of  1946, the Delhi-based 
faction  of  the JUH and the  Khaksar  under  the leadership of  Allama 'Inayat-u'llah Mashriqi  (1888-1963)  
merged with the Muslim league in an electoral alliance.591 The support by the Khaksar can be seen as the initial 
point at which three acrimonious competitors for the sake of  Muslim sovereignty came together under a na ­
tionalist banner..592 The success in political alliance building was paralleled by the League's efforts to win the  
support of  the religious scholars: The League had learned its painful lessons during the 1930s when it had ig ­
nored the strong influence and potential of  mobilization of  e.g. the Bengali Muslim elites and clergy. In the 
mid-1940s the League began to organize countrywide independent (azad) conferences to which the  ulamāʿ ʾ  
were invited, e.g. to a four-day conference  in Calcutta on 26 October, 1945.593 Despite enormous resistance 
587 See also Al-Jam'iyat Press. Delhi, n. d., p. 25. Quoted in Faruqi, 1963, pp. 71/72.
588 Similar arguments can be found in the discourses on other partitioned states as well, e.g. Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Sudan etc.
589 See Faruqi, 1963, and its counter argument in Aziz, K. K.: Pakistan: Studies in History and Politics, p. 330-332. See also Constitu ­
tion of  JUH in Annex, Document 4. 
590 Other prominent supporters for the cause of  the Muslim League were Allama Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, Maulana Zafar Ahmad 
Uthmani and the Grand-Mufti of  Deoband, Mufti Muhammad Shafi. See Pirzada, 2000, p. 5-9.
591 For the Khaksar see the brief  overview in Malik, 2008, pp. 367/368.
592 See Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain: Ulema in Politics. N. p., 1972, p. 324-327. The Khaksar hat shown their street power during protests  
on 19 March, 1949 in Lahore, when several workers died in violent clashes. Their oppositional role and their hostile attitude to­
wards the League was based on their fears that Jinnah's call for a Muslim territory would split Hindus and Muslims in a faith-
based conflict. Khaksar members were allegedly involved in a failed attempt to assassinate Jinnah in 1942. Much later, in August,  
1944, the personal hostilities between Mashriqi and Jinnah whose correspondence hat been published in the English print news,  
came to an end. See telegram correspondence Mashriqi-Jinnah, 28 April, 1942 – 1 August, 1944. In: Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin 
(Ed.): Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, 3rd Ed. New Delhi: Metropolitan Book, 1981, p. 220-224.
593 Allama Uthmani's address in absentia expressed his support for the League by sanctifying the Two-Nation theory. Further, he de­
fended Jinnah and spoke against those who had labeled him as kafir-i-azam. See Pirzada, 2000, pp. 9/10.
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within  the  JUH Maulana  Uthmani  hailed  Jinnah as  the  sole  and  legitimized  representative  of  all  Indian 
Muslims and continued with his support for the League in the 1946 elections.594 
According to their provisional constitutional law, the two dominions of  India and Pakistan were subjected 
to the Government of  India Act of  1935 which was modified at the time of  independence.595 With the aim of  
preserving the religious character of  the new state, especially those scholars who had been forced to migrate  
from India to Pakistan at the time of  partition promoted an immediate date for the enactment of  a constitu ­
tional text which would reconsider Islamic credentials in a proper way. Leading Deobandis from the JUI like 
Maulana Uthmani had signaled their willingness for greater cooperation during the negotiations in which Jin­
nah and his circle was the ultimate authority. Much less willing to subject to the Muslim League's lead was  
Maudūdī's Jama'at-i-Islami that had continued to campaign against Jinnah.596 Although he demanded the unity 
of  the Indian Muslim nation to be preserved, since 1937, he had authored several articles in which he agitated 
against Jinnah and the Congress elite for their un-Islamic power politics.597 
With regard to Pakistan's constitutional history two conflicting narratives can be identified: The develop ­
ment of  a constitution, like in the cases of  other countries too, had originated from the basis of  a symbolic  
framework for interpretation for which the Objectives Resolution of  March, 1949, initially served. However, in  
the following years the secular political elite had to struggle with the demands of  the religious groups who un ­
derlined their claim with lobby work, protests and blackmailing campaigns against advocates of  secular inter ­
pretation. The case of  Pakistan, similar to the Israeli experience, illustrates that the religious claim became the 
hegemonic discourse in which the political leadership had to compromise and, thus, was not able to substanti ­
ate its secular vision in which Islam would be given a defined but only marginal role. On the other hand, from 
the perspective of  the religious parties, their right to co-formulate a religious legal corpus as had been assured  
to them by the League before independence, seemed to be forgotten by the new state's leadership. Hence,  
after independence, the question of  the role of  religion in Pakistan was not yet answered during the decisive  
constitution-making years from 1947 to 1956. The Constituent Assembly drafted the Objective Resolution, ac­
cording to which democratic principles should be followed according to Islamic values and principles. A 22-
points Islamic program, agreed on by 31 ‘ulamā  ʾ of  different factions was presented to the political leadership 
but it remained unclear how to translate these points into a legal constitutional text.598 The discussions and the 
work of  the Basic Principles Committee, that was preparing its interim report after India had promulgated its  
constitution in 1950, reflect a state of  stasis and indicates the conflict between secular and religious constitu­
594 His campaigns were a success for the League especially in NWFP during a referendum in which the Red Shirts were defeated,  
and in the East of  the country, e.g. in Sylhet. See Ibid., p. 11.
595 See Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order. 
596 See Zaidi, 1990, p. 368. He wrote: “[…] this massive crowd which was known as Muslim nation was in such a wretched state that  
999 persons out of  one thousand did not have any knowledge of  Islam. Neither could they differentiate between good and evil.  
Even their moral and mental attitudes had not changed according to Islam. They were Muslims by birth and name only.” See  
Maududi, 1937-1939, p. 105. Quoted in Zaidi, 1990, p. 384.
597 “As a Muslim I do not believe in 'the government of  the people' […]. For me the most important question is whether in your  
Pakistan the system of  government will be based on the sovereignty of  God or on popular sovereignty based on Western demo­
cratic theories. In the case of  the former, it will certainly be Pakistan, otherwise it will be as 'na-Pakistan' as the other areas  
where, according to your scheme, non-Muslims will rule. But in the eyes of  God it will be much more reprehensible and unholy  
than even that. Muslim nationalism is as reprehensible in the Shari'a of  God as Indian nationalism”. Cit. Maududi, Sayyid Abul  
'Ala:  Musalman  aur  Maujudah  Siyasi  Kashmakash  (Muslims  and  the  present  political  struggle),  Vol.  3.  Pathankot:  Makt ­
ab-i-Jama'at-i-Islami, 1937-1939, pp. 86/87. Quoted in Ahmed, 1994, p. 675.
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tional models. For instance the proposals of  its Committee on Fundamental Rights of  Citizens and Matters re ­
lating to Minorities, established to ensure the participation of  minorities in the drafting process599, were neg­
lected in the Objectives Resolution whose drafting had in fact been a step enforced by Liaquat Ali Khan uni ­
laterally.600 Minority members of  both committees had uni-vocally voted against the resolution.601 The authors 
of  the Jinnah Institute write: “The Resolution appeared to be an attempt by Liaquat Ali Khan to appease  
Muslim clerics, while at the same time setting in place an idea of  the Pakistani state based on religion.”602 
In 1956, Field Marshall Ayub Khan passed the first constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan. Its ad­
option of  the Objectives Resolution had been opposed by the minority parliamentarians which were represen­
ted with nine reserved seats out of  which seven were from East Pakistan. 603 The constitution of  1956, like the 
following constitution under Ayub in 1962 which ensured his authoritarian military rule, further excluded non-
Muslim candidates from the highest posts – president and prime minister – in the state. Only six years later,  
the power of  the religious opposition became obvious, when Ayub withdrew the title “Islamic” in order to 
design a secular international image of  the country in the light of  the Cold War, where both ideological blocs 
tried to win allies in the Third World and among the non-aligned states. Facing strong resistance in his country 
in which the religious parties were able to underline their demands with mass mobilizations on the street  
against his modernization policies, the military ruler had to reinstate the Islam label in 1963. 604 However, the 
religious forces received a blow when in 1961, the regime unilaterally promulgated new Muslim Family Laws  
(MFLO) with reforms regarding registration of  marriages and polygamy605, and, thus, formulated its vision of  
personal status law in too much secular and non-traditional terms as the ulamā   ʿ ʾ were willing to accept:
The promulgation of  Family Laws in 1961 offer the most important example whereby the power elite bypassed 
the authority of  the Ulema and appropriated, albeit briefly, the right to legislate in matters of  private law – hence  
encroaching upon the domain which had been held by the Ulema. After 1971, especially during General Zia-ul-
Haq’s era, the situation was reversed and the Ulema regained their position in dictating the terms of  Islam-spe­
cific laws. This trend has since continued […].606 
598 Mainly through the efforts by Jama'at-i-Islami and members of  the Sub-Committee on Constitutions and Powers (Ta'limat-i-Islam­
iya), one of  the three organs of  the Basic Principles Committee, the convention was held in Karachi from 21 to 25 January, 1951. 
Primarily created for the purpose of  finding a mutual response to the interim report of  the Basic Principles Committee and to  
demonstrate a shared position towards an Islamic constitution, Shī aʿ  and Wahhabi representatives joined the convention under 
the chairmanship of  Maulana Sayyid Sulaiman Nadvi, an Indian authority on Muslim law and history. After examination by the 
Ta'limat-i-Islamiya 15 of  the original recommendations finally were considered. See Zaman, 2004, p. 93; Ahmad, Sayed Riaz: 
Maulana Maududi and the Islamic State. Lahore: People's Publ. House, 1976, p. 60-62.
599 See Jinnah Institute, 2011, p. 22.
600 See Ibid., p. 23.
601 See Ibid.
602 Cit. Ibid.
603 See Ibid., p. 24.
604 The protests under the formula “stop innovation” were the response to the attempts by Ayub to modernize and secularize the 
academic institutions and to introduce an Islamic system of  birth control, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, MFLO, of  15 July, 
1961. See Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): Le Pakistan. Paris: Fayard, 2000, p. 127.
605 According to the Ordinance, the institutions of  councils have to be involved for the registration of  a divorce ( talāq). A Muslim 
marriage can be divorced only by the husband due to Islamic law. The MFLO aimed at strengthening the way of  reconciliation 
between both partners. Further, divorce comes in effect only after 90 days from the day on which it had been registered by the  
union council. The MFLO was, thus, a modest attempt of  gender empowerment after the colonial Muslim Marriages Act of  
1939 which granted women the right to divorce without their husbands' consent. However, with regard to its limited de facto  
validity, especially in areas where tribal law is still determining personal status law, it did not change the situation of  women signi ­
ficantly. This is especially true with regard to the Zinā Ordinance of  1985, which opened the door for abuse giving much room 
for charging women of  adultery. Polygamy had been legalized under the framework of  the Muslim Marriage Act in 1965.
606 Cit. Qasmi, 2010, p. 1229.
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Their resistance to the Ordinance lasts until today. Despite rulings by the Supreme Court, and recommenda ­
tions by the CII to modify laws allowing polygamy, there are still petitions opposing the provisions of  the Or­
dinance like the requirement to register nikah (marriage under Islamic law) and divorce at a union council.
During the presidency of  Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the “Islamic” Constitution was passed (1973) as an attempt 
to appease the religious parties with the inclusion of  the special clauses whereby all laws had to be in conform­
ity with the injunctions of  Islam. Bhutto's attempt to harmonize his populist program with Islam, with refer ­
ence to other models of  political compromises in Pakistan's history, promoted the idea of  state religion, with  
which the PPP aimed at providing identification with the religious tradition, the economic needs of  the coun­
try and the contemporary socialist rhetoric of  the 1970s: “Having raised the slogan, 'Islam is our faith, demo­
cracy is  our politics,  and socialism is our economy',  the PPP attempted to reconcile key contradictions in 
Pakistani society and state culture, by propounding a 'state religion' […].”607
 The Council of  Islamic Ideology (CII) became the advisory body to work out recommendations on reli ­
gious matters to the government.608 The Council is composed of  eight to 20 “persons having knowledge of  
the principles and philosophy of  Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or understanding of  the  
economic, political, legal or administrative problems of  Pakistan”609 and are elected by the president. The de­
mand to establish such a body with reference to a similar clause of  1906 in pre-revolutionary Iran's constitu­
tion610, had been brought to Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly in which ulamā  ʿ ʾ and East Pakistanis were in 
a clear minority. The establishment of  the CII was the result of  years of  experiments during which subsequent  
governments tried to build and control an Islamic institution which could support the process of  implement­
ing Islamic elements into the state's institutional and constitutional framework.611 The self-perception of  the 
Council and its role as an ideological defender of  the state idea had been emphasized by its chairman Iqbal  
Ahmed Khan (1994-97):
It is my earnest belief  that our ideology of  Lā ilāha illā ’llāh, Muhammadun rasūlu ’llāh was a solemn pledge which 
we made with Almighty Allah and for which people of  South Asian Sub-continent had rendered unprecedented  
sacrifices. Fulfillment of  this pledge is our sacred obligation. If  we fail in establishing a system based on the in ­
junctions of  the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah of  the Prophet then the justification of  fighting for an independent 
homeland would be nullified and the sacrifices made by millions of  people would be utterly wasted. Therefore, 
examination of  existing laws and submission of  the final report was of  paramount importance and was to re­
ceive priority over everything else.612
607 Cit. Jinnah Institute, 2011, p. 25.
608 See Islamic Provisions in the Constitution in Annex, Document 5.
609 Cit. GoP: Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, (modif. 20 April, 2010), National Assembly of  Pakistan, Art. 228, 
(2).
610 See Zaman, 2004, pp. 88/89.
611 Malik offers the most detailed account on the development of  the CII. The first institution was the Board of  Ta'limat-e Islamiyyah 
set up in 1953. Affiliated with the Basic Principles Committee, its recommendations were not included into the drafting of  the  
first constitution and its ulamā  ʿ ʾ members were keen to bypass the hegemonic role played by the political League elite by founding 
an autonomous platform. Generally, the Council and its predecessor organizations – the Islamic Advisory Council and its sup ­
porting Institute for Islamic Research, both set up in 1962 under the regime of  Ayub Khan – had been subjected to the efforts  
by subsequent regimes to well-balance between secular and religious members of  the body. However, paralleling the rise of  sec ­
tarian struggles, the composition of  the Council is now sensible affair primarily because of  sectarian imbalances. See Malik, 1996, 
p. 33-38. From its office in Lahore, the CII shifted to Islamabad in 1977. See CII website.
612 Cit. CII: Final Report on Examination of  Laws (Up to the 14th August, 1973). Islamabad, December, 1996, iii.
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Changes in the composition of  the Council's members, as Malik has shown613, indicate the degree to which the 
state aimed at winning control over the CII, and, in the light of  Zia's Islamization since 1977, it also shows a  
marginalization of  Barelwi and Shī a participation while “Earlier, the hegemony of  one school of  thought overʿ  
the others was not visible.”614 Until the Zardari-Gilani government in 2009 and before the chairmanship was 
handed over from Masud to Shirani, this trend had been stopped and reversed with Deobandi members being  
in the minority.615 The current composition of  members shows a decrease with only eight members 616, among 
them the former Chief  Justice of  the Lahore High Court, Mian Nazir Akhtar, who in the past had been one  
of  the most prominent defenders of  the Blasphemy Law and who served as the appellate defense lawyer for  
Mumtaz Qadri, the killer of  Salman Taseer.617 Qari Muhammad Hanif  Jallandhary who had claimed the Ah­
madis to be traitors to Islam and Pakistan is another new member of  the Council; he attacked Nawaz Sharif  
for calling Ahmadis an asset for Pakistan.618 The relationship between government and CII was – and still is – 
determined by inter-dependencies with the government accommodating some scholars for their influential  
role in politics and as guarantors for the mobilization of  support on the streets and among their traditional 
support bases (madāris, mosques, endowments, political parties etc.). 
In 1974, Bhutto responded to the pressure by the religious sector when he declared the community of  the 
Ahmadiyya non-Muslims and began to promote his reform agenda of  “Islamic Socialism” with nationalization 
of  companies and, at least rhetorically, promising land reforms. The new design of  Islam alienated not only  
friends and partners in the US-administration but strengthened domestic opposition among the military, the 
feudal land elites and the business and trading families. These groups, with the support of  the army and intelli ­
gence, set up a joint opposition under the name  Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against the “un-islamic” 
Bhutto regime in January, 1977.619 The social composition of  this alliance and especially the important role 
played by both the industrial elites of  Punjab and the commercial upper lower classes made the PNA unique  
when compared to subsequent alliances that were architected against the PPP.620 Facing countrywide protests 
due to the political deadlock between the PNA and PPP after the March elections in which Bhutto won a ma­
jority of  votes with 155 parliamentary seats (PNA: 35), Gen. Zia ul-Haq, the army's new COAS who had been  
613 See Malik, 1996, p. 39-46.
614 Cit.  Ibid.,  p.  42.  In contrast,  the number of  Deobandi,  Jama'at-i-Islami and  Ahl-i-Hadith scholars as well  as bureaucrats that 
stepped into higher administration or government posts after resignation from the CII, has been increased.
615 From 2004 to June, 2009, six members were Deobandi or JUI-F members, six belonged to the Barelwi JUP and its affiliated or ­
ganizations and four were Shiites. Conversation Mujeeb Ahmad, IIUI, Islamabad; CII website; Interview Dr. M. Khalid Masud,  
former Chair CII, Islamabad, 31 July, 2009.
616 Nominated by President Zardari in June, 2011.
617 Together with the ex-Chief  Justice of  the Lahore Hight Court, Khawaja Mohammad Sharif, who is said to be a loyal supporter  
of  the Sharif  family and PML-N.
618 This affair is mentioned in Daily Times: Letters to the Editor, 20 June, 2010. 
619 Hence, the political narrative of  this movement was primarily that of  anti-Bhuttoism and “anti-secularism”. Cit. Conversation 
with Abdullah M. Adnan, International Institute of  Strategic Studies & Research (IISSR), Islamabad, 23 July, 2009.
620 An interesting parallel is the organization of  the urban Bazaris in Iran at the eve of  the Islamic Revolution at the end of  the  
1970s. As for Pakistan, Malik has categorized the commercial traders as the representatives of  the mixed or intermediary sectors,  
which is not cohesive and located between the traditional and the colonial sectors. Their representation in the PNA, together  
with the traditionalist and integrationalist religious agents, conservative political and economic elites, indicates their central role in  
the mobilization of  political support in the urban areas. See Malik, 1996, p. 17-24, and especially footnotes p. 30.  
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hand-selected by Bhutto over veteran generals, seized the opportunity and intervened on 5 July, 1977, and,  
after the president had been arrested, declared martial rule, thus, paving the way for a new military regime.
Generally, the policy of  Islamization throughout the Islamic world has been generated and implemented 
with different models. Similar in many ways to Zia's Pakistan are the cases of  Saudi-Arabia and Umar al-
Bashir's Sudan. It is in all these cases important to note that the endeavor of  Islamization itself  provided a  
setup – politically and economically – on a national level and “a justification of  the integration of  Western val ­
ues and norms and thus of  the colonial structures and not the dissemination of  Islam in hitherto virgin un-Is ­
lamic regions.”621 The state's attempt to establish a legitimizing system of  integration and control is, thus, a 
two-way strategy since it simultaneously aims at traditionalizing post-colonial structures on the one hand, and 
at reinterpreting, thus, modernizing, traditional structures on the other. Here, it has been stated that Islamiza­
tion, as compared to other processes in rural society had a comparable low impact which did not change the  
social fabric fundamentally.622 Following the announcement of  the order of  the Prophet Muhammad (nizām-i  
mustafā) in 1977 and its presentation to the public on 10 February, 1979, – the prophet's birthday (mīlād al-
Nabī) – Zia's top-down superimposition of  religious uniformity and unilateralism in Pakistan623 reached its cli­
max when the president Islamized the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), enacting the Hudood Ordinances. Article 
227, a part of  the Third Constitutional Amendment Order of  1980, stipulated that “All existing laws shall be  
brought in conformity with the Injunctions of  Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part 
referred to as the Injunctions of  Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.” 624 
In 1980, the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established to ensure that all legislation conformed to Islamic in ­
junctions as interpreted from the sharī aʿ  and to exercise appellate power in hudūd625, qisās (retribution) and diyya 
(bloody money) cases. The lack of  a narrow legal interpretation and the antagonism between the (non-reli ­
gious) courts' de jure subordination under the FSC's decisions and their de facto limited validity in contrast to  
secular Anglo-Saxon civil law626,  has since been subjected to many debates among the FSC's members. In 
1983, a FSC commission stated:
The expression “Injunctions of  Islam” is a comprehensive one which will include all injunctions of  Islam of  
every school of  thought and sect etc; but Article 203-D of  the Constitution has restricted its meaning and ap ­
plication and confined it to only two sources for which no Muslim can have any valid objection. These sources 
[…] are (A) The Holy Quran and (B) The Sunnah of  the Holy Prophet.627
Zia  ordered  the  establishment  of  a  majlis-i-šūrā in  1985,  a  step  aimed  at  softening  the  outlook  of  his 
621 Cit. Malik, 1996, p. 17.
622 See Kurin, Richard: Islamization: A View from the Countryside. In: Weiss, 1987, p. 115-128.
623 “Although each of  Pakistan's indigenous constitutions has defined Pakistan as an Islamic state, determining what this means in  
practice has usually been left open to individual preference. General Zia-ul-Haq elevated the tempo of  the debate over the role  
of  Islam in Pakistani society by directly involving the authoritarian state with religion. The Zia period witnessed the Islamization  
of  laws, public policy, and popular culture, producing a unique case of  systematic propagation of  Islamism from above.” Cit.  
Hashmi, Arshi Saleem: Use of  Religion in Violent Conflicts by Authoritarian Regimes: Pakistan and Malaysia in Comparative  
Perspective, p. 31. In: Journal of  South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2007, p. 22-49
624 “Although Article 227 also stipulated that 'the personal laws of  non-Muslim citizens or their status as citizens' shall not be af ­
fected, the military government's Islamisation drive effectively sanctioned discrimination against religious and sectarian minorit­
ies.” Cit. ICG, 2008, p. 3. 
625 Punishment for misbehavior like adultery, consumption of  alcohol, gambling, apostasy etc.
626 See ICG, 2004, p. 2-5.
627 Cit. Hazoor Bakhsh vs. Federation of  Pakistan, PLD, FSC 255, 330, 1983. Cit. in: Federal Shariat Court Annual Report. Is­
lamabad, 2007, p. 48.
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authoritarian military rule which had been further consolidated after political organizations had been banned.  
Another  constitutional  amendment  was  the  introduction  of  separated  electorates628 after  they  had  been 
abolished in 1956.629 The regime's Islamization clashed with partial resistance by the traditional sectors but 
their  opposition  had  only  limited  impact  since  funding  and loans  for  the  religious  institutions  had  been 
centralized under the responsibility of  the Ministry of  Religious Affair which in turn was subjected to the  
government's policies.630 
4.1.1.2 Legal Religious Identities and Citizenship
Primarily constitutional and ideological insistence on Sunni Islam, resulted in the institutionalization of  reli­
gion as the basic determinant of  national culture and ideology and gave rise to a process of  Sunnaization of  
the legislation which contributed significantly to the marginalization of  minorities:631
The Creation of  a truncated Pakistan was itself  an advertisement of  the problem of  conferring equal citizenship 
rights on those excluded from the narratives of  the Muslim nation […] the long-standing demand for the exclu­
sion of  the Ahmadis from the community of  Islam was to utterly confound the nexus between community and  
nation with devastating consequences for not just the logic of  equal rights of  citizenship but also the very no­
tion of  Muslim identity.632
The construction of  an “in-group” as opposed to an “out-group”, as Rahman states, is a variation of  Oriental ­
ism in which the hegemonic perception and interpretation of  one group is institutionalized at the cost of  an­
other group, that has to be “civilized” or “educated” on the basis of  the values represented by the dominant 
group.633 As one of  the most prominent determinants in the perceptions of  religious minorities, especially in ­
ternationally, Pakistan's blasphemy laws gained prominence.
The offense of  blasphemy reflects a fundamental tension within the criminal legislation of  Pakistan, in 
which, from 1979 through the Zia ul-Haq's Islamization, elements of  the Islamic Shariat  law successively 
entered British colonial criminal law.634 The latter's roots go back to 1860, when a commission under the aus­
pices of  the poet, writer and politician Lord Macaulay completed the legal body which, almost unchanged,  
forms the modern Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). Despite its popularized use, the act of  blasphemy is determ­
ined only by Article 295c of  the PPC:
628 See Zaidi, 1990, pp. 384/385. The separate electorates had been dissolved on 27 February, 2002, by Musharraf  on the basis of  
Section 7 of  the General Elections Order 2002. However, on 17 June, Sections 7B and C were amended. For Ahmadis the separ­
ated electorate and legal „Status of  Ahmadis etc. to remain unchanged.“ „[It] shall remain the same as provided in the Constitu ­
tion of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan.” Cit. General Elections Order 2002, Second Amendment, Section 7B, quoted in Reh ­
man, I. A.: Joint electorate? Not quite. In: Dawn, 17 September, 2002.  
629 See Ahmed, Ishtiaq: Religious Minorities in the European Union and Pakistan: Historical Comparisons, p. 8. In: Cheema, 2008,  
p. 1-13.
630 See Zingel, 2003, p. 291.
631 “Pakistan became the setting for sectarian struggle because it is the most important Sunni country in the world, with a large pop ­
ulation at home and abroad, a skilled workforce, industrial capacity and a sophisticated elite, all of  which made it into a signific ­
ant site of  Islamic ideological production.” Cit. Devji, Faisal: Politics of  the Borderland, p. 17. In: IWMpost, No. 101, 2009, p.  
17. 
632 Cit. Jalal, 2000, p. 567.
633 See Rahman, Tariq: Denizens of  Alien Worlds. A Study of  Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford  
Univ. Press, 2004, p. 26/27.
634 For the blasphemy discourse see preliminary work by the writer in Gaier, Malte: Pakistans kontroverses Blasphemie-Gesetz. In ­
terview mit Sayyed Hamid Saeed Kazmi, Minister für Religiöse Angelegenheiten und Hajj. In: Südasien.Info, Pakistan, Interviews  
Politik u. Recht, 2010. 
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Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or in­
sinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of  the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.635
Articles 295a-b are applied to the desecration of  Qur'an and disrespect of  religious feelings for which they set  
penalties of  several years or lifetime imprisonment.636 But Article 295c in particular has been widely criticized 
due to its frequent abuse and its harsh penalties for insult or defamation of  the Prophet. 637 The Article had 
been passed by the parliament on presidential orders in 1984 as part of  the legal implementation of  Islamiza ­
tion. However, even after the end of  Zia's rule the FSC maintained its strict interpretation of  295c and de ­
cided in favor of  death penalty in 1990. An appeal submitted by the bishops and human rights activists Dani  
Tasleem and John Joseph against the FSC's decision in 1991 was rejected after 18 years of  pending by the civil  
Supreme Court in 2009. The court's decision was based on the fact that both applicants at this time were  
already dead. Especially Bishop Joseph's suicide, who was also the main initiator of  a campaign for the aboli ­
tion of  the blasphemy law, exposed the government of  Benazir Bhutto to significant international pressure in 
1998 which it tried to counter by passing two constitutional amendments against the abuse of  Article 295.638 
The next attempt to decrease tension and international criticism came from Gen. Pervez Musharraf  and set 
the beginning for the new regime's first serious political confrontation with the religious parties. After the gov­
ernment proposed an amendment in April, 2000, the religious front which united later under the banner of  
the religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) launched massive protests countrywide supported by Is­
lamist officers in the army and the political opposition under the conservative Punjab-based PML-N until  
Musharraf  withdraw the bill.639
Regular abuses in the context with accusations of  blasphemy have target mainly Muslims as well as mem­
bers of  religious minorities. The suspicion is often tantamount to prejudgment which in several cases has been  
accompanied by arbitrary mob violence and failure by the authorities to protect the accused. Particularly af ­
fected were in the last few years Christians and Ahmadis. The latter, also called Qadianis or Lahori Group, had 
been declared non-Muslims in 1974 by decree of  the Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. For Ahmadis a spe­
cial „Qadiani-Act“ (Art. 298b-c) had been introduced into the PPC. 
The number of  incidents and attacks on minorities has increased dramatically since 2009/2010. Among  
this development's culmination points were the incidents of  Toba Tek Singh, Punjab, in July and August, 2009,  
when Christian villages were attacked by a more than thousand rioters with its residents having been burned  
alive. Rumors according to which pages of  the Qur'an had been defiled by Christian children on the occasion 
of  a wedding ceremony, were spread throughout the days before the attacks by local  clergy via the local  
635 Cit. Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of  1860, amended up to 2006), Art. 295c.
636 See Ibid., Art. 295a-b.
637 See National Assembly of  Pakistan: The Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, 5th Ed., Eighteenth Amendment, 
Preamble. For the responses by Pakistani NROs see statement by the National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) on  
constitutional reforms against the “misuse of  religion”. See Press Statement NCJP: Government urged to address abuse of  reli ­
gion through Constitutional and Legal Reforms, 13 January, 2010.
638 See Pakistan News: Pak SC rejects petition-challenging death as the only punishment for blasphemy, 22 April, 2009; Ahmed, Ak­
bar S.: Pakistan's Blasphemy Law: Words Fail Me. In: Washington Post, 19 May, 2002.
639 See Hussain, Zahid: Frontline Pakistan. The Struggle with Militant Islam. Lahore: Vanguard, 2007, pp. 8/9; Blom, Amélie: The  
2006 Anti-'Danish Cartoons' Riot in Lahore: Outrage and the Emotional Landscape of  Pakistani Politics. In: South Asia Mul­
tidisciplinary Academic Journal, Special Issue, No. 2, 'Outraged Communities': Comparative Perspectives on the Politicization of  
Emotions in South Asia, 2008. 
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mosques loud speakers. The riots of  Gojra and Korian which were led by activists of  Sipah-i Sahaba (SSP) took 
place under the eyes of  the district police. While the public, politicians and Islamic scholars condemned the at ­
tacks uni-vocally, it soon appeared that those accused had been released from jail despite the incriminating 
findings of  the report of  the investigation commission whose establishment hat been ordered by the Shabaz  
Sharif.640 Again at the end of  2010 the blasphemy law became the center of  international criticism against  
Pakistan when it became public that the Christian Aasia Bibi, as the first woman involved in a blasphemy case, 
had been found guilty by a court. The affair provoked a storm of  protest and solidarity with Aasia on the in ­
ternational level and impacted Pakistan's image negatively. When president Zardari showed willingness to par­
don her, the government's coalition partner JUI-F of  Maulana Fazlur Rahman opposed this step and the an ­
nouncement to critically reevaluate the blasphemy law threatening to leave the coalition. Prominent politicians 
such as Sherry Rahman and Salman Taseer took party for the accused. However, the government stepped back  
from its offer and also agreed to another demand made as early as 2008/2009 by the JUI-F when the PPP-led 
government coalition had been formed:  The appointment of  Senator Maulana Muhammad Khan Shirani  
(JUI-F) from Balochistan as the successor of  Khalid Masud on the post of  the Chair of  the CII further alien ­
ated Pakistan's government from its international supporters for Shirani's hardline image.641 
The assassination of  Governor of  Punjab Salman Taseer in January, 2011, shocked many in Pakistan and 
abroad: The killing of  one of  the most prominent and radical activists for an annulment of  Article 295c was  
responded by protests in which most of  the religious parties including the Barelwis and the lawyers' movement  
displayed their solidarity with the murderer openly.642 PPP leader Sherry Rehman, founding director of  the Jin­
nah Institute as well as leading figure in several initiatives for the rights of  women and journalists which is cur ­
rently serving as ambassador to the US, had also raised her voice quite prominently against the blasphemy 
laws.643 Her appointment as ambassador abroad had been also in reaction to death threats by Sunni radical  
groups in Pakistan. The assassination of  Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, in March, 2011, for his op ­
position to the blasphemy law exposed the support for a maintenance of  the law by some religious parties  
such as the JUI.644 As a result of  the federal reform package as part of  the 18 th constitutional amendment, 
passed by the parliament which incorporated the ministry into the provincial responsibilities, the Ministry for  
Minorities (2002) was renamed as Ministry of  National Harmony with Akram Masih Gill as its Catholic head 
640 In a similar way insufficient were the investigations in the following cases legal abuse and sectarian unrest like in that of  two  
Christian brothers in Faisalabad who in July, 2010, under the suspicion of  blasphemy had been killed when in police custody. The 
incident provoked violent clashes between Christians and Muslims.
641 Among the prominent advocates for the release of  Bibi was Pope Benedict XVI. For the protests against the nomination of  
Shirani see The Express Tribune: (Open Letter by Women's Action Forum) Appointment to Council of  Islamic Ideology, 15  
June, 2010. Another reason for the delay of  Shirani's final appointment were fears on the part of  other members of  the CII that  
the JUI-F would gain a majority in the council since six non-Deobandi members from other factions were about to complete  
their terms in office at that time. See Alvi, Mumtaz: Government in a fix over Sherani’s appointment as CII head. In: The News,  
22. August, 2010. International opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy laws had been countered domestically by its supporters who 
referred to similar debates in the West. In the European context, the reference to God in the proposed European Union Consti ­
tution might be a case in point. Similarly, some European countries reintroduced blasphemy only recently. For instance Ireland,  
in 2009, criminalized blasphemy constitutionally with maximum fines up to 25.000 Euro. See Volkery, Carsten: Ungläubiges  
Staunen über Gesetz gegen Gotteslästerung. In: Spiegel Online, 16 July, 2009.
642 See Ahmed, Fasih: Mourning a Martyr. In: Newsweek Pakistan, 17 January, 2011.
643 See Wasim, Amir: How Sherry Rehman got the key diplomatic position. In: Dawn, 24 November, 2011.
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and Paul Bhatti, the brother of  killed Shahbaz, as a Special Adviser for Religious Minorities.645 Although the 
new ministry promotes interfaith dialogue and the improvement of  relations between the Muslim majority and  
non-Muslim minorities, it focuses predominantly on the situation of  Pakistan's Christian minority. Like its pre­
ceding ministry, the establishment of  the new ministry is primarily a bureaucratic response to the harsh inter­
national criticism against the government.
In the light of  these developments Pakistan has acquired an international image that, through the Western 
prism, in many ways resembles that of  an “epicenter of  religious intolerance and religious violence” with “in ­
stitutionalized discrimination” against minorities as an immanent feature.646 However, most of  those affected 
by the involvement in misuses of  the law belong either to the Sunni or Shiite communities. In many cases it  
appeared that denunciation was motivated not so much by religious sensibilities but rather by conflicts on land 
and property, e.g. in rural Punjab between landlords and other rivaling local power groups or even within fam­
ilies and among neighbors. Despite the fact that as of  now death sentences have not been executed, the trials  
are often pending for years until a final decision is made by the court. 647 Beyond this socioeconomic view on 
the blasphemy complex, incidents and especially violence against local minorities by extremist groups is often  
religiously or ideologically motivated under the umbrella of  stereotypes and simple propaganda against Hunud-
o-Yahud-o-Nasara (Hindus, Jews and Christians).648 While the national and international debate on blasphemy 
often concentrates exclusively on Christians, public attention often shifts away from increasing cases of  viol­
ence against other non-Muslim minorities such as the Hindus and Sikhs in KPK and Punjab.649
In the meanwhile, the blasphemy discourse has entered also new public spheres such as the digital media  
and social networks, internet fora, chat rooms and blogs. In a recent case, the state's Pakistan Telecommunications  
Authority cracked down more than 800 web pages in May, 2010. In an official statement the authorities legitim­
ized  their  action  by  declaring the  censored  online  contents  on Youtube,  Twitter  and  Facebook as  being  
“heretic”.650 Facing similar cases more frequently in recent years, considerable opposition and resistance to the 
government's and other official watch dogs' actions has been formed and articulated in the digital sphere. Es ­
pecially Pakistan's young middle and upper-classes have not only responded to conservatism on the web with  
international public campaigns and online petitions but also by more openly questioning the role of  Islam in  
state and society.651 
644 Although JUI-F's leader Fazlur Rahman displayed increased willingness to remove from his hardline position not to discuss any  
amendments to the law and to discuss the blasphemy issue at all, JUI-F and some other religious parties had terminated a Ta­
hafuz Namus-i-Risalat campaign that was launched in 2010. After the assassination of  Taseer and Batthi in 2011, he claimed that  
the JUI was willing to make the protection of  non-Muslim minorities a priority on its agenda. However, this was mainly due to  
political maneuvering and was not referring to the Blasphemy Law explicitely. In the past, Fazlur who saw “a lobby opposed to  
religious circles” threatening national integration with its attempts to annul the Blasphemy articles, had refused any amendments  
to the laws. Cit. Asghar, Raja: Fazl says misuse of  blasphemy law can be discussed. In: Dawn, 5 March, 2011.
645 See Pentin, Edward: Pakistani 'Harmony' Minister Optimistic About Equality. In: Zenit, 25 November, 2011.
646 Cit. Religious Liberty Partnership: Virginia Statement zur Islamischen Republik Pakistan, April, 2011, p. 2.
647 See Amnesty International: Jahresbericht 2010, Pakistan.
648 Shaikh, correctly, points out to the centrality of  these „imagined complexes“. See Shaikh, Hina: Status of  Minorities in Pakistan 
in 2009. South Asian Human Rights (SAHR), Annual Report, 2009, Introduction. 
649 See Interview with Archbishop Lawrence John Saldanha, Lahore, 7 April, 2011. 
650 See Dawn: Pakistan blocks 800 web pages over 'blasphemy', 22 May, 2010.
651 This “silent protest” has not been articulated politically, with the exception of  small platforms like the Christian dominated All  
Pakistan Minorities Alliance.
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Internationally, the perception of  Pakistan's domestic religious unrest is important too and has been subjec ­
ted to some remarkable changes in recent years. From 31 August to 7 September, 2001, under UN auspices,  
delegates met for the UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa. For Pakistan, the 
participation at the conference was crucial due to its leading role in the OIC and the planned tabling of  its res­
olution “Against the Defamation of  Religion”. But the planned foray by Pakistan and other Muslim countries  
to bring the campaign which had been adopted in 1999 by the OIC into the spotlight of  the conference and  
international media failed. Speaking after Iran's president Ahmadinejad, only marginal attention was given to 
the Pakistani delegate. Ahmadinejad had addressed a speech to the delegates in which he demanded the expul ­
sion of  Israel from the UN for what, in turn, the Israeli delegation in response, together with several other  
states withdrew from the plenum. In the Muslim world, Pakistan plays a leading international role in several  
campaigns against the defamation of  Islam.652 On the initiative of  Pakistan, the OIC presented the first resolu­
tion at the UN Human Rights Commission653 in 1999, that was intended as a response to worldwide felt an­
ti-Islamic “racism” but it was responded by Western countries with criticism:
[…] the narrow focus on Islam, the protection of  a religion (essentially an ideology) instead of  an individual, the  
conflation of  race and religion, the erosion of  freedom of  expression as a fundamental freedom, overbroad and 
unclear language, including in the use of  the term “defamation.”654
The perception of  anti-Muslim discourses or “Islamophopia” became stronger following the events of  post-
9/11.655 Under pressure from an opposition within the UNHCR in 1999, a revised resolution, has since then 
annually been adopted by the UNHRC, usually without voting.656 
 The call by some member states to boycott the Durban Conference because of  anti-Semitic aggressions 
was indirectly also applied to the OIC campaign.657 The official end of  the campaign in spring 2011 was, how­
ever, seen as a serious backlash for Pakistan's diplomacy:
Pakistan drew back from its defamation of  religion campaign because it could not muster enough support in the  
UN Human Rights Council. As you well know, religion is no longer a potent force in the West. Issues like blas ­
phemy and desecration of  holy books do not arouse the intense anger they continue to do in the Islamic coun­
tries who revere the 27 prophets and their deeds mentioned in the Quran. Muslims not only in Pakistan but else­
where are deeply offended by disrespect to the Prophet Muhammad or other prophets. The public burning of  
the Quran in the US is a case in point. I think Western countries must show greater sensitivity to Muslim sensib ­
ilities and not offer the justification, which may be valid in their societies, that freedom of  expression permits  
such actions even if  they are reprehensible.658 
However, the withdrawal from one of  its most central demands at international fora came along with the 
transformation of  the discourse on Islam in Pakistan, where after 9/11 increasing religious violence by the  
Taliban and extremist groups, might have strengthened moderate forces to some limited extend:
652 The strongest supporters were Egypt, Iran, and Yemen before it withdrew its support. 
653 Renamed in UNHRC in 2006.
654 Cit. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty: Issues Brief. “Defamation of  Religions”, 2008, p. 2.
655 Important international events included the murder of  Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by the Islamist Hofstad Group, 
the publication of  cartoons showing the Prophet Muhammad by the Danish Jylandsposten and the following protests in the  
Muslim world in 2005/06, and the release of  European films (e.g. Geert Wilder's Fitna) and theater plays which were interpreted 
as an insult to Islam and the Muslims.
656 Despite the claim of  being an interfaith declaration, only Islam, "frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations  
and with terrorism", is mentioned by name. Cit. UN Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Defamation of  reli ­
gions. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/84, 26 April, 2000, p. 1.
657 See Becket Fund, 2008, pp. 4/5.
658 Cit. Email Amb. Azmat Hassan, 30 March, 2011.
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Hurting each others feelings and sensibilities is neither wise nor condonable. If  we are to live companionably in  
our globalized world, we have to respect each others world views and not expect a different world view to con­
form to ours. Just as one can be an observant Jew or Christian and secular at the same time, so can an observant  
Muslim. This is borne out vividly by the Turkish, Indonesian and Malaysian leaderships. Many of  these leaders 
are observant Muslims and at the same time wedded to secular principles in state governance. I believe the same  
applies to Pakistani leaders.659
Another positive trend is the commitment of  political leaders to interfaith dialogues and, in the framework of  
domestic electoral campaigns, the attempt to accommodate the minorities. Institutionally, the Ministry of  Reli ­
gious Affairs, together with the CII tried to play a pioneering role. However, the claim of  these institutions to  
act as a vehicle for the state's doctrine of  Enlightened Moderation, for instance with the establishment of  the 
World Council of  Religions or ulamā  ʿ ʾ conventions, can not be substantiated with concrete positive outcomes bey­
ond its  symbolism.660 Another important  momentum was the change in  US politics  after the election of  
Barack Obama as the new president in 2009. The CII, still under the chairmanship of  Khalid Masud, was keen  
to respond to the promising speeches and statements made by the new president shortly after his election be­
fore and after Cairo.661
The  Ahmadiya  emerged in the late 19th century in colonial British India under Mirzam Ghulam Ahmad 
(1836-1908) as a counter movement to the Hindu nationalist  Arya Samaj and Christian missionary move­
ments.662 Accusations of  heresy became louder in 1891 in a fatwa issued by conservative ulamā  ʿ ʾ that saw their 
religious authority at risk because of  the claim of  the founder's grandson Mirza Nasir Ahmad to be the leader  
of  all Muslims.663 Resentments against Ahmadis culminated in 1953 in the imposition of  the state of  emer­
gency by the government in response to nationwide unrest. Until 1974, the IJT's campaigns had revived allega ­
tions against the community from colonial times, which aimed at targeting Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's “Islamic so ­
cialism” which hat been promoted by the government as a third way model between capitalist and communist  
ideology. Finally, when on 19. September 1974 the National Assembly voted for a bill law that brand marked 
the Ahmadis as non-Muslims since they refused to acknowledge the finality of  the Prophet due to their own 
belief, the religious parties such as the JI were able to demonstrate their potential to pressure the political insti ­
tutions. Bhutto's easing had also been a result of  the strong influence of  Saudi Arabia on Pakistani inner polit ­
ics: For a long time, organizations such as the Muslim World League had stressed the incompatibility of  Ah ­
madi thought with Sunni and Wahhabi interpretation of  Islam, and in the same year as Pakistan's assembly, an­
nounced its ban on the Ahmadis. As a result, Ahmadis were excluded from hajj to Mecca and their possession 
659 Cit. Ibid.
660 This intentional ambiguity is reflected in a speech given by Vakil A. Khan, a former high ranking secretary at the Ministry for Re­
ligious Affairs, at an international conference in which he hailed the establishment of  the Council by the Musharraf  government  
as a significant contribution to integration and religious harmony between all religious groups while at the same time he candidly  
admitted that Ahmadis were not allowed to participate. See Khan, Vakil Ahmad: Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in inter  
religious and intra religious communities, pp. 67/68. In: Cheema, 2008, p. 65-70.
661 Cit. CII: CII launches report on ‘Future Agenda of  Change’, Press statement, February, 2009: “[...] there is a strong need to pro­
mote better relationship of  the Muslim world with the West as was indicated by the newly elected president of  the United States  
Barack Hussain Obama.”
662 See Jaffrelot, 2000, p. 386. See also Ross Valentine, Simon: Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama'at. History, belief, practice. London:  
Hurst & Company, 2008. 
663 “The main point objected to was the claim to be a prophet, since according to standard Sunnite doctrine Muhammad is the last  
of  the prophets; but more worldly considerations were probably also involved. Ghulam Ahmad certainly claimed to be a proph­
et, but not in the sense of  establishing a new religion with a new scripture, only as reinterpreting the Qur'an.“ Zit. Watt, William  
Montgomery: Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity. London, New York: Routledge, 1988, S. 59.
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of  a qur ānʾ  or the use of  Islamic termini in newspapers such as Al-Fazl664 being subjected to punishment and 
censorship.665 Hostilities against the Ahmadis, often declared outlawed as wajib-ul-qatl666, are part of  today's in­
ner-religious tensions which are increasingly articulated in violent terms.667 In May, 2010, more than 194 died 
in attacks on Ahmadi centers in Lahore and through mob violence. Contrary to blasphemy cases and violence 
against Christians, international media in the emotional debate on the religious laws of  Pakistan, seem to have 
turned a blind eye on the “Qadiani Acts”. 
4.1.2 Israel
4.1.2.1 Constitutional Genesis
In the Israeli case the legislation of  Mandate Palestine relied on Ottoman law. After the end of  Turkish rule  
and the (Muslim) millet system in Palestine, the rule of  the British Mandatory power lasted until the independ­
ence of  Israel on May 14, 1948. British administration had maintained the traditional (Ottoman) legal order to 
the extent that English common law was to be applied only where the local law was found to be inadequate 
and as a reaction to local circumstances.668 After independence, the first Provisional Government of  Israel, fa­
cing a lack of  qualified lawyers and know-how, according to the principle of  Continuity of  Positive Law trans­
formed the law of  the the Mandate period into the new state.669 The co-existence of  the de facto and de jure 
three forms of  fundamentally different traditions of  law created a challenge for the establishment of  an Israeli  
legal sector670: 
Most of  Israel's Arab neighbours have changed over to modern legal systems by accepting European civil codes  
or European inspired codifications, and thus have moved far from tradition. By contrast, some Ottoman laws 
have remained in force in Israel, and portions of  Ottoman civil procedure and admiralty law are still the law of  
the land. Some sections of  the Mejelle were abolished only recently.671
Exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of  personal status of  Jews was narrowed under the Mandate to the cent ­
ral issues of  marriage, divorce, alimony and the confirmation of  wills. In modern Israel, this arrangement was 
further narrowed to the extent that only marriage, divorce and halizah672 underlie the Rabbinical jurisdiction.673 
The Foundation of  Law enactment (1980) repelled the binding force of  English law as the primary and subsidi ­
ary source of  law whereas remnants of  Ottoman law were not affected. In other words, the enactment de ­
664 This included the renaming of  the Ahmadi town of  Rabwah into Chenabnagar where more than 60.000 Ahmadis live. See Mac­
Donald, Myra: In Ahmadis's desert city, Pakistan closes in. In: Reuters, 15 July, 2011.
665 See Ahmed, 1994, p. 684.
666 Non-Muslim allowed to be killed. 
667 See Iqbal, Mohammad: Islam and Ahmadism. Islamabad: Dawah Academy, International Islamic University, 1990. 
668 Some fields were modified, for instance criminal law, bankruptcy law, company law and the law of  bills of  exchange. In contrast  
to this, private law, special obligations law and the real property law remained in force due to Ottoman legislation. In addition,  
local non-governmental courts such as the Hebrew Courts of  Peace (Mishpat HaShalom Ha-Ivrith) were introduced by Jewish immig­
rants to Mandatory Palestine. See Bin-Nun, Ariel: The Law of  the State of  Israel. An Introduction. 2 nd Ed. Jerusalem: Rubin 
Mass, 1992, p. 5; Harris, 2003, pp. 76/77.
669 See Provisional Government of  Israel: Law and Administration Ordinance, enacted on 19 May, 1948.
670 This is especially reflected in the case of  the Ottoman codification Mejelle (1869-1876), whose implementation in the new Israeli  
laws was challenging since the original text was in Turkish and different translations created confusion but was not disposed and  
remained formally in force until 1984. As a result, in legal practice, courts and judges from the founding period did favor the  
more familiar British law. See Bin-Nun, 1992, pp. 5/6; Repeal of  Mejelle Law, passed by the Knesset on 13 June, 1984. 
671 Cit. Bin-Nun, 1992, pp. 6/7.
672 Rabbinical order to release a Jewish man from the halachic obligation to marry his deceased brother's widow if  that couple had no 
children.
673 See Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, passed by the Knesset on 26 August, 1953.
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clared the maturity and independence of  genuine Israeli law making. It also stipulated that “where the court,  
faced with a legal question requiring decision, finds no answer to it in statute law nor in case law nor by ana­
logy, it shall make the decision in accordance with the principles of  freedom, justice, equity, and peace of  Is­
rael's heritage.”674 Until today, Israeli legal scholars find it hard and disagree on as how to define the term “Is ­
rael's heritage” as a reference for interpretative purposes to the Jewish law of  halacha or to the nationalist-secu­
lar Jewish heritage. This debate is especially controversial given the attitudes of  Herzl and his followers dis ­
playing deep disrespect to rabbinical authority and religion in general.675
The role of  religion in Judaism and manifestations of  religious life in Israel are bound to the fundamental  
theological preoccupation that the religious and the profane belong together as one inseparable sphere. 676 A 
term for religion in the sense of  its Arabic counter-part (dīn), is in fact missing in Hebrew. Dat, literally “law” 
or “order”, refers to the observance of  religious halachic law and determines the differences in life-style and  
religious orientation between orthodoxy and secular public, with the latter being seen as part of  the com­
munity of  “citizens with Jewish belief ” because of  secular Israelis were born as Jews according to their matri ­
linear descend or have converted.677
In analyzing the role of  Israel's judiciary, it is important to reconsider the lack of  a written constitution as  
an organizing and binding structure for decisions and orders by the Israeli courts (batei mishpat). Ben Gurion's 
decision not to enact a constitution in 1949 resulted in three far-reaching developments: Firstly, without con­
stitutional restrictions, the generation of  the Founding Fathers was enabled to establish the state according to 
ideological lines narrowly defined by a statist approach and pioneering socialist-Zionist values. Though de­
clared in the proclamation of  independence678, the absence of  an equality clause in the constitutional frame­
work favored the maintenance of  military rule and control in areas inhabited by Arabs from 1948 to 1966 and 
allowed to successfully initiate large-scale expropriation of  Arab lands. Israel's long-term policy of  the occupa ­
tion, politically translated into the concept of  civil administration, is basically determined by the Government 
of  Israel and implemented by the Ministry of  Defense. Military courts, as an exponent of  the Israeli system of  
control in the occupied areas of  the West Bank and military law apply basically to Palestinians and non-Israeli  
citizens in the West Bank accused of  acts harmful to the security of  the state. The structure of  military courts  
exists simultaneously to the legal structure in the West Bank prior to the Israeli occupation in 1967, whose  
(Arab) trial and appeal courts continue to apply the law of  the former ruling power Jordan (1948–1967).679 
Secondly, without a constitution, the political leadership and especially David Ben-Gurion were enabled to 
establish the status quo agreement regarding the role of  religion in the State of  Israel. Thirdly, the ethnic hege­
monic and exclusive setup of  Israeli society as it was formulated and implemented by Ben-Gurion and his  
Mapai party established a Jewish republic with a clear Jewish majority. While the state has developed a demo­
cratic institutional setup that is, however, committed to its Jewish character, a legal barrier not only to the con­
674 Cit.  Foundations of  Law, passed by the Knesset on 23 July, 1980, section one; see also The Palestine Yearbook of  International 
Law, Vol. 10, 1998-1999. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 123/124.
675 See Herzl, 1896, p. 75.
676 See Stemberger, 2006, p. 7-10.
677 Ibid., p. 7.
678 See Declaration of  the Establishment of  the State of  Israel, approved by the Jewish People's Council on May 14, 1948. 
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trol of  the relationship between majority and minority does constitutionally not exist. Rather, the intra-major­
ity relations – the social reality of  legally full-privileged Jewish-Israeli citizens that constitute the effective polit ­
ical community with substantial participation in state and society – is subjected to legal diversification through 
the laws of  civil status such as marriage and citizenship. Israel's Basic Laws serve as a surrogate of  a written  
constitution and manifest the spirit of  the Status Quo at the time of  the state's creation. However, the legal  
corpus has been seen as expressing the temporary nature of  the constitutional setup and not a permanent vari ­
ant.
4.1.2.2 Legal Religious Identities and Citizenship
In the legal tradition of  the Ottoman Empire, adopted by the British Mandate and than implemented into the  
Israeli system of  law through the Law and Administration Ordinance (1948)680, many matters of  personal status 
and ritual matters such as kashrut and shabbat underlie the jurisdiction of  the Jewish religious courts (batei din). 
Jews living in Israel are like Muslims, Druze, Christians and Bahai, mandatory subject to the jurisdiction of  
their respective communitarian courts. Although Israel does not have a state religion – among the Middle  
Eastern states only Israel and Lebanon lack the constitutional fixation of  a state religion – “Orthodox Judaism 
functions in the Israeli polity as if  it were the official state religion.”681 Perceiving a way of  separating the pub­
lic and private spheres, fundamental to the liberal and modern Western conception of  society, is foreign to tra ­
ditional rabbinic thinking and the rabbinical court system. Therefore, from the perspective of  liberal political  
theory the rabbinical courts represent “one of  the most problematic parts of  the evolving political culture of  
Israel”682 and do substantially reinforce Israel's character as an ethnic democracy that recognizes and protects  
rights of  individuals while permitting group identities to affect citizen status.
Generally, halachic interpretation is subjected to the Rabbis of  whom, over the centuries,  single rabbis  
reached the status of  halachic leaders. Leadership is reflected in the ability of  a rabbi to creatively apply reli ­
gious norms, provided by the resources of  halacha, to the guidance of  Jewish lifestyle in a manner that is con­
ducive to the vitalization of  Jewish life in its current contexts.683 Among modern rabbis and especially among 
the Sephardi scholarly authorities, Maimonides684, respected by rabbinical authorities regardless of  their tradi­
679 When this policy evolved in the aftermath of  the 1967 war it was basically designed to separate Israel's internal democratic prac­
tices and legal procedures from the new practices of  the occupation. According to Edelman, “this 'compartmentalization' has  
been corroded by the expansionist policies of  some of  the governing parties in Israel, by the length of  the occupation, and by  
the decision to treat the Jewish settlers in the territories within the regular structures of  the Israeli Government, including the 
courts.” Cit. Edelman, Martin: Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel. Charlottesville (a.o.): Univ. Press of  Virginia, 1994, p. 101.  
Due to the perpetuated, seemingly indefinite and consistent occupation this parallel system changed and areas of  jurisdiction 
were broadened in favor of  military law, that applies in today's West Bank reality even to cases involving traffic violations etc.  
The establishment of  military courts in an occupied territory by the occupational power is approved by international law. Unpre ­
cedented in international law and de jure incompatible with Israel's legislation is the practice of  granting inhabitants of  the occu­
pied territory access to the Israeli Supreme Court.
680 See Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, §17.
681 Cit. Edelman, 1994, p. 51.
682 Cit. Edelman, Martin: The Rabbinical Courts in the Evolving Political Culture of  Israel, p. 145. In: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.  
16, No. 3, 1980, p. 145-166. 
683 See Zohar, Zvi: Maimonides as Inspiration and Guide for Sephardic Halakhic Leadership in Modern Times (With Special Refer ­
ence to the Case of  Giyyur), p. 102ff. In: The Journal for the Study of  Sephardic and Mizrahi Jewry, Winter 2007, p. 102-115.
684 Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon (1135/38-1204).
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tion or school of  thought, is considered as one of  the greatest halachic leaders. 685 In the context of  conversion 
to Judaism, it can be observed that though decrees on other matters of  Jewish life might seem to be conservat­
ive and exclusionary, leading rabbis of  modern Israel686 re-interpreting and referring to Maimonides' code – 
the Mishne Torah (1180), a systematized corpus of  classic rabbinic halacha, and his written responses to leaders 
of  the Jewish world – are inclined to follow liberal and inclusive policies versus intermarried Jews and their  
spouses.
The religious communities' attitude towards the legal system in Israel stems from both a normative gap 
between secular law and Jewish law and from an ideological divide between religious and secular-liberal values 
and is thus not only of  a conceptual distinction between public and private sphere. Regarding the former, ac­
cording to the 1947 status quo agreement, all obligations of  kashrut are mandatory, in the latter, the observ­
ance of  laws is voluntary.687 This basic separation marks the “green-line” of  a conflict in which many private  
and public institutions of  the Orthodox religious sector attempt to expand the scope of  obligations into the 
private sphere. Proponent of  such continuous efforts is the Chief  Rabbinate composed by both an Ashkenazi  
and a Sephardi Chief  Rabbi (Rishon LeZion). Based on agencies such as the Ministry of  Religious Affairs, re­
sponsible for the supervision of  kashrut over the last years, the withdrawing of  kashrut certifications that are 
authorized by the ministry and several rabbinical institutions, has become the vehicle for pursuing this policy.688
Laws regulating marriages of  Jews living in Israel but also of  those living abroad and seeking an Israeli cit ­
izenship constitute further and eventually the most complicated clash of  secular and religious legal positions.  
The practice of  marriage of  Jews whether religious (dati) or secular (hiloni) is fully subjected to Orthodox Rab­
binical courts:
[…] these courts apply Halachah, not the secular law of  Israel. And the Orthodox rabbinical establishment has 
been less flexible and less innovative in its Halachic interpretation since the advent of  the State than before. The 
rigidity shown by the Rabbinical Courts has produced considerable resentment among the non-Orthodox Jewish  
majority who are compelled to come before these courts by the laws of  the State.689
Non-Jewish Israeli citizens who wish to marry must do so through an authorized representative of  their reli ­
gious faith. This situation poses a problem for those who are not Jewish according to Jewish law, but who do 
not identify with any other faith. This is for instance the case when halacha prohibits marriages between a cohen  
(descendent of  the priests of  the Temple) and a divorcee or a convert. Furthermore, a bastard – e. g. the off­
spring of  an adulterous relationship between a married woman and a man who is not her husband – cannot 
marry another Jew except for a fellow bastard.690 To bypass the rabbinical approval, marrying abroad has be­
685 Together with Rabbi Joseph Caro (Joseph ben Ephraim Karo, 1488-1575) Maimonides is widely seen as “Rabbinic Master of  the  
Locale” (of  the entire Middle East, Marei DeAtra).
686 For instance Rabbi Ovadia Yussef  (b. 1920), Rabbi Ben Zion Meir AiUzziel (1880-1953), Chief  Rabbi of  Israel (1939-1953), and  
Rabbi Moshe HaCohen (1906-1966), dayyan in Tiberias.
687 The observation of  kashrut in public institutions financed by and representing the state is accepted and unquestioned in public 
life. This is due to the first case, when in 1948 the Knesset voted for kashrut observance in the IDF. Since the army represents 
the country's strongest social fabric, promoting unity in the multicultural immigrant society of  Israel, no other public institution  
could reasonably claim an exemption.
688 Obviously, loosing the official certificate that is renewed within regular terms, means a heavy economic loss for small and medi ­
um-sized businesses. 
689 Cit. Edelman, 1994, p. 53.
690 See Abramov, Zalman S.: Perpetual Dilemma. Jewish Religion in the Jewish State. Cranbury, New Jersey (a.o.): Associated Univ.  
Press, 1976, p. 179-192. The same is true for Jews that are the offspring of  adulterous or incestuous relationships (psulei chitun).
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come the alternative since most of  these marriages are registered and approved by the Ministry of  the Interior.  
In the case of  a marriage celebrated abroad as well as in the cases of  converts ( giyyur), the policy of  Israel, to 
officially recognize only the orthodox rabbinical approval creates another problematic scenario: The approval  
of  marriage by a rabbinical authority belonging to Reform, Conservative or Liberal Judaism whose communit ­
ies are basically in the US, has in most cases not been accepted by the rabbinical establishment in Israel. 691 
From 1959 until the late 1980s, the Minister of  the Interior responsible for the registration of  citizens and 
their personal national and religious status had been a member of  the National Religious Party (NRP). NRP lead­
ers Chaim Moshe Shapira and Yosef  Burg held this post for most of  the years of  the country's existence. 692 In 
addition, over a long period of  time, this power of  intervention had been strengthened by NRP's and Shas' 
powerful base in the Ministry of  Religious Affairs.693 
Until the late 1980s this situation affected only small numbers of  Jewish-Israeli citizens but even in that  
time it created political furor when the government, supported by the US, decided to evacuate the Jews of  
Ethiopia when the fall of  president Mengistu Haile Mariam and his regime became  imminent. During the 
spectacular Operation Solomon (1991), a covert civil-military action by the Israeli Air Force and El-Al, between 
14.325 and 14.400 Jews were evacuated within 36 hours and immediately granted Israeli citizenship termed un­
der the Law of  Return and National Act.694 Given what was seen as an isolation of  this “lost tribe of  Israel”695 
for two millenniums, the Chief  Rabbinate suspected that some Ethiopians may have married non-Jews and 
therefore warned of  integrating an unknown number of  “bastards” (memzer) into Israeli society. The uncom­
promising position of  the Chief  Rabbinate provoked political pressure and public campaigns in favor of  the  
Ethiopians. Forced to respond, the Rabbinate ordered the creation of  a separate Rabbinical court dealing only 
with registration cases for marriage within the Ethiopian community. Nevertheless, before these cases became 
public in the 1970s and early 1980s, it was Israel's policy towards Ethiopian immigrants to make a modified 
conversion ceremony obligatory. This included a ritual bath, an oath accepting Rabbinic law and, for male im­
691 See Ratzlav-Katz, Nissan: Legal Opinion – Rabbinical Court Can Invalidate Conversions. In: Arutz Sheva, 24 December, 2009. 
692 It is notable, that Burg's son, MK Avraham Burg, stemming from a national-religious milieu, on an individual basis, presented a  
proposal for a separation of  state and religion and the annulment of  the status quo to the Knesset in 1992. A first proposal had  
been refused by the Knesset plenum in 1976. 
693 The Ministry was dissolved in 2003/04 but re-established in January 2008 with Yitzhak Cohen from the religious Shas party as its 
responsible minister. The decision by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government faced the resistance of  liberal-leftist parties,  
Labor and Yisrael Beitenu. From 2004 to 2008 the National Authority for Religious Services, a sub-division in the Prime Minister's  
Office had replaced the ministry. Olmert's decision marked a political victory for the religious parties and it is likely that in return 
Shas backed the Olmert administration in the light of  the Winograd report, published on 30 January, 2008, that had criticized  
Olmert and the military  echelon for  serious failings  during the Summer War against  Lebanon and Hezbollah in 2006.  See 
Ha'aretz: Knesset plenum votes to revive Religious Affairs Ministry, 51-27, 14 January, 2008.
694 Earlier, from June, 1949, to September, 1950, the Israeli government had responded to the ongoing uprisings and violent clashes 
between Muslims and the Jewish communities in the Aden region and ordered the secret evacuation of  49,000 Jews from Ye ­
men, Djibouti and Eritrea to Israel (Operation Magic Carpet and Operation On Wings of  Eagles). See Sachar, 2007, p. 982. For Magic  
Carpet see Ibid., p. 395-403. 
695 According to the 1973 decree by Chief  Rabbi Ovadia Yussef, the Ethiopian Jews (Beta Yisrael) were descendants of  the lost tribe 
of  Dan. Therefore, the mass immigration of  Beta Yisrael to Israel was imperative for the sake of  the fulfillment of  the “ingather­
ing of  the exiles” (kibbutz galuyyot), to be followed by mizzug galuyyot, the “merging of  the exiles” which is, divested of  its messian­
ic interpretation, the integral doctrine underlying the state immigration policy. The acceptance of  Beta Yisrael as one of  the lost 
ten tribes of  Israel to be “re-patriated” was later adopted by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and supported by other Zion­
ist-statist (mamlachtiut) rabbis such as Chief  Ashkenazi Rabbi Shlomo Goren. See Rabinowitz, Louis Isaac: Ingathering of  the Ex ­
iles. In: Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd Ed., Macmillan, 2006; for a detailed analysis of  the mamlachtiut rabbinical position see Fischer, 
Shlomo: Self-Expression and Democracy in Radical Religious Zionist Ideology. Unpubl. PhD thesis, submitted at the Hebrew  
University, Jerusalem, January 2007.
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migrants, a symbolic “re-circumcision”. This was in reaction to the halachic doubt (safek) that continued to be 
placed by elements of  the orthodox establishment – basically non-Zionist Ashkenazi rabbinic circles – over  
the Jewishness of  the Ethiopian Beta Yisrael.696 The encounter of  Israeli public with the Ethiopians, for both 
sides, proved to be difficult:
From the point of  view of  the Ethiopian Jews it might be summed up as a failure to feel the sense of  complete­
ness and belonging they had expected, and instead they experienced a continuing struggle to realise their iden ­
tity: the authenticity of  their own Jewish identity had been put into question, their suffering was not acknow ­
ledged and appreciated, and, instead of  acquiring an image of  a brave and resourceful people, they were (and 
still are) viewed by Israelis as helpless-dependent-resourceless people who were saved from starvation by the Is ­
raelis.697 
Essentially the same issue had shaken Israeli political life during the early 1970s when, after the Supreme 
Court's ruling in 1970 according to which an individual's declaration to be Jewish was sufficient to officially 
define him as Jew. The Labor-ruled government of  Prime Minister Golda Meir amended the Law of  Return by 
simply defining a Jew as “one who is born to a Jewess or is converted”. This was the initial point for a series  
of  attacks against the ruling coalition and the refusal by the NRP to join the next Meir government after the  
1973 elections.
Today, because of  the large number of  immigrants from the post-Soviet territories, the discussion about a  
system legally equated with the marriage approved by a rabbinical council has become an unavoidable chal­
lenge and obstacle for a consensual development of  Israeli law.  Hundreds of  thousands of  Israeli citizens 
whose Jewishness is halachically questionable have no religious affiliation. This large group and its children,  
born in Israel, generate strong social power against this monopoly of  religious jurisdiction. Therefore, the de ­
mand for a civil marriage law made it imperative for any government to respond to this large-scale demand: 
There is a connection between religion, the land and the state, but nobody can ignore the need for bridging the 
religious and the non-religious system. The religious majority in the Jewish state is not orthodox at all. This re­
flects the situation in Israel. Why? Because the moderated Orthodox became much more involved on issues like  
borders and settlement. They neglected totally the issue of  the religious institutions like the religious courts and 
the system for conversion. The ultra-orthodox stepped into these positions and control the family issues com­
pletely. The non-democratic and non-Zionist ultra-orthodox made their position clear, that they won't obey the 
decisions of  the Supreme Court which are supposed to be against halachic values. […] In my hometown in the 
USSR, I converted to Judaism, my husband is a Jew and we went to Cyprus for marriage. If  I want to get di­
vorced, again, I have to go to Cyprus. […] So, as a Jew, you have few options and we want to expand them. We  
are willing to integrate the rabbinical courts to the extend that  an applicant is examined on his knowledge of  
Judaism whenever there are doubts but the ultra-orthodox oppose this model [...].698 
The idea for a civil marriage system had been promoted by agents of  civil society that formed a movement for  
civil marriage early in the 1950s.699 The political dimension and the mobilizing potential of  this issue manifes­
ted itself  only since 2000 under the government of  Ehud Barak (1999-2001) when Yossi Beilin, then Minister  
of  Justice, called on the Faculty of  Law, Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, for “some sort of  speed workshop”: 
696 For the Ethiopian Jewish immigration to Israel until 1984, see Ashkenazi, Michael/ Weingrod, Alex (Eds.): Ethiopian Jews and  
Israel. Rutgers, New Jersey: Transaction Publ., 2nd Ed., 1987; Parfitt, Tudor/ Semi Emanuela Trevisan (Eds.): Jews of  Ethiopia.  
The Birth of  an Elite. London (a.o.): Routledge, 2005.
697 Cit. Ezer, Gadi Ben: The Ethiopian Jewish Exodus. A Myth in Creation, pp. 124/125. In: Parfitt/ Semi, 2005, p. 122-130. And  
further: “[...] the Ethiopian Jews arrived in Israel with a heightened sense of  Jewish identity and an already emerging Israeli iden ­
tity. They felt that as individuals and as a community they had been tested, selected and purified through their suffering and had 
therefore earned their 'right' to enter Israel, God's land, and to fully participate in Israeli society.” Cit. Ezer, p. 124. 
698 Cit. Interview with MK Orit Zuaretz (Kadima), Member Lobby to Increase Tolerance Between the Religious and Secular, Jerus­
alem, 21 June, 2010.
699 Interview with Prof. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (University of  Haifa), Haifa, 4 December, 2009.
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“The Minister informed me that in his opinion, having been in politics for quite some time, there is no chance  
that civil marriage will be established in Israel any time soon. He chose to end the meeting by challenging us to  
find creative solutions.”700 Since then, the process of  finding a solution whose final proposal '[…] would not be 
recognized as a halakhic marriage, in order to remain sensitive to the religious community that fears having il­
legitimate children and in order to not let the lack of  a solution lead to a major rift in the Jewish nation'701 res­
ulted in several compromise models like the “pact of  couple-hood” (Brit HaZugiyut) that was passed by the 
Knesset just recently: In March 2010, Knesset passed a bill that for the first time allowed Israelis without reli ­
gious affiliation to conclude a civil marriage. The bill was introduced by the Yisrael Beiteinu (Our Home Israel) 
party led by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.702 However, this limited model further excludes couples 
from certain tax, insurance, and inheritance benefits and applies only to the marriage of  Israelis who declared  
non-religious status leaving aside non-orthodox, reform Jews.
Israel's legal traditions are impacted enormously by the experience of  the Shoah. The motif  of  justice and 
the sub-discourse on the Holocaust, yet not dissolved, is intrinsically interwoven with the national past of  the  
State of  Israel and, accordingly, contributed to some outstanding legal features. Those individuals who helped 
and saved Jews during the Holocaust can be awarded with the title of  a Righteous among the Nations – the highest 
honor given to non-Jews (goyim) by the State of  Israel. The title includes a honorary citizenship which accord­
ing to rabbinical tradition accepts a goy as a ger toshav (Sojourning Alien amid the people of  Israel). According 
to this honor, the righteous, with respect to its in Talmudic roots, “has a place in the world to come”. As  
defined by the  Yad Vashem law, the Remembrance Authority set up a public commission, headed by a Su­
preme Court Justice, which examines each case and is responsible for granting the title and a medal. In the 
Garden of  the Righteous and on the Mount of  Remembrance, Jerusalem, – as of  2010 – the names of  23.788  
Khassidey Umot HaOlam from 45 countries are commemorated.703 Still, the election of  a righteous is broadly 
covered by Israeli media and the public. 
Much more attention is given to the extraordinary attempts by the state, its security apparatus, private or­
ganizations and NGOs worldwide to identify, blame and arrest perpetrators of  the Holocaust. These track II  
efforts, primarily brought forward by private organizations, endowments and foundations, do in a certain way,  
correlate with Israel's official position and legal persecution towards those who are found guilty of  the Holo­
caust against the Jewish people, with the abduction of  Adolf  Eichmann from Argentine as the most promin ­
ent and most spectacular case. The latest initiative was launched in 2002 (Operation Last Chance) by the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center and the  Targum Shlishi Foundation.  The campaign's organizers publish a “Most Wanted Nazi 
700 Cit. Shahar, Lifshitz: The Spousal Registry. Israeli Democracy Institute, 2006. Ironically, the need for a civil marriage system equi ­
valent to the religious marriage was firstly proposed by the religious professors Ariel Rosen-Zvi and Pinchas Shiffman who to­
gether with Lifshitz Shahar chaired the Bar Ilan group working on the new proposal.
701 Cit. Shahar, 2006.
702 On March 17, the bill was passed by 56 votes to 4. The religious parties in the Knesset boycotted the vote. This was completely  
unexpected since coalition partner  and third-largest  party  Shas had declared to  join  the Civil  Union campaign of  the reli ­
gious-rightist coalition. Later, Rabbi Ovadia Yussef, spiritual head of  Shas, and Rabbi Shlomo Amar, Chief  Rabbi of  Israel since 
2003, agreed on a new proposal by Yisrael Beitenu. See Yisrael Beitenu: online press release, 7 March, 2010. World Jewish Con­
gress: Knesset approves bill allowing civil marriage for ‘non-religious’ Israelis; Somfalvi, Attila: Lieberman: Gov't to vote on civil  
marriage bill Monday. In: Ynet, 3 April, 2010.
703 See Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance (Yad Vashem) Law, enacted by the Knesset on 18 May, 1953; website Yad Vashem.
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Criminal” list and rate the efforts by countries in which Holocaust perpetrators live, ranging from highly co­
operative countries like the USA and Hungary (category A) to categories F's-X, which include countries such 
as Syria, Sweden and Norway who refuse in principle to investigate suspected Nazi war criminals because of  
lack of  political will (Austria) and legal or ideological restrictions.704 Still on the top of  the list is Alois Brun­
ner705, SS-Hauptsturmführer and key operative of  Adolf  Eichmann, who lived in Syria for decades, together 
with Aribert Heim706, a medical doctor of  the Waffen-SS who served in various concentration camps. 707 To­
gether with controversial operations in the past, these campaigns are believed by criticizers and supporters 
alike, to be supported at least on the informational level by the Foreign Ministry and the Mossad and, thus, be­
came an informal part of  the state's intelligence affairs.708 These cases in which the state displayed its ability 
and willingness to bring Nazi and war criminals to justice at any diplomatic cost and regardless of  the safety of  
Israeli operatives on the ground, clashes with the disturbing reality in which Holocaust survivors, to this day,  
live in Israel. 
The Entry into Israel Law709, similar to immigration procedures or applications for jobs in the civil service in 
other countries like the USA or Germany, restricts former members of  Nazi organizations, to enter Israel. 710 
In a recent case, the Israeli leadership made use of  this law after German writer and Nobel Prize winner Gün­
ther Grass who in 2006 had acknowledged to have been a SS-member had criticized Israel's position towards 
Iran.711 The argument drawn from Anglo-Saxon legal tradition emphasizes the rights and restrictions to cit ­
izens of  the state and citizens of  foreign states that – due to their diplomatic relations with or actions against 
Israel, apply as persona non grata or, for instance in the case of  an Iranian, who because of  his birthright or his 
residency in Iran applies as an individual of  an enemy state. The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law712 has fur­
ther developed the Entry law of  1952 and, as its criticizers argued, targets Palestinians in order to bring about  
a step-by-step solution of  the unresolved question of  Arab-Palestinian refugees in accordance with the posi ­
tions of  Likud and Kadima. The law argues that an Israeli citizen, in order to enter states such as Syria, Leban­
on, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen, has to apply for a special permission provided only by the Ministry of  In ­
terior. Iran was included on the list of  enemy states in 2007 in accordance with the Prevention of  Infiltration Law  
of  1954.713 Egypt and Jordan were removed after signing peace treaties with Israel in 1979 an 1994. The legal  
704 See Wiesenthal Center Annual Report, 1 May, 2011, pp. 4/5. 
705 Born in 1912 and last seen in 2001 in Damascus.
706 Born in 1914, disappeared in 1963 and allegedly died in Cairo in 1992.
707 See OLC, website.
708 Another campaign launched in 2010/11 is aimed to expose international prominent anti-Semites from politics, arts and religious  
leaders.
709 Passed by the Knesset on 26 August, 1952. Amended on 13 July, 1966, and 31 July, 1985.
710 In contrast, in the cases of  Noam Chomsky who had been barred from entering Israel in 2010 and the debate on declaring con ­
ductor Daniel Barenboim a persona non grata after he conducted music by Richard Wagner in 2001, Israel did not explicitly refer to 
the law of  1952. See Spiegel Online International: Minister Wants Nobel Prize Withdrawn. Furious Israel Bars Günter Grass for 
Critical Poem, 9 April, 2012.
711 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online: Israel wehrt sich gegen DDR-Vergleich von Günter Grass, 12 April, 2012.
712 See The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (temporary provision), passed by the Knesset on 21 March, 2007. The law reaffirms 
the version as of  2003 in principle but added further provisions into the text. 
713 See Prevention of  Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, passed by the Knesset on 16 August, 1954, amended in 1960 and 2007.  
Enemy states had been filed in 1954 with Iran being to only case in which the list had been updated, now including Afghanistan  
and Hamas-ruled Gaza as well.
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determination of  citizenship, in recent years, gained prominence as the most challenging issue for the state in  
the light of  the Middle East peace process to which it is basically connected through the Palestinian refugee  
question. 
In 2006 and 2009, and again, on 11 January, 2012, the Supreme Court decided against the petitions filed by  
national NGOs such as Adalah714, the legal center for Arab minority rights in Haifa, arguing that the law viol­
ated fundamental international human rights and was against the protection of  minorities, provided by the Ba­
sic Laws of  Israel. According to the court panel, the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law was not in violation 
with the existing Basic Laws.715 Here only few exceptional permits were provided by the Minister for Inner Af­
fairs, Eli Yishai (Shas): In April, 2010, Palestinian citizen and resident of  the West Bank, Ala Halihal was per ­
mitted to visit Beirut after a Hight Court ruling. On behalf  of  the Arab writer who planned to visit a cultural  
festival in Lebanon, Adalah won the case in whose debate even the prime minister intervened against the peti­
tioner, and in which for the first time since 1948 an Arab Israeli citizen's visit to an enemy state had been legal ­
ized.716 
The ideological dimension includes the claim of  rightist-conservative parties to introduce stricter laws guar ­
anteeing the loyalty of  citizens to the Israeli state. Yisrael Beitenu as the representative party mainly of  Russian 
immigrants which composed the last big wave of  immigration in the 1990s, stands at the forefront of  this de­
bate. In March, 2011, a bill proposed by Foreign Minister Lieberman, David Rotem and Robert Ilatov was 
passed by the Knesset which empowered courts to abandon citizenship of  individuals for reasons of  security  
threats, treason and contact and passing of  information to the enemy. Lieberman's success to amend the Cit ­
izenship Law for which he had campaigned since the elections in 2009 (“No loyalty, no citizenship”) was based  
on similar arguments like his demand to introduce an oath of  loyalty which recognizes Israel as a Jewish state 
as obligatory for Israeli Arabs living in Israel.717 The law which marked the end of  a long debate, is believed to 
target prominent Israeli Arabs who allegedly misused their position in society or their parliamentary status and  
who openly displayed sympathies with the Arab-Palestinian cause or with policies of  states that are hostile to ­
wards Israel.718 The case of  MK Azmi Bishara, Palestinian and founder of  the Balad party, had been the refer­
ence for the supporters of  the law for his treason against the state because of  his alleged passing of  confiden­
tial military information during visits in Syria and Lebanon between 2001 and 2006 in the wake of  the Second  
Lebanon War:
[…] visits in enemy states stir fear that security information could be passed on and form an encouragement to 
armed attacks and terror attacks against Israel. […] The Azmi Bishara episode and the incitement on the part of  
some of  the Arab Knesset Members, as well as their trips to Syria and meetings with heads of  the Hamas, are 
not in the realm of  free speech, but form clear encouragement of  armed attacks and terror activities against Is­
rael and her citizens.719
714 See Adalah, website.
715 See case Adalah vs. the State of  Israel.
716 For this case see Khoury, Jack: In unprecedented ruling, court lets Israeli Arab visit an enemy state. In: Ha'aretz, 13 April, 2010.
717 See Stoil, Rebecca Anna: Knesset passes law revoking citizenship for treason. In: The Jerusalem Post, 28 March, 2011. 
718 Interview (by phone) with MK Nitzan Horowitz, (Meretz), Jerusalem, 13 November, 2010.
719 Cit. MK Zevulun Orlev (NRP). Quoted in Amnon, Meranda: Law banning visits in enemy states approved in preliminary vote.  
In: Ynews, 31 October, 2007.
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Accordingly, the Knesset had passed a law in February, 2011, which allowed to suspend state pensions to  
former Mks after they were found guilty of  treason.720 
Similarly, the British law tradition defines trading, mercantile and business relations with foreign states and 
their citizens that are politically hostile to Israel as illegal and allows the suspension of  earlier contracts as be ­
ing contrary to national public policy goals.721 The same applies for trading actions by Israeli investors in cur­
rencies of  hostile states. Following the example of  post-Second World War Germany, when international in­
vestors purchased the German Mark on a grand scale when the country's economy laid down but promised  
rich dividends due to the positive prospective for German industrial growth on the basis of  international de ­
velopment  programs,  after  the  fall  of  Saddam Hussain's  regime  in  Iraq,  the  Israeli  ministry  of  finance  
amended the act and legalized trade with the Iraqi Dinar.722 The Trading with the Enemy Act, with its most prom­
inent case being the US where trade with Cuba is still sanctioned723, is a law that, because of  its intensive, if  
not solely reference to war between nations, embodies a strong political-ideological dimension. 724 While re­
gional cooperation and bilateral trade between Pakistan and India but also regionally for the SAARC member  
countries proved to be strongly determined by ups and downs of  IndoPak relations, the economic dividend of  
trade agreements and improvements for cross-border traffic has given new perspectives for reconciliation and 
normalization of  relations (“economic peace”). In Israel and its neighboring countries the potential of  an eco­
nomic win-win situation and expansion of  the regional market, for all parties, is on the table but impossible to 
implement due the conflict situation. Accordingly, and also despite the demand for normalization of  ties in the  
nearest possible future, the Israeli government made sanctioning Iran economically one of  its foreign policy 
priorities. In 2008, a new law restricted Israeli companies from investing in Iranian firms. Therefore, it was as ­
tonishing for the Israeli public and the political elite, when in 2011 the US State Department informed Jerus­
alem that it had imposed sanctions on the Ofer Group, one of  the world's largest private shipping companies  
owned by Israel's top-business family, the Ofer brothers, for having sold a tanker to Iran and because of  its 
false claims to have the admission by the Israeli government to dock its ships in Iranian ports.725
720 Bishara who left Israel in 2007 had received pensions since April, 2007, when he resigned from his MK seat from self-imposed  
Egyptian exile.
721 See Detter, Ingrid: The Law of  War. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, p. 362.
722 See Shefer, Shlomi: Looking for investment opportunity? Try the Iraqi dinar. In: Ynews, 27 July, 2006.
723 The same was the case with regard to trade with North Korea, forbidden until 2008. 
724 “Identification of  'enemy alien' status in a Trading with the Enemy Act may depend solely on residence so that aliens not so clas ­
sified may continue their business and trade unhampered and 'without the slightest governmental supervision'. [...] The question  
of  when a company is of  enemy character is complex. Such character has been held to attach if  the company was under 'enemy  
control'.” Cit. Detter, 2000, p. 365.
725 See Vick, Karl: Shipping with the Enemy: Israeli Firm Deals with Iran. In: Time World, 5 June, 2011.
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5 Sociopolitical Framework I: Pakistan's Religious-Political Groups and the State
This is the picture taken when Zia visited the pirs of  the area. Of  course this was an honor and show of  respect to be visited by the president of  
Pakistan. He also invited us to come to Islamabad. But to be honest, there was not much to talk about between him and us. What has he done for  
these villages and the people here?
Interview with Pīr Syed Zafar Kazmi, Chakwal, 16 July, 2009.
Pakistan's religious sector is not monolithic but fragmented into various Islamic schools of  thought. Given the  
notion of  the state as a “political laboratory eloquently demonstrating that there is no such thing as an 'Islamic 
essence'”726, the same can be applied to its religious landscape. Alavi proposed the following grouping of  ideo ­
logical positions among Indian Muslims before 1947:727
(1) Islamic traditionalism: Deobandi ulamāʿ ʾ 
(2) Islamic traditionalism: Barelwi ulamāʿ ʾ and Pirs
(3) Islamic modernism: Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal
(4) Islamic neo-traditionalism, integrationalism728,  or fundamentalism: Maulana Maududi  and Jama'at-i-
Islami
(5) Secular non-communal trans-actionalism (provincial): Unionist Party729
(6) Secular non-communal radicalism: Krishak Proja Party, Bengal730
(7) Secular non-communal nationalism: Congress Party731
However, such categorizations can serve only as approximate orientation for there exist cross-crossings and  
thereof  hybrid variants and intermediary groups indicating changes in central perceptions and stances within  
the religious sector: 
'Modernity' itself  was an contested idea, open to many varied interpretations. One will have to slip out of  the fa ­
cile and rigid distinctions between so-called Muslim 'modernists' and 'anti-modernists' or 'liberals' and 'tradition­
alists' to appreciate the subtleties and ambiguities underlying the ideas of  those whom these categories have 
sought to classify.732
While Islamic traditionalism and neo-traditionalism have survived after independence, the other groups are 
merely politically visible and were succeeded by new parties. This is especially true for parties with leftist secu­
lar-pragmatist orientation like the Communist party that was banned in 1954, went underground and joined  
the National Awami Party (NAP).733 However, the main representatives of  modernism, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan 
and Mohammad Iqbal, are still very present in political discourses and especially in those which touch upon 
726 Cit. Philippon, Alix: Sunnis against Sunnis. The Politicization of  Doctrinal Fractures in Pakistan, p. 347. In: The Muslim World, 
Vol. 101, 2011, p. 347-368.
727 See Alavi, 1987, p. 28ff. A similar use of  categories can be found in Smith, 1946; and Shah, Syed Mujawar Hussain: Religion and  
politics in Pakistan, 1972-88. Islamabad: National Institute of  Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1996.
728 As, for instance, proposed by Malik as “adapting or modernising one's tradition which continues to be articulated in Islamic sym ­
bols and terms […].” Cit. Malik, 2008, p. 396.
729 With its rightist Punjab wing dominated by the local landlords and similar smaller groups in Sindh.
730 Led by the “Tiger of  Bengal” (sher-i-bangal) A. K. Fazlul Haq (1873-1962), Chief  Minister of  (East) Bengal and future Governor  
East Pakistan.
731 The ruling party in NWFP at that time.
732 Cit. Jalal, 2000, p. 67.
733 This Marxist-Leninist party (Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party, Communist Workers and Peasants Party, CMKP) with non-political but in­
fluential bodies such as Progressive Writers Association under the poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, and the Trade Union Federation formed Pakistan's 
cultural left. In its public debates it was competing with the other political parties and especially with the Jama'at-i-Islami. See Toor, Saa­
dia: A national culture for Pakistan: the political economy of  a debate, p. 330-337. In: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2005, p. 
318-340; N. a.: What is the CMKP? In: Marxism-Leninism in our time, 4 September, 2006; Interview Arif  Malik, Workers Federation/  
Journalist, Mirpur, 27 July, 2009.
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the state's Muslim self-conception. Politicians seek religious and ideological legitimacy through reference to the 
modernist spirit of  Aligarh and the national poet while the fierce hostilities between them and the  ulamāʿ ʾ tend 
to be consequently neglected. An essential feature of  this obsessive reference to the past is its focus on the  
founder of  the nation: Jinnah the Westernized Karachi-born lawyer entered the political arena in 1913 when 
he became member of  the Muslim League. Until he gained chairmanship of  the League (1916) he maintained 
his membership in the Congress and the Imperial Legislative Council where he represented Anglicized liberal-sec­
ular politics with a unified Hindu-Muslim post-colonial Indian state as is its central demand before he with­
drew from his initial formula in favor of  a two-state solution and the emphasis on a separate Muslim identity.
734 However, his campaigning for a distinct Muslim entity provoked broad resistance:
In 1920 the rising stars of  Muslim India, like Iqbal and the Ali brothers, were opposed to Jinnah. In the Nagpur  
Congress session that year, Maulana Shaukat Ali was outraged when Jinnah opposed Gandhi's policies on the 
grounds that they were leading to disunity, and he attempted to assault Jinnah while hurling abuse at him. A dec­
ade later, the same stars would be proclaiming that Jinnah was the only hope for the Muslims. They had arrived  
at the same conclusion as Jinnah and abandoned the attempt to work on one platform with the Hindus, al ­
though they took different routes.735
Nevertheless, from the orthodox to the sub-nationalist political power holders, all of  them have to position 
themselves vis-à-vis Jinnah's movement: Hence, this orientation has resulted in the essentialization and hege­
monialization of  the pertinent question on the groups' loyalty towards Jinnah and, hence, whether they were in  
support of  Pakistan or against it.736 The enormous importance of  this discourse and its presence in the funda­
mental discourses of  national identities and the religious setup of  the state, even more than six decades after  
Pakistan became independent, brings Jinnah's former opponents under pressure to justify their orientation 
during the 1940s and reflects ongoing attempts to reinterpret history:
Certain quarters try to make an impression that Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi and Jama'at-e-Islami had opposed the  
creation of  Pakistan. Though it is a lie and, therefore, not worh-[sic!] talking, it is necessary to present facts for  
setting the record straight. Sayyid Maududi was primarily a thinker, a scholar and a social reformer. He was not a 
'politician' in the currently understood sense. Even Jama'at-e-Islami began to take part in politics only after the  
adoption of  the Objectives Resolution in March, 1949. Maulana Maududi was not involved in active politics in  
the pre-independence era. During that period his contribution was in the field of  reconstruction of  Islamic  
thought, analysis of  the malaise that plagued the Muslim Ummah and spelling out a strategy for their revival 
through an Islamic revolutionary movement. Second, it may also be stated as a matter of  fact that Maulana 
Maududi neither opposed Pakistan Movement nor did he practically participate in it. He had his differences with  
the way the Muslim League had organized the movement. He developed his own distinct approach to the chal­
lenge faced by the Muslim Ummah. One has every right to differ from his approach, but it is unfair to distort or  
misrepresent his position.737
The groups' interrelations are, beyond vehement personal favoritism and enmities, mainly determined by their 
diverging interpretations and stances towards contemporary forms of  Islam such as Sufism and its practices,  
the accommodation of  Western cultural influences “without contravening the religious precepts of  Islam”738, 
legal interpretations as the result of  the respective school of  religious law (madhab) they follow and doctrinal 
734 A detailed analysis is provided by Ahmed, 1997, p. 61ff.
735 Cit. Ibid., p. 62/63.
736 As far as the academic body of  literature is concerned, Shah shares this view: “The literature on religion and politics in Pakistan 
revolves around two themes: firstly, the conflicting role of  religion in the making of  Pakistan where it was used by the tradition ­
alist ulama to negate the idea of  territorial nationalism in South Asia and secondly by the modern advocates of  the Pakistan  
Movement in a purely political context.” Cit. Shah, 1996, p. vi.
737 Cit. (old) website Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan.
738 “Here was an issue loaded with nuances, owing more to individual preferences than a communitarian consensus, not all of  which 
have  been  captured  by  the  insistence  on  consigning  it  to  the  suffocating  confines  of  the  'modernity'  versus  'tradition'  
dichotomy.” Cit. Jalal, 2000, p. 67.
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issues such as ijtihād and taqlid, tauhīd739 and shirk or reformist thought, blamed as bid aʿ  by adversaries.740 Their 
political involvement contributed to this matrix of  cooperation and conflict when the groups were split along 
the lines of  their political support for Jinnah's Muslim League, the fundamental question of  either supporting 
or refusing the creation of  Pakistan, as epitomized in the political agenda of  the 1940's Muslim League, their  
standing on the matter of  relations with post-independent India, from where most of  the groups originated, 
and finally, their opposition or cooperation with subsequent ruling regimes and, as a more recent issue, their 
role within the new religious extremist models of  conflict.741 
5.1 Sunna
5.1.1 Barelwis
Originating from North Indian Bareilly, the Barelwis place the role of  the prophet in the center of  their theo ­
logy. Their love towards the Prophet ( ishq-i rasūlʿ ) is expressed through their devotional practices, for instance 
at holy shrines of  saints which links many among the Barelwis to folk and Sufi Islam. Earlier in another sec ­
tion of  this study, it has been pointed out to the Barelwi sensibility towards defamation or insulation of  the  
Prophet that crystallized in the aftermath of  the Salman Taseer murder in January, 2011. Cases like the killing  
of  the Governor of  Punjab also shows that the Barelwis, often considered to be less able to mobilize in public,  
with regards to blasphemy, are far more concerned about Prophet Mohammad's reputation and good name, 742 
while e.g. the burning of  the qur ānʾ  would mobilize primarily Deobandis.743 As a Hanafi reactionary movement 
to streams such as the Salafi reform movement of  the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Deobandis744, the Ahl-i Sunnat wa-
l'Jama'at refer to the works of  their founder Maulana Shah Muhammad Ahmad Rida Khan Barelwi (1855/56-
1921/22).745 As the largest Sunni stream in Pakistan with an estimated share of  between 50 to 70 percent of  
the total Sunni Muslim population,746 they stand close to the sufi culture, whose orders play an influential rule 
especially in the rural areas of  Punjab747: “For the Brelwis, the Prophet is the pivotal figure, but the Muslim 
739 Belief  in the unity of  god.
740 See Malik, 2008, pp. 296/297.
741 Regarding their new political roles, Malik writes: “Common to all these  ashraf  groups was that they did not in the first place as­
pire for political leadership. But all of  them postulated reforms of  religious education while the emulation of  sunna and hadith – 
which had become a decisively useful means of  safeguarding Muslim identities – was paramount by way of  pious action in order  
to re-establish the cultural and political hegemony of  Muslim power.” Cit. Ibid., p. 296. 
742 The Salman Rushdie affair (1989-1995), the Danish cartoon case might serve as the most prominent examples. Mass protests in  
the whole Islamic world were the direct result. For Rushdie see Hafez, Kai: Die politische Dimension der Auslandsberichterstat ­
tung, Vol. 2, Das Nahost- und Islambild der deutschen überregionalen Presse. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002, p. 240-252. For reac­
tions from Pakistan to the cartoons see Blom, 2008. 
743 Recent events that mobilized Deobandi regional protests with their epicenters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, were US Pastor Terry  
Jones' proclamation to put the holy book symbolically on trial and burn it in April, 2011, as well as more recent incidents at US  
Army bases in Afghanistan. See Sieff, Kevin: Florida pastor Terry Jones’s Koran burning has far-reaching effect. In: The Wash ­
ington Post, 3 April, 2011; NBC News: Obama apologizes to Afghanistan over Quran burnings; 2 US troops shot dead, 23 Feb ­
ruary, 2012.
744 For they refused the Arab-wahhabi influenced renewal movement of  the 19th century, Tariqah-i-Muhammahiyyah and later also the 
Nadwat ul-Ulama (1894) as well as the modernist Aligarh movement. See Ahmad, Mujeeb: Political Role of  the Sunnis (Barelwis)  
and their Factions in Pakistan, p. 26. In: Cheema, 2008, p. 26-35. 
745 For the colonial context see Sanyal, 1999.
746 See Khan, Aarish U.: Sunni Ittehad Council: The Strengths and Limitations of  Barelvi Activism against Terrorism. Paper Center 
for Research and Security Studies. Islamabad: 2011, p. 1.
747 Here, Rana counts 43 groups out of  which six follow a political agenda. See Rana, 2009, p. 353.
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[…] communicates with the Prophet only through a saint.”748 Accordingly, spiritual leaders, the pīrs, mashā'ikh 
and gaddi nashin749 are not only considered mediators and religious authorities but also important sociopolitical 
figures.750 Similar to the level of  organization and inner hierarchies of  the Deobandi groups and much less co ­
hesive than the JI, “the Brelwis adhere to traditional modes of  communication. The majority of  their repres­
entatives in today's Pakistan are, however, often associated with the traditional sector.” 751 The Barelwi cosmos 
is subdivided into at least four major streams (silsilas) that claim their lineage to the prophet – the Qadriya, the 
Naqshbandiya752, the Chishtiya and the Suhurwardiya – and is therefore not a monolithic bloc.753 While the 1990's 
and the 2000's witnessed the trend of  increasing Deobandi influence on state-controlled mosques, this devel ­
opment in general but particularly in Sindh and Karachi seems to have been reversed. Among the various al ­
legations and critiques by their opponents, the view that the Barelwis remained largely loyal to the British au­
thorities754 and supportive towards Jinnah's League, and did therefore not participate in the resistance move­
ments against the British rāj (reign), is still very common.755 Despite the formation of  the All-India Sunni Con­
ference in 1925, the representative body of  the Barelwis, and its participation in the League's political struggle, 
this view usually tends to ignore varying positions among Barelwi leaders that were yet visible at the time of  
independence. Like the other Islamic streams that supported Jinnah, envisioning an Islamic state, the League's  
secular drive after independence disillusioned them gradually.756 However, Barelwi support can be localized 
among the social groups that are linked to Sufi or popular non-canonical Islam757, common in the rural areas, 
mainly in Punjab and Sindh but as Ahmad claims, their influence and social basis is considerable in urban areas  
as well.758
Founded in 1948, the Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama’-i-Pakistan (JUP) provided a platform for those Barelwi ulamā  ʿ ʾ who 
had supported Jinnah's cause. As the party that represented the majority of  the traditional religious authorities,  
the JUP vehemently opposed the nationalization of  shrines since 1959/1960 and lobbied against the establish ­
ment of  the  awqāf  department in 1960 under Ayub Khan.759 After the death of  Allama Abul Hasnat Syed 
Muhammad Ahmed Qadri in 1961 the party remained more or less inactive. In 1968 Allama Abdul Ghafur 
748 Cit. Malik, 1996, p. 5.
749 Or sajjada nashin; custodians of  a shrine and direct descendants of  the buried saint.
750 Their loose political organization is the Jam'iyyat al-Masha'ikh Pakistan. See Malik, 1996, p. 5, 8, 64. The organization was founded 
in 1948 by Pir Sayyid Muhammad Fazl Shah of  Jalalpur Sharif. However, it is debatable whether this organization is still intact on  
the operational level. See also Ahmad, 1993, p. 4. 
751 Cit.  Malik,  1996,  p.  6.  Accordingly,  beyond its  vague political  program of  seeking the implementation of  values  and laws  
provided by qur ānʾ  and sunna, as outlined in its manifestos, “the JUP has not published any written history or other literature.” 
Cit. ICG Asia Report, No. 216: Islamic Parties in Pakistan, Islamabad/ Brussels, 2011, p. 15.
752 For the Naqshbandi see Weismann, Itzchak: The Naqshbandiyya. Orthodoxy and activism in a worldwide Sufi tradition. London 
(a.o.): Routledge, 2007.
753 See Khan, 2011, p. 5.
754 Together with the Shī itesʿ  they were often labeled as puppets and compliant agents in the service of  their colonial masters, as well 
as co-architects of  British-Jewish conspiracies to abolish Islam, e. g. in India and the Ottoman Empire. Polemics against them by  
other religious groups are not uncommon. See for instance Gümüs, M. Siddik: Confessions of  a British Spy. Lahore: Islamic 
Propagation Centre, n. d. 
755 In the post-independence era, they are still seen as loyal to the establishment; in turn some Barelwi groups “stigmatize other  
Sunni sects as being deviant religious 'minorities' who are responsible for 'terrorism' and are patronized by the State.” Cit. Philip­
pon, 2011, p. 349. 
756 See Ahmad, 2008, pp. 26/27. 
757 See De Jong, F.: Die mystischen Bruderschaften und der Volksislam, p. 490. In: Ende/ Steinbach, 1989, pp. 487-504.
758 See Ahmad, 2008, p. 26. 
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Hazarvi became elected as new amir and led the party back into politics after Yahya Khan had dissolved West 
Pakistan's “One Unit” and replaced it with the concept of  party between the Western and Eastern part of  the  
country.760 During  the  1970  national  elections  JUP  performed  best  among  the  West-Pakistani  religious 
parties.761 The new central figure and the party's most visible leader became Maulana Ahmed Shah Nurani Sid­
diqi from Merath, who was elected to parliament from a Karachi constituency in 1970, indicating that JUP had 
become a challenger to the PPP in Sindh. In that elections, the JUP won as many seats as the JUI and more  
seats than the JI.762 Under the chairmanship of  Nurani, a committee presented the party's manifesto for the 
upcoming election, stating that the party would “work against Socialism, Communism, Capitalism and all other 
un-Islamic 'isms', to uproot Feudalism, Capitalism and economic exploitation by a few families” and declared  
that “as long as a single Sunni is alive, no other 'ism' can establish its roots in Pakistan”. 763 The party's cam­
paign, supported and legitimized by a fatwā issued by 113 ulamā  ʿ ʾ was not only intensified during several meet­
ings of  JUP's majlis-i-'amal and All Sunni Conventions, in which factions of  the NAP and the JUI were por­
trayed as pro-Indian and socialist764, ensured the party's transformation into a religious-political force with na­
tionwide support.765 Due to its electoral power and  sadr (president) Nurani's personal engagement, the JUP 
played a significant role in the process that led to the 1973 Islamic Constitution. Like other religious leaders 
too, Nurani claimed to have been the most ardent supporter of  the nizām-i mustafā to be introduced as a frame­
work for state and society under the slogan “roti, kaprā aur makān – is ka dāmin Islām hai” (Islam is the guarant­
or for bread, cloth and house), an inversion of  the PPP's slogan.766 Generally, the interpretation of  the system 
of  the Prophet resulted in a clear divide on this issue, when leading Barelwi leaders condemned the Jama'at-i-Is­
lami and its leader – the system of  “Maududīyyat” – as opponents of  nizām-i mustafā and as a threat to the Sunna 
“greater than socialism”.767
Nurani's political rise and his image as a “luminous” (laqab) leader768 reached its climax when he was elected 
as candidate for the post of  prime minister by the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1973,769 and as one of  the 
main leaders of  the anti-PPP Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in the following years.770 In April, 1974, Nurani 
759 According to the Waqf  Property Ordinance of  1961. See Malik, 1996, p. 59-64: “This nationalization had three aims: first, the State 
wanted to extend and protect its interest, since these endowments are often in the form of  religious schools, estates and shrines.  
[…] Secondly, the State was interested in the financial resources accruing from the shrines and schools. Thirdly, nationalization 
meant the bureaucratization of  the shrine-culture and of  endowments which, in association with  Folk-Islam, was striving for 
autonomy.” Cit. Ibid., p. 55.
760 Ahmad, 1993, p. 45.
761 See Rana, 2009, p. 358.
762 See ICG, 2011, p. 15. 
763 Cit. Ahmad, 1993, p. 44.
764 See Ibid., pp. 49/50. According the authors of  the fatwā, Bhutto's PPP was a party that openly refutes the existence of  God or 
challenges the practicability of  the qur ānʾ  and which does not submit to the principles of  qur ānʾ  and sunna.
765 Among the traditional and urban strata, or what Schulze and Malik described as mixed/ intermediary sector. See Malik, 1996; see  
Ibid., 1990, p. 40.
766 Quoted in Ahmad, 1993, p. 60.
767 See Ibid., p. 51-53.
768 See Malik, 1990, p. 40.
769 Alliance comprising JUI, JUP, JI, NAP, factions of  the PML and independent candidates lead by JUI's chief  Mufti Mahmud and  
the Pir of  Pagaro. For the religious alliances see Annex, Tabelle 1.
770 See Malik, 1990, p. 41. For a detailed analysis of  UDF and PNA see Hussain, Akhtar: Politics of  Alliances in Pakistan, 1954-
1999. Islamabad: Pakistan Studies, National Institute of  Pakistan Studies, QAU, 2008, p. 74ff.
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was elected as the first president of  the World Islamic Mission, a London-based organization for the preaching 
of  Islam and worldwide missionary activities.771 At that time, Nurani had also been accepted as a promising 
political newcomer by prominent members of  the establishment within the JUP where scholars like Maulana  
Abdu Sattar Khan Niazi (1915-2001)772 were similarly influential.773 However, JUP's political success remained 
short-lived: During the 1980s until 1990774, the party lost much of  its organizational consistence when it was 
divided into several splinter groups and boycotted the non-party elections of  1985. 775 In contrast to the JUI 
and JI, the JUP took a critical stance towards Zia ul-Haq's autocratic regime and accordingly, did not profit  
from governmental patronage and sponsorship. According to its official narrative, the party, like the PPP be­
came more and more subjected to stigmatization which provoked new dynamics within Barelwi self-under ­
standing by strengthening Sufism as its primary identity marker during the 1980's. 776 Zia's Deobandi-Wahhabi 
oriented Islamization policies, his alliance building with the other religious parties under Saudi auspices and the  
state's interventions in the Afghan War, indeed marginalized the JUP increasingly:777
[…] Zia provoked its [JUP; M.G.] internal rifts in order to minimise its impact, including by inviting some mem­
bers to join his Majlise-Shura and promising them lands in return for their support. JUP members even argue  
that the MQM’s creation was primarily meant to corrode the JUP, rather than the JI vote bank in Sindh’s urban 
centres, Karachi and Hyderabad.778 
Unlike the JI that enjoys regional and international support and funding – among the religious parties, the JI  
owns the largest resources of  self-financing – , and unlike Deobandi and Shī a organizations from Saudi Araʿ ­
bia779 and Iran, the Barelwi JUP lacks external patronage and funding. Only two main factions survived the in ­
ner party struggle – a wing loyal to Nurani (Nurani Group)780 and its opposite faction, the Fazal Karim Group 
771 The World Islamic Mission had been established in January, 1973, by an international delegation of  scholars with Maulana Abdu 
Sattar Khan Niazi, Allamad Abdul Mustafa al-Azhari and Pir Sayyid Maruf  Husain Shah representing Pakistan. See Ahmad,  
1993, p. 223; Waraich, Sohail: Mazhabi siyasat kay tazaadat (Discrepancies of  religious politics). Lahore: Sagar Publ., 2003, p.  
279-342; Gugler, Thomas K.: Mission Medina: Da wat-e Islāmī und Tablīġī Jamā at. Würzburg: Ergon, 2011, p. 87. See also Guʿ ʿ ­
gler, Thomas K.: Moderne Standardisierung und traditionelle Frömmigkeit: Die pakistanische Missionsbewegung Da'wat-e Is ­
lami, p. 55. In: Reetz, Dietrich (Ed.): Islam in Europa: Religiöses Leben heute. Ein Porträt ausgewählter islamischer Gruppen und 
Institutionen. Münster: Waxmann, 2010, p. 53-78. In this account, the Mission's founding date is claimed to be 1972.
772 Formerly the dean of  Islamic Studies at Lahore's Islamia College, he remained loyal to Nurani and backed him as the First Gen ­
eral Secretary JUP until he split from the party in 1989/1990. 
773 Among others, Lt.-Gen. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, the last Governor East Pakistan who had signed the instrument of  sur ­
render in December, 1971, as Commander of  the Pakistan troops in East Pakistan, joined Nurani's JUP in March, 1977. See  
Ahmad, 1993, pp. 138/139.
774 Facing national elections on 24 October, 1990, the JUP came under political pressure when Nurani decided to join the Pakistan 
Democratic Alliance (PDA) under PPP leadership while another faction under Maulana Abdu Sattar Niazi allied with the Islamic  
Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhuri Ittehad, IJI), consisting of  nine conservative Islamic parties led by PML's Nawaz Sharif. Backed 
by military and security agencies, the IJI won 110 seats, while the PDA won only 44 seats out of  216. The elections of  1990 in  
which Benazir Bhutto's government was dismissed, were the result of  president Ghulam Ishaq Khan's order of  6 August to dis ­
solve the assembly. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: The October 1990 Elections in Pakistan. Report  
of  the International Delegation. Washington, 1990, p. 1-10.
775 See Pasha, 1995, p. 183; Philippon, 2011, p. 351.
776 See Philippon, 2011, p. 350.
777 See ICG, 2011, p. 15. 
778 Cit. Ibid.
779 In fact, JUP showed a decisively hostile stance towards Saudi Arabia and its Hashemite rulers, for instance during the Second 
Gulf  War of  1991 when Nurani declared his party's support for the Iraqi regime of  Saddam Hussein, whose invasion of  Kuwait 
in summer 1990 had been opposed by the Saudis. See Ibid.
780 With Gen. K. M. Azhar as his most loyal adviser. After the retired general and Governor of  NWFP joined Nurani, he stood with  
him in contrast to Dr. Sher Afghan who joined the PPP as government as a minister. See Pasha, 1995, pp. 183/184.
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under the leadership of  Sahibzada Haji Muhammad Fazal Karim who is aligned with the PML-N.781 In 2003, 
again, the JUP faced rapid decline, when Nurani died in December, 2003. 782 It was only during the 2002 elec­
tions, under the banner of  the religious alliance MMA, when the party was able to win significant electoral 
power.783 
Like the Deobandi Tablighi Jama'at784, the Da'wat-i Islami is an organization aimed at spreading the message 
of  Islam through da waʿ  in which it advocates what it calls a “Medina Revolution” by improving and purifying 
the believer's self  and piousness on an individual basis (madanī kām).785 According to Gugler, their reformist 
approach offers  an non-political  alternative strategy  for Islamization with a  bottom-up approach through 
da waʿ .786 Their competing relationship with the Tablighis which they accuse of  being Wahhabis, guilty of  bid aʿ  
and shirk,787 made the organization's outlook more tolerant, open and attractive also to non-Muslims that are  
far more accepted than in the TJ ranks. 
Sunni Tehrik (ST) is another important Barelwi group that transformed into a political party in January, 
2012, together with the Pakistan Islam Students Federation (PISF) as its student wing at universities and colleges. 
The party came into prominence in Karachi in the late 1990's under the charismatic leadership of  Riaz Hus ­
sain Shah of  Multan.788 Due to the dominance of  MQM within Karachi's sociopolitical violence economy, 
very soon, ST's activities clashed with the MQM's hegemonic claim. However, while the conflict between ST 
and MQM, PPP, ANP is mainly a political struggle about the rule over Karachi, ST sees itself  as a defender of  
Barelwi religious interests: Opposition to the appointment of  Deobandis as khatib789 or the distribution of  oth­
er religious posts by the government to Deobandis, or the systematic control over mosques are primary goals  
on the agenda of  ST. Besides, elements within ST are keen to revive religious and political action against the 
781 However, after the attack on Lahore's Data Darbar shrine in July, 2010, he attacked Minister of  Law Rana Sanaullah from the  
PML-N for having links to jihadi outfits that, like the Taliban, were behind the attacks on Sufi shrines. See ICG, 2011, p. 16. Fur ­
thermore, the JUP Nurani criticized the provincial government's selectivity and accused it of  providing security to ulamāʿ ʾ and 
mosques on the basis of  political loyalty. See Dawn: Govt-backed Ulema fanning sectarianism, says JUP-N, 7 July, 2010.
782 His successor and son Shah Anas Nurani resigned from his post in 2008, and was followed by Dr. Abul Khair Muhammad  
Zubair as new president. See Daily Times: Anas Noorani resigns from office of  JUP president, 3 March, 2008.
783 Like the other MMA members, the JUP instrumentalized the popular wave of  anti-Americanism and like some of  his coalitions  
partners, Nurani urged his followers to join the fighting against the troops of  the international alliance in Afghanistan in 2002.  
See World Religion Watch, 2009.
784 Founded in 1927 by Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944), TJ with its center in New Delhi is an international organization with offices  
in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. In Pakistan, the TJ has its center in Raiwind, close to Lahore. For the TJ in South Asia  
and Europe see Sikand, Yoginder: The Origins and Development of  the Tablighi Jama´at (1920-2000). A Cross-country Com­
parative Study. Hyderabad (a. o.): Orient Longman, 2002; Ahmed, Khaled: The Grand Tableeghi Congregation. In: The Friday 
Times, 8 November, 2002. Increasingly the TJ with its image becoming more negative, is accused of  providing a platform for re ­
cruitment to extremist and jihadist groups. See for example Alexiev, Alex: Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions. In: Middle 
East Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, p. 3-11. It has also been blamed for its poor engagement and literary foundations, e.g. by  
Wahid al-Din Khan and Mohammad Khalid Masud since the organization's only source is Faza'il i-Am'aal (The Merits of  Prac­
tice) by Muhammad Zakariyya. See Masud, Mohammad Khalid: Ideology and Legitimacy, p. 82-85. In: Ibid. (Ed.): Travellers in  
Faith. Studies of  the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal. Leiden: Brill, 2000, p. 79-118; Za ­
man, 2004, pp. 184/185.
785 See Gugler, 2011.
786 Ibid., p. 23.
787 Ibid., p. 82ff.
788 See Dawn: Sunni Tehreek announces launch of  political movement, 29 January, 2012. 
789 For instance, ST's Lahore branch has publicly declared its opposition to the appointment of  a Deobandi as the new khatib of  
Badshahi Masjid. See Ahmed, Khaled: Re-assertion of  the Barelvis in Pakistan. In: The Friday Times, 8 September, 2000.
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Ahmadiyya,790 although it is likely that the more moderate elements that brought the organization into the local  
political mainstream, will favor a political outlook that emphasizes national competitiveness on the basis of  a  
national and de-sectarianized agenda with avoidance of  anti-and anti-Sufi polemics. 791 This is basically the way 
that  –  to a considerable  extent  – gave the  Jama'at-i-Islami  under its  populist-pragmatic  amīr Qazi  Hussain 
Ahmad, a de-ideologized and inclusive outlook.792 Although the organization had been targeted by Deobandi 
and political groups before793, the group's official narrative claims the bomb blast that killed more than 60 
people including its leader Maulana M. Abbas Qadri in Karachi's Nishtar Park,794 as a key event and 11 April, 
2006, the date marking the beginning of  ST's war on barbarism and its forces hostile to Islam,795 with martyr­
dom (istishhad) being the group's “enviable destiny”.796 
The group, currently under the leadership of  Muhammad Sarwat Ejaz Qadri,797 has been placed on the 
watch-list of  the Pakistani authorities in January, 2002, which might hinder its recent transformation into a  
political party with national electoral aspirations, illustrated by its involvement in the Barelwi “Save Pakistan”,  
launched in May, 2009.798
Indicating a crisis among the Barelwi leadership,799 around the same time when Daw'at i-Islami came into ex­
istence, Dr. Tariq ul-Qadri's Minhaj ul-Qur'an (MQ), was founded in October, 1980. The MQ is claimed to be 
apolitical like the DI. This is possible since Dr. Qadri is also the chair of  the political party Pakistan Awami  
Tehrik (PAT).800 “In order to not cross the limits of  both spheres, PAT in turn tries to focus on day-by-day  
political matters and serves the people of  Pakistan, while the Minhaj is concentrating its force exclusively on 
Islamic matters.”801 Parallel to the rise of  Allama Ilyas Qadri and his  Da'wat-e Islami in Sindh in the 1990's, 
Tahir ul-Qadri advocated an apolitical Islamic orientation with which he was able to rival the Deobandi influ ­
ence of  Tablighi Jama'at and the jihadi-oriented congregations of  Ahl-i-Hadith Dawat-ul-Irshad802. Both leaders 
790 Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi's (JUP) Khatm-i-Nabuwwat Movement is a case in point. Ahmed points out to the Deobandiza­
tion of  this campaign in the 1980's and increasing cooperation between Deobandis and Shī a on that matter. See Ibid.; Ahmad,ʿ  
Bashir: Ahmadiyya Movement – British-Jewish Connection. Rawalpindi: Islamic Study Forum, n. d. 
791 Like Javed Akbar Saqi's Ittehad Bainul Muslimin, a Barelwi organization that, with the support of  Iran, reached out to the Shī aʿ  
communities and political parties, mainly Tehrik-i-Jafaria. Saqi comes from a pīr family; his father Pir Asif  Ali Gilani, claimed to 
have converted to Shiism only recently, was one of  the main figures behind the establishment of  the Milli Yakjehti Council in 1995 
to address sectarian conflict and a member of  the World Muslim Unity Forum. See Ahmed, 8 September, 2000; Firstpost: Sunni 
Peer Converted to Shia on 5th Muharam 1433.
792 E.g. when the JI and Hiszbul Mujahidin leaders attended ST gatherings in Multan, together with Naqshbandi-oriented organiza ­
tions such as Tanzeemul Ikhwan under Maulana Akram Awan from Chakwal. See Ahmed, Khaled: Re-assertion of  the Barelvis in 
Pakistan, 2000. Qazi claims that the creation of  the MMA – beyond its anti-government and anti-American drive – aimed at  
uniting all schools of  thought in an attempt to end the Sunni-Shī a as well as the Deobandi-Barelwi schism. Interview with Qaziʿ  
Hussain Ahmad, former amīr Jama'at-i-Islami, Mansurah, 21 August, 2009.
793 In May, 2001, ST leader Saleem Qadri had been assassinated by the Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
794 See Daily Jang: Nishtar Park bomb incident: Four martyrs laid to rest, 11 April, 2006.
795 Interview with Maulana Syed Shah Turab-ul-Haq Qadri, Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat, Memnon Masjid, Karachi, 19 August, 2009.
796 Cit. Philippon, 2011, p. 362.
797 Like his successors Salim and Abbas Qadri he is not a religious scholar in the traditional sense but an influential businessman and 
disciple of  Ilyas Qadri. Ibid., p. 359.
798 Ibid., p. 350.
799 See Gugler, 2011, p. 99. 
800 See website Minhaj-ul-Quran International.
801 Cit. Interview with Agha Murtaza Pooya, Vice Chair Pakistan Awami Tehrik, Islamabad, 8 August, 2009.
802 Predecessor and umbrella organization of  LeT.
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are eager to win the support of  the Pakistani expatriate communities, especially in UK and USA.803 Their or­
ganizations are “the most visible faces of  the Barelvi community on the electronic media and among the 
highly respectable among their academic circles.”804 However, this does not prevent other scholars and political 
forces from harsh criticism against ul-Qadri for his reformist positions and the weak performance of  PAT. 805 
While some scholars declared Tahir ul-Qadri a  kafir806, critique comes also from conservative elements that 
blamed him for his personal lifestyle and his commercialization in local media programs:
[…] there is also a picture shown of  Tahir-ul-Qadree alongside Pakistani women without Hijaab, but I suppose 
that this is minor when we consider his Aqeedah and Tawheed related deviations. At one point in the past he  
was seen as a 'leader' of  the Barelwis, but in light of  the fact that nowadays this deviant sect has itself  split up  
into different faction this appellation no longer applies. Instead, he is now known as Sheikh-ul-Islaam by his ig­
norant followers, as I remember seeing in one of  their pathetic newsletters.807
After his resignation from his Lahore seat in the National Assembly (2002-04) and his removal from the  
Pakistani arena to London, he took the lead in PAT's pre-election campaigning and expressed his intention to  
cooperate with religious minority groups.808 
Other leaders like Dr. Israr Ahmed of  Tanzim-i-Islam809 and the former member of  the CII and scholar 
Javed Ahmad Ghamdi810 from the Islamic research institute Al-Mawrid811 are former members of  Jama'at-i-Is­
lami but resigned because of  its involvement in electoral politics which they believed was irreconcilable with  
the revolutionary methodology adopted by the Jama'at in the pre-1947 context.812 Beyond Lahore's Model 
Town where the Tanzim and the Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Qur'an attract thousands of  students and international 
visitors, these organizations and its leaders have to be seen as influential forces for the whole of  Punjab.813 Fa­
cing their political failure, Barelwi activism in Pakistan has significantly changed and highlights their efforts to  
bring about an Islamic system while bypassing the political system with apolitical organizations.
In 2009, the year that witnessed heavy fighting between the Pakistan Army, the Frontier Corps and the in­
surgency at what became known as a “Western frontier line”, terrorist attacks on civilian targets increased dra ­
matically. The Barelwis responded to this unprecedented level of  violence and high numbers of  casualties with 
the creation of  the increasingly influential  Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC),  to create a Barelwi platform against 
Taliban activities in Pakistan and as a reaction to the gradual escalation of  attacks on shrines and targeted  
803 See Ahmed, 8 September, 2000.
804 Cit. Khan, 2011, p. 5.
805 “The reformist positions of  Tahir-ul Qadri are such that he has been marginalized by other Barelwi groups and is often presen ­
ted as the 'Mawdudi of  the Barelwis'.” Cit. Philippon, 2011, p. 355.
806 See fatwā issued by Pir Irfan Shah on Youtube.
807 Cit. Blog entry Salafi Talk forum, 25 November, 2006.
808 For instance in February, 2012, MQ established a Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum. See Press release Minhaj-ul-Quran: Efforts  
of  Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri worthy of  emulation: Minority leaders, 10 February, 2012.
809 After the retirement of  Israr Ahmed in 2002 led by his son Hafiz Akif  Saeed.
810 See Ghamidi, personal website.
811 Founded in 1983. See Al-Mawrid, website.
812 See Tanzim-i-Islami, website. These splits from the JI ranks were, compared to other Pakistani political parties, very uncommon.  
In fact there was only one significant split within the JI in the 1940's as a result of  an episode that involved a young cook, em­
ployed in Maudūdī's household whose interaction with the female members of  the household was considered an offense against  
the commandment of  purdah, where after close followers of  Maudūdī like Maulana Miyan Ai, Maulana Qamaruddin and Maulana 
Ja'far Shah left the party. See Gaier, 2012, pp. 114/115.
813 See Rana, 2009, p. 380-382. I am also grateful to Dr. Ali Usman Qasmi and Prof. Dr. Tahir Kamran for their crucial suggestions  
on these scholars. 
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killings against Barelwi leaders since late 2006.814 Usually these attacks are attributed to banned militant organ­
izations with a Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith background or to the TTP.815 Eventually because of  personal animos­
ities and their apolitical claim, the SIC does not include Da'wat-e Islami  and Minalhuj ul-Qur'an, who have the 
largest numbers of  followers while all the other Barelwi organizations are part of  the alliance.816 Although the 
party leadership displayed its willingness to negotiate on the matter of  a re-establishment of  MMA with other  
religious parties, it is likely that the JUP will try to contest the next elections from the SIC platform to avoid its  
past political mistake of  running for elections without a the broad base of  other organizations that can ensure  
mobilization among supporters. The SIC acts highly responsive to the political and public mainstream which 
includes its condemnation of  US policies in the region, the drone war and the presence of  US and CIA forces 
in Pakistan. When in January, 2011, Governor of  Punjab, Salman Taseer, was killed by his security guard, the  
SIC defended the assassin Mumtaz Qadri and justified the murder with regard to Taseer's critical position to­
wards an amendment or annulment of  the Blasphemy laws.817 As I showed in Chapter 4 the articles of  the law 
refer to the defamation of  the name of  the Prophet, the central authority for the Barelwis. Nevertheless,  
Barelwi solidarity with Qadri – to some extend quite surprising for national and international observers – con­
tradicted the SIC's position against extremism and intolerance.818 
5.1.2 Deobandis
Following the Hanafi school of  law, the Deobandis adhere to the scholarly tradition that evolved at the dār ul-
ulūmʿ  of  Deoband in 1866/67 in today's Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh.819 Both in order to conserve but 
also to revitalize what they saw as traditional Islamic law, they aimed at preserving the Islamic identity of  the  
subcontinent and especially Muslim education.820 Their intellectual refusal of  Hindu influences and resistance 
against the British rule made them an important political player through the JUH. Similar to the Barelwis, the 
Deobandi version of  educational organization and missionary activities is  the  Tablighi  Jama'at.821 While the 
Barelwis in Pakistan comprise between 50 to 60 percent of  the Sunnis, the Deobandis represent only about 15  
814 Initially, the SIC was founded as an alliance of  eight groups such as Aalmi Tanzim Ahle Sunnat, the JUP, Markazi Jamaat Ahle Sun­
nat,  Sunni Tehrik,  Karawan-e-Islam,  Markazi JUP,  Nizam-e-Mustafa Party, the Barelwi Wafaq issuing degrees to madrasa graduates, 
Tanzeem-ul-Madaris under the leadership of  Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rehman and the Jamaat Ahle Sunnat under ex-MNA and khatib of  
the Karachi Memon Masjid, Syed Shah Turab-ul-Haq Qadri. See Shahid, Tanvir Qaiser: Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC): Peaceful 
Barelvis rise against  the  Taliban criminals.  In:  Let  us build Pakistan,  9 May, 2009; Khan,  2011; Balochistan Times:  Ulema,  
Mashaikh declare suicide attacks un-Islamic, 17 December, 2009; Interview with Maulana Syed Shah Turab-ul-Haq Qadri, Kara ­
chi, 19 August, 2009.
815 First incidents included a blast at the shrine of  Pir Rakheel Shah, Jhal Magsi, on March 19, 2005, with 49 killed, and the suicide 
attack at the Bari Imam shrine, Islamabad, on May 27, 2005, with 25 killed and more than 100 injured. Until 2011, According to  
the statistics of  the Center for Islamic Research Collaboration and Learning, 209 persons have been killed and 560 injured in 29  
terrorist attacks on shrines since 2005. For numbers see Khan, 2011, p. 1-3.
816 According to Khan, “some important and powerful Barelvi families like the Makhdooms of  Punjab or the Pagaros Sindh have 
not made many favorable gestures towards SIC either.” Cit. Ibid., p. 5.
817 See The New York Times: Pakistan Faces a Divide of  Age on Muslim Law, 10 January, 2011.
818 The same is true with regard to the prominent Aasia Bibi case: When interviewed on the matter of  a formal amnesty to the ac ­
cused by president Zardari, the leaders of  the SIC refused to support any such step and warned of  uprisings that would spread  
throughout the country in case of  a pardon. See ICG, 2011, p. 16; Dawn: Sunni Ittehad Council warns of  anarchy if  Aasia  
pardoned, 26 November, 2010. 
819 Its founders were the ulamāʿ ʾ Qasim Nanautawi (1832-1879) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905.
820 To counter Western-colonial education and forced modernization, Deobandi scholars were an important motor for the develop­
ment of  religious literature in Urdu. See Malik, 2008, p. 293.
821 See Metcalf, Barbara: Living Hadith in the Tablighi Jama'at. In: Journal of  Asian Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 1993, p. 584-608; Sikand,  
2002.
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to 20 percent. However, Deobandi influence and representation, for instance in Punjab, has been increased  
with an estimated number of  450.000 students in Deobandi  madāris and only 200.000 enlisted to Barelwi 
madāris.822 
Jam‘iyyat al ‘Ulama’-e Hind (JUH), founded in 1919 by former graduates of  the seminary of  Deoband aimed 
at unifying the Indian ulamāʿ ʾ and to form not only a homogenous position in theological and academic terms 
but also a platform of  anti-colonial position, shared by both Muslims and Hindus in order to gain independ­
ence from the British colonial power. The decision to resist Western hegemony, predominantly in terms of  
safeguarding the Indian Muslim culture from the threat of  Western influence, originated from the mutiny in 
1857 where many ulamāʿ ʾ  joined the resistance against the British.823 
Jam‘iyyat-e  ‘Ulama’-e  Islam (JUI)  is  the main Deobandi  political  party  and successor  organization to the 
JUH.824 In 1945 its leading member Allama Shabir Ahmad Uthmani (1886-1949) split with a group of  follow­
ers from the JUH and founded JUI in 1947.825 As a member and one of  the few supporters from the Deoband 
ulamāʿ ʾ, he supported Jinnah's Pakistan movement. This was the case during the 1945/46 elections and two ref­
erendums in NWFP and Sylhet.826 Jalal claims implicitly that his split was rewarded by the League that, accord­
ing to her, sponsored the new organization to counter the Ahrar and the old oppositional wing of  JUH. 827 As a 
graduate and teacher at the dār ul- ulūmʿ  Deoband and parliamentarian in Pakistan's first constituent assembly, 
Uthmani lobbied for the inclusion of  Islamic elements in the 1949 Objectives Resolution. In 1956, at a con­
gregation in Multan and after members of  the Ahrar, formerly opponents of  Jinnah's League joined the party,
828 the group decided to participate more actively and independently in politics, with the central aim of  imple ­
menting an Islamic system of  government and ensuring minority status and a separate voters list for Ahmadis.  
Notwithstanding the harsh opposition from within the JUH against Uthmani and his new party, he was and 
still is considered one of  the leading Deobandi scholars by the establishment and even by his adversaries from  
the Jama'at-i-Islami.829 The close links between the JI and the JUI resulted from their cooperation in religious  
campaigning like during the anti-Ahmadiyya riots in 1953. However, during the 1960s tensions between the two 
groups increased due to JUI's charging Maudūdī for being an “agent of  Western imperialism”. Another reason 
was the refusal by JUI leaders to participate in the anti-Bhutto campaign during the 1970s.830
822 With most  madāris in Bahawalpur followed by Lahore. Numbers quoted in Bahadur, Kalim: Islamisation in Pakistan: A Case  
Study of  Punjab. Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief  12, 2007, p. 1.
823 The involvement of  the scholars is expressed by a  fatwā which had been issued by 31  ulamāʿ , defining the armed resistanceʾ  
against the British as an obligatory duty for the Muslims of  Delhi. Although religious reasons were not primarily among the de ­
termining factors which led to the Mutiny, the menace to the “Indian Muslim heritage” was promoted to be an existential threat.  
See Nawab, Mohamed: The Ulama in Pakistani Politics. Working Paper No. 133, Rajaratnam School of  International Studies,  
Singapore, 2007, pp. 3/4; von Hinüber, 2005, p. 71-73; Ahmed, 1997, p. 40ff; Rothermund, 1998, pp. 21/22. 
824 With the exception of  Pirzada's account, to date there is no monograph on the JUI. See Pirzada, 2000.
825 Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (MJUI) at that time.  
826 See Pasha, 1995, p. 180.
827 See Jalal, 2000, p. 454.
828 As a reaction to the new Ahrar members, Deobandi leaders such as Maulana Thanvi left the JUI. See Pasha, 1995, p. 181.
829 My own conclusion when members of  the JI Karachi showed me Uthmani's grave on the campus of  the Islamia College. The  
site's maintenance seems to rely solely on the college's students and the Jama'atis who referred to Uthmani as a khadim-i-Islam 
(custodian of  Islam). After his death, the title of  a  shaikh ul-Islam was expected to be transferred from Uthmani to a Barelwi 
scholar but, according to Ahmad, the government directed against using this title, eventually in order to prevent further Deo­
bandi-Barelwi divide. See Ahmad, 1993, p. 5. 
830 See Ali, 2004, S. 4.
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In the 1970 elections, the JUI won only seven seats from Baluchistan and NWFP. 831 The party under Mufi 
Mahmud became an intimate enemy of  the Bhuttos, especially after Zulfikar Bhutto was defeated in the 1970 
elections. His attempt to legitimize elements of  his economic agenda of  Islamic Socialism (Musawat-i-Muham­
madi) which culminated in the nationalization of  the leading industries832, generated powerful opposition not 
only in Punjab and Sindh where the leading “22 families” lost their property and were forced to leave the 
country into exile, but also in the religious camp.833 However, strategically bound, the religious parties relied on 
pragmatic political strategies to survive. Therefore, Mufti Mahmud, who had declared Bhutto's flirt with social ­
ism a heresy, allied with the National Awami Party (NAP)834 on the basis of  the Tripartite Agreement835 to be­
come part of  the governing coalitions in NWFP and Balochistan.836 As an ally of  the Pakistan National Alliance 
(PNA), the JUI took part in the blame campaigns against Bhutto. Benazir Bhutto wrote about the 1977 elec ­
tions agitation against her father:
Die Lügen dieser Männer wurden immer dreister. Bhutto sei ein so schlechter Muslim, verbreitete Asghar Khan,  
daß er erst jetzt lerne, wie man die fünf  täglichen Gebete verrichtet. […] Auch diesmal gefiel mir, wie mein Vater 
den Vorwurf  parierte. Als er von einem Reporter gefragt wurde, warum Jasir Arafat, der Führer der PLO, ihm  
einen Besuch abstatte, flachste er: 'Er kommt, um mir Gebete beizubringen.' Mit dem Wahlslogan  Nizame-e-
Mustafa […] beuteten andere Führer der Koalition schamlos die Religion für ihre politischen Zwecke aus. Eine  
Stimme gegen seine Partei, so der Chef  von Jamat-e-Islami bei einer Wahlveranstaltung auf  dem Land, sei eine 
Stimme gegen Gott. Dagegen entspreche eine Stimme für die PNA 100 000 Jahren Gebet.837
In order to counter PNA's campaign and the mud-slinging for the elections of  1977 in which Bhutto's religios­
ity was a central – if  not the exclusive element – , the government's Publicity Cell and the Directorate of  News  
Documentaries838 became active with a PR bonanza in which they laid much emphasis on the PPP's and  
Bhutto's pro-Islamic orientations and achievements during his time in power. 839 An important mark had been 
Bhutto's  support  for  the  banning  of  the  Ahmadiyya and  his  holding  of  the  Islamic  Summit  in  1974  in 
831 See Pasha, 1995, p. 181.
832 Bhutto's nationalization started in 1972. The case of  the Sharif  family stands out in many ways: Mian Mohammad Sharif's steel  
conglomerate Ittefaq was given back to the family when it repatriated to Pakistan from its exile in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.  
This was mainly due to son Nawaz' political career in Zia's IJI. Having been exiled, the Sharifs were able to develop business net ­
works with other exiled Punjabi families like the Saigols and personal relations with the Sa'udi royal family. Back in Pakistan, they  
profited from the bankruptcy of  other steel  companies,  ensuring Ittefaq's  monopoly,  and former competitors'  dependency  
through the privatization under Nawaz Sharif. For instance only through privatization during the 1990's and Nawaz' personal in ­
tervention, Chaudhry Mohammad Latif's Batala Engineering Company – today's Pakistan Engineering Company (PECO) – was able to 
economically survive. Similarly, influential players like the Nishat Group, owned by Mian Muhammad Mansha, became dependent 
of  the goodwill of  Chief  Minister Nawaz and are said to be loyal supporters of  the PML-N to this day.
833 Another reason was his authoritarian leadership after he came into office. Noman sees in the "radical reform programme, feudal  
support in Sind and Bhutto's ambivalent relationship with the army" the main factors that ensured the rise of  the PPP as a mass  
movement and the formation of  Bhutto's cult. See Noman, Omar: The Political Economy of  Pakistan. London: Routledge,  
1988, p. 102ff. Hussain adds the 1971 separation of  Bangladesh as an supportive factor for the rise of  Bhutto: "On 20th Decem­
ber 1971, Yahya Khan resigned and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over charge as a civilian CMLA in less than three hours of  setting  
foot on the soil of  Pakistan. With the formation of  Bangladesh, the situation in West Pakistan was simplified for Bhutto and his  
Pakistan People's Party emerged as the single largest party. Therefore, as a majority party leader Bhutto was in a position to form  
his own government at the centre." Cit. Hussain, 2008, p. 74.
834 After being banned by the Supreme Court the party was renamed as ANP.
835 See Pirzada, 2000, p. 57-63.
836 See Pasha, 1995, pp. 181/182.
837 Cit. Bhutto, 1991, p. 97.
838 Both established in 1976.
839 Funds for PR were increased in 1976/77. These measures included the production and distribution of  books, manifestos and 
movies such as “Prime Minister Bhutto – The Servant of  Islam (Khadim-i-Islam)”.  See Kaushik,  Surendra Nath:  Politics  in 
Pakistan. With Special Reference to Rise and Fall of  Bhutto. Jaipur: South Asia Studies Centre, Univ. of  Rajastan, 1984, p. 77-80.
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Lahore.840 However, the initiatives by the Bhutto regime to appease the religious front ended in the military 
takeover of  1977. In subsequent years of  dictatorial rule, Zia's de-Bhuttoization campaign shattered the cult 
of  personality around Bhutto which included a series of  White Papers documenting cases of  corruption and 
election rigging under the Bhutto regime.
In contrast to the JI, JUI depends much more on its electoral power which is indicated by the party's ability  
to mobilize the masses. While it is true that one can speak of  a clear ethnic predominance of  Pakhtuns for the  
time the JUI was engaged within the ranks of  the MMA, its Baluchi members and support base seems to have 
increased significantly since then841 while its support in Sindh and Punjab has been insignificant.842 
The Hasba Bill and Swat episodes of  1994, 1999 and 2009 indicated JUI's loyalty to the state and a pro-es­
tablishment orientation, when Fazlur Rahman – together with JI's amīr Munawar Hassan – claimed Sufi Mo­
hammad's step to introduce sharī aʿ  in Swat as unconstitutional and demanded the consultation by the Council of  
Islamic Ideology.843 Since the elections of  2008, the party has been a coalition partner to the Zardari-Gilani gov­
ernment. However, the JUI has been in opposition to the army's latest military operations in South Waziristan.
844 The conformist image and personal quarrels between its leaders Fazlur Rahman who was closer affiliated 
with the PPP and the political establishment during the Afghan War845 and Maulana Sami ul-Haq who was 
keen to maintain support for his Afghan clients, resulted in the latter's spli t from the party and the establish­
ment of  a new faction (JUI-S) that took a more close stance towards the JI and the League. 846 Since then, Sami 
ul-Haqs party, after the 2008 boycott of  the elections, distanced itself  from the political game. Its primary fo ­
cus is on the madrasa sector.847 Sami ul-Haq, supported by his son Hamid ul-Haq, serves as the head of  the 
dār ul- ulūmʿ  Haqqania in Akora Khattak near Peshawar, founded by his father the late Maulana Abdul Haq and 
considered one of  the largest seminaries in Pakistan.848 It has been stated that, according to their self-image as 
840 “The Bhutto regime's Islamic rhetoric, songs, symbols and calls for ummah's unity created a euphoria for Islamic revival and  
unity of  the ummah (the gathering of  heads of  Islamic States), captured the imagination of  the people, and created an environ­
ment of  expectancy for Islamic unity and possible Islamic social order. In his speech as Chairman of  the Summit, Bhutto evoked  
images of  Islamic glory, its great tradition, its principles of  justice, equity, fairness in the comity of  nations and a desire of  unity  
among the Muslim States. He made a passionate appeal before the heads of  Islamic States to work for evolving a regional block  
of  Muslim States – a 'Muslim Commonwealth'.” Cit. Shafqat, Saeed: From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of  Dawat-ul-Ir ­
shad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, p. 136. In: Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar 
(a. o.), 2002, p. 131-148.
841 While there are not many in-depth studies on the JUI, most of  them see the JUI as a Pakhtun party. See for instance ICG, 2011,  
p. 10. However, unbroken support comes from the Durrani tribes in the border areas.
842 In the 2008 elections, JUI won only two seats in Punjab and none in Sindh. 
843 See Sunday Times: Religious Parties reject Sufi's Stance, 26 April, 2009.
844 See Daily Times: JUI-F to sit with Opp in NWFP: Durrani, 3 March, 2008.
845 Among the religious-political players, Fazlur has shown to be a true political pragmatist when he stepped into a PPP-led alliance  
with Benazir Bhutto: “His party having won a few seats in National Assembly in the 1993 elections, he now coalesces with 
Benazir Bhutto's government though he has been shouting from roof  tops that according to Shariah a woman cannot be the  
head of  government.” Cit. Pasha, 1995, p. 182.
846 As a third faction of  the JUI lead by Maulana Ajmal Qadri (JUI-Q) has its base in Lahore's Jamia Masjid at Sheranwala Gate  
from where it oversees its limited network in Punjab. See Rana, 2009, pp. 164/165. For Fazlur Rahman and Sami ul-Haq see also  
Waraich, 2003, p. 133-193, 260-278.
847 Sami ul-Haq became amir of  the group when Maulana Muhammad Abdullah Darkhawasti (1887-1994) who led the party since  
1962 died. His faction is believed to control around one-third of  the Deobandi schools. Conversation with Mujeeb Ahmad, IIUI,  
Islamabad. 
848 This institution is commonly associated with the Afghan Taliban movement. Eight Taliban cabinet members have graduated 
from the seminary. See for instance Hussain, 2007, p. 76-81. For his journalist account see Bergen, Peter: Heiliger Krieg Inc.  
Osama bin Ladens Terrornetz. Berlin: Siedler, 2001, p. 186-189. Both visited Sami ul-Haq in his madrasa between 2000 and  
2003.
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defenders of  Pakthun interests, especially the early JUI, in many ways, resembles the Pakhtun nationalist ANP.
849 They both entered politics with the demand of  a socialist-revolutionary transformation of  Pakistani society.  
Nevertheless, the JUI, throughout the country has been identified with its vision of  an Islamic transformation,  
without clarifying its approach to the introduction of  sharī aʿ  as a legal framework for society. With the 2002 
victory in national polls, the JUI proved that its agenda for a development of  the NWFP with the introduction  
of  elements of  sharī aʿ  and repressive gender politics in public was primarily a cultural, rather then the urgently 
needed economic agenda. The latter with a mix of  liberal elements of  social market economy and anti-global ­
ization outlook, was not able to meet the manifold challenges in the area.850 The JUH's initial grand narrative 
of  colonial resistance against the British and revival of  Deobandi Islam has shrunk with JUI's post-colonial  
ideology of  bringing Islam to the masses with a top-down approach and only limited campaigns in parliament
851 that were by far not competitive to the JI's sophisticated theory of  Islamic revolution. Rather, it has become  
more and more “at risk of  being outflanked ideologically and politically by the Taliban.”852 This became obvi­
ous when in 2011, Fazlur Rahman and his followers were targeted twice within 24 hours by suicide bombers in 
KPK for which the party blamed external forces.853
With regard to leadership and authority, South Asian political culture has created and relies heavily on dyn ­
astic systems of  power. The religious-political parties – with the exception of  the Jama'at-i-Islami, whose inner 
shūrā elections were often highlighted as the similar to inner decision-making by Western democratic parties – 
are not different. Like in other parties, there was a dynastic change when Maulana Fazlur Rahman took over  
leadership after his father Maulana Mufti Mahmud's death in October, 1980. 
Mufti Mahmud's appointment as Chief  Minister NWFP in 1972 guaranteed political power for the family  
from the Abdulkhel Banyala area (Dera Ismail Khan) with various posts in subsequent governments. 854 His 
second son Maulana Atta ur Rahman, like his brother Fazlur, served as minister and MNA. Another feature of  
regional political culture – like allegations of  corruption among the political elite – proofed to also apply to 
leadership of  JUI. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, nicknamed “Maulana Diesel”, is said to have profited enormously  
from the smuggling and illegal trans-border trade of  petroleum via the Pakistani-Afghan border and has al­
legedly helped in issuing fuel permits to the Afghan Taliban regime in the 1990s.855 Similarly, the party left the 
PPP-lead ruling coalition after Azam Swati, information technology minister and a major financial supporter 
of  the party, was ousted from the cabinet in December, 2010, on allegations of  mismanagement and corrup­
849 See Lieven, 2011, p. 396-401.
850 See Hippler, Jochen: Das gefährlichste Land der Welt? Pakistan zwischen Militärherrschaft, Extremismus und Demokratie. Köln:  
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008, p. 241.
851 For instance Sami ul-Haq's demand of  amending the bill of  Namus-i-Sahaba  and  Ahl-i Bait in the senate in 1994. See Akhtar, 
Mujtaba: Here is the Parliament. Islamabad: Dost Publ., 1996, p. 143-145.
852 Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 396.
853 See Ali, Manzoor/ Butt, Qaiser: Charsadda strike: Second attack targets Maulana Fazlur Rehman. In: The Express Tribune, 1 
April, 2011. 
854 Mufti Mahmud resigned from this post following his protests against Bhutto's dismissal of  the Balochistan government in 1973.  
See ICG, 2011, p. 11. Bhutto had blamed the provincial government of  JUI and NAP to act as a proxy and “frontline organiza­
tion for Afghan territorial designs against Pakistan” and to support Balochi separatist elements such as Babu Shero (“General 
Sherov”) Sher Mohammad Marri. See Pasha, 1995, pp. 181/182.
855 See also Ali / Butt, 1 April, 2011. 
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tion.856 Although the party is, like the JI, internally loosely structured on the basis of  a shūrā,857 decision-making 
lays in the hands of  Maulana Fazlur Rahman.858  
Together with Sami ul-Haq's faction (JUI-S) the party controls the majority of  religious schools; accord­
ingly its loose organization is based on a large network of  mosques, madāris and welfare organizations like the 
Al-Khair Trust providing ground for recruitment and training of  supporters and networks of  financing and 
donations. Other organizations include the militia-type of  student body Ansarul Islam, and the Majlis-i-Tanseequl  
Islami with which Fazlur Rahman tried to establish an international scholarly network.859 As in the case of  Al-
Khair, JUI's networks are said to include leaders and activists of  former jihadi groups: “Its relief  operations  
unit draws recruits from a militant  jihadi group,  Jamiat-ul-Ansar, the renamed  Harkatul Mujahidin, which has 
maintained bases in KPK’s Mansehra and Kohistan districts since the early 1990s.” 860 Besides, support for the 
party has been generated in public through the media presence of  prominent  ulamāʿ ʾ like Mufti Muhammad 
Yusuf  Ludhianawi (1932-2000).861
Contemporary media and scholarly accounts' blaming of  Deobandi and Ahl-i-Hadith madāris for support or 
at least strategic ambiguity towards the Afghan Taliban movement, have generated a predominantly negative 
image of  these institutions. The initial meeting of  Mullah Umar and Usama bin Ladin at the Deobandi Banuri 
Masjid, Karachi, in 1989 based on single accounts is a case in point.862 The Banuri Town complex of  seminar­
ies hosts more than twelve branches for at least 3.000 to 9.000 students. Well known graduates were Maulana  
Masud Azhar,  leader  of  Jaish-i-Mohammad (JeM)863 and  its  teaching  staff  including  Maulana  Mufti  Rashid 
Ahmad (1928-2002)864 and Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, patron of  the Deobandi jihadis from the Harkatul Mu­
jahidin and a member of  JeM and JUI-F.865
Generally, in the context of  the Afghan  jihād, radicalization and growing extremism in today's Pakistan, 
Deobandi organizations – on both the operational and the ideological level – are widely seen as being much  
more involved into religious violence than the Barelwis:
In the framework of  'War against Terror', mainly targeting Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith groups, the Barelwis  
have finally accessed to political recognition and earned legitimization from the powers to be. The latter are us­
ing sectarian dynamics to underpin and give teeth to their fight against 'the roots of  evil',  that is to say the  
Taliban and al-Qa'ida. In the official narrative portraying the current war as an ideological conflict between 
'moderate' and 'extremist' forces within Islam, the Barelwis have indeed been identified as falling into the first of  
these categories.866
856 See Daily Times: JUI-F quits ruling coalition over Swati’s dismissal, 15 December, 2010.
857 See Lieven, 2011, p. 395.
858 During the 2008 elections, which had been boycotted by the other religious parties, Fazlur lost his seat from his home town DIK 
but won a new seat from Bannu while Attaur Rahman succeeded with a seat from DIK. See Pakistan Herald, profiles.
859 Its establishment was agreed upon during a 2001 Deobandi conference in Peshawar. See Rana, 2009, p. 163
860 Cit. ICG, 2011, p. 13.
861 Affiliated with the Jam'at ul-'Ulum Karachi, the “media mufti” wrote columns for the Daily Jang , the weekly Khatm-i-Nabuwwats a. 
o. since 1978. See Zaman, 2004, pp. 57/58.  
862 See Cooley, John K.: Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and international Terrorism, 3 rd new Ed. London (a. o.): Pluto Press, 
2002; The Friday Times: The grand Deobandi consensus, 4 February, 2000.
863 Azhar was a disciple of  Maulana Nawaz Jhangvi, the leader of  SSP who had been killed in 1990.
864 Founder of  the Al-Rashid Trust, an organization with links to Al-Qa'ida, 
865 Also linked to the seminary is Ibrahim Azhar from the Harkatul Ansar and brother of  Maulana Masud Azhar, who is believed to 
have participated in the hijacking operation of  an Indian airplane to free his brother from jail. See Jalalzai, Musa Khan: Sectarian  
Violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lahore: Maktaba-e-Jadid Press, 2000, p. 35-39.
866 Cit. Philippon, 2011, pp. 350/351.
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While the Deobandis, the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Jama'at-i-Islami were indeed the main Pakistani contributors to 
the war scene in Afghanistan during the 1980's, the Barelwis, as a result of  Saudi demands towards the ISI, 867 
were not directly involved in the support of  Afghan mujahidin and, thus, remained outside the radius of  state 
patronage. As a result of  a new jihadist orientation on Kashmir after the Soviet Union withdrew its troops  
from Afghanistan, militant activities and sectarianization in the Kashmir region increased.868 This trend began 
under Benazir Bhutto's first premiership in which Fazlur Rahman served as chair of  the Standing Committee  
on Foreign Affairs. In September, 2008, the Maulana was elected unanimously as the new Chairman of  the 
Special Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, as part of  the coalition deal with the PPP. 869 Compared to his 
hardline stance towards the issue of  negotiations with India on Kashmir in the past, Fazlur Rahman's rhetoric 
with regard to the unsettled dispute remains ambiguous. However, in his function as chair of  the committee 
and during visits by JUI-F leaders to India870, he displayed much more commitment to the composite dia­
logue.871
5.2 Shī a ʿ
The Shī aʿ  proportion of  Pakistan's Muslim population counts between ten and twenty percent872 and repres­
ents the second largest Shī ite community behind Iran.ʿ 873 Subdivided into two major groups – the Ismailis un­
der the leadership of  the Agha Khan874 and the Ithna 'Ashar875 – the Shī a of  Pakistan has never been fully inʿ ­
tegrated into the national religious discourse, for instance on the issue of  constitution building when Pakistan's 
political elite, the military and the ulema were divided with regard to the question of  an Islamic constitution.  
While the Agha Khan and his network of  universities and institutes is frequently covered by international me ­
dia, it is considered elitist or even decaying876 and distinct from the mainstream by Sunni circles: 
Während sich die Zwölferschia stolz als der Sunna gleichwertige Macht und als ein genuiner Teil des Islams aus ­
gibt  und  Anerkennung  findet,  haftet  diesen  drei  extremeren  Absplitterungen  der  Schia  [Ismailis,  Alawites,  
Druses;  M.G.],  welche  in  der  Geschichte  den  insitutionalisierten  Islam,  das  Kalifat,  dogmatisch  und polit ­
867 See Philippon, 2011, p. 353. The same is true for Kashmir where, despite the activities of  Al-Barq and Tehrik-i Jihad, Barelwi mil­
itant groups were disfavored by the ISI and army command. For an overview see also Ahmed, Naeem: Rise of  Terrorism in  
Pakistan: Reasons, Implications and Countering Strategies. In: Journal of  South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 
4, 2010, p. 16-37.
868 For the Afghan security dimension of  the Kashmir conflict see Zahab, Mariam Abou: The Regional Dimension of  Sectarian  
Conflicts in Pakistan, pp. 121/122. In: Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 115-130.
869 See National Assembly: Press release, 16 September, 2008.
870 His visits to India started in 2003 as “peace missions” and were accompanied by protests by  Harkat-ul-Mujahidin and  Jaish-e-
Muhammad. Interview with Maulana M. Khan Shirani, Senator (JUI-F), Chair CII, Islamabad, 17 July, 2009.
871 See Hassan, Ahmad: India trade should follow Kashmir peace, says Fazl. In: Dawn, 20 October, 2011.
872 Existing numbers from surveys are difficult to interpret, e.g. when interviewees are declining to indicate that they are Shī a inʿ  
preference to Ahle-e-Sunnat or Sunni depending on the survey and for fear of  displaying this belief  in a Sunni majority state. 
873 Naqvi claims even 25 percent and more. See Naqvi, Syed Hussain Arif: Political Significance of  Shiites, p. 38. In: Cheema, 2008,  
p. 37-40; Zahab, Mariam Abou: 'Yeh matam kayse ruk jae?' ('How could this matam ever cease?'): Muharram Processions in  
Pakistani Punjab, p. 104. In: Jacobesen, Knut A. (Ed.): South Asian Religions on Display. Religious Processions in South Asia and  
the Diaspora. New York (a.o.): Routledge, 2008, p. 104-114. A 25 percent proportion is also claimed by the US State Depart ­
ment. See US State Department: International Religious Freedom Report, 2011, p. 3.
874 See Schmucker, Werner: Sekten und Sondergruppen. In: Ende / Steinbach, 1989, p. 505-526.
875 See Eliash, Joseph: The Ithnā'asharī-Shī'ī Juristic Theory of  Political and Legal Authority. In: Studia Islamica, No. 29, 1969, p. 17-
30.
876 Because of  their tactical denial of  their identity, justified on the basis of  taqiyya. In the case of  persecution and threats, Shī itesʿ  
are allowed to conceal their belief. See Malik, 2008, p. 251.
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isch-militärisch (Ismailiten) offen und versteckt bekämpft hatten, das Mal des Verräters, Todfeindes, Zerstörers 
der Sunna an.877
For the Shī a in Pakistan, issues such as religious taxation (ʿ khums) have been a central discourse and bone of  
contention between their organizations and the (Sunni) state authorities. Paralleling the agitations against the 
Ahmadiyya,  the  Shī a  established  the  ʿ Idara  Tahaffuz-i-Huquq-i-Shi'a,  the  “Organization  for  Safeguarding  the 
Rights of  the Shī ites” in January, 1953.ʿ 878 Shī a representatives welcomed the critical investigation set up by theʿ  
Munir Commission for that it questioned the very nature of  Islam and its role in the state, thereby meeting the  
Shī ite demand of  a renegotiation of  the religious status quʿ o.879 Within, differing views on practical Shī a Islamʿ  
in Pakistan between scholars with an educational background from Najaf, Iraq, arose during the 1960's and  
clashed with those ulema who had gained religious knowledge in Northern India880 and, after the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, with a clearly pro-Iranian revolutionary stream, that had been educated in Qom.881 Central dis­
courses between these three streams where differing views on theological concepts such as the Shī a awakeningʿ  
(bidārī) and taqrīb or rapprochement with the Sunna.882 However, besides Shī a identity politics, Shī ite politicalʿ ʿ  
involvement was primarily born out of  the felt need to defend Shī a communities:ʿ
The Shi'i processions during the month of  Muharram and the public shi'i vituperation of  the caliphs Abu Bakr  
and Umar have always carried with them the potential for violence. But the early 1960s saw an intensification of  
this mutual animosity as the Umema [sic!] pressed their demands for Islamic state that conformed solely to their 
vision. The shi'is in response, began to organize politically.883
Beyond these discourses and in the light of  Khomeini's regional power politics, Pakistani Shī ism was seen asʿ  
marginalized, lacking an indigenous Pakistani tradition and had been offended of  assimilation to the Iranian 
project.884 Generally, competition between Saudi and Iranian influence on proxy organizations through ideolo­
gical and financial support lead to splits not only among the Shī a but also other religious parties like theʿ  
Jama'at-i-Islami.885 
Syed Jafar Hussain Mujtahid who had resigned from his post at the CII in 1977 stood for this new orienta ­
tion which, at the climax of  Zia's Sunni politics of  Islamization, felt the need of  protecting and sharpen Shī aʿ  
877 Cit. Schmucker, 1989, p. 510
878 See Jalalzai, 2000, pp. 41/42.
879 For its hearings, the commission invited leading scholars of  all schools of  thought including Shī a authorities such as the saintʿ  
Hafiz Kifayat Husain. See Government of  Punjab: Report of  the Court of  Inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act II of  1954  
to inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of  1953 (Munir Report). Lahore, 1954, p. 203.
880 Due to the lack of  Shī a institutions of  higher learning at the time of  partition, a majority of  them had an educational backʿ ­
ground from Lucknow.
881 See panel contribution Fuchs, Simon Wolfgang: Third Wave Shi‘ism: Sayyid ‘Arif  Husayn al-Husayni and the Islamic Revolution 
in Pakistan. Presented at the conference “Contesting Shi‘ism: Isna ‘Ashari and Isma‘ili  Shi‘ism in modern South Asia”, 9-10  
September, 2011, Royal Holloway, Univ. of  London.
882 See Moussavi, Ahmad Kazemi: The Prospect of  Rapprochement (Taqrib) between Sunni and Ja'afari Shi'i Legal Schools, pp.  
1/2. In: Crow, Karim D./ Moussavi (Eds.): Facing one Qiblah. Legal and Doctrinal Aspects of  Sunni and Shi'ah Muslims. Singa­
pore: Pustaka, 2005, p. 1-29.
883 Cit. Jalalzai, 2000, p. 41.
884 See Fuchs, 2011.
885 Following the 1979 revolution in Iran, a Karachi-based faction under Ghafur Ahmad together with students from the IJT split  
from the JI. Rewarded by Iran's new Islamic regime, from now on they worked with the Iranian charity institutions that were set  
up in Pakistan to counter Saudi influence. This was in opposition to the JI's more Saudi-oriented position that also remained loy­
al to Zia ul-Haq. See Khalid, 1985, p. 102ff. A few months before his death, an Iranian delegation sent by Khomeini visited the 
Mansurah colony. Maudūdī had met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini personally during hajj in Mekkah in 1963 and had offended 
the Persian Shah in an article in Tarjuman ul-Qur'an in which he criticized the Shah regimes repressions against dissident ulamāʿ ʾ.
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identity,  culture  and  religious  practices  and  Jaf'ari  interpretation  of  the  sharī aʿ .886 After  the  Tehrik-i-Ni­
faz-i-Fiqh-i-Ja‘fariya (Movement for the Introduction of  Ja'fari fiqh, TNFJ)887 came into existence under his lead­
ership, the 1980s witnessed increasing radicalization among the religious groups and more sectarian clashes 
between Sunni organizations and their Shī a counterparts.ʿ 888 As an off-shot of  TNFJ,  Sipah-i-Muhammad was 
founded as a defensive militant force while  Imamiya Student Organization, founded in 1972, served as an um­
brella organization for Shī a student groups.ʿ 889 
Shī a fears of  the regime's efforts to declare Pakistan a Sunni state and its support by the predominantlyʿ  
Hanafi religious organizations of  the Qaumi Ittehad (National Alliance), became visible when Zia issued the Za­
kat and Ushr Ordinance in July, 1980, which was followed by a massive Shī a demonstration in Islamabad withʿ  
protesters even occupying Zia's central committee.890 As a result of  a first negotiation round with Shī ite leadʿ ­
ers, the regime accepted a special Shī a taxation status arguing on the grounds of  their non-acceptance ofʿ  
compulsory payment of  zakat as determined by Jaf'ari Islamic law (fiqh)891 which claims the payment to be a 
voluntary tax, while Hanafi fiqh defines zakat892 – an annual tax of  2.5 percent on savings – as obligatory for 
Muslims.893 The perspective of  evading the payment of  zakat, it has been assumed, might be a considerable ar­
gument for some Sunnis to convert to Shī ism. The same might apply to ʿ ushrʿ , the annual tax on agricultural 
produce, which is lower according to Jaf'ari fiqh.894 Another line of  conflict between the Shī ites and the govʿ ­
ernment was the latter's order to unify the school syllabus, especially of  Islamiyyat, for Shī a and Sunni stuʿ ­
dents.895 
This matrix of  various conflicts exploded in July, 1985, when clashes between Shī a and Sunni protestersʿ  
and the authorities reached their climax in Quetta, Peshawar and Rawalpindi.896 Between 1982 and 1985 the 
unrest had increasingly developed into a protest directed against Zia's regime for its refusal to accommodate  
central Shī a demands such as equal representation in government bodies like the CII, the Islamic Research Inʿ ­
stitute, the police and Zia's controlled parliament.897 Accordingly, Shī a leaders like Agha Sayed Hamid Ali Shahʿ  
Musavi, Mufti Ja'far Husayn and his successor Allama Arif  Husayn al-Husayni had called for a boycott of  Zia's  
886 See Bahadur, 2007, p. 4; Rana, 2009, p. 402.
887 Founded in Bhakkar, Punjab, in 1974. Turned into a political party in 1987 and changed its name into Tehrik-i Jafariya Pakistan two 
years later. In 2002, the name was again changed when the party called itself  Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP).
888 For sectarian militancy see Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza: Islam, the State and the Rise of  Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan. In: Jaffrelot,  
2002, p. 85-114; Ali, Nosheen: Sectarian Imaginaries. The Micropolitics of  Sectarianism and State-making in Northern Pakistan. 
In: Current Sociology, Vol. 58, No. 5, 2010, p. 738-754; Jalalzai, 2000.
889 See Rana, 2009, p. 401.
890 See Naqvi, 2008, p. 37-40.
891 The Ithna 'Ashari school of  law that refers to the sixth imām, Ja'far Bin Muhammad al-Sadiq (702-765). According to this lineage, 
twelve a'immah, the descendants of  the Prophet's daughter Fatima and his son-in-law Ali, are seen as the prophetical successors  
and therefore, as the only religious-political authorities. For the legal theory (u ūl al-fiqhṣ ) see Rohe, 2009, p. 43ff.
892 Lit. “purification”.
893 Due to Qur'an 2:177. See Bahadur, 2007, p. 5. 
894 See Jalalzai, 2000, p. 42. 
895 Ibid,, p. 42; Rana, 2009, p. 401.
896 See Khalid, 1985, p. 105; Jalalzai, 2000, p. 43.
897 Like in the case of  the 1980 zakat ordinance, the regime and advisers like Justice Tanzil-ur-Rahman – member of  the CII and  
Chief  Justice of  the FSC – were blamed for their personal sectarian orientation. See for instance Ahmed, Khaled: Ijaz ul-Haq  
and Shia killings in Pakistan. In: The Friday Times, 16 July, 2004.
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referendum of  December, 1984, and the national elections in 1985.898 In this context, the special role of  Shī aʿ  
leaders is touched upon by Zaman:
There is no parallel in the Sunni Muslim world to the authority the highest-ranking Shi'i religious scholars have 
wielded since the emergence of  the position of  the marja' al-taqlid in the second half  of  the nineteenth century,  
a position which, in turn, became the basis for Khumayni's reformulation of  the doctrine of  wilayat al-faqih in  
1970 and for the rise to power of  the Shi'i religious establishment with the Iranian revolution of  1979. Insofar as 
the actual assumption of  political power by the 'ulama is concerned, perhaps the closest contemporary parallel  
to the Shi'i 'ulama of  Iran was represented by the strongly anti-Shi'a Sunni Taliban of  Afghanistan.899 
Arif  Husayn al-Husayni, a Pakhtun from Kurram Agency, combined in his education influences from Najaf  
and Qom and tried to adapt them to the Pakistani religious-political context. Nominated as Khomeini's repres­
entative to Pakistan (Wali-i-Faqih)900 al-Husayni's election as the new leader of  TNFJ was rather unexpected 
and preceded by a split within the platform.901 Nevertheless, during the short episode under al-Husayni's lead­
ership, from 1984 until his assassination in Peshawar in 1988902, Pakistani Shī ism became more pro-Iranian reʿ ­
volutionary and openly opposed the Zia ul-Haq regime. Furthermore, Iraq's intelligence has been suspected of  
having been involved in  the murder of  Husayni  whom it  perceived as an Iranian proxy. 903 The bombing 
marked the beginning of  a series of  targeted killings; in 1989, Palestinian scholar 'Abdullah 'Assam who rose  
to prominence at Jeddah's King 'Abdal 'Aziz University and later at the International Islamic University Is­
lamabad, was killed by a car bomb in Peshawar. Much more outspoken with his criticism than his predecessor, 
al-Husayni had offended corruption among the political elites, the increase of  Saudi influence in Pakistan's  
welfare and education sector and the government's Islamization policies. His exposed role stands in opposition  
to other Shī ite leaders, including the father of  the nation Mohammad Ali Jinnah himself, who kept a low-proʿ ­
file policy in which they tended to not tackle Shī a interests too publicly.ʿ 904
After al-Husayni's death, Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi took over the leadership of  the TNFJ and was appointed as  
quaid (president) for lifetime, but his authority became challenged by the Imamia and conservative elements  
within the party, who blamed him for his mundane lifestyle and his marriage with the former model Shazia 
Qurban in 1994.905 The party tried to survive politically when it allied with the Bhutto-PPP-led Pakistan Demo­
cratic Alliance  (PDA) in the forefront of  the rigged 1990 elections where the alliance was beaten by Nawaz 
Sharif's ISI-sponsored platform IJI until it became part of  the MMA in 2002.906 Politically marginalized and 
898 See Jalalzai, 2000, pp. 43/44. The TNFJ's demands were justified with reference to an accord between government officials and 
the Shī ite 1980 protest movement's leaders, signed on 6 July, 1980 (Islamabad Agreement), in which the establishment of  a comʿ ­
mission designed to deal with the demands had been announced. Cit. Rana, 2009, p. 405: “Imam Khomeini played and import­
ant role in this agreement and had asked for an assurance from Ziaul Haq that the Shia demands would be met. A message from 
Khomeini was read out at the Convention that instructed the people to keep up their spirits.” 
899 Cit. Zaman, 2004, p. 144.
900 He met the Iranian leader in Najaf  where Khomeini spent 13 years of  his exile. 
901 Following the death of  Mufti Jaffar Hussain on 29 August, 1983, Maulana Agha Syed Hamid Ali Shah Musavi – referred to as  
Quaid-i-Millat Jafariya by his disciples – took the lead of  this faction which cooperated with the Zia regime which in turn declared 
Musavi's faction the representative body of  Pakistan's Shī a. This group is still active with its headquarter at Jamiatul Momineenʿ  
at Ali Masjid, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi, but claims to be apolitical. See Rana, 2009, p. 406; TNFL-Musavi, website.
902 The TNFJ blamed NWFP's provincial governor, Fazle Haq, for the assassination. A member of  Zia's presidential elite guard, 
Maj. Majid Raza Gilani, accused for carrying out the murder, was held innocent by the Supreme Court. See Rana, 2009, p. 407;  
Naqvi, 2008, p. 39.
903 See Zahab, 2002, p. 118.
904 Email by Dr. Andreas Rieck (BKA), 4 August, 2009.
905 See Rana, 2009, pp. 410/411.
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weakened because of  Iran's stopping for funding Pakistan's Shī a groups in 1996ʿ 907 and a split in the party by 
Dr. Mohammad Ali Naqvi and his followers as a reaction to the decision to join the PDA, 908 the party's activit­
ies are concentrated on the welfare sector, where its institutions such as the Shaheed Foundation provide support 
and compensation for the families of  martyrs – in general victims of  sectarian attacks. 909 Like its mother fac­
tion, the Naqvi group, Majlis-e-Wahdutul Muslimin, founded in 2008, claims succession to al-Husayni and has the 
support of  the Imamia Students Organization which Rana claims to be the “real strength” behind Shī a politicalʿ  
activities.910 The Imamia has been closely linked to Hibzbul Mominin, the Shī ite jihadi outfit with its bases inʿ  
Azad Kashmir.911 
As the political partner of  five non-Shī a parties in the MMA, the TNFJ has always complained about itsʿ  
marginalization within the alliance, that, according to JI leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad, had put these differences  
on its agenda:
We felt the need to unite in a single front, not on a political basis but on all the religious and social issues. The  
understanding that has been developed, the personal friendships, was an integral part of  MMA. It was a good  
and fruitful alliance and it has done its services to the people, the results are there. Religious tensions have been  
decreased since there is no basic difference between Barelwi and Deobandi. The actual historic difference is  
between Sunna and Shī a. To minimize this difference in Pakistan the MMA was very much helpful. Divide andʿ  
rule was the policy not only of  the Britishers but of  all the imperialistic regimes. They still try to create and in ­
crease differences and schism among the schools of  thought.912
Nevertheless, the TNFJ members and especially its leader Sajid Naqvi who was even barred from entering 
NWFP province in 2004,913 experienced hard times under the de facto leadership of  JI and JUI: “If  that was 
not enough, the MMA did not nominate Naqvi from NWFP for the seat to the Senate and was, instead, given  
the nomination from Punjab where the MMA did not have the required number of  votes to ensure his elec ­
tion.”914 Shī a resignation on political affairs and the question of  adequate representation in a Sunni majorityʿ  
society, has cultivated a somewhat passive stance on electoral politics. A Shī a scholar observes in his comʿ ­
munities that, in reaction to marginalization and under-representation in the civil-service, religious teaching 
and institutions like the CII, Shī a have always tended to abstain from giving their vote to religious parties inʿ  
general and to Shī a partiʿ es in particular.915
Since the 1980s that witnessed a rise of  sectarian violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Shī a scholars,ʿ  
mosques and processions were frequently targeted by attacks. Especially during  ashura,  the holy month of  
Muharram during which Shī ites commemorate the death of  Imam Hussein by the armies of  the Sunni caliphʿ  
Yazid in 680 A.D. – reciting elegies and hymns, carrying black banners and march behind replicas of  Imam 
Hussain's tomb in Iraq – Shī a militias, police and security forces have a hard time to protect the believers.ʿ  
906 According to Nawaz, Yunus Habib, owner of  Habib Bank – later Mehran Bank – sponsored the IJI candidates with an amount  
of  140 million rupees that were distributed by the ISI under former ambassador to Germany and director ISI, Gen. Asad Dur ­
rani. See Nawaz, 2008, p. 434.
907 See Zahab, 2002, p. 117.
908 See ICG, 2011, pp. 18/19.
909 See Shaheed Foundation, website.
910 See ICG, 2011, pp. 19/20.
911 See Rana, 2009, p. 417-424.
912 Cit. Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Mansurah, 21 August, 2009.
913 See Bahadur, 2007, p. 5.
914 Cit. Ibid.
915 Conversation with Syed Hussain Arif  Naqvi, Islamabad, 1 August, 2009.
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Muharram processions (julus) provide important vehicles for sectarian and political mobilization.916 As such 
and due to the radicalization of  Shī ite and Sunni sectarian identities, they became prominent targets of  attacksʿ  
by  Sunni  extremist  groups  such as  the  Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP,  founded  1985)  and  the  Lashkar-i-Jhangvi  (LeJ, 
1996).917 In the service of  the Afghan Taliban, both groups were involved in the sectarian killings of  Hazara 
Shī a. SSP's leader Maulana Azam Tariq had been a political tool of  the authorities: Freed from jail in 2002, heʿ  
contested the elections for the MMA.918 In the Musharraf  era in which SSP was officially banned, among many 
other incidents, the Shī ites of  Quetta were targeted during Muharram by both groups and Shī ite contractorsʿ ʿ  
for the US Army, recruited from this area during the initial years of  the international mission in Afghanistan,  
were  killed  during  retaliation  operations.919 Community  representatives  accused  the  leaders  of  the  MMA 
parties for their authorship of  fātāwa that justified the murder of  Shī ites. In May, 2004, after several attacks onʿ  
Shī ite mosques had claimed lives in Karachi, the leading scholar of  the Deobandi Binori Town complex,ʿ  
Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai was killed, obviously for revenge by Shī a activists. Generally speaking, anti-Shī aʿ ʿ  
violence has been on the rise in recent years with new attacks and fatalities among the Pakhtun Shī a at the beʿ ­
ginning  of  2012,920 with  epicenters  in  KPK and  Baluchistan.921 Issues  regarding  practices  of  formalized 
mourning (azadari) and zuljinah922 such as licenses for the processions together with a separate auqaf  had been 
central demands of  the Shī a groups since the 1950s.ʿ 923
5.3 Jama'at-i-Islami (JI)
Seen by some as the most important Islamist party924 due to its high grade of  organization and mobilization925, 
its prospering system of  self-funding and its exclusivity based on restrictive membership and its theological 
distinctiveness and incompatibility with other madāhib, the JI is, without doubt, the most prominent religious 
party of  Pakistan attracting most academic studies in this field. The party's publication services which make 
the Jama'at “a major stakeholder in the religious ideological media in Pakistan”926 did their part to promote this 
916 See Zahab, 2008, p. 106.
917 For a detailed analysis of  both groups see Rana, 2009, p. 192-212. 
918 Taqir was assassinated two years later. See Rashid, 2008, p. 227.
919 Ibid., pp. 227/228.
920 For its violent crack down on Shī a protesters after the attacks, the Frontier Corps has been frequently criticized. See Taqi, Moʿ ­
hammad: Kurram: Children of  a lesser God. In: Daily Times, 22 February, 2012.
921 See Dawn: Millions of  Pakistanis observe Ashura, 28 December, 2009.
922 Procession with a saddled and decorated but riderless horse representing the Shī a martyr. On these processions, Zahab writes:ʿ  
“Zuljinah was – and still is – particularly venerated as a powerful intercessor. Women watched from the rooftops and brought  
their children to Zuljinah to press them against its flank and offered money to the horse's attendants. In Bengal, Hindu and  
Muslim women placed their newborn babies at Zuljinah's feet to gain protection; they gave milk to the horse, collecting what fell  
on the ground in a vial; it was said not to curdle and was used as medicine.” Cit. Zahab, 2008, p. 105.
923 See Rana, 2009, p. 401.
924 See for instance Waseem, 1994, p. 90. 
925 Here the concept of  professional contracted functionaries and a Leninist cadre organization with reference to the Bolschewiki was 
introduced by Maudūdī who had been familiar with the works of  Stalin and Lenin. See Kepel, 2002, p. 34. The JI has a parallel  
organization on both national and provincial level including a visible presence and alliances with the small landlords and farmers  
in rural areas which provide a grass root base of  support beyond the party's traditional urban networks. Here, the party, in com­
petition with the PPP and leftist organizations, has tried to ensure support among workers with special committees, legal advice  
and welfare institutions such as the National Labor Federation and the Business Forum. See Khan, 2000, p. 337; Gilani, Syed Asad: 
Maududi. Thought and Movement. Lahore: Islamic Publ., 1984, pp. 78/79; Nasr, 1994, p. 63; Interview with Arif  Malik, Work ­
ers' Federation, Rawalpindi, 27.07.2009.     
926 Cit. PIPS, 2010, p. 71.
   Seite 151
reputation.927 Its prominent founder, Sayyid Abul A lā al-Mʿ audūdī928, established the organization in 1941929, 
but it is mainly his intellectual work based on the social-revolutionary call for an Islamic state and its adaption  
by Islamist groups worldwide, which makes Maudūdī a central figure within Islamist discourses.930
 In 1974 the party moved to its new headquarter in Mansurah, Lahore.931 Despite its welfare work and crisis 
assistance, being recognized by many Pakistanis in the light of  the collective traumas of  partition, wars and re ­
cent natural disasters932, the JI has never been able to reach out to the masses, let alone to win the electoral ma ­
jorities as a political party until the late 1970s. The party's strict cadre principle, its radical state design, sectari­
an intolerance and its active discriminatory role towards the non-Muslim population (dhimmī), as well as its in­
tolerant attitude towards the omnipresent cultures of  Folk Islam alienated the bigger part of  society.
927 See Khan, 2000, p. 337; Zaidi, 1990, p. 393. The JI has its own publishing houses and by far, as compared to other reli gious 
groups, the most periodicals in accordance with its sub-organizations their members' particular needs. For its organization and 
hierarchy see Annex, Abbildung 1.
928 Maudūdī, a descendant of  the Chishtiyya sūfī order had not been educated in traditional theology but attended primary classes at  
the Madrasa Fawqaniyah in his hometown Aurangabad. His father, the lawyer Ahmad Hassan had been educated at Aligarh but  
later he split from the college because of  its pro-Western worldview. Maudūdī was, in this respect, a representative of  both, tradi ­
tional studies in dars-i nizāmi under different Deobandi ulamāʿ ʾ  in Delhi and secular educational ideals as expressed through his  
intensive study of  languages, Western philosophy, natural sciences, and his work as a journalist in Jubalpur and later in Delhi dur ­
ing the early 1920s. In Delhi he contributed to the Muslim and from 1925 to 1928 the Al-Jami'a, a periodical published by the 
Jami'at-ul-'Ulama-i-Hind. Indian Muslim intelligentsia became aware of  Maudūdī's works mainly because of  his Al-Jihād fi al-Islam 
(1927/28) which was translated into Arabic and which, together with Towards Understanding Islam (1930) can be seen as a key work 
to his oeuvre. Mohammad Iqbal was one of  the readers of  Maudūdī's works and journalistic articles and asked him to cooperate  
with him in the establishment of  a Dar ul-Islam in Pathankot, following an initiative by Chaudhry Niaz Ali, a future patron and  
friend of  Jama'at-i-Islami. Following engagements with contemporary Muslim intellectual life – in 1932, Maudūdī became an edit ­
or for the Tarjuman al-Qur ānʾ  – he adopted the anti-colonial and anti-Western spirit of  that time but became also a challenger to  
the political Congress elite and nationalist-oriented ulamāʿ ʾ whose monopoly he criticized for their neglecting and passivity to­
wards Muslim decline and their falsification of  what he considered as „true interpretation of  Islam“. In response, Maudūdī had 
been banned as a kāfir and murtad in fatāwā from various religious camps. See Ahmad, 1969, p. 37-39; Hartung, 2001, p. 107-126; 
McDonough, Sheila: Muslim Ethics and Modernity. A Comparative Study of  the Ethical Thought of  Sayyid Ahmad Khan and 
Mawlana Mawdudi. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Univ. Press, 1984, pp. 55/56; Zaidi, 1990, p. 367-398; Ahmad, Khurshid: Mawlana  
Mawdudi: An Introduction to His Life and Thought. Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1992, p. 9-18; Ahmad, 1976, p. 31-33; Ma ­
lik, Jamal: Maudūdī's al-Jihād fī'l-Islām. A Neglected Document, pp. 63/64. In: ZfR No. 17, 2009, p. 61-69; Nasr, 1994, p. 7.
929 At the founding conference on 26 August, 1941, in Pathankot, with 74 members present, Maudūdī elaborated on the importance  
of  his exclusive interpretation of  Islam and the Jama'at's future role as a leading exemplary force and Islamic vanguard. 
930 Thus, seeing him as a „doyen of  political Islam“ within the „Islamist trinity“ together with Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb  
seems to adequately designate his leading role. Cit. Malik, 2009, p. 62. The prominent but incorrect view according to which, “the 
Jamaat-e-Islami was, in effect, the Pakistani branch of  the Muslim Brotherhood” does not adequately take into account the JI's  
agenda which has been strongly oriented, initially to the Indian colonial context, and later to the Pakistani state. Cit. Coll, 2004,  
p.112.
931 In 1968, the Jama'at established its own campus in Mansurah, Lahore, financed with private donations and equity capital and ac­
quired land next to their new headquarters. The area of  the colony houses a number of  educational institutions, research centers,  
schools and institutions for the religious training of  its members.  The JI, from the very beginning, was eager to set up an  
autonomous educational system and, since then, in addition to the training of  its own party cadres, has been strongly frequented  
by the public. This is especially true with regard to its medical services for the poor: Besides offices of  the central secretariat of  
the JI in Punjab, residential areas for leading officials, high style guesthouses and accommodation for students, there is a hospital  
under the aegis of  Al-Khidmat Foundation, which had been built with government subsidies. An ambulatory care service functions, 
like Al-Khidmat with offices in all cities, countrywide and offers reduced prices or free medical care. Al-Khidmat coordinates public 
health campaigns, such as a nationwide vaccination campaign against hepatitis in 2009, in which vaccination for 400 instead of  
1.000 rupees had been provided. Al-Khidmat and smaller trusts associated with the JI had been involved in the emergency aid for  
refugees during war times and victims of  natural disasters, like in the case of  the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir and the 2010 
floods. Beyond that, there are several other organizations and institutions based in the fenced and well guarded colony, some of  
them with branches in the major cities, such as the Academy of  Islamic Studies (Idarah Ma'arif-i-i Islami), the Sayyid Maududi Inter­
national Education institution and the offices of  Voice of  Islam  (Idarah Sada-i-i Islam). See Khan, 2000, p. 337; Gaier, 2012, pp. 
102/103; Interview with Amjad Qurashi, secretary general Al-Khidmat Foundation Islamabad, Islamabad, 4 August, 2009. 
932 During several crises in Pakistan's history, the JI has proven its keen sense for presenting itself  as a competent welfare agency. Its  
immediate aid measures and direct support were, in many cases, much more effective than the slow support provided by the gov ­
ernment and the army. This was for instance the case during the massacres and expulsions in East Punjab following independ ­
ence in 1947, when the JI provided supply of  food to the overcrowded refugee camps as well as during the great flood in Punjab  
in 1950.
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Hierarchically, the amīr (military leader) is the party's highest authority and provides guidance to his follow­
ers.933 According to the constitution of  1941, he is flanked by an elected committee, the majlis-i-shūrā, as an ad­
visory body. A vow of  allegiance to the Amīr-e-Jama'at, as a substantial element of  the Jama'at's centralized and 
authoritative principle of  leadership, ensures loyalty and control from top down to the smallest administrative  
units. With regard to its social basis, the Jama'at relies on the support by its urban lower middle class constitu ­
ency composed of  civil servants, traders and intellectuals.934 Like many other religious-political organizations, 
its student organizations form the ideological spearhead of  the movement with the Islami Jami'at-i Tulaba (IJT) 
as the most active sub-organization.935 In general terms, its own base of  support includes sympathizers (hamd­
ard), followers (mutaffiqan)936 and official members (arkan), with the two former categories providing essential 
support and mobilization for political action (“street power”). Cadre training, education and strict regulation 
with regard to duties and privileges of  members, combined in the concept of  da waʿ  (mission) among new 
members  and in  public,  is  consistently  applied on the individual  level  to  new recruits  in  specific  charac­
ter-building courses and study and prayer circles, and almost analogous to the efforts of  educating Muslim so­
ciety in large on a collective level.937 Membership requires the passing of  strictly codified inauguration rites in 
which the applicant formally declares his abstaining from drinking, music and dance, gambling, protected sex  
and moral misbehavior repugnant to the code of  conduct as exemplified in sunna and qur ānʾ . 
With regard to his political theory, as has been discussed in Chapter 2 in contrast to the arguments brought 
forth by other ulamāʿ ʾ, the League and members of  the Congress, the doctrinal change from a sovereignty of  
the people towards the sovereignty of  God is important to understand the Jama'at's balancing of  genuinely  
political demands for a revolutionary change on the one hand and a theological concept on the other and the 
harmonization  of  this  antagonism within  the  party's  self-understanding.  The  importance  attached  to  the 
people of  the Islamic state becomes clear with Maudūdī's emphasis on khilāfa that makes every individual of  
Islamic society its own caliph or representative of  God's will. "Every true Muslim is a caliph” 938, is, thus, a 
933 Maudūdī who had an undisputed authority as the Amir for life time, was the party's main financial patron due to his active au ­
thorship of  literature which was produced by the JI's press and associated publishing groups. This was probably another reason  
why the JI, as an exception in Pakistan's political culture, since the 1960's seemed to be immune to splits and inner unrest: „Or ­
ganisationally, Mawdudi's hold over the Jama'at rested on the system of  whole time workers who were paid their wages from the 
treasury. In 1965, every fifteenth member was a paid worker. The leadership and its management was entirely under the control  
of  these paid workers. It required great courage to differ from the Amir, when one's livelihood depended on one's agreement  
with the Jama'at.“ Cit. Bahadur, Kalim: The Jama'at-i-Islami of  Pakistan. New Delhi: Chetana Publ., 1977, pp. 13/14: 
934 See Waseem, 1994, p. 90.
935 A detailed analysis of  the IJT is given by Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza: Students, Islam and Politics: Islami Jami'at-i Tulaba in Pakistan.  
In: The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, p. 59-76. The IJT has proven that it can attract students and teaching staff  at  
Pakistan's universities to such an extend that competitive political and religious student organizations are clearly on the margins.  
The University of  Punjab, Lahore, is only one prominent case where the Jama'at wing gained hegemony. See for instance Baker,  
Aryn: The Battle for Punjab University. In: Time Magazine, 8 October, 2006. 
936 The institution of  the mutaffiq had been introduced in the forefront of  the Punjab elections of  1951 and as an substitute for the  
former differentiation between those activists with limited knowledge of  the Jama'at's program (muta'arif) and those who had ap­
plied to the party's rules and educational program (muta'athir). See Nasr, 1994, p. 48.
937 See Zaidi, 1990, p. 395; Khan, 2000, p. 340. The process of  da waʿ  is, according to Maudūdī, based on purification and training of  
spirit and thought, re-orientation and re-building of  one's own character and life, reformation of  society and, finally, the reform  
of  the government. See Gilani, 1984, p. 63-68.
938 Cit. N. a.: Pursuing a Mission. The Life and Times of  Syed Abul A'la Maududi. Rise up with the Message of  Qur'an and go forth 
to win the World (DVD). Karachi, n. d. 
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central message of  Jama'at-i-Islami's ideology as much as khilāfa is a core principle of  political Islamic theory, 
together with tauhīd and risāla (prophet-hood).939 
5.4 Ahl-i-Hadith / Salafiyya 
Markaz-e-Jamiat Ahle Hadith, or Ahl-i-Hadith (AH), though smaller by numbers of  its madaris, holds an consider­
able influence especially in the urban and industrial centers of  Punjab such as Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot  
and Lahore.940 A majority of  Punjabi businessmen sees the Sharif  family, whose founder and dynastic head, 
aba-ji Mian Mohammad Sharif,  until  his death in 2012 had been a member of  the AH, and the Pakistan 
Muslim League of  Nawaz Sharif  as their political representation. The Ahl-i-Hadith is supported by the mer­
chant families of  industrial Punjab and private donors from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. 941 On 
a personal basis relations between scholars and the Saudi royal family were quite close.942 Similar to its support 
for the Nadwat al-'Ulama, who were incorporated into the front against Nasserist Arab nationalism by provid ­
ing funds and leading posts in Saudi-sponsored organizations,943 the AH was seen as a strategic partner. Insti­
tutionally and through the privileged relation, AH schools such as the Jami'a Salafiyya with branches in Fais­
alabad and Islamabad were affiliated with universities in Medina, Riyadh and Mecca. 944 In Pakistan, the influ­
ence of  Ahl-i-Hadith on the society is significant while their political engagement has been traditionally low. 
Gujranwala, formerly Hafizabad, is a case in point: Until the 1970's ruled by the PPP and considered a liberal  
climate, the city increasingly became the focal point of  several blasphemy, fahashi (vulgarity/obscenity) and uri­
ani (nudity) cases in which actresses, musicians and even members of  the Pakistan cricket team faced a variety  
of  court cases.945 The sealing of  Gujranwala theaters, internet cafes and DVD-shops indicates changes in the 
perception of  public morality with the new moral watchdogs from the sectarianized jihadi scene being on the 
rise.946 In general, the area of  the canal colonies, where many Ahl-i-Hadith members settled as refugees from 
939 While the concept of  sovereignty (hakimiyya, Allah's sovereignty) is seen as sacrosanct in Maudūdī's theory of  rule, the concept 
of  khilāfa, the human vice-regency of  the divine will on earth, allows room for interpretation. Power and rule through the ca­
liphate is not given by rank, caste or class, rather, the vice-regency can only be exercised as a collective rule, which has to submit  
to the divine sovereignty. Nevertheless, due to its imprecise character, this theory emphasizes both the interpretation of  rule by  
the community of  believers and a party in the political sense and, thus, creates a twofold meaning. The ideal Islamic state would  
represent  Islam as  an inclusive  system intertwining  politics,  economy and  culture.  However,  Maudūdī's  loose  evolutionary  
multistage model, proved to be historically right, as he claimed Pakistan's head of  state to be a male Muslim candidate only in  
1952, based on the need for a flexible model that would be modified in the light of  coming developments: The future Islamic  
state should not be an identical projection of  ancient Medinensic times. Rather, the prophetic role model and authentic Muslim  
life-style had to be applied to contemporary modern times.
940 As of  2009, Rana counts 17 political, jihadi and Tablighi organizations that are controlled by the Ahl-i-Hadith. See Rana, 2009, p. 
295. Riexinger points out to the AH's expansion in rural areas such as Wazirabad, Sauhadra, Sargodha, Okara and Qila Mahian 
Singh or its traditional presence in Amritsar and the district of  Ferozpur. Here, much emphasis had been laid on the AH's influ­
ence on both urban and rural society. See Riexinger, Martin: Sanâ'ullâh Amritsarî (1868–1948) und die Ahl-i im Punjab unter  
britischer Herrschaft. Würzburg: Ergon, 2004, pp. 591/592. Rana adds Dera Ghazi Khan, Khanpur, Rahimyar Khan and Is­
lamabad to the organization's countrywide network. See Rana, 2009, p. 305.
941 See Shafqat, 2002, p. 131-147.
942 As Zaman pointed out, the strong Saudi influence was the result of  competing claims of  both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. While  
the former has only a limited say in the Subcontinent's Islamic debates, the Saudis, due to their much larger resources through oil  
production and export, are important supporters for religious groups in Pakistan. See Zaman, 2004, p. 174. 
943 One platform was the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-'alam al-Islami) on which Sayyid Abu'l-Hasan Nadwi (1913-1999), eminent 
scholar at the Dar ul-Ulum Nadwat ul-Ulama and the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, played a leading role. See Ibid., p. 160-170.
944 With the Islamic University Medina, the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh and the Umm al-Qura Uni ­
versity of  Mecca. See Ibid., p. 175.
945 See The Friday Times: What's happening to Gujranwala?, 30 January, 2004.
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partitioned Punjab can be identified as the initial center of  AH expansion in Pakistan with Gujranwala and Ly­
allpur as main centers of  their activities.947
In contrast to the Deobandis and Barelwis, “those who do not adhere to any school of  law (madhahib)” 
(ghair muqallid) reject any school of  law – or even consider the schools founders as infidels 948 – and hold that 
hadīth and qur ānʾ  provide adequate guidance to the Muslims.949 Their demand for independent reasoning, their 
refusal of  taqlīd while justifying ijtihād for members of  the educated elite,950 their pejorative notion as Wahhabis 
and Salafis, gave them a widely negative image of  zealots. The jihād oriented faction offered armed resistance 
to the British reign during the 1857 uprisings which was responded by suppression, forcing its leaders to main ­
tain a low profile.951 Soon after its creation around the year 1864, the group, or better, the internally diverse 
conglomeration, formally requested the official differentiation from the Wahhabis in 1887. 952 With regard to 
their Yemeni origins, until today, the Ahl-i-Hadith are perceived as a non-indigenous, largely Arab influenced 
reformist movement, hence, an external competitor in the South Asian religious field. Another stumbling bloc  
in the colonial context was the Ahl-i-Hadith' claim to succeed Shah Wali Allah, a claim that is shared by Deo­
bandi scholars as well.953
Since the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya agitations, the AH has been an active supporter of  the  khatm-i-nubuwwat 
campaign, despite a minority faction refusing it.954 Accordingly, political interventions were limited to those of  
the other religious parties and included opposition to the regimes of  Ayub Khan and Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. Like  
in the case of  the JUP, the 1970 elections became the turning point for the party when it aligned with the Deo­
bandi JUI but failed to win more then one provincial seat in Bengal.955 During the 1970's the most prominent 
figure in the AH was Ihsan Ilahi  Zahir:  While  the party  supported the  nizām-i  mustafā movement against 
Bhutto in 1977, Zahir and other leaders became vehement criticizers of  Zia ul-Haq's policies and later rejoined  
the Bhutto camp and the Movement for the Restoration of  Democracy.956 However, strong linkages between Ahl-i-
Hadith members and the PML-N persist.957 Prof. Sajid Mir is the current āmir of  the group.958 Being a close ally 
946 In the context of  “talibanization” of  the country, similar cases of  artists, writers and public figures who were banned or penal ­
ized, were commonly linked to the Taliban movement and, since 2002, to the governing MMA coalitions in NWFP. See for in ­
stance Pakistan Today: Taliban force famous singer out of  Peshawar, 11 April, 2011.
947 See Riexinger, 2004, pp. 565/566.
948 For instance a fatwā issued by Ahl-i-Hadith scholars declaring Abu Hanifa a kāfir. See Youtube.
949 For AH's inner debate on the role and interpretation of  the hadīth (“hadīth fundamentalism”) versus quranic scripturalism see Ma­
lik, 2008, pp. 361/362.
950 Ibid., p. 292.
951 Ibid.
952 See Jalal, 2008, p. 145. Formally, the All India Ahle Hadith Conference was established later in 1906.
953 Conversation with Maulana Mohammad Ishaq Bhatti, Ahl-e Hadith, Lahore, 22 August, 2009.
954 According to Riexinger, four out of  28 delegates of  the All Pakistan Muslims Parties Conference, held in January, 1953, were from 
the AH. See Riexinger, 2004, p. 570.
955 See Ibid., pp. 571/572.
956 See Ibid., pp. 573/574.
957 For instance the late Maulana Moinuddin Lakhvi, a former MNA for the PML-N and Chairman of  the Standing Committee on  
Religious and Minorities Affairs, had been a prominent Ahl-i-Hadith leader whose father, Maulana Muhammad Ali Madni, had 
spent 36 years as scholar in Saudi Arabia. Lakhvi had also been a mentor to Punjab's assembly speaker Rana Muhammad Iqbal  
Khan (PML-N). See The Times of  India: Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith leader Maulana Moeenuddin Lakhvi dies, 10 December, 2011; The 
News: No undemocratic method to end govt: Rana Iqbal, 18 December, 2011.
958 Mir, who comes from a notable family of  AH scholars, had been educated in religious and secular institutions and has worked at 
a college in Nigeria. See Riexinger, 2004, pp. 566/567.
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of  the Sharif  family, he ensured his election as a senator on a PML-N ticket in the 2002 elections. The party's  
manifesto indicates that the AH had been somewhat in competition with the JI:
Markazi Ahle Hadees raised the voice of  truth against a female rule [Benazir Bhutto, M. G.] and, for the greater  
good of  the country, considered forming a coalition with Muslim League (N) the need of  the day. It is the reas ­
on why Mian Nawaz Sharif  has repeatedly appreciated the organization's efforts. In fact, Mian Nawaz Sharif,  
who keenly desired the support of  Jama'at-e-Islami has now forgotten the way to Mansoora.959
Since than, Mir has displayed his political flexibility through his frequent attendance at  Jama'at-ud-Dawa  (JD) 
jalsas.960 The JD is in this study treated as an distinct organization of  the AH for its clear commitment to polit­
ical participation and for its interpretation of  jihād. Tensions with Ahl-i-Hadith leaders began, when Prof. Hafiz 
Saeed established the  Dawat-ul-Irshad961, initially a charity organization whose identity is highly depending on 
what it considers as the purity of  the Salafi sect which it sees threatened through the political tactical align­
ments of  AH with non-Salafi platforms.962 In turn, Saeed's solo and his rise as a religious-political leader, in­
famous in India and the US, had been criticized by the AH and its Indian organization.963 The latter's repres­
entatives had labeled Hafiz Saeed a khawarij (rebel), who together with the Taliban was part of  an international 
conspiracy against Islam.964 However, Saeed's network is mainly seen skeptical since it succeeded in mobilizing 
extraordinary street power with political and socioeconomic messages while the AH still focuses on the reli ­
gious issues.965 Its jihād doctrine is largely promoted and carried out by the LeT, its Azad Kashmir based milit ­
ary wing which had been banned in 2002.966 
It is believed that LeT's massive presence in the public, is also a result of  its own publications 967 spread des­
pite the organization's illegality.968 In April, 2001, before the events of  9/11 shook the country, and in March,  
2003, public rallies by the LeT were held under the eyes of  the authorities and the ISI, in which Saeed was giv ­
en the opportunity to protest against the ban of  the group by foreign governments and to spread its call for  
suicide missions and participation in the holy war against the enemies of  Muslim Pakistan: 
959 Cit. Rana, 2009, pp. 304/305.
960 See ICG, 2011, p. 14.
961 For fear of  a ban by the authorities this name was changed into JD in 2002.
962 See Rana, 2009, p. 316.
963 For instance by Maulana Muhammad Ishaq from Faisalabad who is a prominent promoter of  Shī aʿ -Sunni unity. In the past, 
Ishaq and other AH leaders from Pakistan launched public rallies against the JD. See Nishapuri, Abdul: Ahl-e-Hadith Muslims 
reject Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). In: LUBP, 3 March, 2011.
964 See Daily News and Analysis India: Taliban, LeT maligning Islam: Scholars, 1 March, 2012. 
965 Conversation with Maulana Mohammad Ishaq Bhatti, Lahore.
966 The founding of  the LeT and JD can be traced back to the Islamiat Department at the Engineering University Lahore, where  
Saeed, together with Zafar Iqbal and the Palestinian scholar Abdallah Azzam established Dawat-ul-Irshad Markaz in 1987. How­
ever, Hafiz Saeed was the main force behind the call for participation in the Afghan Jihad for whose purpose Lashkar-e-Ta'iba 
(LeT) was founded. Similar to other groups fighting in Afghanistan, the LeT sent volunteers that were associated with the AH to  
its training facilities in Paktia and Kantar. See Shafqat, 2002, p. 131-148. For banned jihadi groups see list in Annex, Tabelle 2.
967 This includes its monthly Voice of  Islam, Al-Anfal, Mujalla Al-Da'awa, Tayyibaat, Rozatul Atfal and its weekly Ghazwa. These public­
ations are available in English, Urdu and Arabic and target specific audiences such as women, children or students. See Pak Insti ­
tute for Peace Studies: Understanding the Militants' Media in Pakistan. Islamabad: PIPS, 2010, p. 57-61.
968 “The Pakistani government also made no attempt to contain the inflammatory jihadi literature that flooded the country after  
9/11. Some forty publications with a circulation of  over one million were published by extremist groups. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba  
claimed that its weekly newspaper had a print run of  more than one hundred thousand copies and it continued to publish glory  
accounts of  suicide bombers killed in Kashmir.” Cit. Rashid, Ahmed: Descent into Chaos. How the War against Islamic Extrem­
ism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. London (a. o.): Allen Lane, 2008, p. 227. Despite its military agenda  
for Kashmir, the organization displayed an international orientation, e.g. with its successful recruitment of  British Pakistanis. 
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By staging such rallies, when all political rallies where banned by the regime, the ISI was sending an unambigu­
ous message to the Americans and the UN: that Pakistan continued to support the Taliban even as the UN at ­
tempted to seek an end to the civil war in Afghanistan.969
Its loyalty to the Pakistani state by concentrating exclusively on Indian targets in J&K and India, and after 2006  
on the Afghan arena, was claimed to be the main reason why the organization's activities are still tolerated and  
its leaders protected.970 Following the attack on the Indian parliament in December, 2001, and the Mumbai at ­
tacks between 26 and 29 November, 2008971, the Indian government demanded to arrest Hafiz Saeed and his 
military commander Ziaurrehman Lakhvi.972 Still active and linked to other militant groups like al-Qā idaʿ  and 
Ansar ul-Islam,973 the JD, together with its affiliated charity Falah-i-Insaniyat showed a high-profile during the 
floods of  2010974 and is believed to be independent of  ISI financial support since that time, mainly due to  
profits from its extensive educational and charitable network in Pakistan and in the Diasporas.975 
5.5 Radicalization, Ghairat Conservatism and the Religious Right
Violent clashes are by far not a new feature of  fragmentation and sectarianization of  Pakistan's religious land ­
scape. Increasing in number during the 1980s, main targets of  street clashes, uprisings and revenge and retali ­
atory high-profile killings of  prominent leaders were attributed to the sectarian and jihadist agenda of  new mi ­
litias:
Till 1995, killings were confined to leaders and activists of  both sects; then symbols of  State authority, main gov­
ernment functionaries, police officers and judges, were targeted. A change was seen in 1987 with indiscriminate 
gunfire on ordinary citizens who were not involved in sectarian activity and whose only fault was to be Sunni or  
Shia, and tit-for-tat killings targeting doctors, lawyers and traders.976 
This scenario has changed rapidly in the post-9/11 period: Beyond its economy of  violence that is usually as­
sociated with the Karachi arena, nowadays killings and attacks occur country-wide. As a result, ulamāʿ ʾ from all 
religious schools of  thought are increasingly forced to keep a low-profile with a considerable number of  schol ­
ars having reservations to condemn attacks on civilians and suicide attacks in public for fear of  being targeted  
by militants.977 Loud opposition to religious militancy by representatives of  state institutions such as the CII,  
the Islamic Research Institute and affiliated bodies as well as the Ministry for Religious Affairs has proved to  
969 Cit. Rashid, 2008, p. 53. For the April, 2003, rally see ibid., p. 228.
970 “Pakistani officials have told me that their greatest fears of  a mass revolt in Punjab concern what would happen if  Lashkar-e-
Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa were to swing against the state and use their extensive network to mobilize and organize unrest. This 
they say is one key reason (along with their anti-Indian agenda, which they do not mention) for not taking the sweeping measures 
against the organisation that the US is demanding.” Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 191.
971 In March, 2010, US-citizen David Headley, pledged guilty to have been trained in a LeT camp and to have been involved in the  
preparations for the Mumbai attacks. Amir Ajmal Kasab, the survivor of  the attacks who is in Indian custody, acknowledged that  
he acted on orders by the LeT. LeT is believed to have carried out the 13 February, 2010, bombing of  a German bakery in Pune 
as well. See also group profile on National Conterterrorism Center, website. 
972 See for instance Gul, Imtiaz: The Most Dangerous Place. Pakistan's Lawless Frontier. New York: Penguin, 2010, p. 168ff.
973 For instance Pir Saifurrehman, founder of  Ansar ul-Islam and arch enemy of  the  Lashkar-i-Islam under Mangal Bagh Afridi is 
thought to have been offered shelter in safe homes run by JD or LeT in Central Punjab since 2006. See Gul, 2010, pp. 238/239.  
Earlier, in March, 2002, al-Qā idaʿ  member Abu Zubaydah was captured at an LT safe-house in Faisalabad.
974 Like the other religious groups and especially Jama'at-i-Islami, JD was very active in providing humanitarian relief  to victims of  
the October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir which ensured legitimacy and reputation to the group in Kashmir and Pakistan.
975 See Lieven, 2011, pp. 190/191. 
976 Cit. Zahab, 2002, p. 118.
977 The number and qualities of  attacks had been increased since 2006 significantly with 2009 as the year with most attacks and cas ­
ualties, comparable in number with the civilian and military casualties in Iraq in 2006/07. See for instance The Brookings Institu ­
tion: Iraq Index Tracking Variables of  Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq. Washington, October, 2007, p. 7ff.
   Seite 157
be only limited for similar reasons.978 The wave of  violence which reached its height in 2009 when the Pakistan 
Army launched two military operations against the militants, had a significant impact on society: While sym ­
pathies for the Taliban diminished by the day, new debates about radicalization among the youth, national  
pride and honor facing American interference in the region, and, finally, political instability after the return to  
democracy, have empowered new religious-political forces. In terms of  their political-ideological orientations,  
some of  the religious-political parties have become the upholders of  conservative nationalist right-wing ideo ­
logy too. In addition to their initial agenda of  introducing an Islamic welfare system and against the back ­
ground of  Pakistan's new front state role, their focus has been widened to fields such as foreign affairs. Paral ­
leling the deteriorating security situation since 2007/08, Pakistani and international observers have pointed out  
to an intensification of  discourses in the field of  cultural-religious pietism, conservatism and ultra-patriotism 
in the mainstream public. Ideological reformation and change of  particular mindsets requires more than only 
state policies, but here, a top down reform approach to redefine the existing monopoly of  interpretation of  
just one Islamic sect seems to be essential followed by critical debate and the reform of  education syllabuses, 
media programs and its contents as well as a free intellectual discourse on religion and culture in their Pakistani  
context. As the traditional activists in these domains, the religious parties were joined by the right-of-center 
political spectrum with the PML – especially its conservative Punjabi Nawaz faction – and political newcomers  
like Imran Khan's PTI. Public debates like the case of  TV show anchor Maya Khan who had been fired for 
producing a program in which she raided a public park in Karachi, hounding unmarried dating couples and 
questioning their morality,979 were recent indicators for the rise of  what liberal-oriented Pakistani liberals called 
a ghairat (pride, honor) brigade.980 Exceptional men of  honor (ghairatman) seem to offer more plausible answers 
to the pressing social-economic needs of  the people and can effectively counter the narrative of  crisis and de ­
clinism that had befallen the national discourse in recent years. Highly disruptive events in 2011 like the killings 
of  Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, violence against minorities, the affair on the CIA operative Raymond 
Davis, Memogate affair and speculations about a coming military take-over, and in particular the reactions by 
the political, religious and media public, were seen as an expression of  this radicalization of  society and espe ­
cially its well-educated and privileged middle and upper classes. 
The attempt to implement a single uniform policy in order to control the religious sectors – “Islam from 
the cantonment”981 – has cultivated political alliances despite factional rivalries and internal struggles between 
the  various  Islam  pasand parties.982 Pakistan's  religious-political  front,  outnumbered  in  alliances  only  by 
978 The conclusion that there is a consensus regarding the threat by militant groups and the Taliban, shared by practically all reli ­
gious groups, is based on my interviews.
979 See Kazim, Hasnain: Pakistanische TV-Show: Mama Talib macht Jagd auf  Verliebte. In: Spiegel Online, 25 January, 2012.
980 This term with its polar opposite being scharm (shame) – or ghairatman including both – comes from the tribal code of  pakhtun­
wali where it is used, for instance with regard to the male duty to defend the honor of  female family members. See Steul, Willi:  
Paschtunwali.  Ein  Ehrenkodex  und  seine  rechtliche  Relevanz.  In:  Beiträge  zur  Südasienforschung,  Südasien-Institut,  Univ.  
Heidelberg, Vol. 54. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981, pp. 136/137, 172-177; Paracha, Nadeem F.: Goodbye ghairat. In: Dawn-Blog, 18 
March, 2011; Fayyaz, Sadaf: The Ghairat Brigade. In: The Express Tribune Blogs, 12 October, 2010. 
981 Cit. Malik, 1996, p. 8.
982 This list does not include the smaller alliances of  Milli Yakjehti Council, Muttahida Jihad Council and the Jammu Jihadi Council since 
they represent exclusive jihadi orientations and aims with special focus on Kashmir. For these alliances see Rana, 2009, p. 478-
481.
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Bangladesh, where in 1981 not less than 66 religious parties participated in elections,983 is unique in that it 
comprises of  largely independent Pakistani groups.984 While the creation and funding of  UDF, PNA and IJI 
was primarily ought to counterbalance and defeat the PPP in the electoral process and beyond that, to damage 
the reputation of  their candidates through targeted blackmail and media campaigns, the activities of  present  
alliances such as Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) differ from that tradition. The activities of  the DPC indicate a 
nationalist agenda which is aimed at weakening the present government with its demands of  tackling the  
granting of  a MFN status to India, negotiations on the Kashmir issue and any initiatives to bring the Pakistani  
and Indian sides together.985 The DPC proclaims a coming ghazwa-e-hind986, a religiously sanctified Muslim war 
against India. Furthermore, the DPC has been the most ardent lobby agency for a downgrade of  relations to  
the USA during 2011/12.987  
5.6 Informal Networks of  Power, Folk Islam and Pirism 
 While the rural gentry being the politically dominant force, that was – and still is – able to obtain its power by  
using its biradiri (kinship) networks to prevent land reforms from implementation, the peasantry has ever been 
excluded from political and power participation.988 Being a byproduct of  devotional Islam, “pirism”989 became 
a factor in national politics too. The infamous Pir Syed Mardan Shah (1928-2012) – the Pir Pagaro – exempli­
fies the interplay of  political and spiritual power about which Malik writes: “State politics cannot function  
without integrating or limiting the power of  the pirs in Pakistan.”990 As a central figure of  anti-British hurs res­
istance in Sindh, his father Pir Sibghatullah Shah Pagaro had been executed by the British in 1943. Spending 
years in British protective custody and in England, the Pir who had been educated both traditionally and mod­
ernist at the Aligarh University, returned to Pakistan in 1951 where his titles were restored by Liaquat Ali 
983 In addition to the Jama'at-i-Islami the two Islamic alliances of  the Islamic Jukta Front (Solaiman and Jalalabadi groups) competed 
with the Mafizur Rahman Rokan front.
984 In contrast, the Bangladeshi religious camp of  the 1980s was highly dependent of  foreign support which split the parties into a  
Saudi, a Libyan and an Iranian faction.
985 In a recent case, president Zardari's and his son's private visit to a shrine in India on 8 April, 2012, in which they met Indian  
prime minister Singh, was heavily opposed by the DPC circles in Pakistan. See The Times of  India: Asif  Ali Zardari's visit: India 
will judge Pak ties with action on Saeed, terror, PM tells Pak President, 8 April, 2012.
986 This term refers to the battles in which Prophet Muhammad participated in order to defend Islam or with the goal of  Muslim  
territorial expansion.
987 After the bombardment of  the Pakistani army post at Salala in November, 2011, by NATO air force, Pakistan withdrew its del ­
egation to the Afghanistan Conference in Bonn in December, 2011, and closed the US-NATO supply routes to Afghanistan.  
The DPC has welcomed this step and demanded the route and military airfields to remain closed for US-personal. This includes  
the Shamsi airfield in Balochistan close to the Afghan border, which played a prominent role in the US drone war. See DPC, 
website. Its efforts were sidelined by new organizations and lobby groups such as the self-proclaimed policy think tank Pakistan  
Ka Khuda Hafiz (PKKH) with subliminal incitement of  militancy, glorification of  jihād and martyrdom as well as its displayed ul­
tra-patriotism with regard to support to the army in order to restore and uphold the nation's honor. PKKH sees itself  as an al ­
ternative network for the security and policy community and is also involved in flood relief  work. The organization is chaired by  
former Director MI and ISI, Lt.-Gen. (rtd.) Hamid Gul, talk show host Ahmed Quraishi, PTI member and editor for The Nation 
Dr. Shireen Mazari and Mushahid Hussain Syed (PML-Q) and illustrates the new symbiosis of  traditional political right-wing 
forces with new spokesmen of  a highly sectarianized and ideological middle class, which, with regard to the impressive series of  
DPC jalsas and media campaigns in 2011/12 has large funding on hand. See PKKH, website. 
988 See Bin Sayeed, Khalid: Pakistan. The Formative Phase, 1857-1948. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968, p. 83ff. 
989 Expression used in Schimmel, Annemarie: Islam in the Indian Subcontinent. Leiden: Brill, 1980, p. 138. “Muridism” is used al­
ternatively for this phenomenon by Pasha, 1995, p. 182.
990 Cit. Malik, 1996, p. 8.
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Khan. As a political leader of  different Muslim League factions991, the hurs community and its leader became a 
considerable power group in national politics where he patronized politicians like Mohammad Khan Junejo 992 
and ensured influence in Sindh for the regimes of  Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul-Haq on whose  
martial law regimes he gave supportive statements several times.993 As a considerable political force, he was 
part of  subsequent anti-PPP alliances such as the IJI: It has been said that in the 1990 pre-election campaign,  
Pir Pagaro received ISI funds provided by members of  the Sindhi economic and business elites such as Yunus 
Habib of  the Habib Bank.994 Like in most of  the country's  political-cum-religious dynasties his son Syed 
Sibghatullah Shah Rashdi, chief  of  the PML-F faction, former MPA and Sindh minister, stepped in as a new 
power broker and eighth Pir of  his dynasty when Pir Pagaro died in January, 2012. 995 Marriage politics still is 
an important tool for gaining power: Although his family is loyal to the PPP, present prime minister Yousaf  
Raza Gilani, who himself  hails from a prominent sajjada nashin family from Multan, made his big coup when 
he arranged the marriage between his oldest son, himself  a provincial parliamentarian, and a granddaughter of  
Pir Pagaro only a day before he was sworn in as prime minister in 2008. 996 Political supporters to subsequent 
ruling regimes can also be found among the pīri of  Punjab: Like the Pir of  Siyal Sharif, an influential figure in 
the Sargodha and Jhang districts during the 1977 and 1985 elections997, the pīr family of  the Qureishis from 
Multan, with Shah Mahmud Qureishi as former foreign minister (2008-11)998, pīr Hazrat Syed Ghulam Muhy­
uddin Shah, Babu-ji, (1891-1974) of  Golra Sharif999 was a political heavy weight and a declared opponent of  
the Bhuttos. Provoked by Bhutto's socialist program including land reforms, Babuji who became an ardent au­
thor  of  anti-Bhutto  pamphlets,  mobilized  his  murīdi,  for  instance  in  the  parliament,  to  campaign  against 
Bhutto's PPP. Eventually due to his connections and his potential as a pro-government ally he regained the 
shrine and his property, taken over by the government and placed under the Awqaf  Department in 1961, after 
he won the case at the Rawalpindi court.1000 When Zulifikar Ali Bhutto visited the shrine of  Bari Imam, Nur­
pur, in 1970, Babuji annoyed the political elite when he refused to meet the PPP leader and former foreign  
minister (1963-1966).1001 Opposing the influence of  PPP in Punjab, Babuji supported the Deobandi JUI – es­
pecially when Maulana Mufti Mahmud (1919-1980) from Dera Ismail Khan became general secretary of  the  
991 Qayyum group and Functional group, founded in 1985. Following a deal with the Chaudhry brothers of  Gurajat, the PML-F re ­
joined the PML-Q in 2010. See The Express Tribune: Chaudhrys in new League with Pir Pagara, 19 September, 2010. 
992 See Tempest, Rone: Power Is the Pir's in Sind Province. In: Los Angeles Times, 25 September, 1986.
993 See Ashraf, Mohammad: Pir Pagara's death leaves a political vacuum. In: Gulf  News, 7 February, 2012.
994 See Nawaz, Shuja: Crossed Swords: Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 434.
995 Shah Rashdi proclaimed to continue with his father's efforts to unite the various factions of  the Muslim League, but his call has  
since been ignored by the leaders of  PML-Q and PML-Nawaz and failed as a result of  vendetta politics between the Chaudhrys  
and the Sharifs. See Hassan, Mubashir: No mid-term elections in sight. In: The Nation, 7 April, 2011.  
996 This step primarily ought to appease his Sindhi opponents within the party, who feared his Punjab oriented politics and espe ­
cially his obsession with the idea of  an autonomous Seraiki province in South Punjab might hamper their regional interests.
997 See Malik, 1990, p. 68.
998 As a former PML-Q member, he joined Imran Khan's PTI in November, 2011.
999 At that time, the shrine Babuji inherited from his father, Hazrat Syedna Pir Meher Ali Shah, belonged to the Rawalpindi district  
(today federal district Islamabad) and included “shrines, four guest houses, old and new assembly halls, Library and the keys”.  
Cit. Letter Babuji to Syed Ahmad Bin Mahdar-ul-Atas Madni, 24 April, 1961; quoted in Light of  Golra Sharif, website.
1000Another example of  prominent and well-connected resistance against nationalization is the Pir Dewal Sharif. See Malik, 1996, p.  
64.
1001Similarly, after Bhutto had become president in 1971, the  pīr ignored high-profile visits by Bhutto's ministers; for instance his 
minister for religious affairs, Kausar Niazi.
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party – and Maulana Shaikh Ahmad Nurani from the Barelwi JUP.1002 In general, the majority among the pīrs 
embraced Zia ul-Haq's take-over and the arresting of  Bhutto in 1977. Even the Makhdums of  Hala and their  
pir family members cut off  their links to the Bhutto-PPP when the regime sacked the president. 1003 Like his 
successors in power, Zia became a frequent guest at the shrines and conventions of  the Pirs.1004 
The distinction between Folk-Islam and legal or “official” Islam and its representatives, the ulamāʿ ʾ, is im­
portant. While the ulamāʿ ʾ represent the urban social strata, they are at times opposed to the pīrs in the rural 
areas.1005 The majority of  the pīrs, in contrast to the ulamāʿ ʾ, in whose circles the support for the Muslim League 
found both supporters and rigid opponents, were quite supportive towards the League “[...] for they wanted a  
Muslim state with all that symbolized and devoutly hoped to establish the religious leadership as advisers, even  
partners, to a ruling class whose political goals (as they perhaps failed to see) were largely secular.” 1006 Elements 
of  Sufism were adapted by outspoken opponents of  Folk-Islam as well: Despite their founder's vehement cri ­
ticism of  shrine culture and Sufi rituals, the  Jama'at-i-Islami's inner hierarchical organization is based on the 
concept of  bai'ah, a pledge of  allegiance by the disciple to the authority of  the leader (amīr), obligatory for 
party members and quite similar to a ritual of  initiation.1007 This concept is also part of  Sufi murshid-murīd or 
pīr-murīd (master-disciple) relations in which the novice acknowledges his subordination under the guidance of  
his sūfī master on the spiritual way towards the absolute truth.1008 
Sufi  mysticism played a much more important role in spreading Islam and enforcing Muslim identities  
across the Subcontinent than did the enforcement of  systems of  power by Muslim conquerors.1009 The mystic­
al concept of  Islam with the implicit or explicit assumption that highlights the unity between the believer and 
god with the spiritual authority of  a holy man – often known for working wonders (karāmāt) and being able to 
provide blessings and beneficial power (baraka) through his physical presence or his remains1010 – as a mediator 
1002According to the hagiographic accounts by his followers, his and his successor's death were mourned throughout the country  
with condolences from the government and the army command as well as via Radio Pakistan and PTV while religious institu ­
tions and commercial centers located at Rawalpindi and Islamabad remained closed. See website Golra Sharif: A brief  life-sketch 
of  the Lalajee Sahibaan.
1003One example is Khalique uz-Zaman Makhdum who was a favorite of  Zulfikar Bhutto but distanced himself  from the PPP when 
Bhutto was imprisoned. In 1988 Benazir Bhutto reinstalled him as president PPP in Sindh, probably because of  his family back ­
ground. Another influential PPP member became Amin Fahim Makhdum, who was offered premiership under Musharraf  but  
who refused and instead tried to run for the post of  prime minister after the elections in 2008 but failed due to Zardari's decision 
to nominate Gilani. 
1004See Einzmann, Harald: Ziarat und Pir-e-Muridi. Golra Sharif, Nurpur Shahan und Pir Baba. Drei muslimische Wallfahrtstätten in 
Nordpakistan. In: Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Südasien-Institut, Univ. Heidelberg, Vol. 120. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988, pp.  
28/29; Interview with Pir Syed Zafar Kazmi, Chakwal, 16.07.2009.
1005See Malik, 1990, p. 68.
1006Cit. Metcalf, 1982, p. 14.
1007See Maudūdī's early writings of  March, 1941, in: 'Asim Nu'mani (Ed.): Makatib-i Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (Correspondences  
by Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi). Lahore: Islamic Publications, Vol. 2, 1977, p. 8-10. Quoted in: Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza: 'Organiza ­
tion' in Islamic Movements, p. 65. In: Kennedy, Charles H. / Rais, Rasul Bakhsh (Eds.): Pakistan: 1995. Lahore: Vanguard, 1995,  
p. 61-81. The inclusion of  bai'ah into the Jama'at's organizational contours might have been a result of  Mistri Muhammad Sid­
diq's influence. He was an intimate companion of  Maudūdī and had been sent to scholars in India by Abu'l-Kalam Azad (1888-
1958) to win their support for a new Islamic party for which Azad envisioned  bai'ah as the instrument for ensuring loyalty 
between the party's supporters and their leader, the amīr-i Hind. See Nasr, 1994, p. 11-13.
1008See Weismann, 2007, Chapter 1 and especially p. 3-9; Aziz, 2001. Even in colonial times the administrators pointed out to the  
misuse of  their exceptional social position and personal gains by local saints who often represented the same socioeconomic in ­
terests as the landlords due to their extensive land holdings and income through the management of  the shrines. See Einzmann, 
1988, p. 22-30, 84/85.
1009See Jalal, 2000, p. 17. For the Sufi mystical poets of  Punjab and Sindh see ibid., p. 19ff.
1010See De Jong, F., 1989, p. 495.
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in between.1011 Tombs of  saints (maqbaras) provide the sacral space where the interaction between believer and 
god via the saint takes place, emphasizing an individual way to god, marked by the contemplation of  god ( tas­
awwuf), as contrasted by the more collectivist rituals of  worship associated with the mosque (masjid).1012 The 
prophet is claimed to be the most central authority, sometimes referred to as “the reason of  all being” ( asl al-
wujūd), for instance during the excessive festivities on the occasion of  his birthday ( ursʿ 1013, mīlād or maulid an-
nabī).1014 
It is the link with politics, the misuse of  power over followers by pirs and manipulation in order to legitim­
ize rule by regimes that presents Sufism in a rather ambiguous light: Re-discovered in the post-9/11 era by 
Western think tanks and internationally lauded as the “panacea” to turmoil in the region 1015 and religious-polit­
ical counter force against extremism and intolerance,1016 Sufi concepts of  authority and leadership seem to be 
in a limbo between acceptance on the basis of  a narrative of  moderate and tolerant Islam on the one hand,  
and mistrust, allegations of  nepotism, decadence and feudalism on the other, pointing out to a narrative of  
misuse of  religion.1017 While both accounts generalize and polarize, the latter image is cultivated by national 
media and the religious orthodoxy alike. Hence,  Ahl-i-Hadith, Deobandis and Jama'at-i-Islami, tend to portray 
Sufism as shirk (blasphemy by polytheism), bid aʿ  (unlawful innovation) or simply as kufr (infidelity). As for the 
popular Sufi events at shrines and graves – without exaggerating its reputation in society at large, especially  
due to threats by extremist groups and restrictions by the local authorities for security reasons1018 – it seems 
that Folk Islam can serve as a “substitute culture” that has the potential to attract all strata of  society to some 
extend.1019 
Generally, political groups and actors, similar to the army which owns large property in rural areas that it  
distributes to retired and active officers, provide networks of  patronage and distribution of  resources for their  
electorates. Reconsidering the hegemonic role of  the military, political actors have to appease and accommod­
ate the military establishment. Informal networks, strategic installation of  family members on key posts of  de­
cision making and power ensure their influence and participation. Ideally, the “Pakistani political family thus 
has its members in a range of  influential occupations: a civil servant, a policeman, a lawyer, a businessman  
and, if  possible, representatives in several different political parties.”1020
1011See Ibid., p. 487. The concept of  inter-mediation (tawa) is refused by the Deobandis.
1012See Jalal, 2000, pp. 17/18.
1013Literally “marriage”; celebrities and commemoration of  the death anniversary of  the prophet or a specific saint.
1014See De Jong, F., 1989, p. 491.
1015Cit. paper on Sufism, SAARC conference, Delhi, March, 2006. Quoted in: World Religion Watch, 2009.
1016See Philippon, 2011, p. 347-368.
1017It seems to be adequate to point out to a common “Western” misperception in which the rich cultural conglomerate of  Folk Is ­
lam remains largely unknown to the media public in the USA or Europe as compared to the well-known radicalized representat ­
ives of  political or missionary Islamic movements. For an exceptional German contribution on Sufism in Pakistan see Kermani,  
Navid: Wer hier tanzt, der tut es nicht zum Vergnügen. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 March, 2012.
1018After the attack on the Data Ganj Bakhsh (Data Darbar) shrine on 1 July, 2010, the Government of  Punjab and Lahore's author­
ities officially restricted qawwali (Sufi devotional music and dancing) events at the site.
1019Like integration and isolation, substitution is a modus operandi to deal with the challenges and different realms of  modernity and  
tradition and “[...] provides a temporary refuge from the sharp contrast between modern and indigenous, such as urban crime,  
consumption of  narcotics, or the world of  cinema. The veneration of  saints may also be considered here.” Cit. Malik, 2008, p.  
397.
1020Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 218.
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The social strata of  electoral candidates in Pakistan can be categorized as follows: 1. feudal and tribal elites;  
2.  biradiri elites; 3. industrial elites; 4. middle class and, 5. the  pīrs and  ulamāʿ ʾ.1021 All of  these groups when, 
quite often regardless of  their political-ideological orientations, have to join a party for candidacy in traditional  
constituencies, that guarantee their election. In turn the candidates bring their networks, followers and sup­
porters on the party platform: 
Contesting elections has become the profession of  the very rich. JUI is an ideological party. We do not have  
feudal or industrialists funding our elections. Our workers are awarded tickets on merit and the party men run  
our campaigns. How often can you expect a poor party, its ordinary workers and its candidates to match the  
might and riches of  the feudal or industrialists? Once in five years is okay, but if  elections are held every two 
years, not only JUI but all ideological parties and workers are bound to get eliminated. This is a good way to en ­
sure the 'survival of  the richest'!1022
A PML senator claims that only the Jama'at-i-Islami and the MQM support their candidates financially while the 
other party platforms themselves rely on the wealth and power of  their candidates.1023 Bypassing the formal 
system of  power, informal networks and interdependency are based on the traditional elite of  landlords (za­
mindari)1024 that constitutes its own political and socioeconomic center of  power. Predominantly in the rural 
areas, this group aims at keeping out modern urban elites from the political sphere through its linkages to oth ­
er social sectors: “Patronage and kinship form the basic elements of  the Pakistani political system – if  water,  
chemically speaking, is H²O the Pakistani politics are P²K.”1025 Hence, political parties are dominated by these 
feudal families and dynasties. Further,  any discussion about feudalism, often taken as a distinct rural phe­
nomenon represented by the traditional landowning elite exclusively, has to take into account that the institu ­
tional elites such as the army and new urban business circles increasingly contest these power arrangements  
and can therefore, to a certain extent, be counted to the representatives of  the feudal power structure that  
penetrates national politics.1026 And last, rural socioeconomic and political power brokers were subjected to 
change as well:
More important for Pakistan as a whole is the fact that politics in large areas of  the Punjab and the NWFP are  
no longer dominated by great individual landowners. This is partly because of  land reform and the subdivision 
through inheritance of  formerly great estates, and partly because of  social mobility due to economic change.  
The key rural politician in these areas is a relatively small landowner (with perhaps 100 acres or so), deeply em ­
bedded in a powerful local landowning clan, with influence over the police and administration.1027
However, this elite is highly heterogeneous alongside tribal, clan and client subdivisions with differing and of ­
ten competing interests but it continues to shape Pakistan's socioeconomic reality.1028
1021This categorization is proposed in Waseem, 1994, p. 96-109.
1022Cit. Haq, Azmul: Interview with Senator Hafiz Hussain Ahmed (JUI-F). In: The News, 9 December, 1994.
1023Interview with Semeen Yusuf  Siddiqui, Senator (PML-Q), Islamabad, 30 July, 2009. According to her, despite legal improve ­
ments for the candidature of  women, the increase of  women's seats from 20 to 60 in 2002, this is a problem especially for mar ­
ried female candidates who financially depend on their husbands. Although the creation of  additional parliamentary seats for  
minorities and women might have brought limited improvements, it is questionable if  this will affect the political culture substan­
tially. As of  2008/09 there were 22 percent female MNAs and 17 percent female senators.
1024This term is more used in Punjab while in Sindh big landowners are referred to as waderos. 
1025Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 204.
1026This argument is also raised by Siddiqi, Ayesha: Maleeha Lodhi Juggling a Dream, 13 September, 2011.
1027Cit. Lieven, 2011, p. 219.
1028For  overlapping rural  structures  of  power,  especially  in Punjab and Sindh,  see  the excellent  accounts  by Einzmann,  1988;  
Ahmad, 1985; and especially Aziz, Kursheed Kamal: Religion, Land and Politics in Pakistan. A Study of  Piri-Muridi. Lahore (a.  
o.): Vanguard, 2001. 
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6 Sociopolitical Framework II: Israel's Religious-Political Groups and the State
Rebbe:       I haven't seen you in a long time. Blessing and success.
Netanyahu: I came to ask your blessing and help, both personal and political.
Rebbe:        Since we last met many things have progressed. What hasn't changed, however, is that Moshiach still hasn't come, so do  
something to hasten His coming.
Netanyahu: We're doing, we're doing...
Rebbe: Apparently it's not enough since many hours have already passed today and He's still not here. But there are still a few hours 
left in the day. So try still for today – with joy and happiness. You know that Hasidim are careful to do everything with joy. 
Good tidings, much success.
MK Benjamin Netanyahu meets Lubavitcher Rebbe, Brooklyn, 18 November, 1990.1029
6.1 Israel's Religious Right
The history of  Israel's religious-political parties reflects both the evolving political strength of  various Jewish 
religious groups and the immense influence of  issues related to religion that have occupied the political arena 
and Israeli public over decades. In order to contextualize the importance and centrality of  religious issues in  
the political sphere, I will review the history of  the dominant religious parties and non-political groups in Is ­
rael whereas religious Zionism, haredi Judaism and Hassidism will be in the main focus for their varying orient­
ations towards the state and its ideology. Thereby, the study distinguishes between three different periods. 1030 
The distinction I propose hereby, is based on the religious parties' results in the Knesset elections from the 
first Knesset in 1949 to the eighteenth in 20091031. During the stable period of  Labor rule1032 from 1949 to 
1977, the religious bloc held between 15 and 18 seats in the Knesset,  the  Knesset  HaGdola,  (out of  120). 
Between the second period (1977-1996), the religious bloc constituted between ten and 18 seats of  the Knes ­
set. During the third period from 1996 to 2009 and the last elections, it held between 21 and 27 seats.1033 
Characteristic of  the first period were electoral stability, continuity and a balance of  power among the reli­
gious parties  Mizrachi and  HaPoel HaMizrachi. After a split in 1956, when leftists of  the Mizrachi joined the 
left-wing HaPoel HaMizrachi, the NRP1034 was formed.1035 Together with the ultra-orthodox Agudat Yisrael and 
Palei Agudat Yisrael these parties became the political activists and guardians of  the Status Quo which regulated 
the status of  religion in the future state. The legitimacy of  the Status Quo Agreement, signed by David Ben-
Gurion, Rabbi J. L. Fishman and I. Greenbaum during the inception of  the new state has been the nucleus of  
many  debates  among Israeli  scholars  and  intellectuals  with  regard  to  re-conceptualizing  the  arrangement 
between secular and religious issues in the state. The agreement included: 1. Sabbath shall be the official day 
of  rest; 2. Jewish dietary laws (Kashrut) will be safeguarded in all institutions of  the state, including the armed 
1029Cit. Habad movie clip: Eye to Eye. Politicians for Redemption!
1030For this periodization see Lee, Kangkeun: Religion and Politics in Israel During the Intifada: The Conflict Between Religious and  
Secular Jews and Religion and State in Israel During the Intifada, 2000-2005. Unpubl. PhD Thesis, Hebrew University Jerusalem,  
2007.
1031Results in 2009: Shas (11 seats), United Torah Judaism (5 seats), HaBayit HaYehudi (3 seats, former NRP).
1032Israel's first republic lasted until 1977 and was dominated by the Mapai party (1930-1968), which later became Avoda. Although 
Labor maintained the hegemonic position in parliament for at least two decades, the party's leadership showed a high commit ­
ment to a consensual model towards the management of  the religion-state conflict and included the religious bloc in their coali ­
tions. Especially the National Religious Party became a confirmative element of  Labor's government coalitions in the coalitions 
between 1951 and 1964.
1033See Knesset: Parliamentary Groups Statistics, website.
1034Also known as Mafdal (Miflaga Datit Le'umit).
1035Other influential streams were the religious Kibbutz movement (HaKibbutz HaDati) and the youth movement of  Bnei Akiva. See 
Tepe, 2008, p. 107.
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forces; 3. Marriage and divorce will be conducted according to halachic law; 4. Autonomy of  financing and re ­
ligious education; and 5. Religious representation in the High Court.1036 
The second period, from 1977 to 1996, illustrates not only a deeper involvement of  religious issues in do ­
mestic and foreign policy but also deep struggles within the religious parties vis-à-vis their ideological and eth ­
nic setup, their religious leadership and the competition between the national-religious (religious-Zionist) and 
the ultra-orthodox bloc. During the second period, the competition became obvious when the religious-polit­
ical landscape was more and more fragmented by splits and mergers.1037 
The third period from 1996 to the present was characterized by a change within the religious parties, and 
the rise of  a new generation of  politicians can be identified in the groups' hierarchies. Although Israel has ever  
been an immigration state and “melting pot”, increasing numbers of  Jews from the former Soviet Union arriv­
ing in Israel during the 1990s challenged the state's potential in terms of  the immigrants' absorption and so ­
cioeconomic integration.  Avigdor Lieberman, who immigrated from Moldova to Israel  in 1978 and soon 
entered political life in the Likud created a political representation of  the Russian immigrants when he foun­
ded Yisrael Beitenu in 1999. In the same year the party took four seats in the Fifteenth Knesset. The electoral  
success of  Yisrael Beitenu – similar to the rise of  Shas – demonstrated the power of  identity and ethnic politics 
and the loyalties of  Israel's marginalized communities. Traditional constituencies of  NRP and the right-wing 
list  Ichud Leumi, especially among the settlers, were attracted by Lieberman's secular nationalist program. Fi­
nally, when Lieberman became Foreign Minister in the Netanyahu cabinet after the elections in 2009, the over­
lapping of  secular and religious concepts of  nationalism in the parties' agendas became apparent.1038
The Second Intifada (2000-2005) created the necessity of  promulgating new government policies designed  
to deal with the security crisis caused by the Al-Aqsa Intifada. These policies, in turn, spurred new areas of  
conflict between the elements of  the religious right and the Israeli state. This configuration brought out con­
flicts that had not manifested themselves before the Gaza Disengagement and which defined a new cleavage 
in Israel's  society based on different interpretations of  the territorial  issue.  This climate of  confrontation  
between a geo-theological reasoning on the one hand versus a logic based on national security and diplomatic  
concerns on the other, affected the plan for a freeze of  settlements in 2009.
1036See Unna, Moshe: Separate Ways in the Religious Parties' confrontation of  Renascent Israel. N.N.: Dept. for Torah Education 
and Culture in the Diaspora of  the World Zionist Organization, 1987, pp. 90/91; 94-97.
1037Tami (1981) and  Matzad (1984) split from NRP and rejoined in 1988. Traditionally, though mixed in its ranks, NRP is more 
Ashkenazi-oriented. More significant was the split of  Shas from Agudat Yisrael  in 1984 which was a Sephardic response to the 
Ashkenazi dominance predominantly for ethnic reasons. Later, in 1992, the two Ashkenazi parties, Aguda together with Degel  
HaTora, formed United Tora Judaism (UTJ). 
1038The current cabinet is with 30 ministers, among them several ministers without portfolio, the largest in the parliamentary history  
of  Israel. Due to what Asher Arian calls the “chaotic nature” of  the Israeli political system, the low two-percent qualifying 
threshold for elections, and therefore a large number of  parties and difficulties in forming governments, made the distribution  
of  cabinet positions important in coalition deals. Among the religious parties, only  Shas and NRP MKs serve in ministerial posi­
tions since the Ashkenazi parties traditionally refuse to get involved in the process of  political decision making in the Zionist  
state. 
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6.1.1 National-Religious Bloc and Religious Zionism
Similar to the secular Zionism of  the founding fathers, the religious Zionist “movement of  concrete redemp­
tion in our time” highlights an active Jewish engagement in the process of  redemption (Yesha) of  the people 
and the land of  Israel: 
The Messiah […] is not responsible for the plant and the growth of  the fruit, but rather for its ripening. The  
concrete, historical Beginning we are witnessing today hast not come about through a personal redeemer, but 
through our collective activity and the changes that have taken place in our character as a people.1039
However, it was precisely the Zionist goal – “the normalization of  the Jewish people, by creating a Jewish  
state”1040 – that contradicted the logic of  religious Zionism and provoked opposition at the margins of  the 
Zionist endeavor, by the ultra-orthodox groups who opposed human intervention in the status that had been  
framed by the Jewish covenant with God making the Jews his chosen people. The Zionist imperative of  col­
lective action, seen by its religious opponents not sanctified in religious terms, is linked to the belief  in a post-
Zionist messianic age.1041 The three-way connection between God, the People of  Israel and the Torah is not  
exclusively religious Zionist since it is a basic belief, shared by the haredi interpretation and many secular Is ­
raelis and even anti-Zionists.1042 In contrast to this, the idea of  messianic redemption which finds its expres­
sion in the ideologies of  religious Zionism and haredi groups1043 will become more evident when considering 
the meaning of  the Israeli state in the light of  anti-Zionism:
Seeing the coming of  Zionism and the founding of  the state of  Israel as an opportunity for Jews to improve  
their situation, but not as the beginning of  redemption. […] [They] will avoid any contact with the state, since 
they see it not only as illegitimate, but as an act of  blasphemy. For them the state is still a place of  exile, until the  
coming of  the Messiah.1044
Unlike the interpretation of  the state as “the beginning of  redemption”, the idea of  the Land implies an attri­
bution of  religious dimensions to a concrete geography within a cultural process of  “mapping”. Kippenberg  
and von Stuckrad state that in this geo-theology, a grading according to the holiness and religious purity of  a  
geographic place is central for the interpretation of  Eretz Yisrael as the holy land with Jerusalem and the “lost 
Temple” in its center. In the Temple's holiest circle the manifestation of  God (Schechinah) is still present and 
also manifested in the Hebrew Bible, the Torah. According to both the Zionist-messianic belief, historical  
events such as the Balfour-Declaration, the creation and continuation of  the Israeli state, the Six Day War and  
the conquest and settlement of  the country were steps within the process of  redemption which will lead the  
Jewish People into a Messianic Age in which a Third Temple will be constructed.1045
The second most critical complex in both the religious and political philosophy of  religious Zionism is the 
concept of  the Ingathering of  the Exiles with “a very political idea of  uniting separate Jewish communities, 
1039Cit. Ravitzky, Aviezer: Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago (a.o.): The Univ. of  Chicago Press, 1996,  
p. 81.
1040Cit. Tepe, 2008, p. 109.
1041Ibid., p. 79.
1042Interview with Rabbi Shmuel Strauss, Educational Director Institute for Science and Halacha, 22 December, 2009.
1043In some accounts, Kookist religious Zionism is categorized as a sub-stream of  the ultra-orthodox Haredim movements. While it 
is correct that Kookist thought emerged from a tradition that has been, in many aspects, close to the Haredim, it is here presented 
as a distinctive milieu including its remarkable development after 1967. Thus, the term Haredim Leumi, used by some authors, 
seems not adequate in the context of  this study and is normally not used in Israel where the notion of  “the settlers” seems to be  
much more common. 
1044Cit. Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, p. 133.
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forming a unity that could be seen as a creation of  a nation-state in secular terms.” 1046  Rav Avraham HaCohen 
Kook in his philosophy offered a concept which undid the religious-secular conflict within Zionism: Accord ­
ing to Kook, events like the Jewish settlements in Palestine and the creation of  the state of  Israel implied both,  
the secularist aim of  unifying the Jewish people in order to normalize its relations with the non-Jewish world  
and the orthodox attempt to preserve its uniqueness. Secular Zionists, according to Kook, and even the most  
ardent opponents of  Judaism were driven by divine will and by a latent and hidden religiousness. Their efforts  
to establish the modern secular nation-state and to cultivate halutziut, the pioneering spirit1047, from that per­
spective, were holy and sanctified in halachic terms, equal to the overt holiness of  sanctified deeds (e.g. pray­
ers, Torah studies).1048 Instead of  condemning secular Zionism and its manifestation – the state – as unholy or 
illegitimate the way the ultra-orthodox from the  Agudat Yisrael did, Kook embraced the Herzlian vision of  
statehood. It was under his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891-1982), that the State of  Israel, its institutions,  
representatives and its army, were conceived in terms of  holiness. Kookist worldview and political theology 
were introduced into Israeli politics by Mafdal. The leaders of  the national religious party, with few exceptions, 
had been students of  Rabbi Kook or were associated to the milieu of  the Markaz HaRav Yeshiwah of  Jer ­
uslam: Moshe Levinger1049,  Hanan Porat1050,  Yaakov “Kätzele” Katz1051,  Rabbi Menachem Felix and Benny 
Katzover1052 and others,  after  1967,  emerged as  political  leaders  of  the settler  movement  and introduced 
Kookist thought to the ideology of  the NRP or linked organizations like the Gush Emunim. 1967 and the war 
brought by a new dynamic and enabled the Kookists to expand their discourse into the secular Zionist public.  
A significant event before the war was Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook's prophetic claim on Independence Day at his  
Yeshiwah:
1045The Second Temple was destroyed in 70 A.D. during the Roman-Jewish War. See Kippenberg/ von Stuckrad, 2003, p. 114-120.  
According to this eschatology and basic assumption of  orthodox and ultra-orthodox traditional thought which is to some extend 
shared by Christian interpretations, the Jewish People is God's “chosen people” and “light upon the nations” and the Torah its  
eternal and universal message. To enlighten other nations with the Torah is therefore an integral part of  the concept of  ethnic  
election, destiny and cultural mission. See Smith, Anthony D.: Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of  
Nationalist Ideals. In: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, p. 331-355; Langer, Ruth: Theologies of  the Land and State  
of  Israel: The Role of  the Secular in Jewish and Christian Understandings. In: Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations, Volume 3, 
No. 1, 2008, p. 1-17; Interview with Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Halperin, Head of  Institute for Science and Halacha, Jerusalem, 29  
December, 2009.
1046Cit. Tepe, 2008, p. 107.
1047See Ibid., p. 112.
1048See Ibid., pp. 110/111.
1049Well-known for being the spiritual father of  the first settlements in Hebron. In 1978, he and his followers had occupied the Park  
Hotel and refused to withdraw. 
1050Died in 2011. Ordained as a rabbi as a student of  Kook, he participated in the 1967 war as a paratrooper. For his involvement in  
the capture of  the Old City and his political skills, Porat became the leading figure of  the settler movement and the Gush. As a  
child he was evacuated from the Kfar Etzion settlement in 1948 before its Haganah defenders surrendered to the Arab attackers. 
Known as the Kfar Etzion massacre of  13 May, the killing of  its residents was declared a retaliatory operation as a response to  
the Deir Yassin massacre of  9 April, 1948.
1051After his studies at the Markaz HaRav, he served in an elite unit during the 1973 war behind Egyptian lines where he was heavily  
wounded. Becoming the founder of  the Beit El settlement, he serves today as an MK for the nationalist-religious party  Ichud 
Leumi. Seeing the “de-Arabization” of  Eilat as a role model for the concentration and control of  immigrants, Kätzele makes no  
secret of  his hard-line stance towards the sub-Saharan refugees who illegally live as day-workers in Israel. Interview with MK 
Yaakov Katz (Ichud Leumi), Knesset, 12 November, 2010.
1052Felix and Katzover, together with Porat were the founders of  the Elon Moreh (1975) settlement near Sebastia. Katzover has also  
been the Head of  the Committee of  the Settlers of  Samaria which after the 2005 Gaza disengagement composed an important 
lobby group against the freeze of  settlement constructions in the West Bank. Katzover is also an iconic leading figure within the  
radical Hill Top Youth. For his position on the settlements see Levinson, Chaim: Dismantle Israeli democracy and replace it with 
Jewish law, says settler leader. In: Ha'aretz, 8 January, 2012.
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'They divided up my land.' Yes, this is true. Where is our Hebron? Do we let it be forgotten? And where are our 
Shechem and our Jericho? Where are they? Can we ever forsake them? All of  Transjordan, it is ours. Every  
single inch, every square foot […] belongs to the Land of  Israel. Do we have the right to give up even one milli ­
meter?1053
As Aran points out, 1967 and the conquest of  Jerusalem and the West Bank as its culminating events made  
tensions between secular Zionism as represented by the state and the new re-discovery of  Jewishness after the  
war visible.1054 For Kook's students, their master's “prophecy” had turned into reality. The Kookist narrative of  
the war connected the nation with its land1055 and integrated  1967 as the “year zero”, as “Israel's rebirth” or as 
“the beginning of  the era of  redemption” into the popularized national narrative. Thus, it made the war a  
greater event than the war of  1948/49 with the celebrations on the occasion of  the Jerusalem Day (Yom Yer­
ushalayim) replacing Independence Day (Yom HaAtzma'ut). 1967 had the potential to bridge between ideological 
splits within religious Zionism and enabled it to expand its beliefs, values and world view to such an extend to  
the general statist Zionist secular and religious public that it merged with similar political features of  Israeli  
political culture such as the rightist obsession with security, the claim for expansion, militarism and ethno-reli ­
gious nationalism.1056
Regarding the realization of  the ideology of  Greater Israel, which was not a unique claim of  religious  
Zionism but which filled the ideology with a concrete political program after the victory of  1967, Fischer  
writes:
While of  course, there were important non-religious factors, such as the Movement for the Greater Land of  Is ­
rael, Hug Ein Vered in the Labor Party and the largely non-Orthodox Likud Party, who advocated incorporation 
and settlement of  Eretz Yisrael Hashlema, the religious Zionists were the ones who most ardently advocated 
this program and it became most closely identified with them.1057
The vision of  incorporating territory into the Israeli borders and to politically incorporate it to the Israeli legal  
and administrative system followed by the religious imperative to implement and realize the commandments 
of  the Torah (Mishtar HaTorah) in the whole of  Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael HaShlema), was therefore a demand 
which after June 1967 found resonance beyond the religious nationalist community.1058 Although the process 
of  settling the land started in fall 1967, it manifested as a policy of  settling not before 1977 when the religious  
1053Cit. Kook, quoted in Aran, 1995, p. 202.
1054Similarly, religion's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and regarding Israel's conquest of  Jerusalem and subsequent  
endeavors  to Judaize  the Jerusalem area,  was  significantly  pushed by all  conflict  parties.  Among the additional  events  that  
brought by a sharpening of  the religious factor was the attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque by an Australian fundamentalist Christian  
in 1969. For the discourses of  the official Egyptian clergy on the events during the 1960s see Haddad's analysis of  the meetings  
of  the al-Azhar Academy of  Islamic Research, Cairo. The demand of  destroying Muslim holy places in Jerusalem had also been 
advocated by Christian fundamentalist leaders in the U.S. who fought their crusade trough the media. Within the worldview of  
preachers such as Pat Robertson, the Six Day War “was a defining event in history, a moment of  divine intervention heralding  
the millennium.” Cit. Haddad, Yvonne: Islamists and the “Problem of  Israel”: The 1967 Awakening, p. 271. In: Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, p. 266-285. The perception of  Muslim holy places being threatened initiated a process in which ele ­
ments from the Jewish and Christian and the Muslim side did their part to bolster religion as a unifying and transnational iden ­
tity-building factor. In this context, it is worth to mention the founding of  the Organization of  the Islamic Conference (OIC) in  
1969 and the joining of  Egypt, especially since Gamal Abd el Nasser had opposed to join the Islamic Pact proposed by Iran and 
Saudi-Arabia two years earlier. With membership in the OIC Nasser ought to generate the support against Israel from the Islam ­
ic countries that were not members of  the Arab League. See Ibid., pp. 268/269.
1055See Aran, 1995, p. 197.
1056For instance Sprinzak applied all these per se political features to Gush Emunim and the settlers' organizations, interpreting them 
primarily as a political-cultural phenomenon. See Sprinzak, Ehud: The Ascendance of  Israel's Radical Right. New York (a.o.):  
Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.
1057Cit. Fischer, 2007, p. 169.
1058See Ibid., p. 174.
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Zionist position was adopted by Begin's Likud-led government. The implementation of  the religious through 
the secular – including state policies in military and foreign affairs – demanded a reinterpretation of  the State 
of  Israel and its role in the concept of  Eretz Yisrael HaShlema and in religious Zionism itself  which since its 
birth had advocated its vision of  Mishtar HaTorah, as a revitalization of  the dominant view on the state which 
since 1948 was expressed mainly through loyalty, respect towards and accommodation with its institutions. 
While  Mishtar HaTorah  had existed before 1967 as an utopian and abstract slogan – indeed it can be traced  
back to the first religious Zionist organization, the Mizrachi, a party within the WZO, founded in 19021059 – the 
Israeli conquest of  biblical land on the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan, Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem, upgraded  
the centrality of  Eretz Yisrael HaShlema which maps the territorial contours of  Israel as the biblical land and its  
borders from the sea in the West to the river of  Jordan in the East. 1060 Subsequently, any forms of  political 
concessions which could result in a re-transfer of  parts of  Eretz Yisrael was seen in the light of  the Torah as a 
negative  command while  conquest  and  possession of  the land  were  positive  ones.1061 In this  sense,  only 
through the unification of  parts of  the land and Jerusalem under Jewish-Israeli control the land could be back 
to normality: Since independence of  the State of  Israel large parts of  the territory which, according to the 
Kookist approach can only be seen as part of  an organic whole including the holy trinity of  the Jewish people,  
the Greater Land of  Israel and the Torah, were under foreign control. The Kookist approach to the land of  
Eretz Yisrael sees the demand for the full ownership over the land as non-negotiable while the territorial notion  
of  the land emphasizes its indivisibility. 
Ideologically, the national-religious movement has always existed between two somewhat conflicting posi­
tions: Religion, as a set of  beliefs constructed around the idea of  a god, and secular Zionism, which offered a  
hegemonic ideological platform for a broad spectrum of  different and sometimes competing national Zion­
isms, for instance right-wing Revisionist Zionism which opposed the leftist Zionism of  the Labor Party. An ­
other issue specific to the national-religious camp which is on the political level represented by today's  New 
Mafdal party HaBayit HaYehudi, was that during the 1970s, when the Young Generation faction gained control 
of  the party, it used its political power and by forcing the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, defined a  
new party agenda. This new focus was in favor of  secular political issues and contrasted the party's previous 
focus on the religious-centered issues of  Kashrut, Sabbath legislation and marriage and divorce, which apply  
to the rabbinical religious jurisdiction based on Halachic law.1062 Through education and settlements, organiza­
tions such as  Gush Emunim (Bloc of  the Faithful) and the  Movement for the Greater Land of  Israel,  ought to 
strengthen the Jewish character of  the state. 
Evidenced by a de facto large number of  settlements in these areas, the supporters of  the expansionist nar ­
rative have attained many achievements and gained legitimacy. Israel's demographic environment is further 
fragmented by a growing number of  Israeli citizens who, for the sake of  attractive financial benefits and taxa­
tion, nationalist ideological prospective of  conquering and settling land suffused with a religious mission, live 
1059See Liebman, Charles S.: Religion, Democracy and Israeli Society. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publ., 1997, p. 39ff.
1060See Fischer, 2007, p. 178.
1061See Ibid., p. 172.
1062See Weissbrod, Lilly: Gush Emunim Ideology. From Religious Doctrine to Political Action. In: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 3, 1982, p. 265-273.
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in the area of  the West Bank occupied by Israel in the 1967 war. Often described as “messiah's donkeys” 1063 by 
the liberal left and opponents to the occupation in generalizing terms, today they compose about 311.000 in  
the West Bank settlements and 196.000 in East Jerusalem. Although there are only a few ultra-orthodox settle­
ments in the West Bank, statistics show that the haredi population in this settlements constitutes 26 percent of  
the total Jewish settler population (289.600 as of  July 2009) in the West Bank. The Haredim communities in 
this area are therefore the second largest compared to the settlements of  national-religious (25 percent), secu­
lar (16 percent) and mixed communities (33 percent).1064
Under Zevulun Hammer who became the party's leader in 1977 and Yehuda Ben Meir, a former lecturer at  
Bar-Ilan University1065, religious leaders of  Gush Emunim were placed on the NRP's list of  candidates such as 
Rabbi Chaim Druckman, one of  the leading religious authorities in the settlements.1066 Druckman represented 
a generation of  orthodox religious scholars who graduated from the Merkaz HaRav, which is considered to be 
one of  the most influential religious institutions in orthodox Judaism. Founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook 
(1865-1935) in 1924 in Jerusalem, the Markaz and the attitude of  its graduates shifted away from an integrative  
and liberal orthodox view to a conservative position in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the settle­
ment policy which they interpreted as a natural and historical right. Sharing the coalition with the new elected  
Likud  government of  Prime Minister Menachem Begin was for NRP only logical.1067 In an electoral-based 
context, the antagonism of  weak electoral results and the party’s social power become obvious, since NRP de ­
creased in popularity from an initial success in 1977 with twelve seats to a power loss in 1984 with only four  
seats. 1068
When the right-wing Likud, including the former Herut party, entered the political game and three decades 
of  Labor rule ended, Begin proceeded to implement ideological elements of  the Revisionist Zionists' frame­
work1069 into what Peleg considers a “neo-Revionist” framework1070. The Revisionist Movement, an extreme 
rightist stream within Zionism under the leadership of  Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880-1940), ought to pro­
tect the Jewish communities in Europe from the threat of  antisemitism and was influenced by European na ­
tionalism and elements of  Italian fascism. The Revisionist vision of  settling Palestine was the concept of  a  
powerful nation whose executive and protective force against  natives,  was to recruit  soldiers and fighters, 
rather than workers and farmers as promoted by the socialist vision. The idea of  the “new Jew” - the Hebrew  
1063Cit. Prof. Dr. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (University of  Haifa), Haifa, 4 December, 2009.
1064See ICG Middle East Report: Israel's Religious Right and the Question of  Settlements, No. 89. Jerusalem/ Brussels, 2009, p. 12-
16 and Appendix B, Map of  religious composition of  settlements, p. 40. For this composition and numbers of  settlers see also  
Annex, Tabelle 4 and Tabelle 5.
1065Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan-Tel Aviv, the country's second largest university, offers a dual curricula, combining secular aca­
demics and religious Torah studies. The majority of  its religious students is widely seen as politically and ideologically affiliated 
with religious-Zionism vis-à-vis the settler movement. Following the assassination of  Prime Minister Ytzhak Rabin on 4 Novem­
ber, 1995, by Bar-Ilan student Yigal Amir, the university's policy towards radical political students' unions changed drastically.  
However, the university is frequently stigmatized by the secular public. See Ha'aretz: Losing God's Image, 15 September, 2004. 
1066See Bradley, 1985, pp. 54-57. 
1067See Lee, 2007.
1068In 1981, NRP gained six Knesset seats. See Arian, Asher: Politics in Israel. The Second Republic. 2nd Ed. Washington D.C.: CQ  
Books, 2005, p. 93.
1069See Peleg, 1987, p. 1-15; Peleg, Ilan: A Constructivist Interpretation of  Likud's Foreign Policy, 1977-1999: The Production of  In ­
security. Paper presented at the annual meeting of  the International Studies Association. Montreal, March 17, 2004, p. 11-13. 
1070See Peleg, 1987, p. 51-93.
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Israeli - as a colonialist in the Land of  Israel meant a radical shift away from the Jewish past in exile ( Galut) as 
well as from the “stereotype of  the weak, pale, scholarly Diaspora Man”. 1071 As one of  Jabotinsky's students 
and admirers Menachem Begin internalized the security and defense paradigm of  “building a wall of  iron”  
around the Israeli state.1072 Politically, the Greater Israel ideology was transformed into an ultra-nationalist  
agenda and became the core of  right-wing foreign politics and a strong component of  Israel's military-security  
setup.  Although  Likud never  had  a  similar  organizational  strength  possessed  by  Labor  parties  and  leftist 
groups, Labor lacked to oppose the strong territorial component of  the rightist ideology. The expansion and  
protection of  the land and the call for “tenable borders” became predominant in the elections of  1977: The 
success of  the Arab armies in the first days of  Yom Kippur War (6-24 October, 1973) created a powerful  
trauma in the nation's psyche and memory. As a result, large parts of  the Israeli public were attracted by the  
hawkish neo-revisionist attitude.1073    
During his tenures, Begin offered more than just symbolic gestures towards the national-religious right and 
the ultra-orthodox leadership. Soon after his electoral victory he met with Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook,  
the spiritual father of  Gush Emunim1074, and Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the highest authority of  
Habad-Hassidism.1075 The practice of  following a rabbi and asking for his spiritual support is not exceptional.  
Private audiences at the residences of  former Israeli Chief  Rabbi Ovadia Yusuf, the head of  Shas, and the 
Lubavitcher Rebbe in Brooklyn-Williamsburg are an inherent part of  Israeli political culture.1076 
Facing an evident shift of  political culture and the parliamentary system rightward, the religious-nationalist  
position of  NRP's hardliners towards the settlements became more acceptable for the new political main­
stream. Vice versa, the support of  the Begin cabinet for the establishment of  new settlements in the West  
Bank, announced by Begin and the new agriculture minister Ariel Sharon immediately after the elections, was  
1071See Beit-Hallahmi, 1992, p. 120-124, 129.
1072The commitment of  Likud leaders to the Revisionist thought and to “one of  the intellectual giants in the annals of  Zionism” be ­
comes obvious in a number of  parliamentary rituals. Cit. Knesset: Publ. Division: Address by PM Benjamin Netanyahu to Knes ­
set Session in Memory of  Ze'ev Jabotinsky, 22 July, 2009. The reference to Jabotinsky is frequently used by thinks tanks and in ­
stitutions which are ideologically close to the Likud party such as the Jabotinsky-Institute, the Hadar-Israel Council and the Betar 
Movement.
1073However, Jabotinskysm has often been misunderstood in terms of  an expansionist offensive doctrine towards Palestine – in that  
sense as a militaristic-extremist feature of  Zionism which centered conquest of  land to the project of  establishing a state. How­
ever, while indeed it claimed a hardline stance towards the “people of  natives” that was there before the Zionist settler arrived in  
the holy land, if  necessary with military means for generating deterrence, it was primarily described by Jabotinsky in terms of  
protective means and defense of  Jewish settlements, thus, as a passive doctrine. Theodor Herzl in his works on the Jewish home  
had mentioned the Arab population in Palestine and the potential for conflict between them and the Jewish immigrants only  
sketchily because he believed that there would be a harmonic and peaceful coexistence. Herzl argued that the Jews, the eternal  
refugees, had learned tolerance in Europe where it had been denied to them by their persecutors. In contrast to his utopian vis ­
ion, Jabotinsky was sure of  the fact that the Arabs would resist the Zionist project on their soil with violent means. According to  
his view, anti-Semitic pogroms and violence which he personally experienced in Ukraine would again take place as a transforma­
tion of  the European experience into the Palestinian local context. Therefore, Jabotinsky who had been the architect of  militant  
Jewish self-defense groups in Odessa, claimed that only military might would prevent Arab aggressions.
1074According to the memoirs of  a student of  Kook's Markaz HaRav who attended the reception, “he [Begin] came as if  to  
Canossa, as if  this man, Tvi Yehuda, was God's representative. Suddenly the Prime Minister kneels and bows before Tvi Yehuda. 
Imagine for yourself  what all the students standing there and watching this surrealistic scene where thinking.” Quoted in Lustick,  
Ian S.: For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988, p. 37.
1075Rabbi Schneerson, although a moderate in many aspects of  Halachic interpretations, said that evacuation of  Jewish land was il ­
legal according to Halachic law. 
1076In the case of  opposition leader Tzipi Livni this ritual became a very challenging issue when Ovadia refused to receive the female 
Kadima leader in the middle of  her election campaign for the 2009 polls.
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highly appreciated by the settlers of  Gush Emunim.1077 After Likud's second election victory in 1981, govern­
ment and ministries accelerated and expanded their support for the West Bank settlements. This included pro ­
grams of  land acquisition, and from 1977 to mid-1981 a 400 million USD investment and between 1981 and  
1984 another 600 million program for infrastructural development.1078 The benevolent policy of  land distribu­
tion – which is in the West Bank predominantly administrated by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) – to Jewish Is­
raeli settlers is still a very ambivalent one. 
Although a semi-official support for Israeli settlers existed in a similar manner under the rule of  Labor be ­
fore Likud came into power, the national-religious activists' rhetoric against the demanded withdrawal from the 
Sinai territory – expressed with the formula “not an inch!” – provided a shared oppositional position for reli ­
gious and secular nationalists to the plan and even polarized the political left.1079 Parallel to the Sinai Withdraw­
al, which ended in 1982 and followed the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of  1979, Gush Emunim, after it came 
into existence in February 1974, concentrated its settlement activities in the West Bank. It changed from a “si ­
lent consent”, in its method hidden and with no media coverage – according to defense minister Shimon 
Peres, the IDF did neither help nor hinder them – into an official recognition by the new government of  1977.  
In 1975, Peres recognized Ofra, the first settlement of  Gush Emunim, as “a worker's camp for purposes of  re­
gional defense”.1080 He did so again when in 1977 a group of  Gush activists and graduates of  the Markaz  
HaRav, crossed into the restricted area of  the Palestinian village Sebastia in the Northern West Bank near 
Nablus. Following negotiations with officials led by Perez were seen as the recognition of  Gush Emunim by the 
government. This view became dominant with the following agreement that allowed the activists to stay at the  
neighboring IDF base1081 – a decision that effectively led to the establishment of  the settlement, despite some 
opposition within the Israeli government led by Yitzhak Rabin.
According to the NRP's political manifesto of  1999, the party would act to formalize the relations between 
religion and state relations through a widely supported legislation which would secure the Jewish character and 
biblical heritage of  the state1082: That is Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael) with its borders at the East Bank of  the 
River of  Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). Therefore, a disengagement from these very re­
gions meant the reversal of  the principal achievement of  the national-religious position and its ideological  
core. Since most of  the Jewish settlers living in these areas, had participated in the settlement enterprise for  
ideological reasons, NRP and Gush Emunim situated themselves in the political and public arenas as guardians 
of  the settlements and the population living in the Occupied Territories. From 1977 to 1988, the number of  
Israeli West Bank settlers increased from 7.000 to 100.000. The Bloc of  the Faithful found prominent support­
1077See Peleg, 1987, p. 45-47. For the Likud revolution (Mahapakh) and the transformation of  Israeli society, see Eisenstadt, S. N.: 
Explorations in Jewish Historical Experience. The Civilizational Dimension. Leiden (a.o.): Brill, 2004, p. 139-204. 
1078See Lustick, 1988, pp. 40, 46/47. 
1079See Cohen, Asher: Political Partners: Relations between Religious and Non-Religious in One Political Party, pp. 132/133. In:  
Liebman, Charles S. (Ed.): Religious and Secular. Conflict and Accommodation between Jews in Israel. Jerusalem: Keter Publ.,  
1990, p. 131-150.
1080See Shalev, Nir: The Ofra Settlement. An Unauthorized Outpost. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2008, p. 7/8.
1081“[...] a decision that effectively led to the establishment of  the settlement, despite some opposition within the Israeli government  
led by Yitzhak Rabin.” Cit. Inbari, Motti: Fundamentalism in Crisis. The Response of  the Gush Emunim Rabbinical Authorities 
to the Theological Dilemmas Raised by Israel's Disengagement Plan, p. 698. In: Journal of  Church and State, Vol. 49, No. 4,  
2007, p. 697-717.
1082See also Lee, 2007.
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ers in Israeli society with songwriter Naomi Shemer and Gen. Ariel “Arik” Sharon, the future prime minister.
1083 Openly, Sharon who at that time was named the “father of  the settlers”, it is said, told the settlers of  his  
dream of  bringing one million Israelis into the occupied territories. Accordingly, national-religious circles de­
clared Sharon's coma only six months after his plan for a Gaza withdrawal was implemented – like the assas­
sination of  Rabin1084 – , a divine punishment for his abandonment of  his former promise and the fatal blow he 
had given to the vision of  a Greater Israel. Earlier in 1993, the Oslo peace agreement and the reversal of  Is­
rael's post-1967 legitimation for its territorial conquests1085 had been perceived by the settlers and religious 
Zionists as treachery. Prof. Yosef  Ben-Shlomo from the Tel Aviv University wrote: “This was not a crime of  
treason against the State of  Israel (the legal punishment for which would be death if  Greater Jerusalem was 
also handed over in Oslo) but against the Land of  Israel and against the future of  our existence in the Land  
for years to come.”1086 Ben-Shlomo, who became an important theorist of  the settler movement, accepted the 
security argument according to which Oslo had made the state vulnerable, an argument that had been shared  
later even by leftist groups and the peace movement in the face of  the Second Intifada. But beyond that, he  
claimed that
The fate of  the Zionist enterprise and the State of  Israel will be sealed, in the last analysis, by abandoning parts  
of  the Land of  Israel, because a political entity will not last long without a moral basis […]. Colonialism is no  
longer acceptable at the end of  the twentieth century, and by removing the moral basis of  Zionism, we trans ­
form it into merely colonialism, and with that goes the moral right of  the people of  Israel, the Jewish People, to  
live anywhere in 'Palestine' they choose. […] Ours is a net moral right independent of  UN decisions or even the  
consensus of  most citizens of  Israel or the support of  Diaspora Jewish leaders. Nor even on the basis of  the  
agreement of  the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states achieved only through military force majeure; and by no 
means via the justice of  our claim to a part of  Land conquered from them. The source of  validity of  this claim,  
and not of  a mere given reality, is located here, in Judea and Samaria, not in Tel Aviv. Therefore, the moral justi ­
fication of  the Jewish people's ownership of  the Land of  Israel, in part or in whole, will stand or fall in Judea  
and Samaria.1087
The first settlements in the Yesha region were initiated by  Gush Emunim activists. Though the organization 
formally vanished,  Eretz Yisrael remained the main ideological pillar of  the settlers' worldview and the suc­
cessor organization Yesha Council.1088 The Council is the local administrative body of  the West Bank settlements 
and coordinates municipal and security issues. It provides a political channel through which the settlers' in­
terests are communicated to the Knesset. Another organization which was founded by Gush activists in 1978 
is Amana which launches PR campaigns to encourage Israelis and the Jewish communities abroad for settling  
into the West Bank. An Amana-sponsored ad says:
Settlement in Yesha has served as the Zionist horse pulling the State of  Israel's cart up the hill. […] The pur ­
chase of  a home, which is then rented out to a family wanting to make its home in Yesha, is a giant step forward 
in your love of  Israel in the very areas where our forefathers walked this land. It is an ideological gesture of  love  
of  the Land of  Israel, as well as emunah in Kadosh Baruch [covenant between God and Israel and “the holy one, 
blessed be he”, M.G.] that our future is indeed bright. Such a step is a fulfillment of  the prophecy of  Yirmiyahu: 
1083See Inbari, 2007, p. 698.
1084After the Hebron Goldstein massacre, Rabin had described the settlers as an “contaminant”, as something not belonging to Is ­
raeli society.
1085See Map Israel, Oslo II in Annex, Abbildung 2.
1086Cit. Ben-Shlomo, Yosef: The Beginning of  the End?, pp. 308/309. In: Stav, Arieh (Ed.): Israel and a Palestinian State: Zero Sum 
Game? Shaarei Tikva: ACPR, 2001, p. 308-312.
1087Cit. Ibid., pp. 309/310.
1088Literally, yesha means redemption. 
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'This is what the Lord Almighty, the G-d of  Israel has said: Once again will there be houses, fields and vineyards 
in this Land.' (Jeremiah 32).1089
Amana had been the main force behind the establishment of  the Ofra, Mevo Modi'in, Kedumim and Ma'aleh 
Adumim settlements. In addition, some organizations are responsible for housing and infrastructure support 
and the establishment of  para-military frontier units in the communities. This is in close collaboration with the  
IDF and the Ministry of  Defense. In turn for armament and training, Yeshivot and secular schools in the set ­
tlements provide one-year preparation courses for school graduates, preparing them “physically, spiritually and 
religiously” for the army service, which by many students is not perceived as an obligation but rather as a “reli ­
gious duty”.1090 The commitment to the state's Zionism, especially to its army is documented by the high num­
ber of  recruits from the West Bank settlements, who join – after having completed the three-years of  com ­
pulsory service – the elite units of  the IDF and officer candidate courses. Serving in these units, especially in 
the higher ranks of  the legendary Golani and Paratrooper Brigades, was during the period of  the socialist pi­
oneer spirit which marked the 1950s and 1960s, strictly limited to the Kibbutzim youth. From the 1970s to the 
present, more and more graduates from the settlements serve in the units and reflect a social and ideological  
change.1091 Beyond Hebron, from where cases are reported according to which the settlers enjoy full protection 
by the soldiers who in turn conveniently overlook acts of  violence by the settlers against Palestinians 1092, po­
tential for violent escalation exists in all occupied parts of  the West Bank. Such cases and Palestinian retaliat ­
ory actions occur frequently. Recent Palestinian casualties where youngsters were wounded or killed by Tavor 
army rifle fire, reflect deepened relations between local West Bankers and parts of  the IDF. 1093 On the political 
level, it is said, that the appointment of  a new IDF Chief  of  General Staff  reflects the current governments  
orientation towards the settlement issue with army chiefs with an infantry background being interpreted by the  
security community, the settlers and the international community1094 as much more familiar or even sympathiz­
ing with the settler society vice versa, while the appointment of  former marine or air force generals is aimed at  
signalizing a clear break.1095 
6.1.1.1 Disengagement
The strategy of  disengagement and withdrawal had created serious turmoils in Israel's society and its political  
system when Prime Minister Sharon presented it as an unilateral step to the nation in December, 2003. Based 
on the evaluation of  Israel's ongoing conflict with Palestinian groups in the Second Intifada, Sharon con­
cluded that without a partner in the Palestinian Authority (PA) for peace negotiations – thereby dismissing  
Yassir Arafat as a “non-partner” whom cannot be trusted – the talks were a dead end for the Road Map which 
1089Cit. Amana Settlement Movement: Buy a Home in Yesha! Booklet, Jerusalem, 2007. 
1090Interview with Rabbi David Ben Meir, educator and teacher in Jewish Studies, Settlement of  Eli, 10 January, 2010.
1091Interview with Gideon Spiro, Founder Yesh Gvul, Tel Aviv 11 January, 2010; and Arian, 2005, pp. 88/89. 
1092Interview with Adli Daana, Secretary General International Palestinian Youth League, Hebron, 20 June, 2010. 
1093In May, 2012, a Palestinian was wounded by settler fire with IDF soldiers standing by. This incident that had been filmed by a 
B'Tselem team provoked harsh international criticism. See BBC News: Settlers filmed shooting at Palestinian protesters, 21 May, 
2012. URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18149573, 27 May, 2012.
1094Since this highest army post is primarily a political post, the appointment of  a new chief  is also aimed to send a clear message  
and statement to the US-administration. 
1095The current IDF Chief  of  Staff, Lt.-Gen. Benny Gantz served in paratrooper and air force units.
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was initiated by the USA. In this diplomatic stand-off, which was considered as a harm to Israel's security, he  
decided to act unilaterally within the framework of  the Road Map on which Israel had principally agreed. An  
Israeli disengagement from Gaza meant to get rid of  the security threat at the Western borders and the finan­
cial threat, meaning to relieve the financial pressure which the poor economy in the Gaza area and the costs of  
Israel's occupation laid on the state budget. And last, the cabinet aimed to improve Israel's international status 
with this unilateral step since the Palestinian side had signalized the possibility to cease all kinds of  violent ac­
tions against Israel in the framework of  the Geneva Initiative which had been launched in 2003. 1096 In response 
to the Sharon Plan, NRP resigned from the government in October, 2004, and Sharon offered funds from the 
budget to the ultra-orthodox United Torah Judaism and convinced them to join the government as a successor 
of  NRP. The initiation of  the Disengagement Plan gave rise to defense expenses which resulted in a budget 
cut in almost all ressorts. Shortages in the haredi education system and child allowance had been initiated in  
2001 when the Intifada began. Education and allowances for the large haredi families are on the top of  the re ­
ligious parties' agenda and combined with the political and legal perspective that the implementation of  the 
Sharon Plan was inevitable, UTJ joined the coalition. The NRP attacked this decision as an immoral selling out  
of  the Gaza settlements (Gush Katif)1097
In August 2005, only few weeks before the official date of  the withdrawal, marking a climax of  a series of  
protests and marches against the plan1098, between 70.000 and 250.000 Yeshiva students, Rabbis and religious 
settlers gathered at the Western Wall in Jerusalem's Old City for a joint prayer, asking for divine intervention 
which should stop the planned disengagement. This event was attended by the highest leaders of  ultra-ortho­
dox Judaism in Israel and the Diaspora and MKs of  the religious bloc.1099 The national-religious leadership had 
to make a decision: Accepting the authority of  the decision of  an elected secular government to evacuate Jew­
ish settlements meant to dismantle Jewish villages and communities in Eretz Yisrael, a territorial entity given to 
them by god in order to prepare the “ingathering of  the exiles”. Denouncing state rule meant calling into 
question the legitimacy underlying the elected government's decisions and the democratic will of  the Jewish 
people. The outright opposition of  the settlers – some of  them had lived in Gaza for four decades 1100 – made 
clear that a confrontation with the soldiers who had the order to evacuate Gaza would be unavoidable. Reli­
gious-Zionist activists were joined in their opposition and protests against the plan by the right-wing parties. In  
the Knesset, Sharon defended his initiative against a broad opposition including his own party. Labor voted  
against Sharon in different referendums, the NRP left the government and refused, like many Likud members, 
any kind of  support for the Plan.1101 During several protests and a march from Jerusalem to Gaza, right-wing 
1096See Knesset: Publ. Division: Address by PM Ariel Sharon's to the Knesset prior to the Vote on the Disengagement Plan, Octo ­
ber 25, 2004.
1097Interview with MK Rabbi Menachem Eliezer Moses (United Torah Judaism), Knesset, 11 January, 2010. 
1098The plan envisaged Israel renouncing to any claims to the entire Gaza Strip. All Israeli settlements and military bases had to be  
evacuated, demolished and relocated. In addition to these, four West Bank settlements were added and as a result a total number  
of  between 8.000 and 10.000 Jewish settlers were transferred back into the jurisdiction of  Israel. 
1099See Arutz Sheva: Mass Prayer Against Expulsion Fills Jerusalem's Old City, 10 August, 2005. 
1100After the 1967 war and the recognition of  Gaza as occupied Israeli administrated territory, the first settlement, Kfar Darom, was  
established in 1970. See Inbari, 2007, p. 698.
1101Right-wing politicians submitted at least 12 petitions against the plan and the compensations for the settler families to the Su ­
preme Court, trying to declare the plan unconstitutional. Ruling that the Gaza area was not part of  Israeli jurisdiction, the Court  
disagreed. 
   Seite 175
rabbis of  the religious Zionist camp lined up behind the protesters, asserting that the Torah forbids the relin­
quishing of  portions of  the land to non-Jews: Citing the decree of  the Lubavitcher Rebbe according to which  
“It is good for the non-Jew not to hold the Land of  Israel so that he may live” also different hassidic sects got  
involved in the protests which were organized by the Yesha Council which ought to influence the political ne ­
gotiations by creating a nation-wide resistance of  civil society against the plan.1102 However, the rabbis gener­
ally did recommend non-violent resistance against the soldiers according to the rabbinical decree on the sanc ­
tity and preservation of  life (Pikuah Nefesh). In order to face the protests in an adequate manner, the Ministry  
of  Defense provided a special training for the units involved in the disengagement and selected the soldiers on 
the basis of  their religious observance in order to avoid too strong commitment to the protesters' cause. Com­
bat units, where religious soldiers are most prominently represented, were selected and instead stationed in the 
outermost cordon of  the area of  operation. The cabinet tried to prepare for every possible scenario, including  
violent uprisings in the settlements and Jerusalem. Eventually, due to the ability of  the religious leaders, to  
control and influence the protesters, they enabled the disengagement which launched on September 12, 2005, 
without too much casualties and repressive measures. 
With regard to radical religious Zionism, the willingness to act against state institutions violently, as it had  
been demonstrated by the Hill Top Youth in protests against security forces in recent years, and even attacks 
on army bases in the West Bank, indicates a deep identity crisis: Growing radicalization of  individual and col­
lective modes of  disobedience after the traumatic withdrawal from Gaza – from sit strike tactics to throwing  
stones and garbage at security forces, attacks on Palestinians, in 2010/11 intensified as part of  their “price tag”  
campaign1103, and the placement of  handmade explosive devices at bus stations, has made clear that govern­
ment initiatives like compensation packages for those who had to abandon their homes did not eliminate feel ­
ings of  humiliation and loss. Dialogue between settlers and government, at a certain point, became conflictual.  
While settler society as a whole learned that  it  cannot stop government decisions,  a particular percentage  
seems to be willing to articulate its opposition and resistance to disengagement with physical violence. The 
lack of  proper political representation of  the settlers' interests makes it more difficult to deal with those who 
see violence, even when it targets the State of  Israel directly, as a legitimate means of  resistance while the ma ­
jority might see violence as a great sin due to their statist orientation and loyalty.1104 Especially attacks on IDF 
bases1105 were seen in Israel as the escalation between Israeli mainstream society inside the 1967 borders and 
the national-religious settler society in the occupied territories. More than before, the antagonism between ori­
1102See Arutz Sheva: 250,000 Attend Kotel Prayer to annul Pullout, 11 August, 2005.
1103Its underlying aim being the retaliation for curbs on settlements and illegal outposts by the government. In response, settler act ­
ivists, believed to have links to the Hill Top Youth, destroyed and vandalized Palestinian buildings and property. See Reuters:  
Factbox:  “Price  Tag”  attacks  on  Palestinian  property  blamed  on  Jewish  settlers,  3  October,  2011.  URL:  
http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2011/10/03/factbox-on-price-tag-attacks-on-palestinian-property-blamed-on-jewish-set­
tlers/, 15 March, 2012.
1104This is the majority which composes a core group in the military and which is, because of  its elitist orientation in education and  
career much more committed to the state.
1105In September, 2011, rioters infiltrated an IDF base near Beit El in the Binyamin region of  the West Bank. In December, the base 
of  the Ephraim Brigade and IDF and Palestinian vehicles in the Samaria region had been attacked in response to the demolition  
of  the illegal Ramat Gilad outpost. These incidents and harsh reactions also from the settler society showed that the young at ­
tackers are increasingly acting autonomously and bypass local power groups such as the Council of  Jewish Communities of  
Judea, Samaria and Gaza. See Lazaroff, Tovah/ Katz, Yaakov: Right-wing extremists attack IDF base in West Bank. In: The Jeru­
salem Post, 14 December, 2011.
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entations of  cooperation and disassociation in religious Zionist ideology became apparent.  The first orienta­
tion is that the national-religious public, at present, is and will remain an integral and active part of  Israeli soci ­
ety and the process of  collective Jewish redemption. Further, national-religious strata not only see themselves  
as an active part of  the whole Israeli-Jewish entity but as the spearhead how will lead the Jewish People in the  
State of  Israel along this process. Part of  that thinking is that, whatever wrong decisions and whatever sins the  
government has committed in the past, the survival and the unity of  the state, at any cost, has to be preserved.  
Asked if  he would sanctify a physical attack on Israeli soldiers in order to stop the government's order to 
abandon Jewish homes in the West Bank, an American rabbi from Ofra replies: “Like in every army in the  
world, our soldiers follow orders which might not fit into their own personal or religious belief. But at the end,  
we are all Jewish brothers. Maybe not in this world but in the world to come.”1106 As a result, settlers would ac­
cept democratic norms and the decision to withdraw from settlements against which they would negotiate  
through their representative organs. In contrast, the second orientation, represented only by a tiny minority, is  
that despite the state's holiness, despite the Jewish law to not hurt or kill other Jews, and despite the belief  that  
the return to Zion and the redemption of  the Jewish People is possible only collectively, individual violent ac ­
tion is sanctified in order to preserve the State, the People and the Land from wrongdoing and sin which, fi ­
nally, would endanger the whole process of  redemption. Further, facing the fact that they were abandoned by 
the state and excluded from its public policy of  expanding Israel's borders for the sake of  settling and defense, 
opens the alternative which is to completely disassociate from the rest of  society and to contribute to the pro ­
cess of  redemption either actively or passively, similar to the Haredim's point of  view. Class material provided 
by the NGO Yesodot – Center for Torah and Democracy which dealt intensively with the divide on this issue after 
Gaza between the national-religious public and secular Israeli society, introduces students into prominent rab ­
binical rulings that emphasize peaceful attempts to harmonize the territorial dimension with those of  tradi­
tional Judaism and modern secular mainstream society.
6.2 Ultra-Orthodox Movements / Haredim
Haredim1107 count as a minority within orthodox Jewry whose most distinctive and conservative interpretation 
and lifestyle they represent as a homogenous bloc. Further,  Haredim, much more than their religious Zionist 
counterparts have strong communities outside of  Israel where they represent 8 to 10 percent of  the society 1108, 
and in the US and Europe. The Haredim have, beyond their real participation in politics, gained the status of  an 
immanent political and demographic threat to the state as envisioned by secularists. Derogatorily called “black  
hats”1109,  “messiah's donkeys” or BMOs (“black moving object”)1110,  the relationship between both society 
groups is determined by a deep mistrust, only little knowledge about the other and strict separation in public  
1106Interview with Rabbi David Ben Meir, educator and teacher in Jewish Studies, Settlement of  Eli, 10 January, 2010.
1107“Those who fear”, see Isaiah 66:5.
1108See Ingber, 2005, p. 104.
1109See Arian, 1998, p. 133.
1110Referring to IDF and US army jargon as it has emerged after the invasions of  Lebanon and Iraq where the code was used for  
Muslim women wearing a burqa.
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life.  Apart  from sectarian lines  which include issues of  religious service and life-style,  the various haredi 
group's interpretation of  the Holocaust and their stance towards Zionism and the State of  Israel is important. 
In their view on the Second World War and the Holocaust, the rabbis and Torah sages had difficulties to 
explain the murder and genocide of  millions of  Jews, apparently with the will of  the Lord for whom, accord­
ing to Jewish traditional thought, nothing is more important than human life. The Satmer Rebbe stated that 
the European Jews deserved divine punishment for the evils of  Zionism. Similarly, the spiritual master of  the 
Shas party, former Chief  Rabbi Yussuf  Ovadia – known for his controversial  rulings 1111 – interpreted the 
Shoah as the result of  the sinful secular way of  life of  European Jews and their assimilation. Others, like  
Habad's Rabbi Schneerson said that „the tragedy of  the Holocaust is an unanswerable question. There is no  
human rationale whatsoever that can explain such indescribable suffering. […] Any attempt to cast blame, for 
whatever reason, upon those who perished is shocking.“1112 Rabbi Eliezer Schach, the Dean of  the Ponevezh 
Yeshivah of  Bnei Brak, Tel Aviv, saw the Holocaust as the expression of  God's anger toward the Jews for their 
failure to abide by the mitzvot and their falling under the spell of  Zionism and the Jewish enlightenment.
With regard to its acceptance of  the State of  Israel, the Agudat came into terms with the Zionist project of  
independence. Since 1948 and as a reluctant partner of  Ben-Gurion's status quo agreement, the party has 
shown its neutrality to the state which it continues to condemn as an illegitimate human intervention in the di­
vine process of  redemption but which it accepts in principle. Because of  this ambiguous loyalty, the party has  
been able to participate in subsequent government coalitions with the aim to preserve its control over the state  
subsidies for the ultra-orthodox education system. Symbolically, the rabbis who compose the party leadership 
with the Council of  Torah Sages as an advisory body composed of  their eldest, have direct influence on parlia ­
mentary decisions. Their recommendations are binding for Aguda Members of  Knesset who vote and act ac­
cordingly. Arian in his political diagnosis of  Israeli society stated:
Although religious motifs, groups, and leaders were affiliated with Zionism from its inception, the most vocifer­
ous opposition to Zionism among Jews came from religious circles. It is therefore not without its irony that 
these religious parties are growing and certainly are the most stable organizationally of  the groups competing in 
Israeli politics.1113
While most of  the haredi groups claim to be apolitical expressing their refusal to be part of  the Zionist-led 
state, it seems that their second claim, to prepare Israel's redemption against secular resistance without violent  
means has to be seen in terms of  a generational change. In recent years, ultra-orthodox protests, especially in  
Jerusalem, were accompanied by coordinated street violence with the police and security forces having a hard 
time to appease the mostly young violent haredi protesters. Being the minority, it seems that radical elements,  
similar to the violent strata of  settler society, are more and more able to bypass the decrees of  their rabbis and  
to hijack  peaceful  demonstrations.  Hence,  from the perspective of  the security  forces,  messianic  and an­
ti-Zionist ideology contribute negatively to existing internal security threats; clear indicators for this transform­
ation of  traditional state-religion tensions were the spread of  militant-terrorist ideology combined with Jewish-
1111Ovadia and other Shas politicians had declared that earthquakes and other natural disasters in Israel were a just punishment by 
God for the vicious and sinful life of  homosexuals in Tel Aviv. Similarly, Ovadia blamed Hurricane Katrina to be the divine re­
sponse to the expulsion of  Jews from Gaza in the context of  the 2005 disengagement.
1112Cit. Jewish Week: Schneerson Assails Claim that Holocaust was God's 'Punishment', 4 January, 1991. Cit. In Mintz, p. 51.
1113Cit. Arian, 1998, p. 127.
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Israeli ultra-nationalism by groups and activists that followed the path of  Rabbi Meir Kahane 1114 and the assas­
sination of  Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 in which the Shin Beit acted disastrously because of  its underestima ­
tion of  the security threat by national-religious extremism to Rabin.1115 
Another cleavage that has sharpened in recent years is the sectarian struggle between Jewish groups from 
the Haredim sector. In April, 1998, Shas and NRP presented a proposal to the Knesset which was aimed to give  
them more control over appointments to the local religious councils. This legislative proposal had been pre­
ceded by a strong engagement by the leftist Meretz party within the nomination process for the Jerusalem city 
council when representatives of  the Jerusalem city council named a female Rabbi from the Reform stream of  
Judaism as one of  its council delegates which illustrates the shared attempt of  secular and non-ultra-orthodox  
Jewish representatives in Israel and abroad to allocate financial and political support for synagogues, seminar ­
ies and schools belonging to Reform or American Judaism.1116 As Arian pointed out, the latter groups are 
simply not “in the picture” of  the political arena1117, however, their efforts at winning acceptance in orthodox 
circles in Israel and primarily their court cases gave liberal communities like Beit Tefilah Israeli, founded in 2004 
and comprising today more than 90 families, new forms of  articulation. Especially in Tel Aviv, and also in  
some settlements, these groups respond to the increasing problems that large parts of  the secular public feel 
who cannot identify with the clear definitions of  religious and secular but feel themselves connected to Juda ­
ism spiritually.1118 Preventing non-orthodox Rabbis and activists from the selection to religious bodies marks  
the polarization between secular and religious forces in society and especially in Israel's institutions. 1119 Another 
cleavage which increasingly attracts the attention of  Israeli public in large, is the non-acceptance and discrim­
ination of  orthodox or Haredi Jews that abandoned their religious life and left their communities (Chozrei  
Be'She'ela).1120 Prominent  cases  of  community  members  that  broke  away  from  their  group  (“runaway 
Haredim”), like that of  gossi1121 Sarah Einfeld in 2008 have provoked harsh reactions in both the secular and 
the ultra-orthodox public. Einfeld belonged to the Ger community of  Ashdod but left it and since, has be­
1114Killed in 1990 in New York by an Arab activist. Kahane was the founder of  militant organizations and served as a MK with his  
Kach party from 1984 to 1988 until Kach was banned for its extremist and anti-Arab agenda. Jewish militancy refers extensively to  
Kahane's ideology; e.g. Baruch Goldstein, responsible for the Hebron massacre of  1994, had been a disciple of  Kahane.
1115In this context, the term “Jewish radicalism” has been used more often in official language. For instance by Yuval Diskin the  
former director of  Shin Beit when presenting current threats to inner security: “[...] we have to realize that, without ignoring the  
external scenario, from within, Jewish radicalism knocks at the door of  Israeli society.” Cit. Diskin at the 3rd Annual Conference  
on Security Challenges of  the 21st Century, INSS, Tel Aviv, 15 December, 2009.
1116For appointments to a religious council members of  political parties, as represented in the municipal council, are chosen in pro­
portion to their seats. See Sharkansky, Ira: Religion and State in Israel: Another Round of  an Ancient Conflict among the Jews, p.  
233. In: Safran, William (Ed.): The Secular and the Sacred. Nation, Religion and Politics. London (a.o.): Cass, 2003, p. 217-240.
1117See Arian, 1998, p. 127.
1118Interview with Shira Levine, Beit Tefilah Israeli, Tel Aviv, 11 November, 2010.
1119In this context, it has been said that Jerusalem became the increasingly contested sacred space in which competing sects are in in ­
volved in a proxy war which includes the allocation of  houses and land on a large scale. Similarly, more conservative sects try to 
abandon practices at the Western Wall plaza they consider as being too liberal. For instance Habad's promotion tours at the wall 
in which even non-Jewish tourists are offered tefillin belongs to these discourses.
1120Similarly, the issue of  secular Jews who join a sect and adopt ultra-orthodox lifestyle (Baalei Teschuva) and especially the question 
of  their acceptance by their new community, appears to be controversial. Often, new members are not able to fully integrate into  
the community. The fact that most newcomers are married by their new rabbi master to another  Baal Teschuva indicates that full 
integration is not wanted. See also Jerusalem Backyard (German blog): Wieviele Rabbiner gibt es in der Chassidut Belz?, 26  
November, 2009. 
1121Yiddish term for haredi woman.
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come prominent as a blogger and model.1122 Well known in Israel is also Footsteps, a New York-based NGO 
supported by various Jewish foundations which offers educational and career services to former Haredim and 
Hassidim who wish to enter American mainstream society.1123 Another line of  conflict is drawn by missionary 
activities by “messianic Jews” or Yeshuistim (Disciples of  Yoshua)1124 becoming stronger in Israel: Because of  
their intensive distribution of  messianic pamphlets and rumors about their funding by the government, groups 
like the Evangelistic Messianic congregation Dugit1125 in Tel Aviv have provoked harsh reactions by conservat­
ive orthodox circles and by the local administration authorities and are considered by many as a foreign Chris ­
tian movement that falsely claims Jewish tradition.1126 However, the Haredim seem to hold a neutral stance to­
wards these developments or even sympathize with the new messianic missionaries who in turn are offended 
by the orthodoxy and religious Zionists on the grounds that they “snatch Jewish souls”. Conflicts between the  
Haredim communities occur frequently. On the basis of  their theological reasoning, the borders within the 
Haredim communities are constructed around key values of  their respective ideologies and theological world­
view such as hesed (benevolence to help others) in the case of  Satmar, ahavat Yisrael (love for the Land of  Israel 
and the Torah) as advocated by the Rabbi of  Vishnitz and his followers, or the supremacy of  emet (truth and 
sincerity) with which the Ger Hassidim are identified. 
Similar to the religious parties of  Pakistan who have a keen interest to preserve their control on their own  
institutions of  education, the case of  Israeli religious parties trying to maintain the status quo agreement and 
beyond that, to demand more state subsidies for their Yeshiwot, shows that in the Israeli system religious 
parties were much more able to win key positions in the cabinet and the important parliamentary committees 
than their Pakistani counterparts. Arian has correctly stated that „religious parties have usually served as coali­
tion partners with the biggest winner. To the big winner this makes good sense. It is better to pay the smaller  
price demanded by the third-biggest winner than to pay the higher price that the second-biggest winner could 
demand.“1127 Accordingly,  Mafdal  has always been a coalition partner in ruling left- and right-wing govern­
ments, like the ultra-orthodox parties who could ensure their strong position.1128
6.2.1 Ashkenazim
The various movements with Ashkenazi and Russian ethnic roots are increasingly present especially in their  
countries of  origin which constituted the Grand Duchy of  Lithuania1129 until the 16th century when it began to 
merge with the Polish kingdom as a confederation, and developing countries worldwide due to their mission­
1122After fashion photos of  her were published in Yedioth Ahronoth, members of  the Ger community and other sects threatened Ein­
feld who now lives in Tel Aviv. 
1123See Footsteps website. URL: http://footstepsorg.org/about.php, 7 March, 2011.
1124See Israel Today: The Yeshuistim - A New Identity, July, 2011, p. 22.
1125See Dugit website. URL: http://www.dugit.org, 6 March, 2011.
1126Dugit's Messianic Outreach Center runs a coffee shop in the center of  Tel Aviv which is highly frequented by young secular Israelis.  
In Nazareth Elite, Galilee, poster campaigns in Russian language targeted Russian immigrant neighborhoods whose residents had  
converted after arrival in Israel at the beginning of  the 1990s. It is believed that, with the exception of  some hardline politicians,  
the authorities are trying to avoid public perceptions of  a Jewish-Christian clash. From the government's viewpoint, overem­
phasizing the Christian nature of  the Messianic Jewish movement and to restrict its activities could have a negative impact on 
tourism. In 2010, 69 percent of  international visitors to Israel were Christians.
1127Cit. Arian, 1998, p. 129.
1128With short oppositional interplays in 1958/59, 1974 and during the 1990s. See Arian, 1998, p. 129.
1129Such as Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Moldova.
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ary activities. It is essential that the conflict between the Haredim and orthodox or secular-oriented Jews in the 
European diaspora had been transformed into the context of  Palestine from where it entered Israeli society.  
Although most of  the rabbis' followers and disciples were murdered or sent to the concentration camps dur ­
ing Second World War, in the cases of  some groups, the leadership survived. Bribing German officials, Zionist  
leaders from Hungary were able to organize a transport of  Jews to Switzerland. 1130 This is how the hassidic 
Satmar Rebbe happened to flee via Switzerland to Jerusalem, from where he emigrated to the US in 1946.  
There he founded the Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar two years later. Those few Satmarer that had survived 
the camps followed the Rav's call and emigrated to New York where they settled in Williamsburg. As far as the  
Satmerer in Israel are concerned, one can find their communities in Jerusalem with the Mea Shearim neighbor­
hood as the strictest center barred to traffic, Bnei Brak in Tel Aviv and in distinctive areas in most of  Israel's  
cities. Mea Shearim, the most prominent ultra-orthodox areas has been a stronghold of  Satmerer Jews, fol ­
lowed by the Braslow followers of  Rabbi Nachmann, the radical Neturey Karta which not only refuses to accept 
the Zionist state but also has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the PA and anti-Zionist Jewish and 
Christian movements.1131 Today, because of  the isolation of  Mea Shearim, it can not clearly be stated which of  
the groups dominates the area. Further, haredi expansion beyond the post-1967 borders of  Jerusalem has in ­
creased drastically, thus, dividing the city and surrounding areas into the “orthodox North” and the more secu­
lar-liberal South.1132 On 17 June, 2010, the hassidic Slonim dynasty – its Mea Shearim chapter formerly known 
for its liberal approach and its Bnei Brak organization being more conservative – mobilized one of  the biggest  
haredi demonstrations in the country's history and since than, has reinforced its claim of  leadership in Mea 
Shearim. Despite the security forces' fear of  violent clashes1133 around 120.000 protesters articulated their de­
mands peacefully. The Slonim reacted to the Supreme Court's decision to imprison 40 families from the Em­
manuel settlement in the northern West Bank for a two-week jail sentence after they had refused to let their  
children further visit a ultra-orthodox girls' school with mixed Sephardi-Ashkenazi classes. A pamphlet distrib­
uted among the protesters condemned the hegemony of  state schools as bastions of  racist discrimination 
against Ashkenazim:
These institutions [public schools, M.G.] are teaching in a language called "Hebrew" established for the Zionists  
and their teachings.
On the day of  their calamity they leave from their studies for their calamity and boast. You have hung a flag of  
rebellion and heresy to Rachel's great-grandchildren! 
Learn the books of  national apostasy and heresy and praise Zionism and the history of  the leaders of  heresy, 
etc., etc..
Since the foundation they [public schools, M.G.] produced generations to be loyal citizens of  the state and na­
tional trust.
1130See Rubin, Israel: Satmar. Two Generations of  an Urban Island. 2nd Ed. New York: Peter Lang, 1997, pp. 46/47,
1131With only a few hundred families being members of  the group. See Arian, 1998, p. 128; Ingber, 2005, p. 105-108.
1132See Lehmann/ Siebzehner, 2006, pp. 13/14.
1133In the side streets which the protest march passed until it finally ended at the plaza in front of  the police headquarters of  the 
Russian Compound, thousands of  security forces and Magen David personnel were put on high alert. In the early morning hours 
following orders by the government, Israeli radio stations broadcasted warnings to not enter the ultra-orthodox neighborhoods  
of  Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. 
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And upon the senders and directors of  this impure education, the world's greatest decision was sealed, the Lord  
will not wish, forgive him, outcast and distanced from the People of  Israel, and we shall pursue it with all our  
will.1134
Another pamphlet targeted the state authorities and Zionism more decisively:
We are neither bound to the estate partners and uniformed bad Zionists nor to send representatives to this spe­
cies of  Knesset men and to the municipality because they are part of  the Zionist devastating treason against the  
Kingdom of  Heaven.
We do not need to follow their call, be aware! Be aware!
We don't need them. We are no part of  their protests and their troubles, and winding staffs, quarrel and fighting 
over the state heresy's kosher altar and Israel's peace.1135
Similar to the ethnic discrimination of  Sephardim which has significantly decreased after the 1970s, descent 
and loyalty to a dynasty which itself  represents a specific ethnic and regional setup, indicate a strong ethnic 
divide in haredi society. 
6.2.2 Sephardim
Diversification in  Haredim society caused by the rise of  new competitors in the religious sector is most im­
pressively illustrated by the emergence of  Shas, the Sephardic Guardians of  the Torah in 1984: The autonomy of  
the religious education system, which is run independently of  the state school system, but with state funds, 
and veto power on religious legislation had always been part of  coalition agreements which in return implied a  
non-involvement in the government's decision on war and peace.1136 Shas' claim was the restoration of  the 
“crown of  the Sephardim”1137, the renaissance of  their ancient spiritual and intellectual hegemony in world Je­
wry. However, in the Ashkenazi-dominated haredi world, the newcomers from Edot HaMitzrach  – the entire 
orthodox and non-orthodox oriental Jewish community from Northern Africa and the Middle East – were 
soon perceived as a serious threat and competitor as they claimed the same political benefits in return for join­
ing the ruling coalition.1138 While, generally speaking, Sephardi politicians until Begin's rise in 1977 were more  
closely affiliated with the adversaries of  the Ashkenazi-oriented Labor parties and organizations from the con­
servative camp despite their alignment with the leftist-socialist parties, Shas was, at the beginning, an ethnically 
homogenous formation but accelerated the ethnic fragmentation of  the political sphere in general. While there 
was cooperation between Shas and the NRP, the national-religious party lost some of  its Sephardi members 
like Aharon Abu Hatzeira of  Moroccan descent in 1981 due to minor splits on the basis of  the ethnic cleavage  
from which Likud and Shas profited.1139 NRP and it's ultra-orthodox counterparts Agudat Yisrael, Degal HaTora 
(Ashkenazi Lithuanian stream)1140 and Shas also shared substantial power in various ministries as well as eco­
1134Cit. Haredim, flyer a): What is 'pure' education? From: Protests, Jerusalem, 17 June, 2010.
1135Cit. Haredim, flyer b): Tea for us and them? From: Protests, Jerusalem, 17 June, 2010.
1136See Bradley, C. Paul: Parliamentary Elections in Israel: Three Case Studies. Grantham, N.H.: Tompson & Rutter, 1985, p. 20-26.
1137See election poster, 1984, in Annex, Abbildung 3.
1138Beside the new political arrangement of  the religious bloc, the supremacy of  Ashkenazi orthodox scholarship which was based 
on the traditional education system of  the Yeshiva, formed in Eastern Europe, had to compromise with an emerging Sephardic 
scholarship. See The Jerusalem Post: Rising Star, 22-28 April, 1984.
1139See Arian, 1998, pp. 129/130.
1140Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah represent traditional Eastern European (Ashkenazi) Haredi society. Until 1990, when the two 
streams united in the Knesset, they were historical rivals, due to personal clashes between their leaders. At that time, their spiritu ­
al leader from the smaller Lithuanian wing, Rabbi Eliezer Schach, was seen by both streams as the ultimate rabbinical authority  
on Jewish law (Posek HaDor). His successor, Rabbi Yosef  Sholom Elyashiv lacked Schach's charisma and was much less appreci­
ated by the Hassidim. He died in July, 2012.
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nomic and political institutions, much more than the Agudat Yisrael which had been given responsibility for the 
Ministries of  Labor (1988), Housing (1996), and Health (since 1999)1141 and the Chairmanship of  the Knesset 
Finance Committee.1142 In this context, the control of  the Ministry of  Religious Affairs and Israel's Chief  Rab­
binate – constituted by an Ashkenazi and a Sephardi Rabbi – became one of  the main issues in religious polit ­
ics.1143 Shas' share of  power has, since its inception in 1984, increased visibly with four cabinet posts in the cur ­
rent Netanyahu government.1144 
6.3 Hassidism
The Hassidim trace their origins back to the times of  Rebbe Israel Ben Eliezer (1700-1760) – the Baal Shem 
Tov  (BeSHT, Master of  the Good Name).1145 In Hassidic tradition, the founder was a man of  extraordinary 
skills and reputation, a tzaddik. In a Habad chronicle it is written that “anyone who believes that all the stories 
ever told about the Baal Shem Tov actually happened is a fool. At the same time, anyone who says that it is im ­
possible for any particular story to have taken place is a non-believer, for nothing is beyond the potential of  a  
tzaddik.”1146
Main distinctions among the various groups can be made with respect to their leadership. It is the rebbe or 
spiritual leader who determines the community's way of  life and its position towards fundamental Jewish reli ­
gious issues and the State of  Israel. Beyond Habad as the only case of  a hassidic movement which declared its 
rabbi to be the Messiah, the attachment of  messianic authority to a studied man and community leader is not  
exceptional. According to the imagination of  most haredi groups, the Moshiah will be a human being who 
lives among the Jews. He is already present in this world but “out of  sight” and did not yet expose himself  to  
this followers. In every generation a person will be born that descends from the house of  King David, a „per­
fect person, wiser than King Salomon. The only thing he cannot do is prophesy with Moses.“ 1147 According to 
Hassidic imagination and thought „man is the language of  God“ and man and God are connected through 
love (debekut).1148 Similar to the power of  baraka in Folk Islam, a believer tries to connect himself  to a gadol, a 
wise man considered holy similar to a tzaddik, in order to create a spiritual force that "takes a willing reader 
from who he is to who he can become."1149 Reflecting the cults of  personality that is part of  Haredim move­
1141„[...] since it declined having a minister participate in cabinet meeting, the portfolio was formally held by the prime minister [Net ­
anyahu, M.G.], and an Aguda deputy minister was appointed to handle the day-to-day operations of  the ministry.“ Cit. Arian,  
1998, p. 128. MK Ya'akov Litzman, now UTJ, has the Deputy post since April, 2009.
1142See Ibid.
1143See Unna, 1987, p. 100-105.
1144Ariel Atias as Minister for Housing and Construction, parliamentary leader Eli Yishai as Interior Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Rabbi Yitzhak Cohen as Deputy Minister of  Finance and Rabbi Meshulam Nahari as a Minister without Portfolio in  
the Finance Ministry. Ya'akov Margi leds the Ministry for Religious Services. Another influential Shas personality, Rabbi Emil  
Haim Amsalem was ousted from the party but founded his own Whole Nation Party.
1145See Buber, 1908, Introduction.
1146Cit. Touger, Eliyahu/ Touger, Malka (Eds.): To Know and To Care. Quoted in Marcus, Joel: The Once and Future Messiah in  
Early Christianity and Chabad, p. 387. In: New Testament Studies, Vol. 46, 2000, p. 381-401.
1147Cit. From Mintz, 1992, p. 353.
1148See Haumann, Heiko: Geschichte der Ostjuden. München: DTV, 1990, p. 52.
1149Cit. Lifschitz, 2003, p. 12.
   Seite 183
ments and central to the conception and acceptance of  authority and leadership, students of  competing Yeshi­
wot framed their “rebbegod” in the light of  a Messiah.1150
According to hassidic thought, the world is the arena of  an ongoing struggle between the forces of  dark ­
ness and evil – “the other side” described with the Aramaic term Sitra Achra – and the forces of  light and 
good.1151 The latter represents the divine presence and will of  the Ribbono shel Olom, the master and creator of  
the universe, or God (Hashem). Like orthodox Judaism but much more stressing the difference between Jews 
and non-Jews, Hassidism differenciates between the soul of  a Jew and a goy. While the Jewish soul, after leaving 
the dead body, seeks to unite with god, thus, with eternity, a non-Jewish soul is seen as stemming from the  
Sitra Achra, and therefore seeks to remain a separated individual entity after death. Jewish lives can be categor ­
ized, according to their struggle in the service of  the good against the forces of  evil: The majority of  Jews ap­
plies as a roshe, a sinner who fails to live an exemplary live. In contrast, the benoni is the exception as someone 
whose deeds are exemplary but whose thoughts are uncontrolled. Finally, the tzaddik is a holy and righteous 
man who can control his heart and his thoughts. The tzaddik, it is said, is the greatest gift given to mankind by 
the Ribbono shel Olom and serves his cause as a messenger and fighter against the other side.1152 He became the 
ideal type of  a what a Hassid in his lifetime seeks to become.1153 Being an ordinary man, one from among the 
masses, he became a powerful authority whose followers not only accepted his spiritual but also his mundane  
leadership in terms of  materialistic support. 
In the relationship between the Jews and God man has to do the first step towards building a connection 
with the divine, only than the Lord will do the second step and approach the believer by widening the breach  
that separates the two. The process of  bringing man and God closer is accompanied and actively accelerated  
by the hassidic emissaries, the shlukhim, who, after having been blessed by the Rebbe are sent on their mission  
to spread the message of  Habad in the world.1154 Currently, Habad holds missions in about 100 countries 
worldwide.1155 Their  task  is  to  spread  their  rabbi's  word  and  yiddishkajt  which  includes  traditional  Jewish 
thought and the wisdom of  the Torah. The shlukhim have also the task to find new breaches through which 
God can be reached by the believers; the establishment of  Yeshiwot as active community building supports  
1150Habad prayers and pamphlets that circulated in Israel end with the verse “Long live our Master, our Rebbe, King Messiah, 
forever and ever”. See Sadka, Saul: The Lubavitcher Rebbe as a god. In: Ha'aretz, 2 November, 2007.
1151For the concept see Lurrianic Kabbalah of  Tsfad. URL: http://tsafedkabbalah.blogspot.com/2008/09/sitra-achra-die-andere-
seite.html, 24 November, 2011.
1152See Buber, 1908, p. 3.
1153The conception of  the tzaddik, as Haumann states, included the belief  in the „hidden righteous“ tzaddikim: According to the le­
gend, there are 36 tzaddikim in every Jewish generation. Their task is to protect the world from all evil. They themselves are not 
aware of  the fact that they are considered holy. Theoretically, irrespective of  his piety and faith, each Jew can be a tzaddik without 
knowing it. Among the 36 there will be one who will reveal himself  as the Messiah at the time of  redemption. See Haumann,  
1990, p. 52-54.
1154Habad has established an annual  Kinus HaShlukhim (shlukhim convention) in New York, where all emissaries meet. See Habad: 
The Shluchim Office, Global Chabad Lubavitch Resource Center, website. URL: http://www.shluchim.org/main/inside_v2.asp?
id=37661, 13 May, 2012.
1155Interview with Prof. Alon Dahan, Hebrew University, Ramat Motza, Jerusalem, 14 November, 2010. They were often said to be 
the most active diaspora members in terms of  organization of  Jewish events which in principle are open for any Jews and non-
Jews, contrasting the orientation of  other Jewish groups abroad which often prefer disassociation. 
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their mission „to make the world civilized and a place for Godliness, in that to prepare the world for the Mes ­
siah.“1156 
In its approach towards the outside non-Jewish and Jewish world, Habad differs from other hassidic sects 
only insignificantly. Teshuvah, the return to observance and spirituality is one of  the key features of  the Habad­
niks' mission but is also central for  Shas. As Loeb in his study on the Yemenite community pointed out,  te­
shuvah contains a concrete educational agenda for immigrants to Israel. The Kfar Habad in Israel serves essen ­
tially the same goal. Their Habad programs aim at educating the immigrant in a religious-traditional way with 
yeshiva classes, language classes etc.1157 
Heilman made the point when describing the Hasidim as both ideological and physical survivors of  the  
past but nevertheless as part of  the modern world, a fact that is visible and very much felt in the American  
communities of  New York, like in Williamsburg or in Bnei Brak, Mea Shearim, and Tzfat in Israel. 1158 They 
were ideological survivors in the sense that they overcame the traditional structures of  European Judaism, res­
isted secularization, reform and cultural assimilation. The latter is seen by them as the main evil and main  
threat to the Jews. As the attempt to be integrated and to gain acceptance by mainstream non-Jewish society  
like in Germany or in the US, assimilation is seen as temptation, something which belongs to the repertoire of  
the Sitra Achra. Facing the rise of  Nazi Germany during the 1930s, the rebbes of  the hassidic courts in East ­
ern Europe had warned their followers not to emigrate. With reference to the US, the treyf  medinah (non-kosh­
er country) and world of  the goy1159 and orl (derogatory term for one who is uncircumcised) „where Jews might 
survive but Judaism would die“.1160 Most of  their disciples accepted their advise and remained at the hassidic 
communities. The fear of  active intervention in order to change what only God could change was seen as a ta ­
boo according to the Yiddish saying „So lang wi dos jiddischen Goles, so lang di jiddischen Tsores“1161. The 
German attack on Poland in 1939 which was followed by total mobilization of  the population, it was in fact 
the first time that Jews in Poland became fully integrated into the national discourse when rabbis and their stu­
dents from the Torah Schools joint the trench digging for the defense of  the cities.1162 
The Hassidic movement came into being as a revolutionary force challenging 18 th century Jewish life and 
the rabbinical authorities in Eastern Europe with a mix of  purified mysticism and de-theologized Judaism, 
centering the common believer in their system of  belief. This was a challenge to the traditional authorities  
such as the rabbi, the ritual slaughterer (shohet), the cantor (hazan) etc. Simplifying and liberalizing the strict tra­
ditions of  Judaism was the goal of  other religious movements and sects within orthodox Judaism as well.  
Here, historically, a continuous struggle between conservatives and new emerging revolutionaries has resulted 
1156Cit. From farbrengen addressing shlikhim by Menachem Mendel Schneerson, New York, 01.01.1989. Cit. In: Mintz, Jerome R.:  
Hasidic People. A Place in the New World. Harvard: Harvard Univ. Press, 1992, p. 357.
1157See Loeb, Laurence D.: HaBaD and Habban: „770's“ Impact on a Yemenite Jewish Community in Israel. In: Belcove-Shalin,  
Janet S. (Ed.): New World Hasidim. Ethnographic Studies of  Hasidic Jews in America. Albany: Suny, 1995, p. 69-85.
1158See Heilman, Samuel C.: Foreword, p. 12. In: Belcove-Shalin, 1995.
1159The sinful life of  the goyim in America had been portrayed as evil and, like assimilation as a threat to Jewish tradition; expressed  
in the Yiddish saying „Schiker iz er, trinken miz er, wajl er is a Goj“ (“He is drunken, he is forced to drink because he is a non-
Jew”).
1160Cit. Heilman, 1995, p. 13. 
1161“As long as the Jewish exile lasts, Jewish suffering will continue.”
1162See Haumann, 1990, pp. 180/181.
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in the emancipation of  the latter and restrictive, isolationist or escapist reactions by the former. As for con ­
temporary Israeli Judaism, the Bratzlower Nachman Jews gained an important momentum as a new force and  
re-formulator of  traditional rabbinical Judaism. Their criticism of  the orthodox authorities for their misuse of  
power is expressed in the words of  one of  their rabbis: 
There are some kinds of  people
Who think for a year and a day
And their heads become holy. 
But they consider the body entire as dust made of  dust.
They look into a holy book
And roll their eyes upward,
But they treat their lovely limbs
As if  they were dust and ashes.
And everything over the belt
And under the cincture
Is unclean and then uncleaner.
They teach themselves verbal graces,
And are pilgrims to holy places,
But let a hungry man come begging a handout
And their hands close tight
And their hearts close tighter.
They've exiled their heads away from all reason
And their brains are dizzied, spinning with heavenly spheres
While the dear bit of  humanity is lost
For all eternity.1163
In that sense, the break with tradition can be seen as a sanctified principle in Hassidism. When Rabbi Eliezer, 
the BeSHT, died in 1760, his disciple Dov Bär of  Międzyrzecz1164 (1704(?)-1772), who became known as the 
maggid (the preacher) and as the main architect of  the hassidic movement, was appointed his successor. The 
maggid, before he became a follower of  Rabbi Eliezer, had been one of  his strongest opponents and also after 
the death of  his master, he promoted hassidic teachings that differed from the teachings of  his master. 1165 The 
Bratzlower are now widely accepted especially by the secular Israeli public and their performances and public  
services even in secular Tel Avivian areas attract ordinary non-observant and orthodox Jews alike. Like the  
Lubavitch movement that seems to enjoy increasing acceptance by Israel's secular public, the Nachmans rep­
resent an emotionalized and de-intellectualized Judaism with collectivist rituals of  faith. 1166 Instead of  separat­
ing itself  from the public, their missionary (haftza) activities aim at spreading traditional torah knowledge and 
their Rebbe's mystical mantra. Rabbi Nachman of  Uman (1772-1810)1167, Ukraine, had been a tzaddik of  fam­
1163Cit. Glatstein, Jacob: The Bratslaver to His Scribe. In: How, Irving (a.o.) (Ed.): The Penguin Book of  Modern Yiddish Verse.  
New York: Viking Penguin, 1988, p. 444.
1164Town of  Meseritz, Poland.
1165See Haumann, 1990, p. 52.
1166See Roy, 2005, p. 31.
1167See poster of  Nachman Hassidim in Annex, Abbildung 4.
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ous descent. Being a great-grandson of  the BeSHT, his grave in Uman became the spiritual center for his dis ­
ciples. The most noticeable attribute of  the Na Nachs' haftza is the mantra-like singing (niggun) and dancing of  
the phrase Na Nach Nachma Nachman Me'Uman (Now to Nachman from Uman) through which all of  Israel 
will be redeemed as a precondition for the advent of  the Messiah. The strong emphasis on dancing “with joy 
and pride” is common to most of  the hassidic sects, whereas the considerable proliferation of  Hebrew and 
English literature, instead of  the traditional Yiddish, together with an integrative approach to non-Jews and 
non-observant Jews seems to reflect a break with the tradition of  hassidic isolationism.1168  
The other group that had emerged in both world Jewry and Israeli politics was the Habad movement1169 un­
der the guise of  the Lubavitcher dynasty. Internationally, the portrait of  Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, 
“the Lubavitcher”, is one of  the most visible iconographic symbols in the Jewish world displayed in small 
shops and at synagogues from Williamsburg NYC to Indonesia. Together with the communities of  the con­
gregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, first under its leader Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum, “the Satmarer”1170, and later under 
his successor and nephew Reb Moshe Teitelbaum, Habad is also the leading hassidic court in America. It rep­
resents a future-oriented messianic worldview and sees itself  as a pro-active member of  Jewish and non-Jewish  
society to which it aims at bringing  yiddishkajt and unity1171 in order to re-awaken Jewish orthodox thought, 
education and Torah studies. In contrast, the Satmarer are more oriented towards the past, prefer isolation and 
disassociation and see themselves as the defenders of  traditional customs. Their stance towards Israel is one 
of  opposition and non-acceptance or even militant anti-Zionism. Both movements having settled in Williams­
burg1172 with about five miles in between their headquarters1173, are hostile towards each other with tensions be­
coming increasingly violent. Among the different reasons that separate both camps, is Habad's messianic claim 
that includes the belief  of  the late Rabbi Schneerson being the messiah.1174 Despite messianism having been 
banned from the center of  religious thought in favor of  „Serving God in exile“ – also due to the historical  
Jewish experiences with false messiahs like the Shabbtai Zvi (1626-1676) affair1175 – the idea of  hastening the 
coming of  the Messiah through adherence to the laws is still very present in hassidic thought. Habad's inner di­
1168Surprisingly, at present there is no academic literature on the contemporary Nachman sect, notwithstanding its intensive per ­
formances in the secular public. See also Molner, Adam: Rolling with the Na Nachs, the most high-spirited and newest Hasidic  
sect. In: Ha'aretz, 19 May, 2008. 
1169HaBaD is an acronym for wisdom (hokhmah), understanding (binah) and knowledge (da'at).
1170From the Rumanian city of  Satu-Mare (Yiddish Satmar).
1171For  this  aim  and  Habad's  concept  of  a  united  Jewish  people  see  Habad  Berlin:  Unity  a  special  concept,  website.  URL:  
http://www.chabadberlin.de/library/article_cdo/aid/908651/jewish/Wir-sind-Eine-Einheit.htm, 12 April, 2011.
1172Already between the two world wars, this neighborhood attracted Jewish orthodox immigrants. Mass influx started during World  
War Two with immigrants from the occupied countries and eastern Hungarian communities in particular.
1173The Satmarer residence is located in 500, Bedford Avenue, Habad resides in 770, Eastern Parkway, both Brooklyn.   
1174According to Mintz, the Satmar movement in its battle against the Lubavitcher has been joined by the M'lochim. This purely US-
based group was a general opponent of  Habad and in particular against its fifth and sixth Rebbes. The M'lochim, most of  them 
American-born, were guided by the  malach (angel), Rabbi Haim Avraham Dov Ber Levine HaCohen. The malach was an Lub­
avitcher rabbi, highly respected by the fifth Rebbe, tutor of  the sixth Rebbe and known for his extreme pietistic way of  life. In  
the US, he became a central figure at the Yeshivah Torah Vadaat, Williamsburg, at that time one of  the most important Yeshivot  
in America. Trying to bridge between religious traditional and secular learning in order to eliminate educational barriers to the ac­
ceptance of  his graduates on the job market, the malach's puritanic teaching annoyed the board of  the Yeshivah and he and his 
students were expelled in 1931 and refused to join the ranks under the leadership of  Rebbe Schneerson when he arrived in the 
US in 1940. See Mintz. 1992, p. 21-26, 53-56.
1175For this episode see Kunert, Jeannine: Der 'Juden-Könige' zwei. Zur Wirkung und Rezeption Sabbatai Zwis und Oliger Paullis.  
Dissertation, Max-Weber-Kolleg, University of  Erfurt (work in progress).
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lemma that arose with the new ideology of  some factions according to which the Rebbe was himself  the mes­
siah, was, among several reasons and counter claims by other sects, the precondition for the advent of  the  
Messiah: Only when chaos and a complete breakdown of  social control would introduce the war of  Gog and  
Magog1176, the Messiah would enter the world as the beginning of  the messianic era. 1991 and the Second 
Gulf  War had been interpreted by the Rebbe'e messianic followers as an event that applied to the biblical scen ­
ario. However, despite the Iraq war forcefully entered Habad's narrative as an apocalyptic battle between Israel 
and Saddam's regime, the Lubavitcher himself  saw the war as a contemporary variant of  ancient wars between 
the rulers of  Persia and Arabia.1177 Accordingly, the Rebbe disagreed with his disciples: 
In fact, so strong was his confidence in this exegesis that he forbade his followers to pick up the free gas masks  
provided by the Israeli authorities. Moreover, at a time when many Israelis were flooding to Lod airport to catch  
flights out of  the country for the duration of  the war, the Rebbe not only vetoed such an exit, but also inspired  
hundreds of  his followers from abroad to fly in to demonstrate their solidarity with Israel and their confidence 
in the Rebbe's prophecy that during the war the Jewish state would be the safest place in the world.1178
The fact that Israel survived the war with only marginal damage by Iraqi Scud missiles, contributed to the  
Rebbe's prophetic reputation and his messianic image.1179 And indeed, the Rebbe's life had been miraculously: 
In 1950,  Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902-1994) succeeded his father-in-law, Rabbi Joseph Isaac  
Schneerson (1880-1950) who had become leader in 1920 after the passing of  his father, as the seventh Rebbe  
of  Lubavitch.1180 Not belonging to the dynasty by blood and elected while the old Rebbe's own relatives had 
been bypassed, his election manifested the first divine miracle that habadniks associate with his rise as “Rebbe-
Almighty”. It is said that Schneerson had been a learned man in subjects like engineering due to his studies in 
Berlin and Paris. However, he had no traditional Yeshiwa education until he emigrated to the US in 1941. His  
journey to New York, according to the hagiographic account given by his followers, was possible only because  
he was able to bribe German officers, thus, because of  the miraculous mercy of  his enemies.1181
In Israel, resistance by the orthodoxy against Habad and their campaign “We want Moshiah now!” had been 
formed soon. In January, 2000, the Israeli Chief  Rabbinate, feeling the need to respond to the wave of  pop­
ularized messianism, issued a declaration:
In recent days announcements and declarations are being publicized that can confuse and mislead simple people  
with messianic propaganda that a certain hassidic rabbi is the King Messiah and one should call to him with vari ­
ous proclamations. We have no intention, God forbid, of  diminishing the greatness and the global activities of  
the Rebbe of  blessed memory, but because we are dealing with the foundations of  the faith and there is danger  
in this propaganda, it is necessary to warn against this approach. It is concerning such matters that the Sages  
said,' Wise men, be careful with your words.' Individuals who are undesirable in the eyes of  rabbinic scholars are 
exploiting the signatures of  Rabbis and turning the simple faith in the coming of  the Messiah into propaganda  
1176See Ezekiel: 38-39. For the concept see Marcus, 2000, p. 381.
1177See Ibid., pp. 382/383. 
1178Cit. Ibid., p. 383.
1179"The slogan ‘We want Moshiach now!’, which had already begun to proliferate in the late 1980s, before the main messianic peri­
od, now took on a new urgency. Yet, despite the Rebbe's thrilling announcements of  eschatological advent, which increased mes­
sianic fervour to a burning intensity, he never explicitly proclaimed himself  as the Messiah." Cit. Ibid., p. 392. His death in 1994 
after a stroke in 1992 reinforced the belief  in his future resurrection, comparable to that of  Jesus. To this day, Habad has no new 
leader despite various claims by some of  his followers. For instance Rabbi Shaul Shimon Deutsch claims to be the eighth Lub ­
avitcher, but his claim, like others, have been rejected by most habadniks. See Ibid., p. 390.
1180The Lubavitcher dynasty was born in the town of  Lubavitch in Belorussia with its first Rebbe Shneur Zalman of  Liadi (1745-
1813). His youngest son, Rabbi Moshe, converted to Christianity – a fact that is categorically denied by  habadniks to this day. 
Sheleg, Yair: Chabad's lost son. In: Ha'aretz, 26 December, 2002.
1181Interview with Prof. Alon Dahan, Hebrew University, Ramat Motza, Jerusalem, 14 November, 2010.
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whose end cannot be foreseen. One must be careful and warn people that one must believe in the straightfor­
ward faith that the Messiah will come as our Rabbis have taught us, and anyone who adds diminishes.1182
Eventually the most critical opponent of  the Rebbe was Rabbi Eliezer Menachem Schach (1898-2001) who 
claimed Habad's messianism to be heretical and not authentic. Schach represented the Lithuanian Ashkenazi 
Haredim in Israel and aimed at breaking the political monopoly of  the Agudath Yisrael on ethnic and theological 
grounds. For that reason he supported the foundation of  Shas and the Ashkenazi Degel HaTorah to weaken the 
Aguda in the elections of  1988.1183 The Lubavitcher who since 1988 became involved into Israeli politics in or­
der to support the Aguda1184, was, thus, a sectarian and political opponent of  Schach with a growing popularity 
among Jews that was perceived as threatening Schach's authority in rabbinical circles. Personally, the Rebbe 
never  visited  Israel  where  his  followers  had  build  a  replica  of  his  residency  at  Crown Heights,  Habad's 
temple1185 and, thus, a sacred space even after the Rebbe's death for it contained his divine spirit similar to ob­
jects he had touched during his lifetime.1186
Habad, like most of  the other haredi sects cultivated a special imagery towards the Soviet union similar to  
that of  the holocaust. The Lubavitcher, soon became the Jewish champion of  the US establishment during the 
Cold War for his clear criticism of  the Soviet regime and for his potential to mobilize American Jewish circles  
for elections, but he refused to be involved in world politics. Like Jews worldwide, the Soviet empire had been  
perceived by Habad as a land of  the evil “other side” where Jews had been persecuted for decades and were 
deported into Gulag camps1187, their synagogues being demolished, and where hassidic sects like the Braslower 
and the Ladower were forced to establish illegal Yeshiwot during the 1920s and 1930s under permanent threat:
A Russian death
Is death of  all deaths.
Russian pain,
Pain of  all pains […]1188
Prior to the Soviet Union's implosion in 1991, the Rebbe had predicted the end of  the empire built by “the  
man”, by Stalin whose name, similar to that of  Hitler has been deleted from Habad texts. In fact as early as in 
the 1960s, the Lubavitcher had predicted the end of  world communism and gave orders to prepare for the ab­
1182Quoted in Berger, David: The Rebbe, the Messiah, and the Scandal of  Orthodox Indifference. London: Littman Library of  Jew ­
ish Civilization of  Portland, 2001, pp. 128-129.
1183With regard to the means used by the rabbis to influence voters during the 1988 elections, Arian writes: “[...] on television, for  
example, Shas presented the proceedings of  a rabbinical court that absolved the oaths of  potential voters who had promised to  
vote for the Aguda. […] After that election, it became illegal in Israel to try to influence voters by promising to provide blessing  
or by threatening to withhold a blessing or to curse someone for voting (or not voting) for a specific party, just as it is a crime in  
Israel to buy votes with money or favors. In 1996, despite this legislation, the fierce competition for votes continued, and the use  
of  amulets and promises of  blessings for 'correct' voting were reported widespread.” Cit. Arian, 1998, p. 132.
1184See Arian, 1998, pp. 131/132.
1185See Marcus, 2000, p. 385.
1186Interview with Alon Dahan.
1187“He [the sixth Lubavitcher, M.G.] selected nine of  his young pupils to battle with him. The one sent to Georgia, falsifying the  
KGB document, was my grandfather, Simon Yakabashvili,  my father's father. He, together with hundreds of  his colleagues,  
Chassidim throughout the Soviet Union, was arrested in 1938, tortured mercilessly and given a 25-year sentence in the Gulag.  
Most of  his eight colleagues who accepted the oath never made it out of  Stalin’s hell. They perished in the Soviet Union.” See  
Rabbi Y. Y. Jacobson: Stalin vs. Schneersohn. URL: http://www.theyeshiva.net/Article/View/24/Stalin-Vs-Schneersohn, 11 Oc­
tober, 2011.
1188Cit. Kvitko, Leyb: Russian Death. In: How, 1988, p. 298.
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sorption of  immigrating Jews in the US and in Israel. The fact that the continuation of  Cuba, North Korea 
and rising China proved his prophecy wrong, paved the way for intensive debates within the movement.1189
Habad was among the strongest supporters of  Israeli governments especially when the security of  the state 
was perceived as being threatened. The Lubavitcher Rebbe had also been a supporter and an ardent believer in  
Israel's doctrines of  deterrence and offensive military operations. During the Yom Kippur War, Schneerson 
had send his Peace Corps and members of  the  Habad youth group (Tzivos HaShem), declared an “Army of  
God”, to the military and civilian fronts in Israel. Another supporter of  Israel was Rabbi Yekusiel Yehuda Hal­
berstam, known as the Klausenberger (1905-1994), therefore an opponent of  the Satmar Rebbe. Klausenber­
ger who had founded a Yeshivah in New Jersey, left the US in 1959 and settled in Israel, where he established a  
village for his community.1190 In June, 1976, an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by seven 
Palestinian fighters who forced the crew to fly to Uganda's Entebbe airport. The hijackers demanded the re ­
lease of  53 Palestinian operatives in exchange for the lives of  250 passengers and the crew. Jerusalem, faced  
with the fact that Uganda's ruler Idi Amin, who at the UN had claimed the destruction of  Israel, would not  
cooperate in any rescue initiative. Thus, Israel acted unilaterally and send special units for a rescue mission to 
Entebbe in which the commander of  the Sayeret Matkal unit and brother of  the current prime minister, Lt.-
Col. Jonathan “Yoni” Netanyahu, was killed in action.1191 After all hostages had been freed, Schneerson lauded 
the successful mission as a divine miracle that had manifested through every single Israeli soldier. 1192 During 
most of  Israel's military operations, like those during the War of  Attrition, the Lubavitcher who had been 
lauded by his Israeli guests from politics and the military for his impressive military-strategic knowledge, to­
gether with his disciples had not only adopted its theological concept of  good and evil to the State of  Israel  
and its enemies but had supported military missions spiritually with prayers for Jewish lives and blessings via 
phone to the responsible commanders.1193 
This supportive stance towards the Israeli security establishment together with the Rebbe's hardline posi­
tion to the issue of  a withdrawal from the occupied territories was in opposition to the Satmar Rebbe's credo  
of  not supporting goals, institutions or representatives of  the State of  Israel. Among the Haredim, from their 
very core organizations in the  Yishuv to its modern Israeli and American variants, anti-Zionist orientations 
were strong in which the State of  Israel is considered “a religiously unacceptable project but also as a hollow­
ing of  the religious meanings of  the key religious terms [redemption and ingathering, M.G.], thereby putting a  
1189Interview with Alon Dahan.
1190For his life until his emigration to New York in 1947 see Lifschitz, Judah: The Klausenberger Rebbe. The War Years. Southfield: 
Targum Press, 2003.
1191A detailed account is given by Arazi, Doron: Itzhak Rabin. Held von Krieg und Frieden. Freiburg: Herder, 1996, p. 131-138.  
Yoni became an Israeli hero with his brother Bibi declaring the fight against terrorism his personal mission. Accordingly, the cur ­
rent Prime Minister – called “Mister Security” in Israel – and himself  a former high ranking officer of  the Sayeret Matkal elite 
forces, has written intensively on the issue of  terrorism and was the driving force behind the establishment of  Israel's most im­
portant think tanks with focus on asymmetric warfare. The Netanyahu family's reputation as the role model of  an Israeli-Zionist  
family had started with the career of  the father, the well-known historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu who had succeeded the chief  
ideologue Vladimir Jabotinsky as the head of  the New Zionist Organization in the US.
1192For Lubavitch and the Entebbe Operation see Mintz, 1992, pp. 57/58. 
1193Interview with Alon Dahan.
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major obstacle in the path of  redemption.”1194 In Israel, haredi groups such as Toldot Aharon1195 lead by Rabbi 
Shmuel Pappenheim from Mea Shearim, declare themselves as being opposed to any policies that represent  
the Zionist state.  Toldot Aharon and other groups are organized in the umbrella organization Edah HaHared­
it.1196 In 2008, Nir Barkat became the secular mayor of  Jerusalem.1197 It is said that his electoral success with 52 
percent of  the votes had been possible only because of  the support from influential rabbis and their followers.  
In Barkat's case, his candidature had been supported by the Ger Rabbi who mobilized his followers against the 
competitor Meir Porush from the ultra-orthodox Yahadut HaTorah platform.1198 Barkat's initiative to open the 
parking lot in front of  Jerusalem's town hall on shabbat, provoked violent protests by groups from the Edah 
HaHaredit. They can be seen as the ideological spearhead leading the haredi protests in the recent conflicts 
with the Municipality of  Jerusalem on similar issues such as the opening of  new shopping malls on shabbes,  
gender separation in public transportation etc.
1194Cit. Tepe, 2008, p. 108.
1195This group has its synagogue in Shivtei Yisrael Street, Jerusalem. Members wear a white knitted kipah, similar to the Nachman 
Hassidim but without tassel.
1196See German Hassidic Blog Jerusalem Backyard: Rabbi Shmuel Pappenheim: Spezielle Gebete in der Bar Ilan Street am Erev 
Schabbat, 24 June, 2009. 
1197Barkat, a former paratrooper major and business man, and his party Yerushalayim Tatzliyah had been defeated in the 2003 elec­
tions by the ultra-orthodox candidate Uri Lupolianski with only 43 percent of  the votes. Lupolianski had been the second reli­
gious-oriented mayor of  Jerusalem after the term of  Shlomo Zalman Shragai, a Polish religious Zionist who had served as a  
mayor for West Jerusalem from 1950 to 1952.
1198Until 2003 only secular candidates had served as mayors with Ehud Olmert being the last office bearer before Uri Lupolianski  
was elected mayor. However, as far as the Israeli Arabs of  East-Jerusalem are concerned, the PA has called for boycotts of  the  
elections with the goal to not recognize Jerusalem's municipality and, hence, Israel's occupation and annexation of  East-Jerus­
alem after the 1967 war.
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7  The State's External Dimension - The National Self  and the Other: Narratives 
of  Conflict 
The great regret is that the rest of  the world is talking about this tragedy, this disaster, and our neighboring country, with whom we were trying to  
talk about peace and cooperation, is trying to defame Pakistan and Islam and harm it. If  you look at their television, morning, evening and  
afternoon, a constant barrage is being launched against us. I want to tell them in English: Lay off! The Pakistan Army and every Pakistani are  
prepared to sacrifice their lives for the safety of  Pakistan. At this moment, our full air force is on high alert, and they are ready for a do-and-die  
mission.
President Pervez Musharraf, Address to the Nation, 19 September, 2001.
Please don't forward any jokes that ridicule our army [..] We were there for you in 1948, 1965 and 1971. We were there on Indian Tiger Hills in  
Kargil. Be with us when we have been stabbed in the back.
SMS campaign by Pakistan Army in the aftermath of  US Operation Geronimo, May, 2011.
We fight, therefore we are.
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, The Revolt, 1951.1199
Our hand is always extended in peace but its fingers are always on the trigger.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Air Force Day, 30 June, 1994.
He who blessed our forefathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob – may He bless the fighters of  the IDF, who stand guard over our land and the cities of  
our God from the border of  the Lebanon to the desert of  Egypt, and from the Great Sea unto the approach of  the Aravah, on the land, in the air,  
and on the sea. May the Lord cause the enemies who rise up against us to be struck down before them. May the Holy One, blessed is He, preserve  
and rescue our warriors from every trouble and distress and from every plague and illness, and may He send blessing and success in their every en ­
deavor. May He lead our enemies under their sway and may He grant them salvation and crown them with victory. And may there be fulfilled for  
them the verse: For it is Hashem, your God, who goes with you to battle your enemies for you to save you. And may He bless, preserve and protect the  
captive and missing soldiers of  the Israel Defense Forces. May He rescue them from captivity and speedily restore them in peace. Now let us respond:  
Amen.1200
Prayer for the Israel Defense Forces, Chief  Rabbinate of  Israel.
The previous chapters made the attempt to differentiate between the various discourses that concentrate on 
the self-imagery and statist raison d'être of  Israel and Pakistan. It has been argued that modern nationalism ap­
plied to specific sociopolitical environments and adopted a religious component. However, these attempts  
would not adequately reconsider the impact of  security as another dominant component of  state ideology 
which had striking psycho-political  and economic implications on Pakistan and Israel, through which they 
evolved into “national-religious security states mired in a deep sense of  insecurity which they cannot get rid of  
primarily due to the national narrative being frozen in history”1201, as Siddiqa put it. In Chapter 2 and 3, it has 
been stated that in both cases the nation's ethos as a seemingly unitary progressive narrative claims segrega­
tion. Emphasizing these insistent narratives of  exceptionalism – Israel chosen by God as “a people who dwells  
1199Cit. Begin, Menachem: The Revolt. Los Angeles: Nash Publ., 1951, p. 46.
1200Said on shabbat and holidays, along with the Prayer for the State of  Israel in synagogues administrated by the Chief  Rabbinate of  Is­
rael and some public institutions, e.g. the Jewish Agency. See Jewish Agency, website.
1201Cit. Siddiqa, 2 April, 2011.
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apart,  and will  not  be reckoned among the  nations”1202,  privileged  and obligated  to  be  “a  light  unto  the 
nations” of  exemplary morality, social justice and solidarity with the oppressed peoples around the world; and 
Pakistan, Land of  the Pure and bastion of  Islam, the struggle of  its founding fathers often narrated as “a di ­
vine intervention or at least something that had divine patronage”1203 – how did both states situate themselves 
within the international community? And given the fact that for decades Pakistani and Israeli history has been 
dominated by conflicts in a troubled neighborhood – how did both states defend and justify their roles when 
other states refused to accept them or when they became targets of  delegitimization? In the same way in  
which religion, nationalism and self-imagery form an ideological backbone for both an established and an as ­
piring nation they can significantly influence a state's concrete policies. Thus, this chapter analyzes how views 
on history, religion, ideology and threats or their perceptions1204 affected foreign and security policies and how 
in turn catalytic events in these domains were framed and rationalized in terms of  ideology and seen through 
the ideological prism. 
According to the theory of  conflict, a single bilateral catalytic event and its perception and interpretation as  
a threat by one side has the potential to become a protracted multilateral conflict with a complex matrix that  
appears to be a dead end for any political solution as well as a psycho-political point of  no return eliminating  
any perspective for future dialogue or reconciliation. Therefore, due to the manifold factors constituting a con­
flict, the analysis is based on a multidimensional approach. The analysis will concentrate on narratives of  con ­
flict and highlights the interplay of  both military and economic hard power and political-ideological, cultural and 
religious soft power factors in the perception and interpretation of  threats and mechanisms of  response through 
which they are countered. Root conflicts have been transformed on the multilateral level of  international rela­
tions where deficits of  legitimacy aggregated such phenomena as the feeling of  being abandoned by the inter ­
national community or the fear of  isolation and pariahization. Pariahization or the recognition as a “failed 
state” has often been directly linked to the Pariah's exertion of  hard and soft power and resulting incompatibil­
ities with international norms.1205 De-pariahization or international rehabilitation – has been a result of  both, 
changes in international public opinion, thus the changed perception of  in principle unchanged policies, and  
of  dramatic reversals in state policy, experienced by Pakistan immediately after 9/11 and by Israel during the  
1990s Oslo Accord negotiations. A functional approach towards national narratives and the purposes they 
serve in addition to their potential to provide continuity through identity and legitimacy to state policies, is  
therefore central for this second dimension of  analysis. 
1202Cit. Fourth Book of  Moses, Numbers 23:9.
1203Cit. Ali, Fahd: Our ‘Pakistani Muslim exceptionalism’. In: Daily Times, 28 July, 2010.
1204Scholars agree on a threat definition which highlights the declared or presumable use of  coercion and force. But many ap ­
proaches insist that a threat implies two dimensions: One being “material” – understood by Walt as factors such as defensive or  
offensive military capabilities, security doctrines and geopolitical factors, – the other “ideational” to which Walt added an "ag ­
gressive intention". See Walt, Stephen M: The Origin of  Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987, p. 23-26. Arguing on behalf  
of  the traditionalist view on threats, he proposed a narrowed framework for the analysis of  security and threats and linked  
threats primarily to their military and diplomatic origin. However, the perception of  threats, be they real or more the expectation  
of  an forthcoming hostile action, as “the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis", is  
based on a wider range of  military, political-ideological, social and cultural factors and requires a wider definition of  security and  
threats that can be applied to the specific cases. Cit. Cohen, Raymond: Threat Perception in International Crisis, p. 93. In: Politic ­
al Science Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1, 1978, p. 93-107. A state's definition of  its “national interest” is a case in point. Here I am  
following Buzan and Wæver. For the debate in the security studies between “wideners” and “traditionalists” see Buzan, Barry/  
Wæver, Ole/ de Wilde, Jaap: Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1998, p. 1-7.
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7.1 Securitization
In the same way in which the perception of  existential threats has an impact on foreign and security policies,  
on the political, the scientific and expert level and in public opinion, it has a strong impact on internal struc ­
tures within a state and a society that feels threatened. Typical outcomes of  this process of  securitizing include in­
stitutional limitations to the political process and the liberal self-understanding of  the state, and a shifting of  
civil-military balance in favor of  the generals. Although they are not fully integrated into the normal legal or­
der of  state affairs, security policies require legitimation in cases where they violate the constitutional order.  
Rather than being only of  a military nature, the most distinctive effect of  an existential threat is its extension 
from the domains of  security to more transparent fields like economy, taxation, emergency restrictions etc.,  
but also to society in large. Focusing on society, securitization requires a redefinition of  the society's identity 
and its values through which peace and war are interpreted.1206 Thus, transforming the perception of  a threat 
into an existential threat requires the acceptance of  its logic of  necessity and absolute primacy:
In principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object. [...] Traditionally, it has  
been state representatives who by saying 'security'  declared an emergency condition, claiming a right to use  
whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development. But increasingly, this political move has been  
appropriated by other actors, and 'securitization' has become a more diverse phenomenon.1207
As a possible outcome of  diversification of  state monopoly on the framing of  security discourses, non-state  
individuals or groups can develop a discursive and framing power, which is disproportional to their effective 
participation in state and society, e.g. on the basis of  electoral power. As the cases of  catalytic core conflicts  
within a grand conflict, the Kashmir dispute and Israel's 1967 war, will illustrate, this brought into play minor­
ity groups from the political, the religious and the military sectors. Their discourses include conflict narratives 
which the majority of  the domestic public could identify with but in addition they proposed their specific na­
tionalist-religious variation of  ideology  as an alternative to the prevalent state ideology. Conflicts in which 
Pakistan and Israel were involved, indicate a number of  territorial and security claims that could not be justi ­
fied by the state solely with reference to statist ideology but required a synergy of  religious and nationalist le ­
gitimacy. Diversification of  securitizing in Pakistan and Israel and the rise of  religious conflict groups implied 
various effects such as the open or hidden state-sponsoring of  selected groups who were financed and trained 
as armed proxies deployed in disputed territory from where they acted as a force multiplier.
The process of  selecting among various narrative options, and sub-narratives of  wars in particular, chal ­
lenges the national memory and its teleological meta-narrative. This is obvious when attempts to de-existen­
1205According to this discourse, dominant in media, and increasingly in academia, a “failed state” is unable to perform a set of  func ­
tions taken to be characteristic for a properly functioning state: To maintain secure boundaries, ensure the protection and secur ­
ity of  its population, provide public goods and effective governance and to maintain law and order. While all of  these precondi ­
tions apply to Pakistan and at least three to Israel, the discourse oversimplifies matters. For instance, The Fund for Peace (Wash­
ington) ranked Israel (and West Bank's Israeli sectors) 53th, Pakistan 12th out of  177 states. Indicators used include demography, 
movement of  Refugees or IDPs, economic development, poverty and brain drain, as well as level of  violence and state legitim­
acy. See The Failed States Index 2011. Similar rankings, for instance the European Commission's (EC) Eurobarometer in 2003,  
ranked Israel as the most serious threat to world peace (59%, followed by North Korea, Iran and US with 53%, and Pakistan  
48%). As a reaction to the survey which shocked the Israeli public, especially due to Israel's high ranking by German respondents  
(65%), Israeli ministers accused the EC of  “demonizing Israel” and of  tolerating a new Antisemitism. See BBC News: Israeli an­
ger over EU 'threat' poll, 3 November, 2003.
1206This is especially true for the definition of  what exactly is threatened: “Such a securitizing move involves a claim that the referent  
object is existentially threatened and that action according to the normal procedures will not be able to offset this in time, and  
therefore extraordinary measures are both needed and justified.” Cit. Wæver, 2009, p. 21.
1207Cit. Ibid., p. 22.
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tialize a threat fail due to the powerful argument of  consistent leitmotifs such as the eternal conflict, the cos­
mic battle etc.1208 The narrative of  protracted conflicts – seen as a self-reproducing dynamic – is to a high de ­
gree based on motives that themselves are strongly linked to, for instance, the claim of  inevitability, in which 
conflict is accepted as an inevitable and insurmountable feature inhered in the nation's past, present and fu­
ture. Again, this is an argument which goes beyond the bellum iustum narrative in those cases where peace is 
something which the nation in its past never fully enjoyed.1209 
7.2 Civil-Military Relations
The role of  the military in decolonized development societies has been targeted by various studies that identi ­
fied the military class socioeconomically as the substitute for an underrepresented urban business class and as  
a progressive and driving agency of  change. The perception of  the army as a “modernizing elite” and a central  
force in a transformation process that leads the nation and the people from the “traditional” and socioeco­
nomically backward era into a modern, post-capitalist and post-colonial future was idealistic. 1210 In a similar 
way utopian was the perception that the rise of  democracy in the world would lead to a decline of  authoritat­
ive military rule. Instead of  withdrawing from the political arena, the army in a clear majority of  decolonized 
new nations1211 not only became the dominant force in cementing the colonial sociopolitical status quo but 
also expanded its influence in the civil-political and economic spheres drastically. Furthermore, in states such  
as Pakistan and Israel the military plays the role of  a social agency and fabric. Its manifold activities in the ci ­
vilian sphere and its strong participation in societal, government and security processes enables the military to 
contribute to national discourse and identity building and to emphasize images of  nationhood, solidarity and 
collectivity that are borrowed from its own military culture, a process which is immensely favored and acceler­
ated in times of  war. In turn, the military is not immune against the ethnic-religious set of  problems and soci ­
etal cleavages deeply imbedded in the state since its birth which is illustrated by changing approaches of  the 
military leadership to the inclusion of  religion as a mobilizing element among the soldiers and as a part of  mil ­
itary ideology. The same is true for the ethnic imbalance of  representation in the civil sphere where distinct 
ethnic groups are over-represented while others are marginalized which is also reflected in the military ranks. 
Finally, the military's exceptional position in state and society is legitimized by the powerful ideological nar ­
ratives that were promoted during the struggle for independence by nationalist groups that finally succeeded in 
establishing the state.  Their demand for an independent state was mainly based on two central thoughts:  
Firstly, the historical experience of  victimization, suppression, persecution and violence led to the certainty  
1208Thus, de-existentialization of  threats requires critical review and reevaluation of  security politics, but also the deconstruction of  
its elements in terms of  its non-political and non-military capabilities. 
1209Mufti has stressed this existential crisis of  the minority being threatened. On the basis of  his analysis of  Western and Urdu liter ­
ature Mufti comes to the conclusion that British India's  Hindu-Muslim conflict had been interpreted along similar lines by 
Muslim intellectuals as a local variation of  the European Jewish crisis in the light of  colonial South Asia's rising ethnic and na­
tional movements. See Mufti, Aamir R.: Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of  Postcolonial Cul­
ture. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007.
1210Though his study stresses only the cases of  armies in Arab states, Tibi's model of  the Egyptian army as a social agent can be ap ­
plied to the cases discussed in this chapter. See: Tibi, Bassam: Militär und Sozialismus in der Dritten Welt. Allgemeine Theorien 
und Regionalstudien über arabische Länder. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 14-39. 
1211See Gutteridge, William: Military Institutions and Power in the New States. London (a.o.): Pall Mall, 1964; Janowitz, Morris: The 
Military in the Political Development of  New Nations. An Essay in Comparative Analysis. Chicago (a.o.): Univ. of  Chicago  
Press, 1964.
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that peaceful coexistence within an ethnically and religiously divergent majority was impossible, and secondly,  
that protection and survival could only be guaranteed by the establishment of  a sovereign state with its own  
security and defense capabilities recognized by the international community. This view was only confirmed by 
the immediate state of  war and an atmosphere of  hostility following independence which gave priority to the  
development and buildup of  the army and the defense sector as compared to civil institutions. Different from  
other states that lack the troubled colonial past or the experience of  foreign occupation, emerging in a more or  
less peaceful environment, the birth-narratives of  Israel and Pakistan adhere to a highly militarized component 
which has a tendency to overcompensation in terms of  countering the centrality of  the existential threat faced 
by the fore-fathers. Accordingly, the national ethos tends to stress the new nation's and new natives' attributes  
and strengths such as military might, national grandeur and overwhelming superiority over adversaries or mira ­
culous victory in situations of  inferiority. 
This chapter concentrates on exemplary key events in the early years of  state formation, when the military  
acted as a crisis-manager in support of  the civilian government and in which it could increase its popularity 
significantly. The educational attitude and a superior view to civilians underscores the military's claim to design  
a national image and to become a major force in the process of  national integration. Ideal images within a mil ­
itary ethos, such as the self-sacrifice for the nation, play an important role in national imagining as Benedict  
Anderson has pointed out. In this context, death and self-sacrifice play an important role in national imagining  
and can be seen as the ultimate logic of  modern nationalism that is by and large accepted by society who itself  
responds with expressions of  national solidarity as the case of  Israel's missing soldiers indicates.
The military is both an  institutional interest group1212 under constitutional law1213 that, beyond its natural 
sphere, formulates and expresses political demands, felt mainly in foreign affairs and defense policies, as well 
as  an  associational interest  group due  to  its  involvement  in  the  defense  sector.1214 According to Lasswell's 
concept of  the “garrison state”, mainly under the conditions of  prolonged domestic tensions or the weakness 
of  civil-political institutionalism and leadership and a constant threat of  war, the military can maximize its 
control of  resources and ensure the growth of  its economic and political power.1215 Regarding future develop­
ments, the military, in an attempt of  building bridges, will acquire skills of  civilian management and will cultiv­
1212Almond and Coleman identified four types of  major interest groups in the political system: 1. institutional, 2. associational, 3.  
non-associational and 4. anomic. Among these groups, the army applies to the first type due to its long-lasting formal organiza ­
tional character and its formal authorization given by the state or the constitution. Its monopoly status ensures its ability to influ ­
ence policy outputs. See Almond, Gabriel/ Coleman, James (Eds.): The Politics of  Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton Univ.  
Press, 1960, and for the Israeli case Arian, 1998, p. 286/287ff.
1213In Pakistan the constitution determines the status of  the armed forces under National Assembly of  Pakistan: The Constitution of  
the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, 5th Ed., 18th Amendment, Part XII, Ch.2, Art. 243-245. For Israel see Basic Law: The Army, passed 
by the Knesset on 31 March, 1976. The Israeli army was not subjected to a specific law until 1976 when the Agranat Commis­
sion, investigating the Israeli setbacks during the Yom Kippur War (October 1973) criticized the military's influence on political  
decisions through active and former senior officers with close ties to Knesset and cabinet members and recommended in its final  
report the enactment of  a new Basic Law in regard of  the army's status and role in the state.
1214For a recent study on the defense economy and the military business interests (Milbus) of  the Pakistan Army see Siddiqa, Aye ­
sha: Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. London: Pluto Press, 2007. Though somewhat out of  date, the study by  
Mintz and Wardt analyzes the impact of  Israel's high military expenditure in terms of  its political-economic effects in boosting  
national economy and thereby affecting the electoral climate in favor of  the responsible political decision makers. See Mintz,  
Alex/ Wardt, Michael D.: The Political Economy of  Military Spending in Israel. In: The American Political Science Review, Vol.  
83, No. 2, 1989, p. 521-533. 
1215See Lasswell, Harold: The Garrison State and Specialist on Violence. In: American Journal of  Sociology, No. 46, 1941, p. 455-
468.
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ate elements of  its ethos of  national duty within the civilian sphere. Changing conditions for access to the  
ranks of  the armed forces will turn the elitist-exclusive image of  the army and will emphasize a more merito ­
cratic approach to the recruitment processes of  officers. As a result, the military retains its organizational co ­
hesion and independence which is only possible through its holding of  unprecedented amounts of  direct or  
indirect political and administrative power, e.g. budget autonomy.1216 Laswell's model emphasizes “a model of  
relations between the civil and military sectors, in which the boundaries between the two are fragmented” and 
permeable.1217 As a result, a partial militarization of  the civilian sector takes place that allows the military to par ­
ticipate in the task of  nation-building and to co-formulate policy agendas.1218 In return, to a certain extend, ci­
vilians try to increase their influence on matters of  military and defense. They respond with a partial civilianiza­
tion of  the military structure which together with the military's  expansion to the civilian sphere,  provides  
ground for the model of  a people's army.1219 This model, connecting civilians and soldiers as one national en­
tity, that has the potential to be mobilized and transformed into a nation-in-arms, finds its opposing trend in a 
professional, closed and socioeconomically privileged military “caste”, “based on the premise that the differ­
ence between the military and civilian sectors, especially in democratic societies, cannot be bridged.” 1220 In an 
ideal democratic setup a balance of  power, legitimated by the constitution, separates and isolates the military  
from the civilian culture. In response, the military cultivates its own ideological framework and distinctive  
framework of  values through which it perceives domestic and international affairs and through which it in  
turn is perceived by the civilian sector. 
7.2.1 Pakistan 
Negotiations on the status of  the colonial Indian army were a struggle of  its own between India and Pakistan,  
both insisting on their full share of  the Indian army in order to guarantee defense capabilities for their territor­
ies, and the British, who still hoped for a united independent India through political negotiations and, in case  
of  partition, the establishment of  a common defense arrangement between India and Pakistan in order to  
avoid law and order problems.1221 Unprepared for partition and facing the risk of  a breakdown of  military dis ­
cipline and an administrative collapse, the three sides agreed on a formula which included a step-by-step pro­
cess of  reconstitution of  the colonial armed forces.1222
1216See Janowitz, 1964, pp. 4/5, footnote 4.
1217Cit. Ben-Eliezer, Uri: A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First Years, p. 265. In: Comparative Studies in  
Society and History, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1995, p. 264-285.
1218See Ibid., 1995, pp. 265/266; Horowitz/ Lissak, 1989, p. 200-230.
1219For a systematic examination on different forms of  legitimacy of  people's armies see Fried, Robert C.: Comparative Political In ­
stitutions. New York (a.o.): Macmillan Press, 1966, pp. 85/86. The legitimacy of  the military also derives from a doctrine of  na­
tional salvation according to which the army will save the nation from external threats. Irrespective of  their organizational mod ­
els and ties with the civilian sector, this narrative can be found in in both cases analyzed in this chapter. 
1220Cit. Horowith/ Lissak, 1989, p. 204.
1221See Jalal, Ayesha: The State of  Martial Rule. The Origins of  Pakistan's political economy of  defense. Cambridge (a.o.): Cam ­
bridge Univ. Press, 1990, p. 37-39. 
1222Instead of  full administrative control, the two dominions were given operational control preceded by a transfer of  predomin­
antly Muslim units to Pakistan, an exchange of  personnel of  the administrative services, the duplication of  training facilities and  
the division of  military equipment.  The process of  division was supervised by the Joint Defense Council,  chaired by Lord  
Mountbatten and composed of  the defense ministers Liaqat Ali Khan and Baldev Singh. See Ibid., pp. 40/41.
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The post-partition Pakistan Army's evocative image and reputation exceeded its real seize and military ef­
fectiveness. During the chaotic partition, between forced migration and massacres, most of  the new Pakistani  
citizens, mainly those who came as refugees “had come to know the army before getting to know the nation.” 
Having been called to aid the civil power with refugee rescue and support operations, the army in spite of  its  
deficiencies, “was there while the nation was yet to take shape.”1223 Furthermore, during the flood relief  opera­
tions in 1948, 1949 and 1950, the Pakistan Army could successfully link its initial military successes in fighting 
at the borders in its first war in Kashmir (1947-1949) with a professional crisis management in the country. Es­
pecially during the September 1950 Ravi floods that inundated several areas of  Lahore, the officer in com­
mand, Lt. Gen. Azam Khan, later Governor of  East Pakistan (1960-1962),
[…] with his natural flamboyance, energy and passion for publicity, turned the natural disaster into a PR bon ­
anza. With the help of  the PR outfit at his disposal, he had all his moves and actions connected with the relief  
operations covered in full. […] The pressmen jokingly called the yearly visitation as the Lahore Annual Flood 
Festival or Parade with General Azam leading it. The role of  the army jawans in providing-relief  to the uprooted 
earned them universal acclaim and recognition. Azam cultivated the Lahore press to the point of  fraternization.
1224
Based on these experiences the military enforced martial law, that had been declared on 6 March, 1953, to 
bring law and order to Lahore where the anti-Ahmadi agitation had erupted and where the heads of  the riots 
in the Wazir Khan mosque had responded with violence to police action. Protests, boycotts and propaganda 
against  the  Ahmadis  had  been  initiated  in  1952  by  a  number  of  bodies  such  as  Majlis-i-Tahaf­
fuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat,  Majlis-i-Khuddam-i-Rasul and  All  Muslim  Parties  Convention composed  of  the  Majl­
is-i-Ahrar, Jama'at-i-Islami, the Islam League and Shī a clergy. In their countrywide ʿ Khatm-i-Nubuwwat (Finality of  
Prophethood) campaign1225 they demanded the communal exclusion of  the Ahmadis and initiatives by the gov­
ernment to remove Foreign Minister Sir Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan, representative of  Pakistan to the United 
Nations and active member of  the Lahore Ahmadi community, from his post.1226 Until the middle of  March, 
1953, Lahore returned to normality after the army had put down mob violence. General Azam, as the Chief  
Administrator of  Martial Law (CAML) did not end the emergency but started a press campaign in which the 
Lahore and national press were given only censored information. The military castigated especially the Gov­
ernment of  Punjab branch responsible for public relations under its director Mir Nur Ahmad for its pro-active  
role in advancing anti-Ahmadi articles and large amounts of  money to those local media that had heated up  
agitations against the Ahmadis.1227 The initial strategy of  the Martial Law command was to control and direct  
the reporting to prevent future misuse of  media and religion by “trouble-makers and mullahs”, seen as the  
root of  all evil.1228 Instead of  removing martial law, the army, acting mainly under General Azam's personal or­
1223Cit. Siddiqi, A. R. (Brig. Rtd.): The Military in Pakistan. Image and Reality. Lahore (a.o.): Vanguard, 1996, p. 1.
1224Cit. Ibid., p. 14.
1225On the basis of  this issue, similar campaigns against the Ahmadiyya still exist, see Khatm-i-Nubuwwat, website. For the Ahmadi 
theory of  prophethood see Watt, 1988, p. 59ff; Jaffrelot, 2000 and Khalid, 1989, p. 386ff. 
1226For the most comprehensive account on the 1952/53 events, see Government of  Punjab, 1954.
1227See Ibid., p. 83; Ahmad, 1976, p. 67-70; Khan, Fazal Muqeem (Maj. Gen.): The Story of  the Pakistan Army. Karachi: Oxford  
Univ. Press, 1963, p. 180.
1228The resentments against the mullahs that were part of  the anti-Ahmadi front during the sectarian riots became tangible when two 
prominent religious leaders, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi and Maulana Maudūdī for their role in the agitations were sen­
tenced to death by a military court. This decision created a public furore in which government members called on the army com ­
mand to reverse the court's ruling but the military insisted on its right to try the defendants under martial law.
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ders,  maintained its  presence and with the support  of  members  of  the central  governments  civil-service 
launched various educational campaigns, e.g. by assembling senior university and college staff  members and 
advocating a new philosophy of  education.1229 Moreover, the army tried to integrate its civil agenda in public 
life:  
He [CAML, M.G.] had launched an extensive clean-up campaign making fly-proofing of  all provisional shops  
obligatory. Non-observance of  the order carried heavy penalties. The ancient city looked a much better and 
cleaner place and the citizens were peaceful and orderly, in sharp contrast to the pre-martial law chaos. […] Bri­
gadiers and colonels formed the social elite, assuming highly condescending airs. They looked so superior to 
their civilian counterparts […]. Officers were treated and projected as popular heroes and leaders. Every day  
news photographs showed them presiding over public functions, addressing people, touring city areas for on-
the-spot surveys, opening new markets and public buildings.1230
The Lahore Martial Law which was in force for 70 days implied mainly two long-term consequences on the  
national political and legal level. Firstly, the success of  the Pakistan Army in the civilian sphere and the rise of  
its national image from the very beginning was a process that took place solely in West-Pakistan. Due to the  
imbalance in the numerical preponderance and the provision of  equipment and facilities, from a military point  
of  view, East-Pakistan was demilitarized and excluded from full participation in the armed forces.1231 The alien­
ation of  Bengali society to the Pakistan Army and the resentments within the army against the East Bengalis  
became obvious during General Ayub Khan's flag marches that aimed at bringing West Pakistani troops closer  
to the East Bengali population in an attempt to introduce the new defenders.1232 Rare insights into accounts by 
ordinary Pakistani soldiers and bureaucrats show that the shared belief  in an Indian conspiracy became a pop­
ularized variant of  1971. Stereotypes – such as the “bread eaters” of  the West as against the “rice eaters” in 
the East – were fed by physical-racist motives. In a political analysis of  1953, the author wrote:
If  it is asked why there should be divergent or conflicting claims, the answer is that the racial, cultural and lin­
guistic differences between the peoples of  west and east are such that friction is inevitable. The Punjabis, the  
Pathans and the Sindis of  the west are of  Aryan stock, and tend to look down on the Mongoloid races of  East  
Pakistan. The latter resent this attitude of  superiority and the remote control of  Karachi; they are also devoted  
to their language, Bengali, and fiercely resist proposals that Urdu, the language of  the west, should be adopted as  
the sole state language of  Pakistan. Successive administrations, from the days of  the first Governor- General,  
Mr. Jinnah, and his great Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, onwards have failed to reconcile these differ­
ences and to weld the two wings into a harmonious whole. It is not that East Pakistan is any less patriotic than  
the other wing, or that it has the slightest desire to break away and rejoin India; but it just will not be treated as a 
colony.1233
The failure in nationalizing the army was visible also on the political level with an under-representation of  
Bengali political participation, in the national economic system and psychologically in a way that left much  
room for resentments and prejudices canalizing feelings of  martial superiority vs. non-martial inferiority and 
mutual stereotyping between West and East Pakistanis whose “only military image […] was that of  a police  
constable or of  a political militant.”1234 The racist overtones were mainly based on the British colonial recruit­
1229See Siddiqi, 1996, pp. 28/29.
1230Cit. Ibid., pp. 27/28.
1231Pakistan had inherited eight infantry regiments that were all barracked on West Pakistani territory. In addition to the two existing  
battalions in East Pakistan the East Bengal Regiment, mainly composed of  Bengali Muslims but commanded by West Pakistanis,  
was raised in February 1948.
1232“The columns taking part in the marches consisted entirely of  non-Bengali soldiers, of  tall and light-skinned Punjabis and Path ­
ans looking physically superior to the short, dark-skinned, non-martial Bengali pedestrians. […] At the very outset, the national  
army thus acquired the look of  a foreign military presence in Bengal.” Cit. Siddiqi, 1996, pp. 6/7.
1233Cit. Innes, F. M.: The Political Outlook in Pakistan, p. 3. In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1953, p. 303-317.
1234Cit. Siddiqi, 1996, pp. 5/6.
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ment policy which was made the policy of  the Pakistan Army, giving preference to the martial races of  Punjabi 
Muslims and Sikhs and the Pakhtuns in the North-West Frontier Province to the disadvantage of  the non-
martial ethnic setup in East-Pakistan.1235 More understated was the anti-British drive in the attempts of  the 
West-Pakistani  military  elite  to  “pakistanize” the army.  British  officers  still  serving in  the military  of  the 
Dominion of  Pakistan were mainly targeted by the army's Rawalpindi press corps that reported on failures and  
mismanagement especially in the promotion processes in the army ranks in journals like The Civil and Military  
Gazette1236 and Mujahid that after reorganization of  the military press in 1952 was converted into the daily  Hilal 
magazine.
Secondly,  the  Muslim  League  in  West-Pakistan  had  experienced  a  serious  backlash  earlier,  when  Mo­
hammad Ali Jinnah, serving a Chief-Governor of  Pakistan died on 11 September, 1948, which was followed 
by the assassination of  his political companion, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan on 16 October, 1951. The 
death of  the statesmen and figureheads of  the Pakistan Movement sustainably weakened the civil-political sec ­
tor in terms of  authoritative and charismatic leadership. The political and bureaucratic elite of  East-Pakistan  
was not spared by the deterioration of  civilian rule when the Dacca-born successor of  Liaqat Ali Khan, Prime 
Minister  Khawaja  Nazim-ud-Din,  was  dismissed  by  Governor-General  Malik  Ghulam Mohammad on 17 
April, 1953. Nazim-ud-Din who had expressed dissatisfaction over the military's martial law rule in Lahore was 
succeeded by another Bengali, Muhammad Ali Bogra, who was dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad in October, 
1954, together with the National Assembly. These interventions by the civil-bureaucracy backed by the military 
not only reaffirmed the distrust of  the Punjabi West Pakistani establishment for their Bengali East Pakistani 
counterparts but were also legitimized by the Supreme Court with the sacred formula of  the “Law of  Neces­
sity” which paved the way for the constitutional and military coups to come.
7.2.1.1 Islamization and the Army
Regarding the army's national task to defend the people, the territory and the ideology of  Pakistan, especially  
the latter's interpretation by the military has been subjected to several changes in terms of  its interpretation  
and adaption to the security doctrines of  the state. What Siddiqa calls the “pragmatic-nationalist” character of  
the military privileges the army with the ability to swiftly shift between different ideological outfits. 1237 This 
crystallized under the rule of  General Zia ul-Haq during the Afghan War when regime and army successfully  
involved religious groups and parties in the jihad against the Soviet Union. Zia who saw the army and the for­
eign service as “the nation's first line of  defense”1238 personally ordered the implementation of  several Islamic 
elements in the legal structure of  the army, such as an amendment to the oath of  allegiance, obligatory for  
1235An alternative approach to the British recruitment policy focuses on the British policy of  granting agricultural land as a reward to 
communities for their services to the raj. The distribution of  land by the colonial government, mainly in the Western Punjabi 
canal colonies, attracted the Punjabi peasantry for service in the army enabling them to improve their socioeconomic status. See  
Rizvi, Hasan-Askari: Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2003, p. 37-40.
1236See Siddiqi, pp. 9/10.
1237See Siddiqa, Ayesha: The military's ideology. In: Dawn, 25 September, 2009.
1238Conversation with Amb. (rtd.) Dr. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Chairman Institute for Strategic Studies, ex-Member of  Foreign Service, 
Islamabad, 29 March, 2011.
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members of  the armed forces1239 and the introduction of  the army's new slogan Iman, taqwa, jihad fi sabil Allah 
(Faith, Piety, Jihad for the sake of  God), when being appointed COAS by Bhutto in 1976. Regarding institu­
tional Islamization, most of  the reforms are still visible and remained unchanged:
786: these three numbers represent the numerological equivalent of  the opening sentence of  the Quran, Bismal ­
lah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim […]. 786 became the identification number for the GHQ of  the new Pakistan Army 
when it took over the operations and offices of  the British north command in India in Rawalpindi after inde ­
pendence. This numerical code was emblazoned on all gate posts and vehicles, as a reminder that this was the  
army of  a Muslim country. But the Islamic identity was only in name at that stage. The senior echelons were still  
British officers who had opted to stay on, and they were in turn succeeded by their native clones [...]1240
While making the appearance and outlook of  the Pakistan Army more Islamic was primarily an infrastructural  
task,  comprising army jargon and culture,  the  educational  system,  names  and codes  given  to operations, 
weaponry and defense facilities etc., Islamizing the ethos and the esprit de corps as a means of  mobilizing sol­
diers and bureaucrats by Islamic ideology and ideas was a more complex task colliding with the predominantly  
secular, pro-Western and liberal tradition in which the general corps had been educated: 
Zia's Islamization over 11 years of  his rule did affect the Army in that overt religiosity increased not significantly  
in my opinion, but somewhat perceptibly. It paid career-wise to be seen as an 'observant' or 'practising' Muslim.  
To give an example from another religion, if  the Pakistan Army was Jewish, it would appear as if  the number of  
Orthodox soldiers had increased, not preponderantly but noticeably. However the Army in the post-Zia period 
has maintained it's largely secular ethos and this trend is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. This is 
true of  the across the board spectrum of  Pakistani society. [...] General Kayani and his post-Zia predecessors  
were all firmly in the secular camp. This trend will be maintained and perhaps increased when US forces with­
draw from Afghanistan.1241
However, the Pakistani generation of  officers that entered military life during the Zia period was subjected to 
the Islamization of  army curricula and courses at the National Defense Colleges (NDC)1242 and the new military 
jargon. As an education officer of  the Pakistan Air Force and NDC lecturer, himself  an Aligarh graduate, put  
it:
It is my sincere faith that our best defense lies in the character training and we must cultivate Islamic moral and 
spiritual virtues to be successful in this world and in the hereafter. The officers in the armed forces have to be  
the most loyal, most patriotic and selfless members of  our society. They can inspire others and build up national  
morale. I also believe that education plays the most important role as a non-military means of  defense. National  
security depends on our noble ideas, trust in Almighty Allah and neatly ordered living. Our entire educational  
system must be reformed and Islamized if  we want to progress and survive as a nation.1243 
In contrast to the policy of  Islamization which ended after the Zia-period, the offensive educational approach 
combined with modest attempts to integrate traditional strata of  society such as the graduates of  the  dīnī  
madāris and religious scholars1244, was concentrated during the 1990s. While politicized Islamic elements were 
slowly pushed back under COAS Gen. Asif  Nawaz Janjua, and the army chiefs succeeding him, the mainten­
ance of  the military ethos combining Islam and professionalism as part of  the army's military ideology contin­
ued.1245 Officers' biographies and textbooks distributed in the army seminaries and published for general sale  
1239“May Allah Almighty help and guide me, A'meen.”, see Presidential Order, No. 14, 1985, Art. 2, National Assembly of  Pakistan: 
The Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, 5th Ed., 18th Amendment, Part XII, Ch.2, Art. 244.
1240Cit. Nawaz, 2008, Introduction, see also Haider, Ziad: Ideologically Adrift, pp. 120/121. In: Lodhi, 2011, p. 113-130.
1241Cit. Email by Amb. (rtd.) Azmad Hassan, 31 March, 2011.
1242Other educational institutions for officers include the Command and Staff  College (Quetta), the Pakistan Navy War College (Lahore) 
and the Air War College (Karachi). In 2007, the National Defense University (Islamabad) was established offering classes in advanced 
strategy, conflict resolutions, nuclear politics and diplomacy for army officers and civil-servants and international applicants. 
1243Cit. Haq, Inamul: Islamic Motivation and National Defense. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991, Preface. 
1244See Malik, 1996, p. 278.
1245See Rizvi, 2003, p. 245-248.
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indicate an explosion of  literature on Pakistani and Muslim military history, where issues of  warfare, leadership 
and jihād embedded into traditional Islamic frameworks and values are contrasted with international conven­
tions of  war as well as Christian and Jewish traditions.1246 Central concepts such as the jihād and shahadat find 
their place also in current army literature and periodicals together with expressions of  cohesion and solidarity  
between the mujāhid and his comrades in poems and songs – for instance Ghazi ya Shahid, here we go the Heaven's  
Way1247 – that form the ideal image of  military heroism and martyrdom1248 referring to a glorified past.1249 In a 
wider context, patriotism and the willingness to self-sacrifice attributed to a military ideology in which religious  
and nationalist overtones are closely linked to the mechanisms and processes in which national images are pro ­
duced.   
7.2.1.2 Current Developments
An army's attributes and ideological outlook are mainly influenced by its leadership's directives and its recruit­
ment patterns that, due to the strict but permeable hierarchical structure allows social mobility and provides 
privileges that employment in the economy cannot. Indicating social change, service in the officer corps more 
and more attracts the lower middle class and goes hand in hand with the withdrawal of  the upper middle class.  
Regarding an ethnic change in the Pakistan Army, the traditional recruitment areas are still the main pool for 
recruiting but recruitment from the formerly underrepresented areas has been increased: Within Punjab, the 
number of  recruits in general and from the traditionally favored districts, Rawalpindi, Attock, Chakwal and  
Jhelum, in particular, has declined, regarding the soldier ranks1250 and has also changed in regard of  the new 
officers' home districts in Punjab shifting to the urban centers in Central and Southern Punjab. The rising 
trend of  recruiting soldiers from other provinces1251 reflects the increased requirements of  personal resources 
given Pakistan's internal security situation.1252 Though the quoted data reflects a limited degree of  ethnic re-ar ­
rangement in the army, it is questionable if  changes in the recruitment policy will bring a fundamental and  
1246See Haq, 1991; Rahman, Afzalur: Muhammad as a Military Leader. Lahore, Islamic Publ., 1990; Qureshi, M. M. (Lt. Gen.): Land­
marks of  Jihad (first Ed. 1970). Lahore: Ashraf  Press, reprint, 1996; Yousaf, Mohammad S. (Brig.): Silent Soldier. The Man be ­
hind the Afghan Jehad. Lahore: Jang, 1991; Ali, Laiq (Brig.): Concept of  Islamic State in Islam and Applicability to Pakistan. In:  
NDC Journal, 2002, pp. 77-91.
1247See Khan, Junaid (Cpt.): Here we go the Heaven's Way. In: Hilal. Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine, No. 2, 2011, p. 17.
1248 See also Pakistan Army's Shuhada's Corner, website.
1249As for instance cultivated in the army's Hilal magazine: “Captain Bilal Kamran, exemplifying the extreme courage and comrade­
ship, willingly opted to help his comrades strangled at Ahmed Khel. When this Quick Reaction Force reached at Shina Khawar, it  
was also ambushed. In such a precarious situation Captain Bilal decided to fight back the ambush under intense fire. Such was  
the ferocity of  ambush that the soldiers could hardly come out of  the vehicles. Captain Bilal gathered all his guts in dismounting  
to charge on the terrorists. In that process he received a volley of  bullets in chest being daringly exposed to embrace Shahadat.  
There in the remote areas of  FATA he performed an act beyond call of  his duty to ascend another step on the ladder of  excel ­
lence. […] In 2008-09, his unit was deployed in Congo in support of  peacekeeping operations. […] In Congo, Muslims is a mar ­
ginalized community. On his own, he started working to renovate the mosques. He would visit remote villages, hutments and 
people to find out how he could help with renovation or constructing a mosque, and then would do it till completion. […] Bilal  
and many like him are the sons of  great regiments and proud parents who lived a life of  total commitment, selflessness and sac ­
rifice to enrich the great heritage of  Pakistan Army. The nation is proud of  the families who offer their sons for the defense of  
the country.” Cit. Amin, Arshad (Col.): In Pursuit of  Excellence. A Tribute to Capt Bilal Kamran Shaheed. In: Hilal, No. 2, 2011,  
pp. 26/27.
1250From 63.7% in 1991 to 43.3% in 2005.
1251Sindh: 8.9% to 23%, KPK and FATA: 20.9% to 22.4%, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas: 5.9% to 9.7%, Balochistan: 0.5% to  
1.5% and since October, 2010, the induction of  additional Baloch soldiers to be increased up to 10.000. See recruitment data 
provided by the GH in Nawaz, Shuja: Army and Politics. In: Lodhi, 2011, p. 79-94.
1252According to the army the losses count 2.800 killed soldiers and about 9.000 wounded since 2001 as of  April 2011. See The  
News: Pakistan rejects US Report, 8 April, 2011. 
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long-term turn towards full national integration of  peripheral provinces. In addition, the change that the army 
will have to deal with is likely to influence also the composition the future high-level officer ranks. Stephen  
Cohen's periodization1253 highlights a British generation of  officers that served in the army's leadership posts 
until 1953 followed by an “American” officer generation (1953-1971) in which the close US-PAK military co ­
operation provided the army with extensive military aid and officer-exchange programs that made them one 
of  the most international-oriented group in Pakistan. The era of  this generation ended with a humiliating de­
feat and the defacto state collapse through the loss of  East Pakistan and the independence of  Bangladesh. Es­
pecially the higher command posts came under severe criticism and were accused of  “corruption arising out  
of  the performance of  Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses” and of  
being an army that “had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for tak ­
ing the vital and critical decisions demanded of  them for the successful prosecution of  the war.” 1254 One out­
come of  the war in East Pakistan (25 March to 17 December, 1971) was a world opinion strongly condemning 
the Pakistani military and political leadership similar to the criticism in the final report of  the investigating ju­
dicial commission, classified until 2000, that tattered the army's professional and moral image and stigmatized 
the institution as a whole. What followed was a “Pakistani” generation of  officers that entered military life at a  
time when about 90.000 Pakistani POW's were still held captive in India. 1255 Pakistan's foreign policy under Zia 
was mainly characterized by the involvement in the Afghan Jihad that brought the army back to the interna ­
tional spotlight, lifted military sanctions1256 and resulted in a supportive military cooperation with the US which 
gave rise to the consolidation of  a nontransparent intelligence subculture (ISI and MI). The fact that the Zia  
bharti  will succeed the current general officers and will be promoted to the highest officer ranks within the  
next years implies the potential for new changes within the military.1257 The role of  the Pakistani military in 
politics, however, can not be overestimated: Being the most important political and economic player since the  
country's birth, an Indian analyst, correctly, stated: “Changes in army chiefs of  staff  in Pakistan are as import ­
ant as changes in heads of  governments.”1258
1253See Cohen, Stephen P.: The Pakistan Army. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998.
1254Cit. GoP: Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, 1974, Ch. 1, Introductory.
1255Both, the official numbers of  Pakistani citizens and “collaborators” held in India and Bangladesh and the number of  Banglade ­
shi war dead vary enormously,  from the official Bangladeshi figure of  3.000.000 to the Pakistani figure of  26.000. See van  
Schindel, 2009, p. 161-174.
1256The 1965 and 1971 IndoPak wars resulted in an US- and Western European-military embargo against both Pakistan and India 
that was lifted in 1975. Responding to Pakistan's nuclear program that had been initiated in 1965 in Parr, Rawalpindi, by Foreign  
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the US-administration again stopped all military aid in 1979. In the Pressler Amendment of  1985, the 
harmlessness regarding Pakistan's nuclear ambitions certified by the US-president on a yearly basis was made a precondition for  
further military aid. On the basis of  this mechanism, President Bush imposed new sanctions in 1990 followed by the embargo as  
a response to the nuclear tests in 1998 which were lifted in October, 2001. The politics of  sanction and the effect of  internation ­
al isolation, according to Reetz, can be identified as the two main sources for anti-Americanism in Pakistani society and the up­
per classes including the officer corps. See Reetz, Dietrich: Antiamerikanismus in Pakistan. In: Faath, Sigrid (Ed.): Antiamerikan­
ismus in Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost. Formen, Dimensionen und Folgen für Europa und Deutschland. In: Mitteilungen, Vol.  
68. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2003, p. 261-278.
1257With regard to the lower ranks, the army remains silent on the issue of  deserters. In the context of  Pakistan's operations in the  
tribal areas, there has been much speculation about cases of  soldiers who questioned orders and who displayed solidarity with  
their TTP enemies whom they considered to be Muslim brothers. However, with Taliban attacks on army bases since 2009 and  
cases of  soldiers taken hostage – some of  which were beheaded after sentenced guilty by Taliban tribunals – such cases might 
have vanished.
1258Quoted in Krepon, Michael: Important personalities. In: Dawn, 18 January, 2012. 
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7.2.2 Israel
The formation of  the Israel Defense Forces (IDF or Zahal) as ruled out by the law of  the Israeli military ser ­
vice in August, 1949, required restructuring of  the existing Jewish underground armies of  Palestine. This pro­
cess which was completed until the end of  the year, was based on an integrative and consensual approach,  
making the new army an umbrella organization covering all of  the ideologically divergent armed groups. Haga­
nah (1920), the defense organization of  the Jewish population in Palestine and coordinator of  the clandestine  
illegal immigration from Europe to Palestine (Haapala) through its branch Mossad L'Aliya Bet – later known as 
Israel's secret service – became the main body of  the new IDF. The Haganah, comprised of  diaspora organiza­
tions such as Hashomer, founded 1909 in Russia for the protection of  the Jewish local communities facing viol ­
ent pogroms, beyond its military approach was active in the construction of  settlements through its Planing 
Department. The number of  the cooperative villages (Moshavim) and the kibbutz settlements that at the time of  
independence drew substantially the territorial border of  the evolving state, grew massively during the 1940s  
and were exposed to violent resistance and attacks by the Arab local population. Following the countrywide ri­
ots and Arab-Jewish clashes in 1929 and 1936-1939, the Haganah recruited a storm troop (Palmach) among the 
settler communities to counter the attacks in the countryside but also in the urban areas of  Haifa, Yaffa and 
Jerusalem. The strategy of  guerrilla warfare against the Arabs and since 1939 against the British presence in 
Palestine, was mainly achieved through sabotage and terror operations by the armed groups Etzel, Lehi and Ir­
gun. The latter rose to prominence because of  its bomb attack on the King David Hotel, the Headquarter of  
the British Army Command, in Jerusalem on 22 July, 1946, under the leadership of  the future Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin.1259 Loosely organized but closely linked on the personal command level, the underground 
armies operated mainly autonomously with their own command structure and were not transformed into one 
independent body, as leading Zionists such as Ze'ev Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Tabenkin had 
voted for after World War I and against the model of  a Jewish Legion incorporated in the British Army for the  
defense of  the Mandate. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of  defensive and military power in the pre-state peri ­
od facilitated the establishment of  the IDF on the basis of  a four-tier military system including a career army,  
a regular army; the reserves and paramilitary border units from the settlements.1260 
In the period of  state consolidation, beginning in 1950, the IDF became a basic agent of  Israel's immigra­
tion policy. The IDF organized the on-the-spot absorption of  the new immigrants that were hosed in the 
ma'abarot, squalid camps near the airports and along the coast line. The IDF's main tasks involved education,  
Ivrith (modern Hebrew) teaching classes, geography and history, dispensing medical aid and supplying food 
and clothing. The order to “teach the new immigrant that the army and the uniform he sees are in fact his”1261 
had been clearly formulated by the founding father in a speech addressing the Knesset: 
1259Similarly, Lehi was headed by the future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. To achieve its political goals, the Lehi group applied both 
military and terrorist tactics. This included the assassination of  Swedish diplomat and UN-mediator on the Palestine dispute,  
Count Folke Bernadotte, on September 17, 1948, whom it suspected of  lobbying for a return of  British rule at the expense of  an 
independent State of  Israel. Lehi and Irgun were banned subsequently after the Bernadotte assassination on the basis of  a new 
anti-terrorism law but the groups' arrested members were released soon after their trials. See Byman, Daniel: A High Price: The  
Triumphs and Failures of  Israeli Counterterrorism. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011, p. 270.
1260See Ben-Eliezer, 1995, p. 273.
1261Cit. (IDF Journal) Bamachane, 23.11.1950. Cit. In: Ben-Eliezer, 1995, p. 272. 
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I have been a Zionist all my life and I do not deny the existence of  Israel, heaven forbid [...] but […] even the 
English nation was not always that nation […] but was composed of  different tribes […] fighting one another.  
And only after a development of  hundreds of  years did they become one nation. We do not have hundreds of  
years, and without the instrument of  the army […] we will not soon be a nation […] We must guide the progress 
of  history, accelerate it, direct it. This requires a framework of  duty, a framework of  national discipline.1262
Earlier, in 1949/50, the IDF and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) that had its roots in the air wing of  the Haganah 
(Sherut Avir), with British support, assisted the Jewish Agency during the evacuation of  Jewish communities 
from neighboring Arab countries. From June, 1949, to September, 1950, as a reaction to fighting and rioting  
between Muslims and the Jewish communities in the Aden region, 49.000 Jews from Yemen, Djibouti and Er­
itrea were airlifted to Israel (Operation Messiah's Coming/ Operation On Wings of  Eagles).1263 The humanitarian im­
age built in these early days evoked solidarity in the Jewish communities abroad and created a positive public  
opinion on the international level which was essential for the new state. Far from Lasswell's model of  the sol­
dier as a “specialist in violence” – the IDF's soft image of  an uniformed nation-building force and crisis man ­
ager in immigration policy resulted in institutional affiliations, collective solidarity and intimacy forged between 
the new immigrants and the army altogether attested to the new Israelis' mobilization to the security missions  
of  the state.
7.2.2.1 Religious Disobedience in the IDF
In accordance and due to diplomatic pressure through the Obama administration, Prime Minister Netanyahu  
and Minister of  Defense, Ehud Barak, by the end of  2009, decided to make an unilateral “painful step” and to  
freeze the construction of  settlements in the West Bank in the interest of  Israel's broader national security. 1264 
The decision was part of  Netanyahu's willingness to accept a Two-States solution, announced in his speech in 
June 2009 at the campus of  the Bar-Ilan University.1265 The speech, which marked an – at least rhetorical – 
turn in the history of  Likud, provoked protests in the settler movement which escalated in November. Rabbis 
heading the Yeshivot in cooperation with the Ministry of  Defense were in joint force declaring resistance 
against the government's plan to authorize the 10-month building freezing in the settlements beyond the bor ­
ders of  1967. When the government became aware of  the extreme resistance of  settlers against the plan, it in ­
cluded several other settlements in the National Priority Area (NPA) which marks a zone for the favored devel­
opment and tax benefits of  selected communities. The definition of  this particular area in the past reflects the 
ideological positions of  left-wing and right-wing led coalitions. Labor tried to compromise and used to include  
Arab villages in the NPA, whereas cabinets, led by Likud, removed them. Moreover, the implementation of  a 
discriminative legal framework hinders Israeli-Arabs to purchase or lease property distributed by the JNF.1266 
1262See Speech by David Ben-Gurion. In: Knesset Protocol, 19 August, 1952.
1263However, the romanticizing national narrative of  the “ingathering of  the exiles” and its adaption to Israel's immigration policies,  
ignores the various problems involved in the airlifting operations. The air transportation of  the Iraqi Jews (Operation Ali Baba), 
with 113.000 passengers flown to Israel from May, 1950, to December, 1951, and communities from the other Arab states was  
more challenging in terms of  the political consequences and the impossibility of  overland transport given the state of  war  
between Israel and the neighboring regimes. Agreements were mainly possible through clandestine negotiations and the involve­
ment of  mediating third parties as well as payments by the Jewish Agency. See Sachar, 2007, p. 395-403. 
1264See Yedioth Ahronoth/ Ynetnews, 25 November, 2009.
1265See Netanyahu's foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan, 14 June, 2009. Full text in Ha'aretz.
1266Interview with MK Hanna Swaid (Hadash), Knesset, 6 January, 2010; Interview with MK Sheikh Ibrahim Zarzur (Ra'am-Ta'al),  
14 January, 2010; Interview with Michal Radoshitzky, Geneva Initiative, Tel Aviv, 14 January, 2010. 
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This marked a significant turn in the relationship between the rightist coalition and the religious leadership of  
the West Bank settlements. In a declaration, representatives of  religious seminaries in the West Bank called col­
lectively on religious soldiers to refuse any sort of  order to evacuate settlements. Previously, rabbis in the West 
Bank and all heads of  Yeshivot Hesder – schools for religious and military education – had joined the call of  
Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, head of  the Har Bracha Hesder Yeshiva, to disobey the government's order. Members  
of  the religious parties supported the rabbinical declaration: Parallel to the protests in the settlements, Rabbi  
Ben Elon, a former military chaplain and MK from HaBayit HaYehudi and Rabbi Druckman attacked the con­
struction freeze and the harsh responses to the cases of  insubordination.1267 Similar incidents had taken place 
within the IDF when reservists declared in public not to obey orders, because they were immoral and a viola ­
tion to religious law. In December, following the rabbinical decree, a whole unit of  soldiers declared solidarity  
with the Yeshiva leadership while attending an IDF ceremony at the West Bank Army Base, which was covert  
by national media.1268 According to their assertion, Torah law is above any other law, meaning the laws of  the 
Israeli state and international law. Therefore, soldiers have to refuse orders which command them to evacuate  
Jewish settlements and which they interpret as being opposed to religious teachings.1269
For the first time, the IDF, considered the nation's most moral and loyal institution, became involved in a  
new cleavage of  the society – somewhere in between a politicized confrontation of  contrary ideological camps  
within the new rightist government coalition and the settler movement and an existentialist clash between a 
secular Zionist raison d'état and a religious-nationalist interpretation of  the status of  settlements. Since most  
of  the supporters of  the rabbinical order belonged to the higher ranks and elite units of  the military echelon,  
the paralyzed Israeli public questioned the loyalties of  the army which seemed to be more and more commit­
ted to national-religious ideals than to their loyalties towards state and nation. Moreover, the conflict of  loyal ­
ties between military duties and Jewish religious obligations can be considered a mirror of  numerous conflicts,  
other institutions were confronted with in the history of  Israel.1270
Since the last four decades, when the army was dominated by secular Kibbutzniks, the IDF's policy towards 
the role of  religion has drastically changed and became highly ambivalent. Always, the army had pronounced 
its non-political and non-religious position in the framework of  a Jewish democracy. 1271 Cooperations between 
the IDF and religious institutions, Yeshivot and rabbis have to be authorized by the Chief  Rabbinate, the Min­
istry of  Religious Affairs and the Ministry of  Defense. Created as a people's army unifying all Jews in Israel  
and therefore forming an Israeli identity, was the vision of  Ben-Gurion, when the underground army Haganah 
was transformed into the IDF. This concept of  integration was exactly what the haredi communities tried to  
1267See Ha'aretz: Barak orders IDF to cut ties with far-right yeshiva, 13 December, 2009.
1268See Ha'aretz: IDF reservists declare solidarity with ousted Hesder Yeshiva, 21 December, 2009.
1269In response to the mutiny in the IDF's ranks, Defense Minister Ehud Barak (Labor Party) ousted the Yeshiva of  Rabbi Melamed 
from the Hesder cooperation.
1270For instance, the ban on El-Al flights on Shabbat which was passed by the Knesset in 1981.
1271Especially the insufficient Kashrut observance together with general anti-religious resentments created a serious dilemma for re­
ligious recruits. The religious parties Agudat Yisrael and HaPoel HaMizrachi intervened for the first time during the Second World 
War, when Jews from the Yishuv enlisted for the service in the British Army and later for the Jewish Brigade. When observant  
soldiers tried to organize a kosher kitchen in the Brigade, the majority of  the Jewish soldiers voted against it. Issues like kosher  
food, and the order to shave everyday remained issues which were intensively discussed in the religious sector until the 1980s. See 
Unna, 1987, p.94-97. 
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avoid since they were founded on the principles of  isolation and disassociation from mainstream society. The 
army was seen as a vehicle by which secular Zionism was attempting to eliminate the cultural autonomy which  
separates the haredi community world of  Mea Shearim and Bnei Brak from the secular world of  most Israelis.  
Ultra-orthodox Haredim theoretically and according to the secular Israeli press, refuse to make any contribu­
tion to the Zionist state and society but receive the benefits of  money and protection from the state. 1272 Nu­
merous belief-based and structural obstacles prevent young haredi men from transitioning from their tradition­
al environment into most spheres of  secular Israeli life, including job market and military service. After a long  
legal debate (1948-2002) about refusal and deferments claimed by the religious parties and the haredi authorit ­
ies, the Knesset passed a law that legalized a practice of  granting deferments to all Yeshiva students while al ­
lowing them to study and join the workforce after completing one year of  civil service. An answer to the  
haredi refusal to serve in the IDF and to some objections of  orthodox Jews was provided by the establishment 
of  Nahal Haredi and Nahal Hesder programs, two alternatives for encouraging Haredim to serve in the armed 
forces. The latter drafts religious soldiers for a five-year duty, of  which all but one and a half  years are spent  
studying in a yeshiva which as a post high school institution of  religious studies is part of  the religious educa ­
tion system. Although, there is an administrative body, the curricula are not prescribed. Launched in 1999, the 
organization works in cooperation with the IDF and the Ministry of  Defense. It claims, according to its slogan  
“guarding the Torah, the Land and the Nation” to bridge the social gap between secular and religious Israelis.
1273 Haredim constitute only a minority of  the soldiers in these units, a great majority being religious-Zionist,  
most of  them living in the West Bank settlements.1274 According to Cohen, a growing religiosity in the army is 
mainly expressed by the fact that IDF Education Centers in cooperation with military rabbis, run the most 
successful conversion centers in Israel, due to the growing number of  converts to Judaism, of  whom many 
after their graduation have ascended to command positions.1275 Conversion in the IDF has been in the center 
of  a debate between government, the Ministry for Interior, the Jewish Agency and religious groups in the Dia ­
spora and in Israel. In 2010/11, the Military Conversion Bill1276 had led to speculations about a breakdown of  the 
Likud-led coalition. Until then, conversions in the army had been organized by the Nativ program, eight-week 
study courses on Jewish identity and mitzvot funded by the Jewish Agency in which soldiers are prepared for 
their formal conversion through the military rabbinate.1277 The question of  responsibilities had exposed a com­
1272For an analysis of  secular media campaigns against the Haredim see Heilman, Samuel C.: Religious Jewry in the Secular Press. Af­
termath of  the 1988 Elections. In: Liebman, 1990, p. 45-65; for the ultra-orthodox press in Mea Shearim see Levi, Amnon: The  
Haredi Press and Secular Society. In: Liebman, 1990, p. 21-44. 
1273The original Nahal was founded as a strategic defense tool by Ben-Gurion in 1948 who intended to integrate the first battalions'  
mixed activities of  agricultural work and military training into the border hinterlands. See Ze'ev, Drori: Between Faith and Milit ­
ary Service: The Haredi Nahal Battalion. Floersheimer Studies, No. 4/22, 2005; Nahal Haredi, website. 
1274Interview with Aliza Herbst, Director Foreign Affairs Yesha Council, Jerusalem, 4 January, 2010.
1275See Cohen, Stuart: Tensions Between Military Service and Jewish Orthodoxy In Israel: Implications Imagined and Real. In: Israel  
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, p. 103-126. Although the IDF's files and data-sets are inaccessible and the religious and ethnic  
composition of  its personnel is not released, these findings seem to be reliable as they are also reflected by epistolary exchanges  
between soldiers and rabbis. Further, the re-vitalization of  army ceremonies and rituals during the last years (e.g. public blessings  
for the army, joint prayers at the Western Wall and the Tomb of  King David) are performed in public.
1276Authored by MK David Rotem and MK Robert Ilatov, both from Yisrael Beitenu.
1277According to the Jewish Agency, about 1.000 soldiers per year participate in the program for which the agency, together with the  
Genesis Fund contributes 2.5 Million USD per year. See Jewish Agency for Israel: Press Release: Update on IDF Conversion  
Law, 19 December, 2010.
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petition between the IDF rabbinate and the Chief  Rabbinate and as a result all parties involved in the conver­
sion debate agreed to an extended moratorium to solve the issue.1278
The discussion in public and in the Knesset – whether to close the seminaries for combined religious and  
military education or to expand the Hesder cooperation – stalled after the Gaza Disengagement, caused by an 
escalation of  Israel's military policy from 2006 to 2009. Israel went into war against Lebanon and Hezbollah in  
2006 and entered Gaza in December, 2008, in order to remove the Hamas regime. In the case of  the latter (Op­
eration Cast Lead), reports and testimonies of  units involved in the fights were published in March, 2009, and  
created controversies in the Israeli and international public. Brigade Commanders and the military rabbinate  
were accused of  having promoted a religious Jewish war against non-Jews. Several booklets and Halachic com­
mentaries, which highlighted the importance of  serving in this “holy mission” to defend Greater Israel against  
“Arab invaders”, were authorized by the chief  military chaplain Avichai Rontzki and distributed to the troops.
1279 
Since the war of  2006, the IDF intensified its recruitment and expanded the existing programs. Founded in 
1923 by Vladimir Jabotinsky, international branches of  the Betar Movement offer a broad range of  activities 
for young Jews from Israel and abroad including Hebrew classes and lectures on Judaism, Zionism and Israel.  
Additionally, the recruitment for para-military training in the IDF programs Marva and the one-week course 
Gadna at schools have been intensified after the last wars.1280 The Jewish Agency offers similar courses for in­
ternational volunteers in the army (Sar El) where they serve on bases and in hospitals with a non-combatant 
status.1281 The incidents within the IDF, which is supposed to be a people's  army and the country's most  
powerful social fabric of  national integration and religious conversion of  non-Jewish immigrants 1282, reflect a 
growing potential for conflict in the ultra-orthodox and national-religious strata of  Israeli society and thereby 
contradict integral elements of  Zionist ideology. However, they express the transformation of  traditional do­
mestic state-religion tensions into a composite of  religious and political interpretations of  a genuine territorial  
issue, thereby re-conceptualizing the existing cleavage secular vs. religious. 
7.2.2.2 Current Developments 
The IDF's religious factor only recently became one of  the most heated debates among politicians, officers 
and experts when discussing models for Israel's army of  the future. The development of  Israel's political sys ­
tem in which labor-Zionism,  Mapai and later  Avoda party ruled the country until Menachem Begin's “ballot 
box revolution” in 1977 through parliamentary majority or coalitions of  national unity, strongly affected the 
ethnic and social composition in the IDF units. Since the political turn, the 1967 war and the intensification of  
1278See Jewish Agency for Israel: Press Release: Natan Sharansky's Statement on Agreement With Israel's Ministry of  Interior Re ­
garding Conversion, 16 June, 2011.
1279Rontzki is himself  a prominent figure in the national-religious circles of  the West Bank, especially in Hebron, where Gush Emun­
im activists under Rabbi Moshe Levinger built a Jewish settlement in the middle of  a Palestinian neighborhood. See The New  
York Times: A Religious War in Israel's Army, 22 March, 2009. The Hebron settlement and Rabbi Levinger who served in the 
Knesset for the NRP during the 1970s and promoted a “Jewish Renaissance” became the ideological backbone of  the religious  
settler movement and a hotspot of  confrontations between settlers and Palestinians.
1280See Ingber, Michael: Friedenserziehung und Militärdienstverweigerung in Israel als Prüfsteine für die Entwicklung einer Frieden­
sperspektive mittels gesellschaftlicher Veränderung. Unpubl. manuscript, Vienna, 2008, pp. 11/12.
1281Interview with Pnina Schreiber, Jewish Agency in Austria, Vienna 8 March, 2007; Sar El volunteers for Israel, website. 
1282Olim, based on the Law of  Return (Aliyah), passed by the Knesset in 1950. 
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military conflicts since 2000, especially the prestigious combat and special units face increasing numbers of  or ­
thodox and haredi recruits:
[…] you have four groups of  people who will go on to be generals in the IDF. The first component of  the IDF 
is the Kibbutznikim. They no longer have the image of  admiration and prestige in Israel, and they want to get it  
back. Secondly, you have the group that historically was excluded from the IDF...Jews of  North African and  
Middle Eastern background, who are increasingly becoming an important factor in the officer corps and in the  
combat units of  the IDF. Thirdly, 20 percent of  the population is immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
who have come over since 1990. These are people who want to become the establishment of  Israeli society.  
They want to get into the mainstream. The way to do that is  through the IDF and its fighting units.  And 
fourthly, the IDF ranks are increasingly filled by religious recruits. If  you look at who got killed in the last Le ­
banese war you would see these groups, all of  which were formerly excluded and now have a chance to get in. 
For the religious it means a way to lead Israeli society. We have a group here that has a vision of  how Israeli soci­
ety, as an integral religious national division, should be run. That's why they invented the Mahina programs. For a 
long time people thought that the Hesder programs were the spearheads. The Hesder movement got its cache in 
the 1973 war and the 1982 war in Lebanon. In my Hesder Yeshiva in 1973 we had 250 students. In the Yom Kip­
pur War we had 11 dead and 50 wounded. This is a pretty high casualty rate for one institution. The other Hesder  
Yeshivas looked the same. And in 1982 it repeated itself. I had four sons who served in Hesder and they all served 
in combat units. That's very much in the ethos.1283
From the government's and the military's point of  view, this development has the potential to generate future  
scenarios in which religious soldiers and those who identify themselves with the settlers' religious-Zionist ideo­
logy could harm Israel's long-term strategic and political interests by disobeying orders, e.g. with their refusal  
to evacuate  Jewish settlements  in  the occupied areas.  Within its  training curricula  in  public  and religious  
schools, the IDF and civil-society groups try to target students participating in preparation courses for the 
IDF service (e.g. Gadna) and units with predominantly religious soldiers which are likely to participate in future  
disengagements operations with special courses dealing with democratic values, human dignity in Jewish tradi ­
tion and halachic law or rabbinical decrees. 
The issue of  prayer services in the IDF has been subjected to reforms under Chief  of  Staff  Gantz in 2011:  
As part of  the IDF order of  1962, memorial prayers for the fallen and imprisoned IDF staff  had been intro ­
duced and were, legally, binding to all units but were recited in different ways with one original version and the 
verse “May the People of  Israel remember” (Yizkor Am Yisrael) and a version introduced by Military Chief  
Rabbi Shlomo Goren after the 1967 war with the verse “May God remember” (Yizkor Elohim). A military com­
mittee appointed by Gantz demanded the banishment of  both versions in order to not deepen the secular-reli ­
gious divide in Israel's oldest institution par excellence. The committee admitted that the Judaization of  milit­
ary ceremonies, until than accepted by all army commanders, had not been determined by the IDF laws and  
was, thus, a potential risk for further cleavages in the army.1284 
Though the access to empirical data is limited due to the restrictive information policy of  the IDF, there is 
evidence that the IDF command in accordance with the Military Rabbinate has widened its links with selected  
religious groups. One example of  these non-institutional cooperation are the visits at the front in order to  
raise the morale of  the troops and to provide religious services. The support of  the troops was formerly a  
privilege of  the Lubavitch Habad sect who in the 1967 war sent a Peace Corps and Habadnikim Lamplighters to 
the front lines and invited the IDF generals to personal audiences with their spiritual leader in New York. 1285 In 
1283Cit. Fischer, Shlomo at Round Table Discussion “Who are the settlers and what do they want?” on 16 December, 2009. 
1284See Katz, Yaakov: IDF panel keeps God out of  Yizkor prayer. In: The Jerusalem Post, 4 August, 2011.
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1982, Habad activists "followed hot on the heels of  the invading Israeli army in its incursion into Lebanon". 1286 
During the Second Intifada (2000-2005) and later in the Lebanon War1287 the Military Rabbinate cultivated new 
ties between the units in the field and religious groups, including relatively new sects such as the Breslav dis­
ciples of  Rabbi Nachman (Na Nachs). The Hassidim's activities and their educational and missionary approach 
underscores the ambivalent position of  the Rabbinate that officially refuses to have links to orthodox Rabbis,  
especially after the critical opposition role they had played during the Disengagement. 1288 Furor was also cre­
ated by incidents in 2011 in which female soldiers, under the eyes of  IDF Chief  Rabbi Rafi Peretz and a re ­
gional Division Commander were separated from their comrades at the occasion of  Hakafot Shiyot1289 and dur­
ing other religious celebrities on the basis of  conservative orthodox halachic interpretations.1290
7.3 Catalytic Conflicts
7.3.1 Pakistan: The Kashmir Conflict
Separating and differentiating themselves from each other and at the same time avoiding a complete break­
down of  bilateral relations remain key features of  IndoPak relations. Seeing the other over decades as distinct  
from the bloc of  South Asian states has generated continuity of  hostilities, animosities and deep mistrust in ­
terrupted only by periodical gestures of  goodwill. Since the year of  independence, two wars (1947/48, 1965),  
the war of  1971 with limited ground operations in Kashmir, several low intensity conflicts like the Siachem 
glacier crisis (1983) and the Kargil conflict (1999), mobilizations at the border and nuclear threats deepened  
the rift between the two countries. As in the case of  Israel, a normalization in terms of  stable diplomatic rela­
tions and linked to these,  images of  peace remain abstract for different reasons: Firstly,  compared to the  
Middle East which had always been a focal point of  international conflict mediation and prominent peace ini ­
tiatives – although until today apart from the Israeli-Egypt and the Israeli-Jordan peace only limited progress  
has been made in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which remains the region's diplomatic Gordian knot – South  
Asia lacks the historical  experience of  an exemplary peace that  could serve as a symbol and role model.  
Secondly, the nature of  the Kashmir conflict, in which international mediation and intervention by the UN  
with resolutions and a permanent mission on the ground1291 did not change the situation as such. Since then, 
1285At the outbreak of  the Six Day War, Habad initiated an international tefillin (set of  black leather boxes containing religious verses) 
campaign as “a means of  ensuring divine protection against Israel's enemies”. After the war,  Habad established committees to 
raise funds for its  War Orphan Program. See Habad: Challenge. An Encounter with Lubavitch-Chabad in Israel. London: Lub­
avitch Foundation of  Great Britain, 1977, pp. 200/201.
1286Cit. Marcus, 2000, p. 385.
1287See 'Na Nach hafatza during Lebanon war', on Youtube. 
1288Interview with Dr. Yaacov Yadgar, Dept. of  Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, 09.12.2009.
1289Marks the end of  the Simhat Torah holiday with dancing and music while the Torah is presented by the rabbis. In contrast, gender  
separation has been widely accepted in Hebron where the celebrities for soldiers and inhabitants from the local settlements have  
been institutionalized. 
1290See Pfeffer, Anshel: Female soldiers leave IDF event after ordered to sit in separate section. In: Ha'aretz, 23 October, 2011.
1291UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) as a permanent mission was established in March, 1951, following 
the IndoPak ceasefire in July, 1949. After the outbreak of  the Second Kashmir War, the UN Security Council (UN SC) author ­
ized UNIPOM (UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission) in September, 1965, as a temporary one-year mission to observe bilateral 
disengagement and withdrawal of  troops as agreed on in the Tashkent Agreement on 10 January, 1966. See UN Peacekeeping,  
India-Pakistan, website.
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international attention paid to the “lost paradise” and the high numbers of  people being killed in the conflict
1292, remains very low. In this context, Ahmar writes: “[…] the absence of  war in South Asia is like a no-war  
and no-peace situation. Unlike the Middle East, where tremendous pressure was exerted by the United States  
on Israel and the Arab countries  to establish normal  ties,  no such factor exists in the case of  India and  
Pakistan so far.”1293 It has been argued that the conflict on Kashmir can be seen as one of  the main obstacles  
for an improvement of  IndoPak relations ”because the dispute over Kashmir recurs in nearly every catalytic 
event during and after the partition in 1947 and each event in turn has been shaped by the Kashmir dispute.”
1294 An argument in favor of  the approach on the centrality of  Kashmir is the limited success of  conflict resol­
ution initiatives such as the Tashkent Agreement following the 1965 war and the Simla Accords after the war 
of  1971 in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh. Both mechanisms were, as Ahmar emphasizes, short-limited and did 
not prevent subsequent wars between India and Pakistan as they did not significantly affect the situation in  
Kashmir.1295 
In 1947, at the eve of  partition, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) under the Dogra rule of  Maharaja Hari Singh,  
together with 561 other autonomous principalities and kingdoms was confronted with the decision to join one 
of  the two dominions of  Pakistan and India or to declare itself  independent. Like most of  the other princely  
states, J&K had owed allegiance to the British through the acceptance of  the British “paramountcy” through  
which they enjoyed the right of  self-administration and several privileges. Given the religious heterogeneity of  
his  state  with  the  Muslim  majority  valley  of  Kashmir,  the  Hindu-dominated  Jammu and  predominantly 
Buddhist Ladakh with a share of  Shī aʿ  Muslims, the ruler fearing the partition of  his state due to the Muslims' 
claim of  joining Pakistan and the Hindus' preference of  joining India, claimed independence for J&K.1296 In 
October, 1947, Pakistan's Governor-General Mohammad Ali Jinnah ordered an attack on J&K aimed at put ­
ting military pressure on the Maharaja that would force him to give up autonomy and to join Pakistan. In con ­
trast to India that had forced the princely states of  Junagadh and Hyderabad by the force of  its army to accede  
to India, Pakistan, for the first time, made use of  the deployment of  non-state proxies – a strategy which al ­
lows denial before the international community if  an operation fails – to substantiate its political and military  
goals.1297 Facing an attack by Pakhtun and irregular troops on Srinagar, the Maharaja requested Indian military  
1292According to Bose, Indian numbers estimate 50.000 killed whereas anti-Indian Kashmiri factions claim a toll almost double that  
figure. See Bose, Sumantra: Contested lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. Cambridge (a.o.): Harvard 
Univ. Press, 2007, pp. 154/155.  
1293Cit. Ahmar,  Moonis: The Road to Peace in South Asia: Lessons for India and Pakistan from the Arab–Israeli Peace Process.  
ACDIS occasional paper, 1996, p. 27.
1294Cit. Fair, Christine C.: Islam and Politics in Pakistan, p. 248. In: Rabasa, Angel: The Muslim World after 9/11. Santa Monica  
(a.o.): Rand, 2004, p. 247-296.
1295See Ahmar, 1996, p. 26ff.
1296This step met also the demands of  his opponent, Shaikh Abdullah, leader of  the Muslim National Congress and strong pro ­
ponent of  self-rule and land reforms for J&K. In 1946, the “Lion of  Kashmir”, who in 1948 became the first prime minister of  
J&K and later its chief  minister, launched a massive campaign (Quit Kashmir) against the Maharaja which contributed to the  
state's political instability at the time of  partition. The Abdullah family could assert its influence on Kashmiri politics based on  
its dynastic dominance in the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC), currently with Umar Abdullah as chief  minis ­
ter. 
1297At that time the Pakistani troops were still commanded by British officers due to interim nature of  the dominion statute. Follow ­
ing an agreement with the British, Pakistani commanders selected troops for the Kashmir operation which in turn received vaca­
tion from their British officers and were sent as irregular forces into Kashmir. See Rothermund, Dietmar: Krisenherd Kaschmir:  
Der Konflikt der Atommächte Indien und Pakistan. München: C. H. Beck, 2002, p. 25.
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support and acceded his state to India. With the use of  regular Indian and Pakistani troops, the conflict escal­
ated in the first war between the two countries (1947-1948/49), in which India referred the Kashmir issue to 
the UN in January, 1948. The Security Council issued Resolution 47 on Kashmir, and several modified resolu ­
tions until 1957, emphasized the right of  self-determination of  the people of  Kashmir and their empower ­
ment to decide through a plebiscite either to join Pakistan or India.1298 
Pakistan's  territorial  claim derived from the principle  of  the impossibility of  harmonic coexistence of  
Muslims and Hindus in one state as enshrined in the Two-Nation Theory.1299 This ideological view on Kashmir 
which soon dominated over its perception as a “regional dispute between two newly sovereign states over 
rightful ownership of  land”1300 reinterprets the unresolved conflict as the root of  distrust and hostilities in In­
doPak relations and the nuclear armament in the region as its causal outcome.1301 Therefore, in the past, Is­
lamabad made a breakthrough in the stalemate a precondition for the progress of  talks on the official level. 1302 
Since 1947, Pakistan has held that a political solution could only be found under international auspices on the 
basis of  the UN resolutions. Furthermore, Pakistan frequently expressed doubts about the existence of  the In­
strument of  Accession that was signed by India and the Maharaja. 1303 The same applies to a territorial renego­
tiation  of  borders  which,  due to Pakistan's  position,  could  only  be made with  reference to geographical  
factors. For instance, according the Chenab Formula a division of  J&K would be based on the natural flow of  
the Chenab river, with Jammu and some districts of  Jammu province as part of  Indian territory and Srinagar 
and most parts of  the Kashmir valley together with parts of  Jammu region transferred to Pakistan. 1304 While 
Pakistan defines the Kashmir issue as the core conflict between the two countries, India sees Kashmir not  
linked to the general peace discourse and refuses to accept the Pakistani view on Kashmir as a disputed territ ­
ory.1305 However, these positions prove more and more to be inconsistent with the indigenous Kashmiri claim 
of  self-determination. 
As a means for improving ties confident building measures (CBMs) were taken by both sides, such as the 
establishment  of  the  trans-Line  of  Control  (LoC)  bus  service  from Srinagar  to  Muzaffarabad  in  April, 
20051306,  and “cricket” or “mango diplomacy”.1307 In October, 2005, an earthquake with its epicenter near 
Muzaffarabad destroyed large parts of  Azad Kashmir (AK) controlled by Pakistan and claimed deaths also in 
Indian-held Kashmir's northwestern areas. Although India's initial offer for disaster relief  was accepted by 
1298See UN Security Council Res. 47, The India-Pakistan Question. 21 April, 1948. Subsequent resolutions corrected the demand for  
a unilateral withdrawal of  Pakistani troops and replaced it by the formula of  a synchronized withdrawal of  both sides. 
1299See Bose, 2007, p. 167.
1300Cit. Ibid., p. 163.
1301See Ahmar, 1996, p. 27.
1302See Ibid., p. 28.
1303See website Pakistan Mission to the UN. 
1304This solution, proposed in the 1960s was also favored by Gen. Pervez Musharraf  and, hence, since 1999, when prime minister  
Nawaz Sharif  via secret track II diplomacy sent a special envoy to New Delhi to offer the Chenab model in March, 1999. See 
Waslekar,  Sundeep (Ed.):  The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations.  Mumbai:  Strategic Foresight Group/  
ICPI, 2005, p. 47-54. Again, after the 2001 attack on India's parliament and the hold of  the talks, Chenab formula and similar 
proposals like the Dixon plan were favored by the Pakistani side. For instance, when leader of  JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rah ­
man visited India in 2003, he advocated a formula based on these geographical arguments. Interview with Mawlana M. Khan 
Shirani, Senator (JUI-F), Chair CII, Islamabad, 17 July, 2009.
1305With reference to the document of  accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947.
1306See Bose, 2007, pp. 156/157.
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Pakistan in principle and seen by some observers as a positive stimulus for the peace process 1308, bilateral dis­
aster management and cooperation on the ground failed due to inadequate coordination and, among other  
reasons, the unwillingness on the Pakistani side to allow Indian army helicopters to cross the LoC. 1309 The 
earthquake episode showed that beyond the positive feedback from both sides and the international com­
munity, CBMs and declarations of  goodwill earned only limited success and did not affect the basic elements  
of  the dispute, highlighting a psychological milieu in the political and military sectors on both sides which still  
struggles with ideological mindsets: 
The Pakistani military does capitalize on the feeling that we are constantly threatened by a much stronger neigh ­
bor who has not psychologically accepted Pakistan. They have not accepted that Pakistan has the right to be­
come an independent state. I mean mentally. [...] The feeling is that there are elements among the Indian strata, 
the civilian and the military, who do not accept it yet. And therefore they have feelings of  enmity and therefore  
we have to guard ourselves. And that is why the military plays a role as the guardian of  Pakistan's territorial fron­
tier as well as Pakistan's chief  formulator and chief  conceptual thinker of  strategic security policy.1310 
Between 2004 and 2007/08 the prospect of  a composite dialogue and a peace initiative was opened but re­
mained volatile and peace dividends diminished over night when the bilateral reconciliation came to a halt fol­
lowing the Mumbai attacks between 26-29 November, 2008.1311 Nevertheless, apart from relations on the polit­
ical-military level, ties on other levels, like in media cooperation, cultural exchange1312 etc., remained close and 
were not negatively affected by the political hick ups. Recent meetings on secretary and minister level during  
June/July, 2011, and subsequent talks indicate a more positive atmosphere in which the focus has been shifted 
from Kashmir to aspects of  economic and trade cooperation with the perspective of  a final agreement regard ­
ing the reciprocal  grant of  a Most-Favored-Nation1313 trade status (MFN).1314 In addition, in 2012, informal 
1307Pakistan made headlines when former Prime Minister Gilani on the invitation of  his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh atten ­
ded the 2011 World Cricket Cup's semi-final in Mohali. After visits of  Gen. Zia ul-Haq in 1987 and General Pervez Musharraf  
in 2005 it was for the third time that Pakistani leaders and their Indian counterparts exchanged gestures of  goodwill and dis ­
cussed selected aspects of  IndoPak. Nevertheless, while the positive atmosphere of  Mohali was extensively covert by the media,  
it was overshadowed by spy-affairs within the High Commissions and contrary positions towards the formulation of  a road map  
during the parallel secretary-level talks in which Pakistan wanted to discuss a range of  issues including Kashmir. India, however,  
insisted on “talks about talks” and the problem of  terrorism. Similarly, as Ahmar points out, “mango diplomacy” – the exchange  
of  seasonal fruits between Indian and Pakistani leaders as a gesture of  good will – refers to the very idea of  CBM's. 
1308See Basrur, Rajesh/ Kassim, Yang Razali: Pakistan, India And Kashmir: Will Nature Force An Aceh Effect? Analysis, S.Rajarat­
nam School of  International Studies, 21 October, 2011.
1309See Bose, 2007, pp. 161/162 and The Economist: Kashmir's earthquake: A humanitarian failure, 27 October, 2005.
1310Cit. Interview with Amb. (rtd.) Azmad Hassan, DG Prime Minister's Office for Afghanistan, Lahore, 27 March, 2011.
1311The attacks, in which 170 people died, were carried out by LeT activists against ten targets in the Mumbai city area. In an attack  
against the Nariman Jewish Community Center, coordinated by Habad emissaries, the rabbi and four other Jews were killed. The 
attack was extensively covered by Israeli and Jewish media and security measures at hundreds of  Israeli and Jewish institutions  
worldwide were advanced. See Susser, Leslie: Mumbai attacks mean new challenges for Israel. In: Jewish Journal, 4 December,  
2008. 
1312Private partnerships, exchange programs etc. between Indian and Pakistani cultural sectors have in fact never been interrupted.  
This might be due to the well-connected figures behind these programs, as well as their use of  digital technology for distribution.  
For instance Aar Paar launched in 2000 as a partnership between artists from Mumbai and Karachi, whose works thematized the 
search for peace and mutual understanding beyond political-ideological borders. See Wille, Simone: Contemporary Art from 
Pakistan: A continual Process of  reconstructed Pasts and anticipated Futures. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of  Vienna, 2011,  
pp. 191/192.
1313Despite the World Trade Organization's (WTO) principle of  equal treatment for all trading partners, MFN regional trading agree­
ments are allowed on the basis of  the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT, 1994) to be set up as a special exception, 
provided certain strict criteria are met. See WTO: Trade without Discrimination, website.
1314This positive trend has been reflected during the 17 th SAARC summit and Pakistan's willingness to give up its hardline stance to­
wards the grant of  the MFN status to India at the end of  2011. This step in which Pakistan agreed to the grant only in principle,  
came 16 years after India had offered the status to Pakistan. Since, various nationalist and religious parties had opposed recipro­
city because of  the unsolved conflict. See for instance Ahmar, Moonis: Looking Beyond Conflict. In: South Asia Global Affairs,  
December, 2011.
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discussions took place between Zardari and Singh with regard to future revitalization of  talks on Pakistan's  
military presence at the Siachen Glacier.1315
Internationally, Pakistan blames India for human rights violations in J&K whereas India counters with ac­
cusing Pakistan of  supporting militants and jihadis in Kashmir. Through what it sees as an extended arm of  
Islamabad's foreign policy, India suffered heavy losses and diplomatic isolation in the Muslim world, when its  
efforts to contain extremist jihadi forces and to maintain military law and order in J&K became more and  
more repressive.1316 The jihadi  factor  linked to the issues of  cross-border infiltration and terrorism since  
1989/90, became a dominant element of  the international discourse on Kashmir, or even the principle cause  
of  tensions as some authors claim.1317 However, the way how the Kashmir conflict is framed has been trans­
formed from a secular locally based struggle, initially associated with the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 
whose symbolism emphasizes identification with the Palestinian struggle, to one that for the last years has 
been largely carried out by non-Kashmiri militants, rationalized in pan-Islamic religious terms. Kashmir, being 
referred to with a similar narrative as the Palestine issue in the Middle East although not so extensively covered 
by international attention, experienced a new climax of  violence in 2010 in what became known as the “Kash­
mir Intifada” between stone throwing young Kashmiris whose central demands were more focusing on politic ­
al rights and economic reforms by the Abdullah government than on sovereignty, and Indian security forces,  
killing more than hundred protesters.1318 In October, 2010, the European Parliament, for the first time, held a 
committee hearing on Kashmir and delegated a fact finding mission to the region. Beyond the symbolic value  
of  these signs of  international concern, from the Kashmiri point of  view, focusing of  world attention is a  
clear success.1319 
The religious scholars contributed to the national claim on the princely state and thereby initiated a dis ­
course on the legitimacy of  Pakistan's war and the Kashmiri militant resistance against India in which they  
soon became cosponsors of  the  jihād-e-Kashmir as a just war.  Sayyid Abul A lā al-Maudūdī  ʿ introduced the 
concept of  jihād into the rising conflict by stating that the war did not apply as a  jihād whereas ulamā  ʿ ʾ of  the 
1315See The Economist: Working Lunch, 14 April, 2012, p. 52.
1316See Ahmar, 1996, p. 28. In statements, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh pointed out to the domestic opposition by Hindu 
nationalists and militants that would be provoked in case of  a plebiscite for Kashmir. Although there exists no Islamic and an­
ti-Indian bloc, regarding protests and criticism in the Islamic world, single events indicated that India's relations with the Islamic  
world suffered significantly. For instance, in the aftermath of  the destruction of  the Ayiodhya mosque in 1992, an event which  
caused widespread negative perceptions of  the country, India's relations with the Gulf  states – important for the country for its  
need to access to oil – were on the brink of  being downgraded. See also Gordon, Sandy: South Asia after the Cold War: Winners  
and Loosers, pp. 886/887. In: Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 10, 1995, p. 879-895.  
1317See for instance Ishtiaq, Ahmar: Towards a Kashmiri Settlement Beyond Jihad. In: Perceptions, Journal of  International Affairs,  
Vol. 9, 2004, p. 29-44.
1318See for instance Kumar, Aband: Fair Elections needed for Peace. Article No. 857, 12 September, 2002. In: IPRI Factfile No. 34:  
Election in Indian held Kashmir, pp. 41/22. Pakistan was accused by Indian officials of  taking advantage of  the uprising by try ­
ing to mobilize international opinion against India, mainly in the US Obama administration. For the “Kashmir Intifada” see Saj­
jad, Mohammad Waqas/ Hafeez, Mahwish: Contextualizing Kashmir in 2010. Paper, Institute of  Strategic Studies Islamabad,  
2010.
1319Recent developments indicate signs of  warming in the relations between Pakistan and India in general and in the Kashmir issue 
in particular: In September, 2011, Chief  minister J&K, Umar Abdullah, announced to ease the restrictive security laws and to re ­
move the repressive Public Safety and Armed Forces Special Powers acts providing legal immunity to Indian soldiers involved in cases 
of  killing, misuse or extrajudicial disappearances of  civilians. Moreover, prominent hardline separatists such as Syed Ali Shah  
Gilani, founder of  Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and part of  All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) agreed to reenter talks with the national 
government In the past, the highly heterogeneous APHC – an alliance of  secessionist parties and leaders formed in 1993 – had  
shown unity with its uncompromising denial of  holding talks with India. See The Economist: Season of  Cheer? 29 October,  
2011, p. 60. 
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Deobandis and Barelwis argued in favor of  a jihād and issued several fātāwa in which they distanced themselves 
from the Jama'at's position.1320 As the driving force behind the Barelwi fatwa, Mawlana Abu'l Hasanat Qadiri, 
amīr of  Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama’-i-Pakistan1321 and its nazim-i-a'ala, Allama Ahmad Saeed Kazimi, supported the collec­
tion of  funds in Lahore for the Kashmiri refugees. The welfare work which was extended to Karachi in 1949,  
won the support of  Azad Kashmir's first government. After visits at the Kashmir front in which the JUP del­
egates expressed their solidarity with the Pakistan Army and the irregular Pakhtun troops, subsequent JUP ses­
sions on Kashmir were joined by Pakistani generals on a frequent basis.1322 Later, in the aftermath of  the 1965 
War, Barelwi support for Kashmir went further when a JUP faction from Gujranwala opened the organiza ­
tion's first office from which workers, mujāhidīn and “thousands of  volunteers and necessities of  daily life were 
sent to the battlefield”1323 The JUP, which enjoyed state patronage by the Ayub Khan regime and received 
strong support from AK officials, became, together with Jama'at-i-Islami, the dominant religious force in Kash­
mir until the take-over by Deobandi groups.1324 On the part of  the Deobandis, amīr of  Jam‘iyyat-e ‘Ulama’-e Is­
lam, Allama Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, like the Barlewi scholars had issued a pro-jihād fatwa for the war against 
India. However, the party's support of  the Pakistani state and its army materialized not before the 1965 war,  
when members campaigned for the establishment of  a defense fund while its leaders reconfirmed their 1948  
fatwa for the  jihād. Like the JUP, the Deobandis insisted on the inclusion of  a clause regarding plebiscite in 
Kashmir, as a main element of  negotiations with India.1325 
7.3.2 Israel: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1967 Six Day War
Beyond its centrality to the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict, 1967 is a key event with regard to three main pro­
cesses it initiated: Firstly, the Israeli conquests determined the current territorial-political scenario in the re­
gion; secondly, the Israeli state and Zionist self-consciousness was confronted with an ideological dilemma 
which, until today, includes the state's democratic nature and international norms, domestic civil-military ant ­
agonisms, and the discourses on colonialism and illegal occupations. Thirdly, its outcome impacted Jewish dis ­
courses including identity concepts, the re-discovery of  traditional Judaism and the rise of  religious Zionism. 
In the weeks before June 1967, Israel and Syria were involved in border clashes. 1326 President of  Egypt 
Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to remove the pressure from Syria and ordered the closure of  the Straits of  Tiran  
1320Later, Maudūdī in his correspondence with the 'ulamā' who tried to convert him to their opinion, recalled his position. See Pirz­
ada, 2000, p. 15.
1321At that time Markazi Jam‘iyyat ‘Ulama’-i-Pakistan (MJUP). In this text reference is made only to West Pakistan's JUP. 
1322See Ahmad, 1993, p. 5-7.
1323Cit. Ibid., p. 26.
1324According to Rana, most of  AK's 5.000 mosques are Barelwi while the Deobandis dominate the much smaller madāris sector. See 
Rana, 2009, p. 102. 
1325See Pirzada, 2000, pp. 27/28.
1326In 1964, an Arab summit approved plans to divert the headwaters of  the Jordan River from flowing into Israeli territory. Attack ­
ing Syrian construction units involved in the diversion project, Israel also involved its air force forcing the Syrian government “to 
choose between abandoning the diversion project and risking war”. In addition, in early 1967, Israeli cultivation of  land in the 
settlements near the border was demonstratively resumed “in a manner calculated to provoke clashes”. In turn, Syria's new Ba'th  
regime (1966) shifted the parameters of  its military doctrine against Israel and began to support Palestinian Fatah irregulars in 
their guerrilla war for the liberation of  Palestine while Egypt and Jordan refused open support for Fatah operations in Israel. See 
Shlaim, Avi: The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World. New York: Norton, 2001, p. 228-232.
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on 22 May.1327 Until 1956, when Israel seized it in the Sinai Campaign, the Strait had been closed for Israeli  
ships.1328 While there was no dissent in the Eshkol cabinet to see Nasser's move as an aggressive act, there was  
significant resistance among the ministers against Rabin's demand of  a direct military response against Egypt  
and to regain military strength, in Israel and in the eyes of  the world.1329 In anticipation of  an armed clash with 
Egypt – according to the Israeli intelligence analysts this was not likely to happen prior to 1970 1330 – and a mil­
itary victory over the Egyptian army and a political blow against Nasser's legitimacy in the Arab world split not 
only the cabinet but also Israeli public in large. The discussions in the cabinet reflected the dissent between 
politicians who insisted on waiting for diplomatic alliance support by the US or a European power in order to  
not to be the first to attack. The military who insisted on the security argument that in any case a war with 
Egypt was inescapable and unavoidable, pressed the Eshkol government to show strength and to launch an 
immediate all-out retaliation strike.1331 The domestic pressure and the call for a war cabinet under a strong 
leadership became stronger when public life was paralyzed while the economy suffered significant losses due 
to the general mass mobilization of  Israeli citizens as a direct impact of  the reserve system. The public de ­
mand for a government of  national unity under David Ben-Gurion reflected a growing mistrust against Levi  
Eshkol, although Ben-Gurion himself  – calculating a disastrous outcome of  a war with the Arab states with 
about 10.000 killed out of  two million Israelis1332 – showed little support for the military response envisaged by 
the military.1333 The crisis of  legitimacy of  the Eshkol government resulted in the appointment of  Moshe Day­
an as defense minister.1334 The fall of  Eshkol and the rise of  Dayan during the 1967 crisis can also be seen as 
the epitome of  a cultural conflict between two generations of  Israeli leaders and as a change in the mindsets  
of  the political and military echelon where hawks and military commanders, especially those from the  sabra 
generation, offended the old generation of  European Jews, many of  them being religious. In this sense, the  
crisis during May/June challenged the state's self-understanding as a democracy with separated political and 
military spheres, when, responding to the weakness of  the doves in Eshkol's government putschist ideas in the 
public and in the cabinet became stronger and were only countered by influential personalities like Ben-Guri­
on. It is important to contrast the call for war with Israel's “depression” at that time. 1335 The polarization of  Is­
raeli public manifested politically in new alliances between hawks across various ideological party boundaries  
with Golda Meir from Mapai as a leading force of  the hawks from Mapai, Moshe Dayan's Rafi, Menachem Be­
1327From 1958 to 1961 Egypt and Syria had been united under the flag of  the United Arab Republic (UAR). 
1328See Segev, Tom: 1967. Israels zweite Geburt. München: Siedler, 2005, pp. 292-295.
1329See Ibid.
1330See Ibid., p. 296.
1331Among the arguments of  the supporters of  an open war was also the fear of  an Egyptian air strike on Israel's nuclear facilities in  
Dimona and the fear of  solidarity between Israeli Arabs and the Arab armies. See Ibid., p. 297, 317.
1332Other leading figures shared this view. For instance Chief  of  Staff, Yitzchak Rabin, who suffered a nervous breakdown at the 
end of  May, calculating tens of  thousands of  deaths, gave order to prepare public buildings as hospitals and morgues. Rabbis  
from the Chief  Rabbinate blessed public parks to prepare them as potential mass graves. See Ibid., p. 344.
1333See Ibid., p. 301-303.
1334Dayan's appointment was both an attempt to restore the public trust in the government and the result of  a political intrigue in  
which the fall of  Eshkol was the price for the participation of  Rafi  and  Gahal, a party represented by Menachem Begin and 
Yosef  Sapir, in the new government. Dayan enjoyed strong support in the media. For instance the newspaper Ma'ariv and its ed­
itor, Arieh Dissentchik, lobbied Eshkol to give up the defense resort. Similarly, prominent columnist Efraim Kishon mobilized 
public support for Dayan. See Ibid., pp. 306/307. 
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gin's rightist Gahal and the old Ahdut HaAvodah.1336 As a side effect and reaffirmed by the success of  the 1967 
war, the military gained an influential role in the political decision-making on the cabinet level at the cost of  
the foreign service.1337 The camp of  the doves though in a minor position during and after the 1967 war, was  
still represented by prominent names such as the highly respected foreign minister from Mapai, Abba Eban, 
Yaacov Shimshon Shapira, Elias Sasson and Levi Eshkol but refused to overcome the ideological rift between 
them and smaller moderate parties. 
The Israeli perception of  being abandoned by the international community and especially by the U.S. was 
mainly based on the assurance of  support given earlier by Secretary of  State John Foster Dulles to Abba Eban, 
than Israeli Ambassador in Washington, that had reaffirmed and granted Israel's right of  free passage into the 
Gulf  of  Aqaba. Before this background, Israel, whose Eilat port was cut off  from the Red Sea without free  
passage through Tiran, launched a full scale air strike on Egyptian air bases in Suez and Sinai on 5 June which 
destroyed the full Egyptian air force on the ground. The perception that the air force had prevented an Egyp­
tian attack on Israel became the dominant narrative in Israel and internationally. In a second step, armored di­
visions pushed into the Sinai where Egyptian troops were defeated after heavy fighting. In a booklet, published  
shortly after the war, Division Commander for Sinai Gen. Israel Tal is quoted addressing his armored units  
with the words:
Today we are going to crush the hand that was sent to strangle our neck. Today we will go to open wide the 
gates of  the south that the Egyptian aggressor closed. Our armor shall bring the war deep into enemy territory.  
We are not pleased to go to battle. The enemy wanted it. The enemy started it. The enemy will get it once and  
for all. We shall remember: It's for the third time that the Egyptian dagger had been raised upon us. It's the third  
time that the enemy is mistaken in his insane illusion: Seeing Israel kneeling. In blood, in fire and iron we will rip  
this skim from his heart. We must also remember: We are not fighting the Egyptian civilians. We do not want 
their land and their property. We do not come to destroy their land or inherit it. We jump forward to crush the 
enemy forces that are threatening our peace. We jump forward to take down the gates of  the Egyptian blockade.  
We jump forward to stop the skim of  destruction. Today the Sinai desert will know the power of  the Iron Divi ­
sion. And the earth shall shake underneath it!1338
In the first hours of  the war, Israel, through third parties sent out warnings to King Hussein to keep Jordan's 
army out of  the war.1339 King Hussein, personally informed by Nasser about a successful Egyptian counter at­
tack, together with faked reports by Egyptian media portraying the loss of  Egypt's air force as a total defeat of  
the Israeli army, the information forwarded by Cairo to its Arab allies encouraged Hussein to join the attack 
on Israel.1340 Although Eshkol's position coincided with the Chief  of  Staff's and the intelligence's view that 
Jordan would not join the war, Jordanian forces and the Arab Legion – at that time under Egyptian command 
1335When in 1963 David Ben-Gurion resigned from his second tenure as prime minister in the aftermath of  the Lavon Affair, the  
country had lost its dominant leading figure and founding father but also the main architect of  the Israeli socialist-Zionist model.  
Prior to that, in 1961/2 during the Eichmann trial, for the first time, Israelis were confronted with the horror of  the Holocaust.  
Before that, the Holocaust had been abstract to the majority and “a focus of  polemics”. The kidnapping of  Adolf  Eichmann 
from Argentine and his trial and execution in Jerusalem “provided a catharsis, after which the destruction of  European Jewry be ­
came a topic that united Israeli society.”  Cit. GoI: Prime Minister's Office: General Introduction to the Eichmann Trial. Fifty  
Years After, Israel State Archives, n. d. 
1336“She was a disciple of  David Ben-Gurion and shared his views about the implacable hostility of  the Arabs and about the need to  
deal with them from a position of  strength”. Cit. Shlaim, 2001, p. 286.
1337See Ibid., p. 287-289.
1338Quoted in Military Photos: Six Day War, website.
1339The Arab states relied on the wrong Egyptian reports on 5 June. BBC news correspondent Michael Elkins who reported on the  
defeat of  Egypt's air force only hours after the war began, was censored by the Israeli officials. See Gorenberg, Gershom: The 
Accidental Empire. Israel and the Birth of  the Settlements, 1967-1977. New York: Times Books, 2006, p. 35.
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– attacked parts of  Jerusalem and seized areas in the West Bank: “Had King Hussein heeded Eshkol's warning,  
he would have kept the Old City of  Jerusalem and the West Bank. No one in the cabinet or the General Staff  
had proposed the capture of  the Old City before the Jordanian bombardment began.”1341 Eshkol's authority 
and his refusal to give the order for a military response to the Jordanian attack, was bypassed by the new ap ­
pointed war minister Dayan. Though he had given the order to surround the Jordanian-held east of  the city on 
6 June, but to “keep out of  all that Vatican”1342, on June 7, when rumors circulated about an cease-fire to be 
called for by the UN, Dayan ordered the capture of  the old city which was unlike the Golan Heights or the 
Sinai impossible to capture and hold after a definite UN cease-fire agreement.1343 At the Eastern front units 
pushed into the West Bank and, after the Syrian air force had been destroyed, Israeli forces took the Golan 
Heights. On June 10 a ceasefire was signed under UN mediation.
As a common focal point of  statist Zionism and other religious-political streams of  Israeli Judaism, the Jer ­
usalem episode deserves a more detailed analysis. Two days before the war began, mayor of  Jerusalem Teddy 
Kollek, in a conversation with international journalists presented a plan in which he argued for the construc­
tion of  a new traffic system connecting all parts of  Jerusalem.1344 Kollek's plan, seemingly impossible to imple­
ment  due  to  the  division  of  the  city  in  Israeli  West-Jerusalem and  East-Jerusalem,  administrated  by  the 
Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan since the war of  independence in 1948, gave expression to the national mood.  
Through Naomi Shemer's Yerushalayim shel Zahav (Jerusalem of  Gold), a song that was presented at the Israeli  
Song Festival on Independence Day, about three weeks earlier, Jerusalem and the lost holy sites had powerfully  
returned into the public consciousness:
The trees and stones there softly slumber,
A dream enfolds them all.
So solitary lies the city,
And at its heart – a wall. 
[…] Alas, the dry wells and fountains,
Forgotten market-day
The sound of  horn from Temple's mountain
No longer calls to pray,
The rocky caves at night are haunted
By sounds of  long ago
When we were going to the Jordan
By way of  Jericho.1345
1340When on the first day of  war, Jordanian artillery shelled Western Jerusalem, prime minister Eshkol as one of  the strongest ad­
vocates of  peaceful relations with the Hashemite kingdom, prevailed with his argument that King Hussein, having been forced  
to join the war against Israel by its Arab allies without wanting it, only tried “to uphold Jordanian honor” but would not start a  
full war.
1341Cit. Shlaim, 2001, p. 244.
1342Cit. Gorenberg, 2006, p. 36.
1343See Teveth, Shabtai: Moshe Dayan. The Soldier, the Man, the Legend. New York: Dell, 1974, pp. 408-435.
1344See Trost, Ernst: David und Goliath. Die Schlacht um Israel 1967. Wien: Molden, 1967, pp. 182/183.
1345For the full lyrics see Tsur, Avi (Ed.): Landmarks: Resource Material, Poetry, Songs, Games and Activities. Jerusalem: Ministry of  
Education, Culture and Sport, 1998, p. 103; Jerusalem of  Gold, website.
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The song suffused with classical Jewish and Talmudic motifs told about the unfulfilled marriage between the 
Jews and their holy city pointing out to the connection between the land, symbolized by Jerusalem wearing a  
bride's golden tiara, and the people's promise never to abandon it and to return to its holiest site.  Shemer's 
song which became Israel's unofficial national anthem, re-centered East-Jerusalem, deserted and uninhabited 
only waiting for the Jews to return, into the national context.1346 Similar to the Masada myth, the conquest of  
the Temple Mount and the Western Wall was immediately transformed into a historic turning point, commem ­
orated and institutionalized with the establishment of  the Jerusalem Day, the day marking the city's liberation  
and unification. The fact that this unexpected and surprising event, not included in the military and political  
goals which were in general not narrowly defined by the leadership, required an immediate formula that would 
appease critiques and therefore an legitimizing argument. Accordingly, Israel's PR bonanza started the moment 
when its troops seized the area – most prominently with the movie clips and David Rubinger's photos of  the 
paratroopers praying at the Western Wall. The image of  members of  the paratrooper unit which soon became 
an iconic image of  Jewish-Israeli might and power, had specific significance for Israelis and the religious-na ­
tionalist public in particular: In contrast to other units such as the Golanis, considered a domain of  military 
life with a predominance of  Sephardim, soldiers serving in paratrooper units were traditionally identified with  
the elites of  Ashkenazi European descend politically raised in the socialist-Zionist movements and stand for 
the secular native Israeli sabra. Accordingly, the photographs, covering the front pages of  international newspa­
pers were seen as the  proof  for the young generation's return from secular Israeliness to religious Jewish­
ness.1347 
In an “atmosphere of  spiritual elation”1348 the statements and speeches given by the military leaders on the 
spot emphasized the re-turn to the place from where the Jewish people by force had been spread around the  
world: “You have been given the great privilege of  completing the circle, of  returning to the nation its capital  
and its holy center. Jerusalem is yours forever.”1349 Like Gen. Uzi Narkiss, Moshe Dayan who appeared with 
Chief  of  Staff  Rabin at the wall, underlined the Israeli permanent claim for the city and at the same time, ex­
pressed Israel's desire for peace:
This morning, the IDF liberated Jerusalem. We have united Jerusalem, the divided capital of  Israel. We have re­
turned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again. […] To our Arab neigh­
bors we extend, especially at this hour, the hand of  peace. To members of  the other religions, Christians and  
1346Naomi Shemer (1930-2004), honored with the Israel Price in 1983, was a main figure in the musical integration of  Zionist and  
Hebrew themes, like the kibbutz life, the element of  nature and romanticized scenery of  the land, into Israeli folklore art, poetry,  
literature and music. Her main works can be counted to the corpus of  Shirei Eretz Yisrael – the songs of  the land of  Israel. Until 
the 1960s/70s, this genre was disseminated in the education sector, the national radio programs and in the army's music en­
sembles. See Regev, 2000, p. 229-231. Shemer's style and use of  symbols and language which provided ground for the nationalist  
ideological canon, together with her sympathies for the post-1967 Gush Emunim movement, aroused suspicion in the political 
leftist camp. See Haußig, Hans-Michael: "Ha-Chagiga Nigmeret" - Naomi Shemer 1930-2004, p. 48. In: Pardes, No. 9, 2004, pp.  
48/49.
1347The images can also be seen as imitations of  other world famous conflict scenes. For instance, a picture showing soldiers raising  
the flag with the Star of  David on the top of  the Temple Mount or at a military post near Eilat were often linked to the scene  
where four American soldiers raise the US-flag after the Battle of  Iwo Jima. For the symbolism of  the 1967 war see also Presner,  
Todd Samuel: Muscular Judaism. The Jewish Body and the Politics of  Regeneration. New York (a. o.): Routledge, 2007, Intro ­
duction.
1348Cit. Shlaim, 2001, p. 245.
1349Quoted in The Israel Forever Foundation, Yom Yerushalayim, website. 
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Muslims, I hereby promise faithfully that their full freedom and all their religious rights will be preserved. We did 
not come to Jerusalem to conquer the holy places of  others.1350  
Foreign journalists covering the event shared Israel's euphoria and adopted Dayan's justification. 1351 Military 
chief  rabbi Gen. Shlomo Goren, after he gave a blow into the same shofar which he had sounded on Mount 
Sinai when it came under Israeli control in 19561352, was keen to stress this sacral moment with reference to 
biblical quotes according to which ”to the sound of  trumpets the Temple fell, to the sound of  trumpets it will  
be restored.”1353 The IDF operation in which Israeli soldiers crossed into the holy area of  the Temple Mount 
became a stumbling block among the rabbis and ultra-orthodox circles: According to one prominent view, the 
entry into the site of  the destructed Second Temple was strictly prohibited for those who have been rendered  
ritually unclean by contact with the dead. The fact that troops directly involved in fighting were entering the 
holy center or the forbidden area of  the site of  the ancient holy of  the holiest, the sanctuary and its surround­
ing courts, was seen as a theoretical violation of  halachic law. Thus, Rabbi Goren and other rabbis upheld that  
the armed forces were acting on the basis of  a security necessity in which the failure of  their mission or dis ­
obedience to the orders given by their commanders could threaten the safety of  Jewish lives. Thus, pikkuah ne­
fesh, one of  the highest rabbinical commandments calling for the necessity of  the preservation of  life, justified  
the capture of  the Temple Mount area.1354   
The army's image in Israel and abroad became mystified: Its one-eyed defense minister and commander  
Moshe Dayan whose adventurism had bypassed the political leadership's vote regarding the capture of  the Old 
City and the Golan Heights and who “symbolized the national and military rebirth and the revitalization of  
Jewish strength, the myth of  the Jewish fighter”, represented the new image of  the IDF.1355 The symbolism of  
return that hijacked the narrative of  the 1967 war and the battle of  Jerusalem readjusted also the old connec ­
tion between the people and God and the holy land and corrected what was seen as Israel's historic mistake 
not to have taken the Old City and the West Bank during the War of  Independence. In 1948/49, Israel had 
won the war but lost its holiest site: Although Transjordan had guaranteed free access for Jews to their holy  
1350Quoted Ibid.
1351For instance Trost, 1967, p. 196.
1352The shofar is a ram's horn which has been introduced into Israel's political culture, for instance when being used at the inaugura ­
tion of  a new president at the Knesset. Traditionally, it is sounded on Rosh HaShanah, the Jewish new year or the day of  judg ­
ment and commemorates Isaac's sacrifice.
1353Cit. Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd Ed., Vol. 18, 2007, p. 508. After that Goren addressed the soldiers: “The vision of  all generations 
is being realized before our eyes: The city of  God, the site of  the Temple, the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, the symbol  
of  the nation’s redemption, have been redeemed today by you, heroes of  the IDF. By doing so you have fulfilled the oath of  
generations, ‘If  I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning.’ Indeed, we have not forgotten you, Jerusalem, 
our holy city, our glory. In the name of  the entire Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora, I hereby recite with supreme joy,  
Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of  the universe, who has kept us in life, who has preserved us, and enabled us to reach  
this day. This year in Jerusalem – rebuilt!” Quoted in: Israel Forever Foundation website. The traditional phrase, “next year in  
Jerusalem” with which each Passover Seder ends, had been the expression of  the Jews' desire to return to Zion during exile. On  
7 June, Goren tried to persuade Narkis to blow up the Dome of  the Rock in order to eliminate Arab-Muslim memory from the 
holy city. See Shlaim, 2001, p. 245. The same demand can be found in the attempts by religious groups in Israel to “free” the  
complete length of  the Western Wall (ca. 465m) at the cost of  non-Jewish architecture in the area. See Ricca, Simone: Historical  
Features. Nationalism and the Shifting Symbolism of  the Wailing Wall. Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 24, 2005, p. 45.
1354Furthermore, Rabbi Goren argued that the location of  the original forbidden area surrounding the holy of  the holiest differed 
from the location of  the Dome of  Rock. In fact he located the center of  the Temple in an area south of  the Temple Mount.  
1355Quoted in Fishbein, Einat: The shattered myth of  Moshe Dayan. In: Ynet News, 10 October, 2010.
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places, for 19 years Jews were prohibited from visiting the Western Wall, hence, the grave of  King David, loc­
ated on the Jerusalemite hill of  Zion became the surrogate for the wall.1356 
The centrality of  Jerusalem and its new place in the “reborn” nation's imagery required the Western Wall's  
transformation into a concrete sacred space where hundreds of  thousand of  visitors and pilgrims, streaming 
into the city, could perform the commemoration of  both past and present. On 10 June, the day of  cease fire, 
Teddy Kollek, former mayor of  West-Jerusalem, now representative of  united Jerusalem, after consultation 
with the IDF and the prime minister's office ordered the demolition of  the Moghrabi (Moroccan) Quarter op ­
posite the Western Wall.1357 The quarter had been built by Salahuddin's son in 1193 and had been the seat of  
Jordanian waqf  endowment and of  Al-Aqsa scholars since.1358 Lying across the way of  the Prophet's nocturnal 
journey from Mecca to Jerusalem's al-haram aš-šarīf  on al-burāq it is considered holy by Muslims. After forced 
evacuation of  more than 650 Arab residents, the area demolition was hastily completed until 12 June for fear 
of  international protest and an additional road was built to connect the area with the Western city.1359 At the 
end, the pavement in front of  the wall had been extended to today's Kotel Plaza, a 20.000 square meters area 
accommodating 400.000 people.1360 Since, the Kotel plaza occupies a special place in the Israeli-Jewish-Zionist 
imagery and became “the central altar of  the Israeli state” and the “representation of  Israeli 'civic religion'” 
with the religious events, parades and swearing-in ceremonies by the IDF.1361 But as Ricca states, the pre-occu­
pation of  the area with the symbolism of  Zionist Israel had to compete more and more with what she calls  
“new religious communities” who religiously re-appropriated the Wall area.1362 This was linked to the paradox 
that the Western Wall, represents only the very surrogate idea of  the Second Temple, built as an external sep­
aration and protection wall to the inner holiest areas, and is, hence, connected to the commemoration of  the  
past and the destruction of  the temple. The messianic notion of  a reconstruction of  the temple, gained mo­
mentum with the fading of  Zionist model of  civil religion which tried to compromise between the past and  
the future – between the tradition embarked on the centrality of  the destructed temple and the Jewish telos  
1356See Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement, Art. VIII, 3 April, 1949. Free access to the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount was  
also denied to Israeli Arabs.
1357This has been interpreted by some as the intentional erasement of  Arab memory of  the city with the goal of  replacing it by a  
new Jewish-Israeli memory. Indeed, there are only few photographs showing the quarter before its raze in 1967 and those rare  
images one can find in some Arab Old City shops date back to the beginning of  the century. 
1358See Abowd, Tom: The Moroccan Quarter: A History of  the Present. Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 7, 2000.
1359The UNESCO accused the Israeli government of  disregard towards preserving the historical features of  the city which in turn  
emphasized that the Moroccan Quarter had been a “slum” and was therefore demolished for the purpose of  a better access to  
other historical and archeological sites in the area which the Israeli authorities planned to conserve. This official description for  
the non-Jewish heritage in the Old City was used by the authorities also as a justification for the excessive excavations during the  
1970s in which the Ministry of  Religious Affairs, international archaeologists and Chief  Rabbinate emerged as the major conflict  
parties. See Ricca, 2005, p. 46.
1360See Kollek, 1992, p. 308-310.
1361Cit. Ricca, 2005, pp. 47/48.
1362“The 'master commemorative narrative' that created the Wall plaza and the new Jewish Quarter as the symbol of  continuity  
between the ancient past and the modern Jewish state persists, but is now shared by a different constituency. This new 'Jewish'  
community (including a large group of  foreign born-again Jews) that has developed within the quarter itself  no longer pays  
much attention to archeology or to celebrating the heroism of  the quarter's defenders in the 1948 battle. Rather, it longs for the 
'dream' of  a new temple.” Cit. Ricca, 2005, p. 50.
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“that will be in the rebuilding of  the Temple however theoretical that may be and however delayed it may be  
till the arrival of  the Messiah.”1363 
On June 10, 1967, the territory that the IDF had conquered was more than three times the seize of  Israel  
itself. The Israeli military success and the total defeat of  Egypt's, Syria's and Jordan's armies came close to the  
feeling of  Arab humiliation that had accompanied the nakba of  1948. Israel's attack on Egypt, referred to as 
al-udwan (the aggression), marked “the crisis point in the personal and collective memory of  the Arab nation  
and umma. […] The war had proved the bankruptcy of  the dominant nationalist and socialist agenda.” 1364 In Is­
rael, the victory created an euphoria and led leftists and rightists, doves and hawks, to the acceptance of  milit ­
ary power as the legitimate means of  responding to Arab claims.1365 On the international level, Israel's elite no­
ticed what it described as a “reversal of  causality”1366, in which the dominant Western view on the conflict 
switched from the perception of  Arab-Palestinian hostilities only hours after the Jewish state's creation into 
the perception of  Jewish expansionist policies of  colonialism as the precondition of  what became a Zionist 
settler state in 1948.1367 1967 marked Israel's turning into a militaristic nation, a “little Sparta” whose aggress­
ive, shameless and brutal policies clashed with international norms of  warfare, law and morality.1368 As Shlaim 
points out, “The speed and scale of  Israel's military victory led some observers to suspect that Israel launched  
the war not in self-defense but in order to expand its territory.”1369 The '67 war catapulted the Israeli-Palestini­
an conflict on a new international focus and polarized international public opinion in which the Arab world 
together with the international left coined the phrase of  a colonial settler regime or Zionist entity in the 
Middle East.1370 In Israel the two synchronous processes of  ultra-nationalization and a rediscovery of  Jewish­
ness and Judaism took place.1371 Golda Meir who succeeded Levi Eshkol after his death as prime minister in 
March, 1969, reemphasized the principle of  only engaging in territorial concessions after separate bilateral  
peace accords with the Arab states as a result of  direct negotiations and ergo the defacto and dejure accept ­
ance of  Israel as a state including its security needs. Even despite negative international opinion and high dip ­
lomatic costs, Israel would insist on this formula:
1363Cit. Ben-Dov, M./ Aner, Z.: The Western Wall. Tel Aviv: Ministry of  Defense Publ., 1983, p. 165. Quoted in Ricca, 2005, pp.  
50/51.
1364Cit. Haddad, 1992, p. 267. During the first days of  the Yom Kippur War of  1973, initial Egyptian successes during Operation Badr 
– the crossing of  the Suez Canal and the Israeli defense line in Sinai – were depicted as the restoration of  Arab honor as a re­
sponse to the collective feeling of  shame and humiliation after the 1967 war. See Ibid., p. 269. 
1365The same feeling was present in the public even prior to the war. When the war broke out and the army called for its reservists  
abroad, American and Canadian Jewish volunteers in New York and Washington besieged Israeli consulates, at London airport  
British Jews rioted when El-Al, the only airline flying to Israel during the war, appeared to be unable to transport all volunteers. 
See Meir, 1976, pp. 300/301. And Gorenberg writes: “[...] men feared they would be left out of  the war that was approaching by 
the minute”. Cit. Gorenberg, 2006, p. 34.
1366See Netanyahu, Benjamin: A Durable Peace: Israel and its Place Among the Nations. New York: Warner, 2000, p. 142ff.
1367See Meir, 1976, p. 312; Freudenstein, Roland: Welches Israel hätten wir denn gern? In: Die Politische Meinung, No. 1, 2011, p.  
73-75.
1368The UN General Assembly condemned Israel's operations as an “invasion of  Africa”. Pakistan asserted that it was a “[...] nefari ­
ous and naked aggression […] against the territorial integrity of  the United Arab Republic and the adjoining Arab States […] Is­
rael is an illegitimate child born of  fraud and force.” Quoted in Pakistan Horizon. PIIA, Vol. 20/21, 1967, p. 324.
1369Cit. Shlaim, 2001, p. 241.
1370Anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian interpretations of  1967 are expressed in the slogans of  American student unions: “Hoh, Ho, Ho  
Chi Min, al-Fatah will win!”. See Ullrich, Peter: Die Linke, Israel und Palästina. Nahostdiskurse in Großbritannien und Deutsch­
land. Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Texte, No. 48. Berlin: Dietz, 2008, p. 91.ff.
1371See Aran, 1995.
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After the Six Day War, Israel's leading satirical writer, Ephraim Kishon [...] published a book called So Sorry We 
Won. It was a bitter title, but not in the least ambiguous to its Israeli readers. In fact, it summed up rather suc ­
cinctly the way we were beginning to feel, by 1968, which was that the only recipe for improving Israel's rapidly  
deteriorating image was to forget all about peace. Our crime appeared to be that we kept saying to the Arabs  
'Let's negotiate.' Not, as we were entitled to do, 'This is the new map; sign on the dotted line,' […]1372
Further, the international critical front evoked solidarity in Israel – in society and between former political ad­
versaries – which was based on the assumption that only a hardline stance towards the regional Arab powers,  
even at the cost of  Western sympathies, would allow Israel to survive and to formulate a future Middle East  
policy according to its strategic goals:
But neither Eshkol nor I, nor the overwhelming majority of  other Israelis, could make a secret of  the fact that  
we weren't at all interested in a fine, liberal, anti-militaristic, dead Jewish state or in a 'settlement' that would win  
us compliments about being reasonable and intelligent but that would endanger our lives.1373
Meir's reflections indicate also the growing awareness of  the need to explain the government's policy and to  
justify the war's territorial outcome internationally. According to Aran, “the secular, statist ideology found it  
hard to justify Israel's position in the territories without recourse to once-rejected principles deriving from the  
religious heritage.”1374 Facing negative international reactions to the conquest of  the Temple Mount, on 27  
June, 1967, the Knesset passed a law in which it ensured “the freedom of  access of  the members of  the differ­
ent religions to the places sacred to them […].”1375 However, this step was rejected by all Arab states and only 
recognized by Pakistan and Great Britain.1376 When the Knesset adopted the Basic Law on the status of  Jerus­
alem in 1980 which made the city the capital of  Israel, the international community protested against the law 
which it perceived as a violation of  international law and post-'67 UN resolutions claiming Israel's withdrawal.  
This demand had been articulated at the UN SC, at the request of  Pakistan, which acted on behalf  of  the  
members of  the OIC.1377 Pakistan's permanent representative at the UN, Niaz A. Naik, justified this move with 
what he identified as a lack of  international will to condemn Israel's illegal capture of  the city in 1967 which  
gave rise to subsequent violations of  international norms.1378 Israel's permanent representative to the UN, Ye­
huda Zvi Blum spoke after Naik:
[…] The law adopted last month assures yet again due consideration to the concerns of  all religions in Jerusalem 
and to the sentiments of  their adherents. I must reiterate 'due consideration to the concerns of  all – I repeat, 'all'  
– 'religions in Jerusalem'. It also stands in stark contrast to the situation which prevailed under the Jordanian oc ­
cupation of  a part of  the City, between 1948 and 1967. Thus, complete freedom of  access to and worship at the  
shrines sacred to the adherents of  all faiths has been guaranteed and maintained by Israel in a manner unpreced­
ented in the history of  the City. Jerusalem should be approached, in every sense, with veneration and respect,  
with reverence and dignity. As I said at the outset of  my remarks, the initiators of  this debate seek to exploit it  
for incitement, both religious and political. In fact, these shrill voices of  religious fanaticism have been heard  
sabre-rattling in recent days and weeks, in this chamber and beyond. Israel would hope that all the members of  
1372Cit. Meir, Golda: My Life. London: Futura Publ., 1976, pp. 311/312.
1373Cit. Meir, quoted in Shlaim, 2001, p. 284.
1374Cit. Aran, 1995, p. 199. 
1375Cit. Protection of  Holy Places Law, passed by the Knesset on 27 June, 1967. This was a step aimed at winning international opinion 
by contrasting the restrictive policy of  Transjordan between 1948 and 1967: The West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem, captured by  
Jordan in the 1948 war and annexed in 1950, restored was seen from the Jordanian view as an attempt to establish “complete  
unity between the two sides of  the Jordan and their union into one State, which is the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan, at whose  
head reigns King Abdullah Ibn al Husain [...]” Cit. Resolution Jordanian Annexation of  West Bank, adopted by the House of  
Deputies on 24 April, 1950. URL: Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Historical Documents, Vol. 1/2: 1947-1974. 
1376Great Britain refused to accept Jordan's annexation of  Eastern Jerusalem. See Shlaim, 2001, p. 43. For Pakistan's reaction to this  
step and its relationship with Transjordan, renamed as Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan in 1949, see Silverburg, Sanford A.:  
Pakistan and the West Bank: A Research Note. In: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1983, p. 261-263.
1377See UN SC: The situation in the Middle East: Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of  Pakistan to the UN ad­
dressed to the President of  the SC, S/14084, 1 August 1980.
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the Council would agree that the injection of  fanaticism, bigotry and hatred into these proceedings is highly un­
desirable and in no way conducive to advancing the cause of  peace, which is epitomized in Jerusalem, a city  
whose very name in Hebrew – Yerushalayim – means 'the City of  Peace'. For its part, Israel will not allow Jerus­
alem to become another Berlin, with all that implies not only for the welfare of  its citizens but also for interna ­
tional peace and security.1379
The image of  opening the city including its religious places for the international public and worshipers of  oth ­
er religions, together with the restoration of  Jerusalem's Jewish heritage and increased excavation activities, was 
aimed at substantiate Israel's historical claim. In response, the UN SC adopted a resolution in which it called 
on “those States that have established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the  
Holy City”.1380 The withdrawal of  all embassies and consulates from the Jerusalem municipality was completed 
in 2006.1381 
1378“The Israeli authorities have also revived with increased vigour the obsessive Zionist scheme to Judaize the Holy City of  Jerus ­
alem by destroying its historical personality and turning it into 'the eternal capital' of  Israel. […] They constitute a serious ob ­
struction to the achievement of  a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. So far, Israel has contemptuously re ­
jected the decisions of  the Council and is ruthlessly pursuing its policies of  aggression and expansionism.” Cit. UN SC: Official  
Records, 2245th Meeting, 20 August, 1980, p. 3. Pakistan's request at the UN SC which referred to resolutions adopted earlier 
during the 11th Islamic Conference of  Foreign Ministers in Islamabad was in principle identical with the position of  the Arab  
states. For instance, they condemned Israel's refusal to cooperate with UN bodies related to the Palestinian issue, reaffirmed the  
legitimacy of  the PLO as the representative of  the Palestinian people and their commitment to UN Resolution 3379 which  
equated Zionism to a form of  racism. Another issue was the refusal to accept the Camp David peace agreement between Israel  
and Egypt, signed in September, 1978, and March, 1979, and its condemnation as a “departure from the Charter of  the Organiz­
ation of  the Islamic Conference and a violation of  international law.” See Res. No. 2/11-P on Palestine Cause, and Res. No.  
3/11-P on the Normalization of  Relations between the Egyptian Regime and the Zionist Enemy, both adopted by the Islamic  
Conference of  Foreign Ministers, Islamabad, 17-22 May, 1980.
1379Cit. UN SC: Official Records, 2245th Meeting, 20 August, 1980, p. 7.
1380Cit. UN SC Res. 478, adopted on 20 August, 1980, 2245th Meeting, 5B.
1381Subsequently, Israel protested and refused to accept Resolution 478: “The Council can no doubt adopt whatever resolutions it  
likes and for whatever reasons it chooses. The fact remains that such resolutions cannot and, will not further the cause of  peace,  
nor are they calculated to further that cause. But whatever their purpose, they cannot and will not alter the fundamental reality  
that united Jerusalem has been and will remain the capital of  Israel.” Cit. UN SC, Official Records, 2245th Meeting, 20 August,  
1980, p. 19.
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8 Conclusion: Contextualizing National-Religious Security States
In this thesis I presented an alternative approach towards the status of  exceptionalism in which Pakistan and 
Israel have been styled as artificial, experimental and revolutionary states by their domestic historical culture  
and its popularized narrative. The creation of  both states, with reference to the numerous accounts mystifying, 
sacralizing or even re-interpreting the event of  statehood with the selectivity towards historical facts, had not  
the innovation of  a political-nationalist mass movement which represented the consensus of  a homogenous 
ethnic-religious society. Rather, a secular oriented oligarchy in politics and economy had been the spearhead of  
the nationalist endeavor and religion had been introduced into classical nationalist discourses like those of  col­
lective liberation and freedom, independence and self-expression, peace and war.  
In both cases the independence movement had to negotiate with the British colonial or mandate power in 
order to gain acceptance. A central means was, as Kumaraswamy has pointed out, that of  parity 1382: The de­
mand for the creation of  a state required a demographic share to substantiate the claim for statehood. In this  
context, the promotion of  immigration and the absorption of  refugees became another key element during  
the formative period. Their translation into the respective religious context was, thus, a logic step. Pakistan re ­
ceived millions of  refugees from the Indian side who as  muhajirun became a strong economic and political 
group of  society, especially in Sindh where they soon represented the dominant ethnic groups, similar to the 
Punjabis. For the Israeli state, aliyahʿ  (ascent) is the basic ideological key concept and the absorption of  Jews in  
a sovereign state had been the raison d'être for its creation. In contrast to Pakistan which is facing various  
problems due to its large population and further population explosion to come in the future1383, the Jewish 
state depends heavily on immigration for various reasons. Thus, yeridah (descent), the Israeli variant of  emigra­
tion, is seen today as one of  the main threats to the stability of  local economy and the job market. Today Israel  
has to struggle with historic lows of  immigration which after the fall of  the Soviet Union had reached its cli­
max. Drastic increase of  yeridah and “demographic bloodletting” would have a direct impact on Israel's demo­
graphic reality including its political component with the balance of  Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Israeli population 
on the one hand, and the implications of  growing religious ultra-orthodox strata of  society on the other. 
In the context of  absorption of  immigrations and their introduction to the new state, the military, in both 
countries,  played an important role.  Due to the “birth in war” that  marked the event of  the creation of  
Pakistan and Israel, as the need of  the hour, their armies were the first institutions being developed in order to  
guarantee proper defense and were massively involved in the process of  nation-building. This role has since  
been claimed by the military: In Israel, the IDF continues to serve integration and is widely accepted since  
most Israelis served in the army as part of  the Israeli model of  citizenship. In Pakistan, due to its frequent in ­
terferences in the political process, the Pakistan Army has lost much of  its reputation in society. However, it  
still serves as a strong nationalist symbol and powerful economic player and, thus, is often positively contrasted 
to the political elites' negative image.  
1382See Kumaraswamy, 1997.
1383At times it is difficult to understand why – in the light of  mass illiteracy and poverty due to the lack of  proper educational re ­
sources etc. – the population explosion and Pakistan's man power are still highlighted by many Pakistanis as a great national  
achievement and positive factor for the future of  the country.
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While academic literature has highlighted various aspects of  religious movements that arose in both coun­
tries, like their stances towards democracy, human rights, violence, etc., whereas the role of  the state and its 
own ideological resources – religion, political and cultural traditions etc. – played only a minor role. However,  
the state stands in the very center of  both Pakistani and Israeli self-conception and ethos as a collectivist en­
deavor and the greatest achievement in their respective Weltanschauung and view on history. The state and the 
event of  its creation, with regard to the dimension of  time, has been styled as the historical turning point and  
radical break with the past. With regard to the dimension of  space, one can find both, the view on the state  
through a prism resembling the strategy of  religious mapping in which territory, as an object, is reinterpreted 
as a sacred space, and thus as an indivisible organic whole and subject attached with strong religious meaning. 
Rothermund and Kumaraswamy have pointed out to the geographical artificiality of  Pakistan and Israel: 
Both states had awkward borders at their start. Israel's territory resulted from the happenstance of  war and led  
to such anomalies as a divided capital city and a country with a waist only nine miles wide; only in 1967 did Israel 
end these irregularities. Pakistan had an even more bizarre geography, for it consisted of  west and east wings 
separated by a thousand-mile Indian territory.1384
Like the (re-)introduction of  ancient languages, the emphasis on a shared religion was as a tool of  national in ­
tegration and identity building for the new citizens
Because of  the strong ideological integration of  religion into the ideological repertoire, it is to question if,  
at all, a strictly secular organization of  state and society could be achieved as it has been claimed in both coun ­
tries. A crucial difference in the perception of  the state and its transformation into a part of  a political theo ­
logy can be seen in the religions of  Islam and Judaism from which particular elements were drawn and integ ­
rated into the nationalist discourse: I presented basically two antagonistic orientations towards the State of  Is­
rael:  These are  the established Zionist  statist  mamlakhti orientation of  Ben-Gurion and the secular  Labor 
founding elites on the one hand, and secular and religious anti-Zionism and ultra-orthodox haredi worldview 
that refuse to accept the state on the other. I also discussed religious Zionism as a third way and as the attempt  
to bridge between the two opposing camps. Especially this latter movement has highlighted the state's special  
place in Judaism without denying its centrality in the secular Zionist narrative of  Israel, in which it serves as a  
protective means and home for all Jews and guarantor for international acceptance and recognition. Religious 
Zionism also gave new meaning to Ben Gurion's mamlakhtiut – loyalty and obedience towards the state and its 
institutions which are superior to civil society and even to the nation – in that it attached a sanctity to the state 
that also secular Israelis were willing to accept. More so, the land, on which it has been built, is one of  its cent ­
ral references. In contrast, Pakistan has been portrayed by early historiography and religious groups as a fort ­
ress of  Islam and as a new leading nation among the Muslim nations of  the umma. Its sacralized narrative sees 
the state in a historical tradition with early Islam and as continuity of  the first Muslim community of  Prophet  
Muhammad.  However,  lacking  the  central  territorial  factor  of  Judaism and the  Israel's  biblical  meaning, 
Pakistan never acquired the notion of  holiness that Eretz Yisrael and Zion had for two millennia. Pakistan, un­
like Israel with the notion of  the Ingathering of  the Exiles, redemption and the advent of  the Messiah, has not  
the centrality as the sacred center of  a future divine process. Its notion as the Land of  the Pure whose borders  
mark the boundary between purity and impurity, with its crossing styled as a hajj, was much more emphasized 
1384Cit. Kumaraswamy, 1997.
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in the context of  the partition of  the Subcontinent but as early as in the 1950s lost its pertinence. The Islamic  
Republic is seen in terms of  Islam primarily in the context of  its history and vis-à-vis its non-Muslim neighbor 
countries with Hindu India at first place. Thus, Pakistani Sunni-Muslim nationalism as the central ideological  
core of  the state, is a religious nationalism that highlights exclusiveness and distinctiveness from its Indian 
counterpart on which it heavily depends for reasons of  legitimation. Further, Pakistani nationalist communal ­
ism allowed its strongest institution, the military, to gain its dominant role because of  its claim to save Pakistan  
from external threats and of  being the defender not only of  the people, the territory and the state, but also of  
Islam. Ironically, it is in the highest ranks of  the army where moderate-liberal Islamic and even secular orienta­
tions towards the models of  Turkey and Indonesia increasingly gained momentum in recent years. At the same  
time, the army, ignoring the demand of  the US and its international partners, has not abandoned its patronage  
of  Islamic radicalism. It seems to be granted that the withdrawal of  the biggest international alliance since  
World War Two from Afghanistan will impact the Pakistani complex. However, this could lead to a revitaliza­
tion of  old patterns of  Afghan-Pakistani enmities and claims which are determined by Pakistan's security in ­
terests, or it could generate a scenario in which Pakistan would engage with its environment in terms of  ac ­
commodation and cooperation without losing the leading regional role that it would gain after the withdrawal.  
Despite these changes being tremendous, they would not touch Pakistan's inner ideological setup. It seems that  
changes on this level will be possible only through reformed and strengthened institutions as agencies of  na­
tional integration and the generation of  a consensus strong enough to re-negotiating the status quo with re­
gard to the country's ethnic, religious and socioeconomic cleavages.  
This study argues that politics of  identity and its variant with religion as the main marker of  individual and 
collective identities of  citizenship, in both countries had a mobilizing effect during independence but failed to  
integrate society in its entirety during the consolidation of  state and society. In Israel, more than in Pakistan,  
the process of  identity-building – of  the state and its society as an collective approach – was by far more suc ­
cessful.  However,  during and after  the  formative  phase in  which institutional  and  political  patterns were  
shaped, new alternative and contradicting religious, ethnic and political identities arose which often clashed  
with the ideal that was drawn by the founding elite. Especially on the constitutional and legal level the compet ­
ition between the various conceptions and models of  identity has increasingly been sharpened due to asym ­
metric legal configurations which deepened existing and new cleavages, and contributed to further destabiliza ­
tion of  society in large. The state has responded to these challenges only reluctantly. To date, beside cosmetic 
legal changes and limited constitutional amendments, the courts have avoided dealing with fundamental legal 
problems relating to the “essence” of  the state. In some precedent cases, the courts' decisions were ignored or 
adjourned and later not implemented due to political pressure and interventions by dominant sectors like the 
religious parties, the military or the political leadership. Rare, reactive and situational decisions on a case-by-
case basis did not amount to reversal of  the policies that were implemented and perpetuated with the found­
ing of  the states and within the cultural, legal and social framework of  their ideologies. Though ideologically 
granting neutrality and protection towards all social, religious and racial groups and equal rights to all citizens, 
both states, since their inception have maintained a strong distinction between the majority and the minority, 
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Muslims and non-Muslims vis-à-vis Jews and non-Jews. Legal procedures and the system of  the courts repres­
ent a narrative that is designed at cementing and enforcing these trends. As far as the decentralized system of  
courts in regard of  religious law is concerned, perpetuation of  this dual legal system – of  civil and religious  
law – because of  the inability to re-arrange the status quo or to reform judiciary. As a result, both countries are  
facing a Kulturkampf  along the lines of  the religious-secular, the sectarian, and the majority-minority cleavages. 
Pakistan and Israel represent two cases of  religious-political sectors which in its majority has shown strong 
commitment to the project of  nation-building either in cooperation with the government or at the grass-roots.  
In the political system, religious parties in both countries, with the exception of  Haredim groups in Israel that 
refuse to accept the parliamentary process for reasons of  their theological opposition to the Zionist state, ad ­
here to the democratic rules, and, thus, question a popular thesis in political sciences, according to which they 
constitute a threat to the democratic process. 
Recent and future developments, more than ever, will be influenced by regional and international impulses.  
In 2011, international public perception had been strongly affected by the sociopolitical dynamics and trans­
formation of  power in the Middle East which washed away the narrative of  an Arab exceptionalism (al-istithnā'  
al-'Arabī) that for decades had been static and immune towards indigenous structural change. The Arab upris ­
ings had, it seems, an indirect impact on the civil societies in the bordering regions as well, not to speak of  the 
new role played by informal protest cultures.1385 However, Pakistan and Israel, two countries which in the last  
decades had been described in terms of  a largely lethargic and apolitical youth, experienced new forms of  
political articulation and popularization of  politics. Being in the midst of  this very recent process, it would be  
inappropriate and premature to see these developments in the wider framework of  a fundamental change.  
However, the trend towards a changing political public sphere and a revitalization of  the “unfulfilled dream”  
of  a revolution to change existing realities is visible. What became more clear than in recent years was the re-
entering of  extreme political  leftist  and conservative religious-nationalist  discourses articulated by political 
parties, non-state organizations and interest groups. They all aggregate, through new channels of  communica ­
tion and through the prism of  new social, political or economic frameworks, inherent cleavages of  both soci ­
eties. 
But despite recent positive developments in Pakistan which include the 18 th constitutional amendment, an 
increasingly emancipated judiciary and a change in perception towards India, these imputs can be only cosmet ­
ic due to the continuation of  the status quo with a highly corrupted political class and the army defending 
their spheres of  interest. Thus, empowerment of  marginalized groups and civil society is possible only within 
the narrowed borders provided by these two power groups. The same seems true with regard to Pakistani  
political culture and its ideological preconditions, in which even secular political groups cannot but display 
their commitment to Islam in general and Pakistani Muslim nationalism in particular, as the cultural heritage 
and raison d'être of  Pakistan, as claimed by official state ideology. Beyond their real proportional influence, the  
religious parties and non-political Islamic interest groups can confront secular-oriented narratives on every 
1385As they manifested in the anti-nuclear movement in India and Japan, the Occupy Movement in the US and Western Europe, the  
Pirates party in Germany becoming a role model for clone organizations in neighboring countries and the expansion of  former  
blogger subcultures worldwide.
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front due to this framework. The army, despite frequent Islamist interventions within, has to be seen as in­
creasingly representing a moderated image. However, in contrast to Israel's people's army which pro-actively 
plays the role of  a school for the nation and is one of  the main vehicles for the dissemination of  the identity 
of  Zionist Israeliness, the Pakistan Army has cultivated the image of  a professional entity which relies on pub­
lic support and loyalty but which in turn, does not have the potential to co-formulate public culture and mind­
sets at grass-root level, mainly because of  its self-imposed distinctiveness from the civilian sphere.
Israel's worst case scenario regarding inner stability according to which mass protests lay unrest on society  
and lead to painful losses in economy – present in the minds since the 1980s protests in the context of  the  
First Lebanon War – became reality but under a framework which was not thought about before: In July, 2011,  
and still at the time of  writing, hundreds of  thousands of  protesters held countrywide rallies in what became a 
“Rothschild Boulevard Revolution”, Israel's local version of  the Arab uprising narrative. The protesters – ini ­
tially ridiculed as „sushi eaters“ and „lefties“ by Likud minister Ayoub Kara and Prime Minister Netanyahu – 
can be seen as the backbone of  future Israel, including the educated middle classes who serve in the army  
where they participated in the wars of  Lebanon and Gaza and in the Second Intifada, who go to the country's  
elite universities and were considered an Israel-born generation loyal to Zionism. Relevant in the context of  
this study are two central demands formulated by the protesters: Firstly, an immediate end of  Israel's occupa ­
tion of  the West Bank territories and secondly, the cancellation of  subsidies for the settlers in the occupied  
territories and those for housing and education for ultra-orthodox Haredim.1386 Deeply intertwined, these two 
demands touch two inner core conflicts of  today's Israeli society and question basic features of  modern Israeli  
Zionism who, according to the protesters' view failed to address the pressing needs of  Israeli society.
With regard to their regional orientations, developments in Pakistan and Israel are increasingly depending  
on their changing environments, which automatically undo their traditional worldview as expressed in foreign  
policy and strategic security thinking. Both countries have difficulties to articulate their existential security in­
terests which goes hand in hand with their ideological orientation towards the international community being 
increasingly determined by the perception of  misunderstanding, mistrust, isolation or even hostile views on 
them. Pakistan's standing in the world is increasingly determined by its relation with the US with bilateral rela­
tions being at a historic low at the present. Mutual mistrust revitalizes anti-Americanism in Pakistan and, as  
Lieven correctly pointed out, negative US perception of  Pakistan to the extend of  treachery with the feeling 
of  being betrayed by Pakistan which is seen as being already overpaid with little to show for it. 1387 In response, 
Pakistan claims compensation for its own losses in the Global War on Terror. 
Period hiccups were quite usual in US-Pak relations swinging from the notion of  Pakistan as America's  
“most-allied ally”  to “the most  dangerous  country  in  the world”.1388 In 2006,  Stephen Cohen noted that 
Pakistan has the potential to become America's biggest foreign policy problem and that Washington should do 
1386According to  Peace Now, Israeli settlement building activities in the West Bank in 2011 have increased by nearly 20 percent as  
compared to 2010. Tenders for settlements, official recognition of  illegal outposts by the government and plans for the construc­
tion of  homes in East Jerusalem show a similar rise. See Annex A, Tabelle 6.
1387See Lieven, Anatol: With a Friend Like This. In: The New York Times, Op-ed, 1 November, 2011.
1388According to a statement on the Pakistani-Afghani border areas by Barack Obama in March, 2009, „for the American people,  
this border region has become the most dangerous place in the world.“ Cit. The New York Times: The President has commen­
ted on safe haven in Pakistan and connection to Afghanistan, 27 March, 2009.
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everything needed to avoid such a scenario. Even before 2006, his prophecy had turned into reality with sur ­
veys (June, 2011) stating that about 38 percent of  the Pakistanis see America as more of  a threat than India  
(9%) or extremist Islamist networks (22%).1389 Pakistan faces severe problems in countering its negative image 
and denying allegiances mainly by the US, Afghanistan and India, according to which it is double-gaming its  
friends and closest allies in the fight against international terrorism and in the Afghan counter-insurgency. An 
ad published by the Government of  Pakistan in the Wall Street Journal on 11 September, 2011, ten years after 
9/11, asked “Which country can do more for your peace?”.1390 With Pakistan's credibility and legitimacy deteri­
orating in the eyes of  the world,  the country is believed to continue its support  for the Taliban and the  
Haqqani Network1391 directly and to maintain its ambiguity on the long term policy towards the Taliban and 
the future of  Afghanistan and the border areas after the withdrawal of  the international alliance in 2014.1392   
Like Pakistan, Israel, especially after the 1967 war, faced massive international criticism which it tried to 
counter. However, despite initial efforts to appease its supporting powers and especially the USA, the state is  
still perceived as an occupation power. After years of  criticism against the information and PR-policies of  the  
army, the Jewish Agency and the foreign ministry have developed a sophisticated system of  dissemination 
known as  hasbara (explanation) hailed as public diplomacy to counter anti-semitism and anti-Israelism by Is­
rael's friends and allies, condemned as Zionist propaganda by its adversaries. Accordingly, the political leader­
ship has called for “synchronized victories” on the battlefield, on the PR front abroad and at home among 
young Israelis, Israeli Arabs and the ultra-orthodox groups who distanced themselves from the Zionist Jewish-
Israeli mainstream narrative, in order to generate worldwide understanding and solidarity with Israel's cause.  
Nevertheless, and similar to Pakistan, Israel's vulnerability, its dependence on the political support 1393 by the in­
ternational community and mainly the US, is reinforced with the country's public image in general and in US 
society and the current administration in particular deteriorating by the day.  
Threats and their perception can be seen as an integral part of  a nation's teleological historic framework.  
They compete with a claim of  inevitability on the one hand, and the desire for restoring normalcy on the oth ­
er. Pakistan and Israel are the key actors in the world's two most prolonged conflicts – the Israel-Palestinian, 
1389See Khalatbari, Babak: Pakistan nach dem Tod von Osama bin Ladin – Tanz auf  dem Vulkan? Islamabad: Konrad Adenauer  
Foundation, June, 2011. According to The Economist, 60 percent saw the US as the biggest threat to Pakistan as of  April, 2011, 
before Operation Geronimo in which Usama Bin Ladin was killed by a US commando had been launched.
1390See Annex, Abbildung 5.
1391Based in FATA's North Waziristan, the organization is lead by Maulwi Jalaluddin Haqqani – a former mujahidin commander and 
Jadran tribesman from Paktia, client of  the CIA, ISI and various Arab States who was offered the post of  prime minister by 
Afghan president Karzai – and his son Sirajuddin. See Interview Sirajuddin Haqqani. In: Asia Times, 5 May, 2004. Another mem­
ber  of  the  family,  Muhammad  Haqqani  –  Sirajuddin's  younger  brother  responsible  for  the  network's  activities  in  North 
Waziristan and Afghanistan's Paktia province, was killed in February, 2010, in a drone strike. See Gul, 2010, p. 217. Blamed for  
the ISI's supportive role in the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan's denial for supporting the Haqqanis includes the insistence that the 
militia is based in Afghanistan and not in FATA.
1392“[…] if  the Afghan Taliban resurge fully after 2014 and the tribal areas are not under firm Pakistani control, southern and east ­
ern parts of  Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas will become their stronghold. If  Pakistan cannot control the tribal areas by  
2014 it may lose these areas to the Taliban forever.” Cit. Rizvi, Hasan Askari: In quest of  new norms. In: Pakistan Today, 25 Oc ­
tober, 2011.
1393However, in recent decades, Israel was able to abandon its dependence for resupply which was a main factor that led to the initial  
crisis in the first days of  the 1973 war: “Indeed, perhaps Israel's greatest miscalculation was the amount of  artillery shells it  
would need to fight the war;  the amount required vastly outstripped expectations.  Such a seemingly minor thing created a  
massive dependency on the US, allowing the US to shape the conclusion of  the war to its own ends so that Israel's military vic ­
tory ultimately evolved into a political retreat in the Sinai.” Cit. Friedman, George: Israel's Borders and National Security. In:  
Stratfor: Geopolitical Weekly, 31 May, 2011.
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the Israeli-Arab and increasingly the Israeli-Iranian antagonisms, together constituting the Middle East Con­
flict, and the IndoPak conflict which after 9/11 has been expanded to the Afghan theater. Escalations in bilat ­
eral relations with Kabul, Teheran and Ankara indicate that both states have entered a new security environ­
ment. In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, existential threats and their perception require reassur­
ances  through the  de-existentialization  to  break  the  escalatory  dynamics  and  make  conflicts  controllable.  
Hence, as both a precondition and as a result of  this process, de-securitization of  their international orienta­
tion is imperative. 
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Appendix
Document 1 - The Objectives Resolution1394 
(In the name of  Allah, the most beneficent, the most merciful.)
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has 
delegated to the State of  Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is 
a sacred trust;
This Constituent Assembly representing the people of  Pakistan resolves to frame a Constitution for the 
sovereign independent State of  Pakistan; 
Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of  the people; 
Wherein the principles of  democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam 
shall be fully observed; 
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance 
with the teachings and requirements of  Islam as set-out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah; 
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to [freely]1395 profess and practice their religions 
and develop their cultures; 
Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may 
hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous 
with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed; 
Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of  status, of  opportunity and before law, 
social, economic and political justice, and freedom of  thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and 
association, subject to law and public morality; 
Wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of  minorities and backward 
and depressed classes; 
Wherein the independence of  the Judiciary shall be fully secured; 
Wherein the integrity of  the territories of  the Federation, its independence and all its rights including its 
sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded; So that the people of  Pakistan may prosper and 
attain their rightful and honored place amongst the nations of  the World and make their full contribution 
towards international peace and progress and happiness of  humanity.1396
Document 2 - Islamic Provisions Constitution1397 
Provisions relating to the Holy Quran and Sunnah
Art. 227 (1) All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of  Islam as laid down in the  
Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of  Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is  
repugnant to such Injunctions.
[Explanation: In the application of  this clause to the personal law of  any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran 
1394As proposed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and adopted on March 12, 1949, by the Constituent Assembly of  Pakistan.
1395Added by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010.
1396Cit. Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, (modif. 20 April, 2010), National Assembly of  Pakistan, Annex, Art. 2A.
1397Cit. GoP: Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, (modif. 20 April, 2010), National Assembly of  Pakistan. 
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and Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by the sect.]1398
(2) Effect shall be given to the provisions of  clause (1) only in the manner provided in this part. 
(3) Nothing in this part shall affect the personal laws of  non-Muslim citizens or their status as citizens.
Document 3 - Declaration of  the Establishment of  the State of  Israel by the Provisional Government 
of  Israel1399 
The Land of  Israel was the birthplace of  the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity 
was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of  national and universal significance 
and gave to the world the eternal Book of  Books.
After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and 
never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of  their political freedom.
Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-estab ­
lish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, defiant re ­
turnees, and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and 
created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to de ­
fend itself, bringing the blessings of  progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent 
nationhood.
In the year 5657 [1897], at the summons of  the spiritual father of  the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the  
First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of  the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own  
country.
This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of  the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the 
Mandate of  the League of  Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection  
between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of  the Jewish people to rebuild its  National  
Home.
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of  millions of  Jews in Europe - was  
another clear demonstration of  the urgency of  solving the problem of  its homelessness by re-establishing in  
Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of  the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon  
the Jewish people the status of  a fully privileged member of  the community of  nations.
Survivors of  the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of  the world, continued to mi ­
grate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right  
to a life of  dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.
In the Second World War, the Jewish community of  this country contributed its full share to the struggle 
of  the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of  Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of  its sol ­
diers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.
On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the es­
tablishment of  a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of  Eretz-Israel to 
take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of  that resolution. This recognition by  
the United Nations of  the right of  the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.
This right is the natural right of  the Jewish people to be masters of  their own fate, like all other nations, in  
their own sovereign State.
Accordingly we, members of  the People's Council, representatives of  the Jewish Community of  Eretz-Is ­
rael and of  the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of  the termination of  the British Mandate 
over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of  our natural and historic right and on the strength of  the resolution of  the  
United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of  a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be  
known as the State of  Israel.
We declare that, with effect from the moment of  the termination of  the Mandate being tonight, the eve of  
Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 [15th May, 1948], until the establishment of  the elected, regular authorities of  the 
State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not 
later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of  State, and its execut ­
ive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of  the Jewish State, to be called  
1398Added by the Constitution Third Amdt. Order, Presidential Order No. 14, 1980, Art. 2.
1399Publ. in the Official Gazette, Tel-Aviv, No. 1, 14 May, 1948, p. 1.
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"Israel." The State of  Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of  the Exiles; it will  
foster the development of  the country for the benefit of  all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice  
and peace as envisaged by the prophets of  Israel; it will ensure complete equality of  social and political rights 
to all its inhabitants irrespective of  religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of  religion, conscience, lan­
guage, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of  all religions; and it will be faithful to the prin ­
ciples of  the Charter of  the United Nations.
The State of  Israel is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of  the United Nations in 
implementing the resolution of  the General Assembly of  the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to 
bring about the economic union of  the whole of  Eretz-Israel.
We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of  its State and to receive  
the State of  Israel into the community of  nations.
We appeal – in the very midst of  the onslaught launched against us now for months – to the Arab inhabit­
ants of  the State of  Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of  the State on the basis of  full  
and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.
We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of  peace and good neighbourli­
ness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of  cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people  
settled in its own land. The State of  Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement 
of  the entire Middle East.
We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of  Eretz-Israel in the tasks  
of  immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of  the age-old  
dream - the redemption of  Israel.
Placing our trust in the Almighty1400, we affix our signatures to this proclamation at this session of  the provi­
sional Council of  State, on the soil of  the Homeland, in the city of  Tel-Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the 5th day 
of  Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948).
Signed by David Ben-Gurion, Daniel Auster, Mordekhai Bentov, Yitzchak Ben Zvi, Eliyahu Berligne, Fritz 
Bernstein, Rabbi Wolf  Gold, Meir Grabovsky, Yitzchak Gruenbaum, Dr. Abraham Granovsky, Eliyahu Dob­
kin, Meir Wilner-Kovner, Zerach Wahrhaftig, Herzl Vardi Rachel Cohen, Rabbi Kalman Kahana, Saadia Ko­
bashi, Rabbi Yitzchak Meir Levin, Meir David Loewenstein, Zvi Luria, Golda Myerson, Nachum Nir, Zvi  
Segal, Rabbi Yehuda Leib Hacohen Fishman, David Zvi Pinkas, Aharon Zisling, Moshe Kolodny, Eliezer Ka­
plan, Abraham Katznelson, Felix Rosenblueth, David Remez, Berl Repetur, Mordekhai Shattner, Ben Zion 
Sternberg, Bekhor Shitreet, Moshe Shapira, Moshe Shertok.
Document 4 - Constitution JUH (1939)1401
1. To guide the followers of  Islam in their political and non-political matters from a religious point of  
view.
2. To protect Islam, centres of  Islam (Hijaz and Jazirat-ul 'Arab) and Islamic rites and usages, and defend 
Islamic nationalism against all odds injurious to it.
3. To achieve and protect the general religious and national rights of  the Muslims.
4. To organize the 'ulama' on a common platform.
5. To organize the Muslim community and launch a programme for its moral and social reform.
6. To establish good and friendly relations with the non-Muslims of  the country to the extent permitted 
by the Shari'at-i-Islamiyyah.
7. Complete independence for the nation and the country according to shar'ia objectives.1402
8. To organize the Millat-i-Islamiyah into a shar'ia body and establish Mahakim-i-Shar'iyah (religious 
courts).
9. To work for the religious, educational, moral, sovial and economic reforms of  the Muslims, and to 
propagate Islam, by way of  missionary activities, in India to their best ability.1403
10. To maintain and strengthen the bond of  unity and fraternal relations (as ordained by Islam) with the 
1400The original Hebrew version of  the text does not explicitly stress the term God, but refers to trust “in the Rock of  Israel”. This  
is perhaps the most highly discussed section of  the declaration that until today, has been subjected to various interpretations.
1401Der  Verfassungstext  wurde  1919  verabschiedet  und  1939  in  den  Paragrafen  2,  7,  8  und  9  erweitert.  Vgl.  Miyan,  Sayyid  
Muhammad: Jam'iyat-ul'Ulama' kiya hay?, Bd. 1. Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulama', U.P. (Publ. Div.), k. D., S. 10. In: Faruqi, 1963, S. 68/69.
1402In the original formulation of  1919: „[...] freedom for the country [...]“.
1403In der Gründungsverfassung sieht derselbe Artikel die Mission auch im Ausland vor. 
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Muslims of  other countries.
Document 5 - Composition, etc., of  Islamic Council1404 
Art. 228 (1) There shall be, constituted within a period of  ninety days from the commencing day a Council of  
Islamic Ideology, in this part referred to as the Islamic Council.
(2) The Islamic Council shall consist of  such members, being not less than eight and not more than [twenty]
1405 as  the  President  may  appoint  from  amongst  the  persons  having  knowledge  of  the  principles  and  
philosophy  of  Islam as  enunciated  in  the  Holy  Quran  and  Sunnah,  or  understanding  of  the  economic, 
political, legal or administrative problems of  Pakistan. 
(3) While appointing members of  the Islamic Council, the President shall ensure that
(a) so far as practible various schools of  thought are represented in the Council;
(b) not less than two of  the members are persons each of  whom is, or has been a Judge of  the  
Supreme Court or of  a High Court;
(c) not less than [one third]1406 of  the members are persons each of  whom has been engaged, for a 
period of  not less than fifteen years, in Islamic research or instruction; and
(d) at least one member is a woman.
[(4) The President shall appoint one of  the members of  the Islamic Council to be the Chairman thereof.]1407
(5) Subject to clause (6), a member of  the Islamic Council shall hold office for a period of  three years. 
(6) A member may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office or may be removed 
by the President upon passing of  a resolution for his removal by a majority of  the total membership of  the 
Islamic Council. 
Document 6 - Chronology of  Events in Israeli-Turkish Relations (2009-11)
 30 January, 2009: Turkey's president Erdogan stormed out of  the Davos World Economic Forum after 
a panel discussion with Israeli president Shimon Peres on the Gaza attack 1408
 31 May,  2010: During an Israeli  raid on the Gaza Flotilla's  flag ship,  Mavi Marmara,  nine Turkish 
citizens were killed.1409 In the aftermath and due to Israel's refusal to apologize for the attack, Turkey 
expelled Israel's ambassador and downgraded formal diplomatic ties. In the following statements and 
throughout 2011, Turkish officials reiterated their claim and stated that Turkey could not eliminate any  
possibility of  military measures against Israel
 July/August, 2010: President Erdogan announced to visit the Hamas government in Gaza in case, if  
Israel will not apologize for the flotilla incident.1410 
 September, 2011: Turkey announced to vote in favor of  the Palestinian bid for statehood at the UN 
1404Cit. GoP: Constitution of  the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan, (modif. 20 April, 2010), National Assembly of  Pakistan. 
1405Subs. by the Constitution Fourth Amdt. Order No. 16, 1980, Art. 2.
1406Subs. by the Constitution Eighteenth Amdt. Act No. 10, 2010, p. 85.
1407Subs. by the Constitution Third Amdt. Order, Presidential Order No. 13, 1982, Art. 2.
1408See Bennhold, Katrin: Leaders of  Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel. In: The New York Times, 29 January, 2009.
1409The UN's investigation commission found Israel's naval blockade to be legitimate but stated that its disproportional use of  force  
was excessive and unreasonable. See UN Report of  the Secretary-General’s Panel of  Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incid ­
ent (Palmer Report), July, 2011.
1410This step would violate the official position of  NATO members and the Arab League, to boycott visits to the Hamas leadership 
in Gaza. 
   Seite 236
General Assembly, together with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon
 Responding to the Turkish position, Israel announced to deepen its relations with Armenia, and to 
support the Armenian international claim to recognize the Armenian genocide during Ottoman rule
1411 
 Summer 2011: Tensions between Turkey and the Greek Republic of  Cyprus on the latter's exploratory  
drilling  for gas  and oil  fields  off  the  coast  of  Cyprus  intensified.  Israel  declared its  support  for  
Nicosia's position and initiated joint military exercises. Turkey, in response, announced to send war 
ships together with Turkish exploration teams.1412   
Document 7 - Palmer-Uribe Report on the 31 May, 2010, Flotilla Incident
The Panel1413 finds: 
 i. The events of  31 May 2010 should never have taken place as they did and strenuous efforts should be made 
to prevent the occurrence of  such incidents in the future. 
 ii. The fundamental principle of  the freedom of  navigation on the high seas is subject to only certain limited 
exceptions under international law. Israel faces a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza. The  
naval blockade was imposed as a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza 
by sea and its implementation complied with the requirements of  international law. 
 iii.  The flotilla was a non-governmental endeavour,  involving vessels and participants from a number of  
countries.
 
 iv. Although people are entitled to express their political views, the flotilla acted recklessly in attempting to 
breach the naval blockade. The majority of  the flotilla participants had no violent intentions, but there exist 
serious questions about the conduct, true nature and objectives of  the flotilla organizers, particularly IHH.  
The actions of  the flotilla needlessly carried the potential for escalation. 
 v. The incident and its outcomes were not intended by either Turkey or Israel. Both States took steps in an  
attempt to ensure that events did not occur in a manner that endangered individuals’ lives and international  
peace  and  security.  Turkish  officials  also  approached the  organizers  of  the  flotilla  with  the  intention of  
persuading them to change course if  necessary and avoid an encounter with Israeli forces. But more could  
have been done to warn the flotilla participants of  the potential risks involved and to dissuade them from their  
actions. 
1411Turkish-Armenian are  also strained because of  Turkey's  demand of  a  complete  withdrawal  of  Armenian troops from the  
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict region. Traditionally, Israel has close ties with the Armenian Church's Patriarchate in Jerusalem, es ­
pecially since Teddy Kollek's 28-year tenure as mayor. 
1412While the international community and the EU have recognized the Republic of  Cyprus after the island's division in 1974 and its  
separation through an UN administrated green line in the partitioned city of  Nicosia/Lefkoşa claimed by both countries as cap ­
ital, Turkey has only recognized the breakaway Turkish Cypriot north. Accordingly, Turkey does not recognize the Greek Cypriot  
economic zone in which the resource fields are located. A similar dispute arose in 2009/10 between Israel and Lebanon, after the  
discovery of  two offshore natural gas fields, Dalit and Tamar, in an area claimed by both states. Diplomatically still in a state of  
war, the land border between Israel and Lebanon (blue line) has not been recognized yet, neither bilaterally nor by the internation­
al community. Given the non-permanent border status, drafts regarding boundaries in the sea that were presented at the UN in  
2010/11 overlapped. Both countries declared to defend what they regard their national resources by force if  necessary. Regard ­
ing Israel's economy, operation of  Tamir whose production is scheduled for 2014 would not only reduce the need for imported 
energy but could enable the country to export energy resources to Europe via a sea pipeline connection to Greece. See Knell,  
Yolande:  Israel-Lebanon  sea  border  dispute  looms  over  gas  fields.  In:  BBC  News,  11  July,  2011.  URL: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14104695, 13 July, 2011; FAZ: Israel steht vor einem Energieumbruch, 25 April,  
2012.
1413The international committee was chaired by Geoffrey Palmer, Alvaro Uribe (Vice-Chair), Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar and Süley ­
man Özdem Sanberk.
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 vi. Israel’s decision to board the vessels with such substantial force at a great distance from the blockade zone  
and with no final warning immediately prior to the boarding was excessive and unreasonable: 
  a. Non-violent options should have been used in the first instance. In particular, clear prior warning that the  
vessels were to be boarded and a demonstration of  dissuading force should have been given to avoid the type  
of  confrontation that occurred; 
  b. The operation should have reassessed its  options when the resistance to the initial  boarding attempt  
became apparent. 
 vii. IDF personnel faced significant, organized and violent resistance from a group of  passengers when they  
boarded the Mavi Marmara requiring them to use force for their own protection. Three soldiers were captured,  
mistreated, and placed at risk by those passengers. Several others were wounded. 
 viii. The loss of  life and injuries resulting from the use of  force by Israeli forces during the take-over of  the  
Mavi Marmara  was unacceptable.  Nine passengers were killed and many others seriously wounded by Israeli 
forces.  No satisfactory explanation has been provided to the Panel  by Israel for any  of  the nine deaths. 
Forensic evidence showing that most of  the deceased were shot multiple times, including in the back, or at 
close range has not been adequately accounted for in the material presented by Israel. 
 ix. There was significant mistreatment of  passengers by Israeli authorities after the take-over of  the vessels  
had been completed through until  their deportation. This included physical mistreatment, harassment and 
intimidation, unjustified confiscation of  belongings and the denial of  timely consular assistance.1414 
Document 8 - MK Hanin Zoabi adresses the Knesset on 2 June, 2010, on the Gaza Flotilla incident,  
(Knesset Protocol)
Chairman of  the Knesset: What are you afraid that she would tell you something? Does your strength lie 
within what she would say? What do you care?
Interrupter: She's a terrorist.
Chair: MK Ze'ev, maybe you should get out to calm down? So you don't speak.
Zoabi: The siege is illegal, unhuman, illegitimate. Every politician that has a ...[interruption]
Chair: Let her finish, MK Regev.
Zoabi: Every politician who has a moral stance opposes the siege. [MK Zuarets interrupts]
CHair: MK Zuarets, leave! Show her where there's coffee outside!
MK Zuarets: Hypocrisy, hypocrisy!
Chair: MK Zuarets, please leave.
Zoabi: Everyone with immoral stands supports the siege ...[interruption] ... The pirate military operation 
should be ... [interruption] ...
Chair: MK Rotem is not out yet? Take more time to relax. MK Bibi, you're still here? I ordered you to leave. 
He didn't understand, get him out! MK Berkovic you're next in line to leave. Madam, please finish in 1:30 
minutes. You don't have an unlimited amount of  time here. 
1414Cit. UN Report, July 2011, p. 3-5. 
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Zoabi: No, I have 5 minutes.
Chair: You have been speaking for 5 minutes.
Zoabi: I haven't "spoke". The operation was an act of  crime ... [interruptions] ... which goes against 
international law [interruptions]. An international inquiry should be set up to investigation … [interruptions].
Chair: Did she say something new?
Zoabi: ... what happened on the ship. Why is the Israeli government opposing the investigation, why is it 
opposed to revealing the truth? Are you sure of  the Israeli story? And if  you aren't sure, why did you prevent 
the reporters to ...[interruptions]...
Chair: MK Levi, your father and I have heard much worse words.
Zoabi: Why did the Israeli government ban the press from reporting? MK Shama, why did you confiscate the 
reporters' cameras? Why did you silence the … [interruptors calling MK Zoabi a terrorist] ...Why did you only 
publish the images that relate to the injured Israeli soldiers? Why didn't you publish the images related to the 
dead victims, of  the 10 dead bodies? Publish the images.
Chair: This is a speech not a clarification, and you shall not preach the Knesset about morals. The Knesset did 
not publish, the Knesset discusses the matter. If  you have something to say about your personal subject the 
MKs have mentioned, please reply to the accusations of  the MKs against you.
Zoabi: They accused me of  being a terrorist... [interruptions]... They accused me of  possessing knives. You 
said that I had the knives and that I am a terrorist.
Interruptor: I suggest to search if  she has a knife in her. A Chainsaw.
Chair: No, don't MK. I guarantee you she doesn't have one.
Zoabi: You are afraid of  what I am going to say
Interruptor: You are hiding behind your parliamentary immunity.
Zoabi: The Israeli Knesset is afraid to listen to me. You know that the whole world is against you.
Interruptors:  You are a terrorist,  a  saboteur.  No one is  afraid of  you.  Traitor,  terrorist,  traitor...  [physical  
altercations between MK Zoavi and other Mks]1415
1415Transcription of  live broadcasting, Israeli television, 2 June, 2010.
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United Democratic Front (UDF)1416
(1973)
Pir Pagaro, JUP (Shah Ahmad Nurani), independent MNAs
Pakistan National Alliance 
(PNA)1417
(1977)
JI, JUP (Shah Ahmad Nurani), Nizam-i-Mustafa (Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan 
Niazi,  JUP),  JUI,  PML  (Pir  Pagaro),  Tehrik-i-Istiqlal  (Air  Marshall  (rtd.) 
Asghar Khan),  NDP (Sardar Sher Baz Mazari),  CMPK, Milli  Awami Party, 
Pakistan  Democratic  Party  (Nawabzada  Nasrullah  Khan),  Khaksar  Tehrik, 
Muslim Conference
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 
(IJI)
(1988-1990)1418
PML1419 (Muhammad  Khan  Junejo,  Nawaz  Sharif)1420,  JI  (Qazi  Hussain 
Ahmad),  Nizam-i-Mustafa  (Maulana  Abdul  Sattar  Khan  Niazi),  National 
People's  Party (Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi),  ANP (Abdul  Wali  Khan)1421,  MQM 
(Altaf  Hussain)
Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF)1422 
(1993)
Muttahida Dini Mahaz (MDM)
Islami Jamhuri Mahaz (IJM)
JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmad), individual candidates, rtd. Army officers
JUI-S  (Maulana  Sami  ul-Haq),  JUP-Niazi  faction,  Anjuman Sepah-i-Sahaba 
Pakistan (ASSP)
JUI-F, JUP-Noorani faction, PML-Functional group, Pakistan National Party 
(PNP) 
Afghan Defense Council 
(2000/01)1423
JUI-S,  JUI-F,  JUI-Kashmir,  JUP (Nurani),  JI,  Hizb ul-Mujahidin,  AH, SSP, 
Tehrik-i-Ittehad-i-Pakistan  (Gen.  Hamid  Gul),  Tanzim ul-Ikhwan,  Harkatul 
Mujahidin, Jaish-i-Muhammad, LeT, Harkatul Jihad ul-Islam, Al-Badr, Pakistan 
Shariat Council, Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghanistan (Mullah Umar), Majlis-i-Ulema 
Council,  Khatam-e-Nubawwat,  Jamiat-i-Mashaikh  Pakistan,  Muslim  League 
(Kabir Wasti), Pakistan Ulema Council, Mashaikh Pakistan, Muttahida Ulema 
Forum, Baniyan-i-Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) 
(2001/02)
JI, JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP-Nurani, Tehrik-i-Jaffariya, Markazi Jamiat Ahl-i-Hadith
Difa-e-Pakistan Council 
(DPC)
(since 2011)
JUI-S,  JD  (Hafiz  Saeed,  A.  Rehman  Makki),  JI  (Liaqat  Baloch,  Munawar 
Hassan),  JUP (Sahibzada Abdul Khayr Zubair,  Shah Ovais Nurani),  JUI-N 
(Maulana  Asmatullah,  Maulana  A.  Qadir),  Jamiat  Mashaikh  Ahle  Sunnah, 
1416The  UDF members,  under  the  banner  of  the  JUP,  supported  and  joined  the  Majlis-i-Amal in  June,  1974,  for  the  Tahaf­
fuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat, the group that, while referring to the legacy of  the 1950s anti-Ahmadi movement and its massive cam ­
paign for the protection of  the finality of  the Prophet, aimed at putting Bhutto's government under pressure. See Ahmed, 1993,  
p. 105-121.  
1417After the elections in March, 1977, and the catastrophic result for the PNA with only 36 seats out of  192 parliamentary seats 
won, the leadership under Nurani, with the support of  the Pir of  Golra Sharif  and the Pir Pagaro, changed its name into  Tehrik-
i-Nizam-i-Mustafa. See Ahmed, 1993, p. 136-143.
1418As admitted by Brig. Imtiaz Ahmed and Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg in court, the alliance was formed by army and ISI with Beg,  
Hamid Gul and president Ghulam Ishaq Khan being its leading forces. Illegal money was used to get support of  right-wing  
parties and form an alliance against PPP. This covert operation that aimed at weakening the Bhutto government became known 
as Operation Midnight Jackal.
1419PML accounted for about 80 percent of  the IJI's electoral candidates and was, therefore, the driving force behind the alliance.
1420Among the most prominent members of  the IJI and aides of  Nawaz Sharif  was Husain Haqqani, a former president of  Jama'at-
i-Islami's student body and future ambassador to the US who lost this position during the Memogate affair in 2011/12. See Nasr,  
1994, pp. 208/209.
1421ANP contested the 1988 national elections in alliance with PPP. However, this alliance collapsed in 1989. 
1422Within the PIF the JI contested the elections of  1993 but won only six seats. With regard to the 1997 elections it remained inact ­
ive due to its boycott of  the elections. See ICG, 2003, p. 6. 
1423The establishment of  the council (Difa-e-Afghan Council) by Sami ul-Haq was a reaction to the UN SC's imposition of  sanctions  
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in early January, 2001. According to Rana, the council demanded a boycott of  US  
goods, declared its commitment to the jihad in Palestine and gave Usama Bin Ladin the title of  a  Mujahid-i-Azam. See Rana, 
2009, p. 475-478.
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Muslim  Conference  AJK  (Sardar  Atiq  Ahmed),  Mohsinan-e-Pakistan 
(Abdullah Gul), Tehrik-i-Ittehad (Lt.-Gen. (rtd.) Hamid Gul), PML-Zia (Ijaz 
ul-Haq),  Awami  Muslim  League  (Sheikh  Rashid  Ahmed),  Tehrik-i-Hurmat 
Rasun (Maulana Amir Hamza), Ansar ul-Ummah (Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman 
Khalil), Aalmi Majlis Tahaffuz Khatm-e-Nubuwwat (AMTKN, Maulana Ismail 
Shujabadi, M. Ilyas Chinoti), Pakistan Ulema Council (Allama Tahir Mehmud 
Ashrafi), Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf  (Chaudhry Ijaaz)1424, Jamhoori Watan Party – 
Baluchistan,  Tehrik-e-Azadi  Kashmir  (Saifullah  Mansoor),  Muslim  League-
Sher-e-Bangal  (Sualeh  Zahur),  Sunni  Ulama  Council  (Maulana  M.  Ashraf  
Tahir), Jamiat Ittehad ul-Ulema Pakistan, Tanzim-e-Islami (Hafiz Akif  Saeed), 
Jamiat  Ahl-e-Hadith  (Ibtisam  Elahi  Zaheer),  ASWJ  (Maulana  Ahmed 
Ludhianvi)1425,  Muttahida  Jamiat  Ahl-e-Hadith  (Naeem  Badshah),  Majlis 
Ahrar-e-Islam  (Syed  Kafil  Shah  Bukhari),  Jamiat  Ashat  Tauheed  Sunnah 
(Maulana Tayyab Tahiri)
Tabelle 1: Religious-political alliances in Pakistan (1973-2011)
Sources: Newspapers; party websites, Rana, 2009; Pirzada, 2000; Ahmad, 1993; National Democratic Institute, 
1991; Waseem, 1994; Nasr, 1994; Election Commission of  Pakistan.
Organization Ban/ Watchlist
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan 14 August, 2001
Jaish-i-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-i-
Jaafria Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, Tehrik-i-Islami
14 January, 2002
Al-Qa'ida 17 March, 2003
Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan, Khuddam-ul-Islam, Islami Tehreek Pakistan 15 November, 2003
Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Furqan, Hizbut Tehrir 20 November, 2003
Khair-un-Naas International Trust 27 October, 2004
Balochistan Liberation Army 7 April, 2006
Islamic Students Movement Pakistan 21 August, 2006
Lashkar-i-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam 30 June, 2008
TTP 25 August, 2008
JD, Al-Akhtar Trust, Al-Rashid Trust 10 December, 20081426
Regional bodies from Gilgit and Balochistan: Shia Talba Action 
Committee, Markaz-i-Sabeel, Tanzeem Naujawan-i-Sunnat, People's Aman 
Committee, Balochistan Republican Army, Balochistan Liberation Front, 
Lashkar-i-Balochistan, Balochistan Liberation United Front, Balochistan 
Musallah Difa Tanzeem
2011
Tabelle 2: Regional, Jihadi and Sectarian Organizations banned by the Pakistani State. Source: Dawn articles. 
1424Chairman Imran Khan had dismissed rumors that his PTI joined DPC officially but Chaudhry Ijaz who joined events organized  
by the SSP in the past, has been present at different DPC jalsas in 2012.
1425Ahl-e-Sunnah wa l'Jama'at, successor organization to the SSP, has been banned under the Musharraf  regime in 2002 and again in 
March, 2012. The group's acceptance by the authorities and the release of  its leader Maulana Ludhianvi from custody following  
negotiations between Minister for Interior Rehman Malik and Abdallah Gul, Ijaz ul-Haq and others, has been highly controver ­
sial. See Hasan, Syed Shoaib: Pakistan bans Ahle Sunnah Wal Jamaat Islamist group. In: BBC News, Karachi, 9 March, 2012; Az ­
eem, Munawer: Maulana Ludhianvi released. In: Dawn, 29 March, 2012.
1426With reference to UN SC Resolution No. 1267.
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Tabelle 3: Total numbers settlers and Palestinians in West Bank and East Jerusalem (2011)
Settlers in the West Bank 310.990
Palestinians in the West Bank 2.360.000
Israelis in East Jerusalem 196.000
Palestinians in East Jerusalem 282.000
Source: Peace Now.
Tabelle 4: Distribution settler population in West Bank and Jerusalem (2011)
Secular settlements  15 %
Mixed religious-secular settlements  31%
National-religious settlements  25%
Ultra-orthodox settlements  29%
Source: Peace Now.
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*  In 2011, Peace Now counted a total settler population of  310.990 and 196.000 Israelis in East Jerusalem. The first number 
represents the official Israeli number while the US-government adds the settlers within the 1967 Green Line (~ 500.000 in  
total). From 1993 (Oslo Accords) until 2011, 43.304 new housing units were built in settlements.1427
1427See Peace Now: Torpedoing the Two State Solution – The Strategy of  the Netanyahu Government. Summary of  2011 in the  
Settlements, January, 2012. 
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Tabelle 5: Development of  settlements in West Bank and East Jerusalem (2011)
Tabelle 6: Jewish Population in Israel and worldwide Diaspora (1882-2009)
Year In Israel 
(percentages)
In Israel (numbers) Jewish world population 
18821428 0,3 24.000 (Yishuv) 7.800.000
1900 0,47 50.000 (Yishuv) 10.600.000
1914 1 85.000 (Yishuv) 13.500.000
19221429 1 84.000 (British Mandate) 14.400.000
1931 1 175.000 (British Mandate) 15.700.000
1939 3 449.000 (British Mandate) 16.600.000
1948 6 650.000 11.500.000
1955 13 1.590.000 11.800.000
1970 20 2.582.000 12.630.000
1980 25 3.283.000 12.840.000
1990 30 3.947.000 12.870.000
1995 35 4.522.000 12.892.000
2000 38 4.955.000 12.914.000
2005 41 5.314.000 13.093.000
2009 42 5.704.000 13.421.000
Sources: Central Bureau of  Statistics, American Jewish Committee.
Tabelle 7: Total numbers immigrants to Israel (1882-2008)
Wave of  Immigration Period Number of  Immigrants
First Aliyah 1882-1918 65.000
Second Aliyah 1919-1927 100.350
Third Aliyah 1928-1937 218.279
Fourth Aliyah 1938-1947 120.000
Fifth Aliyah 1948-1957 908.792
Sixth Aliyah 1958-1967 366.307
Seventh Aliyah 1968-1977 341.460
Eighth Aliyah 1978-1987 180.365
Nineth Aliyah 1988-1997 868.004
Tenth Aliyah 1998-2008 404.282
                                                                  Total: 3.572.839
Sources: Jewish Agency for Israel, Central Bureau of  Statistics.
14281923-1948 was the period of  the British Mandate on behalf  of  the LoN, drafted on 24 July, 1922. It came into effect on 26  
September, 1923.
1429The Jewish settlements in Palestine, prior to the creation of  the State of  Israel in 1948, are widely known as Yishuv (settlement). 
All Jews living in the land prior to the first Aliyah constituted the Old Yishuv while the years between 1882 to 1948 constitute the 
New Yishuv.
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Tabelle 8: Muslims in South Asia (2010) (estimated numbers)
Country Muslim population in numbers Muslim percentage of  total population 
Pakistan 178.097.000 96.41430
India 177.286.0001431 14.6
Bangladesh 148.607.000 90.4
Source: Pew Research Center.
Tabelle 9: Jewish population in Israel (2008)
Continent/Country of  Origin Numbers Percentages
Israel 2.197.600 38.5
Europe/ Americas 1.921.100 33.7
Africa 886.800 15.5
Asia 698.200 12.2
Total 5.703.700 100
Source: Central Bureau of  Statistics.
143096.3 percent according to the official census for 1998. See GoP, 1998. Like the census before (1981), and after 17 years of  in­
activity on the part of  the officials who pointed out to the ongoing ethnic conflict, mainly in Sind h, the 1998 census did not con­
tend the numbers of  minority share of  the total population. See GoP: Population Census Organization: Census Report of  
Pakistan, Islamabad, 1984.
1431The last census published by the Government of  India with numbers regarding the country's religious composition the 2001 
census (138.188.240 Muslims, 13.4 percent of  the total population). See Government of  India: Ministry of  Home Affairs, Office  
of  the Registrar General & Census Commissioner: India Census Data, 2001.
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Abbildung 1: Organizational chart Jama'at-i-Islami. Sources: Websites and interviews; Nasr, 1994; Grare 2005; ICG, 2011; Gaier,  
2012.
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Abbildung 2: Map Israel Oslo Accords, Oslo II. Source: Mideast Web. URL: http://www.mideastweb.org/palestineisraeloslo.htm
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Abbildung  3:  Crown  symbol  of  Shas  (pamphlet,  1984):  
"The Association of  the Sephardi Guardians of  the Torah."  
Source: Herzog, 1987, p. 163.
Abbildung 4: Nachman Hassidism, Tzfat. Source: M. G.
   Seite 249
Abbildung 5: Public diplomacy campaign by Government of  Pakistan. Ad in The Wall  
Street Journal edition of  11 September, 2011.
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10 Zusammenfassung (dt.): Systemischer und institutioneller 
Vergleich Pakistan/ Israel
Pakistan und Israel wurden in der Literatur klassischerweise den new states/ nations zugeordnet, 
nachdem sie 1947 bzw. 1948 schrittweise in die Unabhängigkeit entlassen wurden. Die vorlie ­
gende Arbeit hat, unter Berücksichtigung des jeweils spezifischen kolonialen historischen Kon­
textes1432, das Element der Fremdherrschaft sowohl in der Selbstwahrnehmung der Staaten als 
auch im Prozess der Entwicklung einer „indigenen“ Kulturnation zur Sprache gebracht. Territ­
orial-politisch  war  die  Transformation  hin  zu  einem souveränen  Staat  ein  einschneidendes  
Ereignis und bleibt bis heute auf  allen im Projekt untersuchten Vergleichsebenen ein zentraler 
Bezugsrahmen. Bereits vor der Staatsgründung hatten sich ethnische, religiöse und politische  
Gegensätze gewaltförmig geäußert  und sich unmittelbar nach Staatsgründung in Form von 
Kriegen fortgesetzt. Im Falle von Pakistan hat sich mit der politischen und konfessionellen  
Teilung des indischen Subkontinents der pakistanisch-indische Gegensatz etabliert und dauer­
haft gefestigt. Dieser vielbeschworene Antagonismus hat sich in der 65-jährigen Geschichte des  
Landes am deutlichsten in drei Kriegen und weiteren gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen sow­
ie  der  nuklearen  Mobilisierung  in  1998  und  2001/02  geäußert.  Israels  Unabhängigkeit ­
serklärung und die starke Polarisierung zwischen Unterstützer-Kräften der ersten Stunde auf  
der einen, und einem arabisch und nicht-arabischen Block feindlicher muslimischer Staaten hat 
sich im wesentlichen bis zum heutigen Tage erhalten.1433 Der Kashmir-Konflikt als regelmäßig 
wiederkehrendes Epizentrum des IndoPak-Konflikts ist, ähnlich der Konfliktmenge zwischen 
Israel und seinen arabischen Nachbarstaaten und dem israelisch-palästinensischem Komplex 
genuin ein Territorialkonflikt. Im Hinblick auf  die untersuchten Aspekte der Staatsideologie  
beider Länder wurde die  steigende Diskursfähigkeit  alternativer Deutungsansätze sowie der 
gesellschaftspolitische Einfluss ihrer Repräsentanten herausgearbeitet. Das markanteste Narrat­
iv bietet hier die genuin religiöse Interpretation des Territoriums, des Staates und der Nation. 
Beide Staatsgründungen stützten sich auf  eine ähnliche Argumentation, wonach die Glaubens­
gemeinschaft der Muslime auf  dem indischen Subkontinent, ähnlich der zionistischen Bewe­
gung mit ihrer Idee eines Judenstaates eine sichere Heimstätte und staatliche Souveränität so­
wohl  als  Garant  existentieller  physischer  Sicherheit  als  auch  als  Absicherung  der  eigenen 
1432 Die  Islamische Republik  Pakistan wurde 1947 von der  britischen Kolonialmacht  in den Dominionstatus 
entlassen woraufhin bis 1956 mit der Verfassungseinführung die sukzessive staatliche Unabhängigkeit folgte. 
Israel ging aus dem Mandatsgebiet Palästina unter britischer Administration hervor. 
1433 Deutlich muss die Rolle der Friedensabkommen mit Ägypten und Jordanien hervorgehoben werden. Davon 
abgesehen haben die  meisten muslimischen Staaten ihre  bilateralen Beziehungen mit  Israel  entweder  auf  
niedrigstem Niveau konsolidieren können oder beharren auf  einer Nichtanerkennung Israels. 
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wiederentdeckten kulturellen Tradition und ihrer neuen Elemente forderte. Diesem etablierten 
Narrativ sind die Beiträge neuerer Historiker und Soziologen kontrastiv gegenüberzustellen, da 
sie z.B. primär wirtschaftliche und politische Eliten als Hauptantriebskräfte hinter der Unab­
hängigkeit sehen. Deren insbesondere ethnische Zugehörigkeit habe, so das Alternativ-Narrat­
iv, zukünftige Proporz- und Machtverhältnisse eingeleitet und etabliert. 
Die Rolle der Religion ist in beiden historischen Ereignissen der Staatsgründung zentral: Die  
Sakralisierung  der  Staatsidee,  gefördert  von  der  Gründungselite  entgegen  ihrer  z.T.  athe­
istischen Orientierung, sicherte die Unterstützung ehemals kritischer gesellschaftlicher Grup­
pen und insbesondere der religiösen traditionellen Eliten. Eines der Hauptproblemfelder beider  
Staaten ist im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen der Statusbestimmung der Religion in Opposition 
zu säkularer moderner Staatlichkeit zu sehen: Seit der Gründung wird dieser Konflikt am deut ­
lichsten in der verfassungsrechtlichen Auseinandersetzung zwischen religiöser und säkularer In­
terpretation. Die religiöse Legitimation des Staates und ihre ideologische Integration wurde zur  
Arena eines Kulturkampfes, in der sich religiöse Parteien und Gruppen auf  die Religion als 
Staatsreligion berufen und die Übereinstimmung staatlicher Gesetze mit den Prinzipien von 
Qur'an und Sunna bzw. der Torah fordern. Genauso trägt der Status der Verfassung maßgeb­
lich zum „theologischen Dilemma“ beider Staaten bei.  Verhandlungen über eine Verhältnis­
bestimmung der Religion in der Verfassung scheiterten angesichts der klaffenden Abweichun­
gen zwischen säkularen und religiösen Entwürfen, die u.a. die Gottessouveränität einschlossen, 
bereits im Vorfeld der Staatsgründung. Israel verfügt über keine schriftlich fixierte Verfassung,  
einzelne Basic Laws sollen den Rahmen für eine spätere Ausarbeitung der Verfassung bilden. In 
Pakistan  verlief  der  Kampf  um  eine  demokratische  Verfassung  parallel  zum  politischen 
Machtkampf  zwischen aufeinander folgenden Militärregimes und Versuchen der politischen 
Führung, ihre Autonomie zu wahren. Eigene Einrichtungen wachen in beiden Ländern über 
die Übereinstimmung staatlicher Gesetzgebung mit religiösem Recht und versuchen die Anfor­
derungen des modernen öffentlichen Lebens mit den religiösen traditionellen Anforderungen 
zu harmonisieren. Innerhalb dieser staatlichen Institutionen macht sich seit den 1980er Jahren 
vermehrt ein sektiererischer Konflikt um die Partizipation unterschiedlicher Strömungen und 
die  Deutungshoheit  über die  Rolle  der  Religion im Staat  bemerkbar.  Die Unterteilung des 
Rechtswesens in konkurrierende säkulare1434 und religiöse Gerichtsbarkeiten erweist sich vor al­
lem in Personenstandsfragen als problematisch und birgt ein steigendes gesellschaftliches Kon­
fliktpotential. 
1434Hier bietet bis heute gleichermaßen die angelsächsische Rechtstradition den Rahmen des Zivilrechts.  
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Allgemein macht sich im Hinblick auf  die Rolle und den Einfluss von Religion in Gesell­
schaft und Politik eine deutliche Abweichung bemerkbar: Während in der pakistanischen Öf­
fentlichkeit die klassische Trennlinie zwischen dem Religiösen und dem Säkularen bereits vor 
der Gründung an der Überbetonung des Islam als zentraler Grundstein des pakistanischen Na­
tionalismus an Schärfe verlor und durch innere und äußere Einflüsse spätestens seit den 1980er 
Jahren ein gesellschaftlicher Wandel hin zu einem öffentlichen religiösen Konservativismus er­
folgte, weist Israel eine entgegengesetzte Entwicklung auf. Entgegen der fundamentalen Kritik 
am Säkularisierungsparadigma deutet  der Querschnitt  der verfügbaren Erhebungen an, dass 
sich  eine  deutliche  Mehrheit  der  israelischen Gesellschaft  nach ihrem Eigenverständnis  als  
säkulare Juden sieht, welche zwar an kulturellen jüdischen Normen festhalten mag, jedoch eine 
öffentliche Rolle der Religion ablehnt. Allgemein weisen beide hochkomplexen Gesellschaften 
religiöse,  ethnische  und politische  Fragmentierungen auf,  welche  Desintegration begünstigt. 
Trotz, oder gerade aufgrund staatlicher Integrationsbemühungen und ihrer Erstarrung in ideo­
logischen Pfadabhängigkeiten, welche sich zunehmend immun gegen eine Anpassung an ak­
tuelle Entwicklungen erweisen, werden die immanenten Interessengegensätze zunehmend über 
die Identitätspolitik alternativer nicht-staatlicher Anbieter und ihre Narrative artikuliert. 
In den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen des modernen Staates liegen die Hauptunter­
schiede zwischen beiden Ländern:  Pakistan weist  eine der  am schnellsten wachsenden und 
jüngsten Bevölkerungen der Welt auf  mit derzeit rund 180 Millionen Menschen. Derzeit ist  
noch immer fraglich, ob sich die demokratisch legitimierte zivile Regierung bis zu den Wahlen  
im nächsten  Jahr  halten  kann und damit  als  erste  Regierung des  Landes  eine  volle  Legis­
laturperiode  regieren  wird.  Politische  Instabilität  durch  Militärinterventionen und  Legitima­
tionsdefizite der politisch-zivilen Elite ist in Pakistan endemisch. Starke Institutionen sind das  
Militär, die Zivilbürokratie sowie die landbesitzenden Feudaleliten. Dagegen verfügt Israel über 
eine Bevölkerung von knapp acht Millionen Einwohnern und hat trotz der starken Stellung des 
Militärs, welches vermehrt zu einem politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsträger sow­
ie gesellschaftlich zur Schule der Nation wurde, die Autonomie der politisch-zivilen Macht­
sphäre gewahrt. Die „Geburt im Krieg“, die anhaltende sicherheitspolitische Bedrohungslage 
und die staatliche Militarisierung (security state) sowie die Wehrhaftigkeit von Institutionen und 
Gesellschaft (securitization) weisen zudem signifikante Parallelen auf. 
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